

**Nonviolent Peaceforce Sri Lanka Project**  
**Quarterly Report**  
**Volume 1, No 9, October-December 2006**

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**GENERAL SITUATION IN SRI LANKA**

**Overall**

The period covered in this Quarterly Report is that from October to December 2006. It was a quarter that was intensely challenging for NP Sri Lanka in many dimensions. At one level, NPSL had to cope with the unprecedented increase in the level of violence faced by civilians, and at another level it was affected by the hostility of certain influential actors towards international humanitarian assistance. Added to this situation, many field staff faced the debilitating effects of a dengue-like fever in the last two months of the year, further impacting on the programmatic output of the fieldsites.

When looking at the graph that plots the number of people killed as a direct result of the conflict during the twelve months January to December 2006, October clearly stands out as the crest of a bell-shaped graph. Scores of military men got killed in October in the northern battlefield as well as in unarmed convoy when heading home on vacation. The military focused its activities on the East. While incessant artillery shelling continued in the direction of the North, so as to contain the LTTE from consolidating in the East, three-pronged attacks (aerial bombing, naval shelling along the coast, and combined ground troops) were unleashed in the East to regain LTTE territory.

The last quarter of 2006 was also a period with unprecedented number of displaced persons, most of whom were concentrated in the eastern districts of Batticaloa and Trincomalee where NPSL is actively working.

Another phenomenon that sprang up during this period was abductions of another kind, different to child abductions that continued unabated. While the latter form of abductions targeted youth and children from the conflict zones for arms' training (with the newly set

up IDP camps becoming a mushrooming source), the other kind of abductions targeted prominent persons and businessmen for the purpose of extortion and political intimidation.

Much attention in Sri Lanka found the summarizing statement by the UN Special Advisor on Children and Armed Conflict Allan Rock after his ten-day visit in which he not only talked about the continued child recruitment by both LTTE and the Karuna faction, but spoke of “strong and credible evidence that certain elements of the government security forces are supporting and sometimes participating in the abductions and forced recruitment of children by the Karuna faction.”

As if to support the government in its military campaign against the LTTE, sections of the national media and some political parties launched a smear campaign against all actors that are working in LTTE areas. This resulted in the provision of humanitarian assistance to those who are in need - irrespective of whether the recipients were in government or LTTE controlled areas - becoming an uphill battle of its own. It was also a part of a media campaign to discredit the findings of the UN Special Advisor on Children and Armed Conflict Allan Rock, by tarnishing his image and by directing the discourse in a different dimension.

The joint military and media campaigns against the LTTE received a major boost in December by way of law, with the reintroduction of some provisions of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 (PTA), now called the New Emergency Regulations.

During a quarterly period where prospects for peace looked grim on most fronts—military, legal, humanitarian and economic—an experts’ panel set up under the President’s patronage recommending “genuine power sharing to end the ethnic conflict” also by way of a bi-cameral legislature and two vice-presidents to be chosen from other communities, brought in a glimmer of hope.

## **Political Developments**

### **The end of a waning peace process**

Even before the month of October dawned, the last quarter of the year held much promise for those yearning for a negotiated political settlement to the conflict in Sri Lanka, in anticipation of the upcoming talks between the Government and the LTTE scheduled for October 28-29 in Geneva. But this so-called “Geneva II” became a non-event, because the LTTE delegation was not willing to meet the Government delegation, even after both had arrived in Geneva. For some political analysts, this was the final nail in the coffin of the ‘peace process’ that began with the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement in February 2002 (CFA). As if to pacify mainly the international actors trying so hard to keep the peace process alive, both sides reiterated its commitment to the CFA and not to proactively launch any military offensive against the other. The death of LTTE’s ideologue Anton Balasingham was undoubtedly another setback not only for the LTTE but also for the political negotiations process.

### **The “logic” of escalating violence**

Military activities initiated by both sides did not subside and continued unabated. Even before the delegations to Geneva II could return to Sri Lanka, fighting erupted in the

northern seas off the Jaffna peninsular with the Navy destroying an alleged LTTE arms shipment, soon followed by heaving clashes in the northeastern seas off the Trincomalee port, where once again the Navy claimed over a dozen LTTE suicide boats targeting a civilian ship carrying over 300. The sea battles were preceded by some on the ground, and in the Jaffna peninsular the LTTE inflicted a heavy setback for the military when it killed over a hundred soldiers and wounded five times that, by routing the Army who was attempting to regain LTTE territory around Muhamaalai.

### **Coming to terms with working in a war era**

In October two attacks in particular exemplified the belligerency of the violence-makers and brought closer to home for NPSL staff that they truly are working in a violent environment. The first was an LTTE suicide attack on a military bus convoy killing nearly a hundred and injuring as many, near the northeastern town Habarana. Habarana is a gateway town to the eastern districts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa and frequently used by NPSL staff as a point of convergence/divergence during their travels, and used also for staff meetings for its convenience as a midway point. The second attack was that by LTTE suicide boats on the southern naval base and port in Galle. Since the attack on Galle was considered an audacious attack right in the heart of Sinhala Southernism and on a tourist hotspot, there were rumours of a backlash on Tamil civilians. This resulted in NPSL staff quickly go in to ‘cautious operations’ mode (as alerted by the management through the security infor sms network) and be prepared of any eventuality.

### **Hold back humanitarian assistance to cage the Tiger**

Throughout these incidents and developments the government continued with its decision to close the A9 highway—the by-land artery that is the supply line for all essentials to the North (food, medicine, soap and batteries)—even in the midst of requests and pressure from international actors to local religious dignitaries for a reversal on the decision.

A least anticipated development during this time was the agreement between the country’s two largest political parties—the opposition UNP and the ruling coalition’s key member the SLFP—for a bipartisan approach on “issues vital to the nation’s wellbeing” including that of a political resolution to the conflict.

The response of each NPSL field site to the situation on the ground is described in detail in the next section of this report.

## **Nonviolent Peaceforce Sri Lanka Project (NPSL)**

### **Humanitarian work in the political game**

In conflict zones and at times of disasters humanitarian assistance is usually accepted with appreciation even by those engaging in the violence, mostly as a means to restore normalcy. In Sri Lanka however, aid delivery to the conflict zones controlled by the LTTE is politically charged more than its due share. This sentiment was used to curtail the activities of all aid agencies working in the North and East. First came the regulation for agencies to get approval from the Ministry of Defence, without which the expatriate

staff of these agencies will not get a work permit and visa extension to continue to work in Sri Lanka. All of NPSL's non-Sri Lankan staff received a work permit in October 2006 for the six-month period from September to February 2007, following the meeting NPSL management staff had with the Defence Ministry.

However, for an extension of the work permit after February, the expatriate staff will need to submit a police certificate (a form of security clearance) from their home country along with credentials for employability in Sri Lanka, as well as a letter of recommendation by the Government Agent in the district they are working in. The new requirements mean NPSL staff—particularly the management as the coordinator among all staff and liaison with the Defence Ministry—is burdened to negotiate with bureaucracy as it had never done before.

Humanitarian activities are further restrained by the need to negotiate travel passes from the nearest police authority, before agency staff could visit IDP camps etc. Even then the monitoring of passes at security checkpoints at times takes a long time and functions as a discouragement. A travel and vehicle pass is also required for vehicles leaving and entering the eastern districts.

INGOs and national NGOs are often accused to support the LTTE, especially if they seek to deliver humanitarian aid to IDPs and other people in need within LTTE controlled territory. Persecution on (national) aid workers continued in the reporting period with the abduction of aid workers, the bombing of NGO-run refugee camps, the destruction of NGO offices and supplies and the obstruction of NGO activities.

### **Serving the most vulnerable**

NPSL staff in all of the four field sites in the eastern districts experienced an increase in the demands made of them as a result of the huge increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs). The demands were multi-dimensional; from protective presence at campsites to deter abductions and harassment, to accompaniment for sorting out basic needs such as medicine and identity cards, to coordination with other agencies on needs-based resource distribution.

NPSL staff has been keenly proactive to support the displaced persons, and this includes closely coordinating with field sites not only within the district (Valaichchenai and Batticaloa and, Mutur and Trincomalee) but also across the two districts. For example, when field staff in the Trincomalee district first hear of intense and continued shelling in their district, they monitor the possible outcome of that through their contacts in the district (from Peace Committee colleagues, to field staff from other agencies, to even contacts in the warring parties) and from the security information network, and then assess what the impact may be on civilians. Once the Trincomalee district staff becomes aware of the potential for larger numbers of displaced civilians to trek to the adjoining district, they urgently alert Batticaloa district staff of these developments and thereby mobilize the latter's support networks to anticipate the exodus.

Such inter-district coordination and proactive mobilization have made it possible for NPSL staff to lessen the instances of abductions of IDPs, to reduce the harassment at security screening when civilians from LTTE controlled areas enter government controlled areas, and to assist with relocating lost family members or urgent medical needs.

## **Activities of NPSL**

### **Jaffna District: NP Jaffna Field Site**

During October when it was still not possible to return to Jaffna, Jaffna team members conducted an assessment of the IDP situation in Mannar. Many IDPs from Jaffna and Trinco districts have settled in the northwestern Mannar district. Some of the IDPs take the high risk of trying to reach India by boat. Reports from Chennai, India, show that 15,000 refugees had arrived there from Sri Lanka as of October. As part of the exploratory visit, NPSL Jaffna discovered a sanctuary for nearly 8,000 IDPs in Madu area, which is recognized as a peace zone by all actors to the conflict. No firearms or military uniforms are allowed and recruitment is forbidden within the peace zone's four hundred acres.

Members of the Jaffna team prepared their return to Jaffna in November, with three members returning to Jaffna by a special UN flight, and a fourth member staying behind in Colombo to support Jaffna team's work from Colombo. The closure of the A9, prolonged displacement, food scarcity, restricted mobility (road closures and curfew), harassment at checkpoints, fuel shortages, and economic decline were the main factors contributing to raised tensions throughout the peninsula. Armed hostilities have continued during day and night. Additionally, 'white van abductions', extra-judicial killings and confirmed reports of torture have also increased fears substantially among all communities and specially the youth.

Upon re-entry to Jaffna, NP Jaffna met almost all of its international and national partners in order to assess the possibility of resuming programmatic activities within the area, identify and prioritize activities responsive to the needs of the current context; and implement a limited programme mindful of human resource constraints. The team slowly resumed travelling throughout Jaffna town and the surrounding areas in the district in order to re-establish a visible presence among the communities, armed actors, GoSL and international agencies. The Team also visited two IDP camps as community outreach and confidence building measures. In both camps, the IDPs there had come from Allaipidy and Mandaitivu and have lived in the camps since the horrible events of 11 August (see NPSL QR 1:7~8 for details).

Throughout November and December Jaffna was still facing serious food shortages, while other basic needs were not addressed. Abductions by paramilitary groups continued and that led to dozens of youth opting to go to prison and seek safety behind the bars.

Due to the security situation, the NPSL Jaffna team was forced to move its office to another location. Its efforts in December concentrated on visiting people under threat and the accompaniment of one its local partners, the Center for Peace and Reconciliation, which is one of the few organizations still functioning in terms of HR monitoring in Jaffna. NPSL Jaffna continues to be involved in the security of IDPs from Allaipidy who remain vulnerable.

### **Trincomalee District: NP Mutur and NP Trinco (Town) Field sites**

The security situation in Trincomalee was calm early in October but later changed as a result of the suicide attack on the military convoy in Habarana. The military presence in Trincomalee town is unprecedented and it puts a great deal of pressure on the inhabitants. Numerous checkpoints including the new vehicle/travel pass system to leave the district is

causing serious delays and tensions among the people. Meanwhile, the so-called Karuna group has opened a political office (TMVP) in the district and its cadres have become increasingly active, resulting in disappearances and killings in the town and its outskirts. There are also rumours of LTTE cadres having moved into town, thus increasing the likelihood of serious clashes between the two groups.

Many Tamil IDPs still feel unsafe to settle back in Mutur and they commute daily instead. These families fear hostility from the Muslims in Mutur, and local authorities continue their unlawful campaign to pressure these families to return. Now that Security Forces control the areas of Sampur and Rakuli, Muslim civilians there feel safer. The Mutur and Trinco teams monitoring IDP camps hear the issue of forced return being raised with various local authorities. The Mutur team has increased its visits to Mutur, while living in Trincomalee town, and has re-connected with the Mutur Peace Committee whose members are still scattered and some have been killed, requiring the members to seek replacements and possible restructuring of the committee itself.

Protective presence by NPSL Mutur on Mondays at the Serunwara market place has prevented abductions and violence against the IDPs who come there to buy food. This initiative is considered to be a confidence builder and means to reduce the vulnerability of IDPs. NPSL Mutur has also brought up the security situation regarding IDPs with the local SLA commander. At times, NPSL is serving as bridge-builders between the host community and the IDPs. In one instance, NPSL Mutur mediated a dispute between one of its local Christian Aid partners operating in several IDP camps and the local government authority. Due to the spread of IDPs over many places in the district and to ensure its non-partisanship, NPSL Mutur has widened its reach far beyond Mutur town and Mutur division and includes Muslim, Tamil and Sinhala areas in various divisions. For the time being, it will continue to operate from Trinco town which enables it to cover all of these areas.

A big success for NPSL is the decision by the British High Commission, after initially denying visa to the UK, to grant visa for six months for a person and his family who had to leave Sri Lanka for being at risk after his son and four other students were murdered. Much credit goes to the Trinco team that stood by the family from the moment they lost their son, and to Colombo Management staff to fully supported Trinco team's efforts and at times the person himself directly. The recently established National Commission of Inquiry will investigate the murders.

Forced return of IDPs was a significant focal issue during November and protection issues for the IDPs at a certain church in Trinco engaged the team's attention and efforts. Regular protective presence at IDP camps was maintained and significant collaborative efforts with the Sri Lanka Human Rights Commission (HRC) were initiated with a meeting with its Protection Officers in the Trincomalee office. Monitoring and joint advocacy of detained persons was conducted, when the team in collaboration with the ICRC and HRC addressed the issue of two IDPs detained by the security forces after a round up. The team constantly reminded the ICRC (who had significant access) and the HRC about the case and kept abreast of the facts till the IDPs were eventually released. NPSL Trinco and USAID agreed to work together to build capacity and confidence building of the peace committees in the area.

**Batticaloa District: NP Valaichenai and NP Batticaloa (Town) Field sites**

Days before the Geneva II talks in October, NPSL staff in Valaichenai noticed Karuna cadres freely roaming the streets of the town while the police quietly observed the spectacle. The increased presence of the K-group in Valaichenai puts a great deal of pressure on the local community. Not a day goes by without several families knocking on the doors of NPSL's office asking for help to get back their children who have been abducted. There are few places for the victims to turn to. The local Police openly say they can not do anything and discourages people from filing a complaint to them and to international agencies. Families generally know where their children are being kept. If it involves abduction by the K-group, the families often travel through army checkpoints to where their children are being held.

NPSL in Batticaloa has brought this issue and other human security concerns to the attention of a high level donor group visiting the district. The teams in Batticaloa continue to provide representatives of international agencies and donor countries with an accurate picture of the human security and human rights situation in the district in the hope that such information is used to address the issue of impunity and that it increases accountability by the actors involved.

Forcible underage recruitment is on the rise with child abductions carried out by both the LTTE and the Karuna group. Because NPSL does not have access to LTTE areas, it can only monitor and report on the activities of the K-group which is operating in government controlled areas. The activity is increasingly being criminalized with monetary rewards for those identifying children suitable for recruitment. Children in IDP camps in particular are vulnerable. Military bombardments in Vakarai has created new waves of IDPs in and around Valaichenai. There have been repeated requests for overnight presence in the IDP camps, but such presence is considered risky and does not seem to have the expected deterrence effect. A suitable solution to this request has yet to be identified. Frequent protection visits to IDP camps continue as part of the protection programme with the UNHCR.

More official channels such as the recently established National Commissions are being approached by NPSL to see how they can support families dealing with disappearances and child abductions. NPSL Batti supported a family of a person abducted in Batticaloa. In a joint effort with the family, a civil society group and the NPSL Colombo office, a multilevel strategy was formulated that raised the profile of the individual both nationally and internationally (including Amnesty International) thereby ensuring protection. The person was released eleven days after the abduction and he is now in a safer environment.

In the Batticaloa district alone there were 61 IDP camp sites holding over 72,000 IDPs. Aid agencies have been stressed to the limit and are unable to respond properly to the flow of IDPs while the Tsunami reconstruction has virtually stopped. Due to increased shelling in the Vakarai area, IDPs try to escape south to Valaichenai. Some who attempted to come by boat drowned when the boat sank. The increase in armed group activity in and around Valaichenai and the lack of any police involvement while thousands of IDPs from various different communities have settled in the area, are gradually creating an unmanageable situation. Requests for overnight international presence in IDP camp sites have been repeated (now also in Trinco) as abductions of IDPs by armed groups increased, although most still happen outside the camps.

NPSL Valaichenai visited various camp sites and communicated the protection needs to local authorities and international agencies. It also facilitated a fact-finding mission by a local human rights organization, to document the plight of IDPs. This has been part of

increased collaboration and the start of a new reporting and support mechanism between NPSL and several local human rights actors. In addition, a protection meeting is being organized by the Valaichchenai office to come up with some new approaches to become more proactive rather than reactive. One idea that will be explored is the possibility to organize a 'peace circle' about nonviolent principles and methods, involving community based organizations and the IDP camp management.

Fewer families have come to report to NPSL on missing children although the actual number of abductions has increased despite the pledges by both Karuna and the LTTE to release them following the statements made by UNICEF, Human Rights Watch and UN Special Rapporteur Allan Rock. Only a few children have been released so far and in almost all cases it has been due to the pressure put on the abductors by the family. In response to several requests for safe places, NPSL Valaichchenai contacted different international and local actors that are working on child/youth issues to assess the possibility to create a 'network of safe places'. The initial response by religious leaders was positive, as they play an important role in the safety of civilians.

NPSL is also encouraged by the interest and support from local actors including religious leaders in the development of a so-called 'abduction secretariat' introduced by NPSL Batticaloa. Such a body would coordinate the response in case of abductions and the prevention of them.

Overall the attitude of civil society actors is changing. They have become very cautious. This is related to the increase of activity by armed groups. The Karuna group, for example, has taken over private houses and forced several community organizations to move. NPSL Batticaloa and Valaichchenai as well as the Mutur team are hopeful that their increased efforts to engage with the police and security forces and continued dialogue with some local actors to work together on new strategies will help to respond to address lack of accountability by some of the armed groups.

In January, NPSL will also restart its engagement with the armed groups including the Karuna group which is represented politically by the TMVP party. Other initiatives such as the advocacy by the Human Security Working Group, a consortium of local and international agencies in Batticaloa originally set up by NPSL several years back, becomes increasingly more important to tackle the prevailing situation in the district and ensure that communities do not completely get paralyzed.

### **Colombo and NPSL**

Many reports were due in October that burdened the staff in Colombo. In order to fulfil all future reporting requirements from donors as well as the wider NP network, NPSL has introduced a new reporting process and format. In addition, a financial audit of the NPSL project by UNICEF caused some difficulties when the latter's rigid criteria and lack of cooperation by its internal auditors forced NPSL to bend over backwards to comply.

In response to the Executive Committee's new requirement for NPSL to reach a position of self-sustainability, NPSL initiated the process of recruiting a Grants Manager by advertising internationally.

In October, members of the Management took part in a one-day workshop on Non-Violent Communication (NVC) as part of NPSL's staff welfare through further and continuous learning.

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**Written by Dilshan Muhajarine**

As part of representation at international gatherings, a member of the Batticaloa team attended Forum Asia's Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) conference in Thailand. Approximately 200 human rights defenders from across Asia attended this meeting to share strategies and work towards regional cooperation. Participants included National Human Rights Organisations, Human Rights NGO workers, activists, UN Special Rapporteur on HRDs, Ms Hina Jilani, and one government representative from South Korea. Many of the participants expressed an interest in NP's work and had requested information on how to contact the organisation.

After much waiting and weeping NPSL's international staff finally received in October work permits valid for 6 months although only for government controlled areas (entry in to LTTE areas not allowed). NPSL continues to advocate for access to LTTE areas for itself and other agencies delivering humanitarian assistance. Without such access, NP's non-partisan approach to its work is being heavily compromised.

Another bureaucratic excess the Colombo office has to comply with is the need to submit a detailed account of NPSL's financial transactions as required by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, as part of the government's efforts to stop funds going to the LTTE. In this regard, the bank accounts of a well known INGO working in LTTE areas were frozen and assets seized, as per newspaper reports.

The Colombo office is increasingly receiving requests to get involved in the many disappearances in Colombo. Together with two members of the Jaffna team who are currently staying in Colombo, it has been working on cases of missing and attempted abductions of several boys. The office has also been approached by the family of the abducted Vice Chancellor of the Eastern University in Batticaloa who went missing from a high security area in Colombo. NPSL has been able to raise the attention on the case and put pressure on the GoSL through its contacts at diplomatic missions, international and local HR agencies and contacts within the GoSL itself. Unfortunately, the efforts have not led to the release of the Vice Chancellor and there is a real concern for his life.

The end of 2006 was also marked by a Chikungunya outbreak in Sri Lanka which, besides tens of thousands of other people, affected the NPSL staff. This viral fever, spread by mosquito bites, and the holiday season affected the capacity by NPSL to respond to the latest developments. Towards the latter part of December many of the staff were either ill in bed or outside the country.

In Colombo, NPSL finalized the Sri Lankan review, 2007 strategy and budget and it started interviews with candidates for the position of Grants Manager. At the request of wider NP an assessment on international presence in IDP camps was carried out among the field teams. In another event, members of the staff in Colombo took part in a workshop on Confidence Building and Stabilizing Measures organized by the UNHCR, which involved representatives from both government and nongovernmental institutions and agencies.

Several reports from the field indicate that the teams will require more support to remain safe, sane and healthy. As we enter 2007, it is already clear that this year will be even harder and more difficult than 2006. It is our hope and wish that we can count on the full support from the peaceforces outside Sri Lanka.

## Appendix

*Sources and Literature: Links to Internet that have information of current situation*

*Official Sri Lankan and LTTE Sources*

Sri Lankan government: <http://www.priu.gov.lk/> and

Official webpage of the Sri Lankan Government's Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) <http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/>

Tamil Eelam Homepage: <http://www.eelam.com/>

Referenced Sources:

UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions calls for urgent measures to end political killings and to strengthen protection for human rights in Sri Lanka April 27 2006

<http://www.unhchr.ch/hurricane/hurricane.nsf/view01/16F8C22F9FB1E05EC125715E0037176E?opendocument>

*Sri Lankan NGO and Media Sources*

The Academic : <http://www.theacademic.org/>

Centre for Policy Alternatives: [www.cpalanka.org](http://www.cpalanka.org)

Digest of News Links at Lanka Academic Network:

<http://www.lacnet.org/slnews/index.html>

Google news: <http://www.google.com/alerts?q=&hl=en>.

<http://www.info.lk/slnews/>

<http://www.lankapage.com/>

LAcNet News (also to be found going to the Digest of News Links of Lacnet listed above): <http://www.lacnet.org/slnet/>.

National Peace Council of Sri Lanka : [www.peace-srilanka.org](http://www.peace-srilanka.org) , Mailing List order at [peace2@sri.lanka.net](mailto:peace2@sri.lanka.net)

People's Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL): <http://www.paffrel.lk/>

Sarvodaya: [www.sarvodaya.org](http://www.sarvodaya.org). They also offer a mailing list.

Social Issues: <http://www.infolanka.com/org/srilanka/issues.html>

Society for Peace, Unity and Human Rights in Sri Lanka : <http://www.spur.asn.au/>

Sri Lanka Page: <http://www.lankapage.com/> (internet paper, Sinhalese-oriented)

Tamilnet: <http://www.tamilnet.com/>

The Island: <http://www.island.lk/> (newspaper)

University Teachers for Human rights (Jaffna): <http://www.uthr.org/>

*Articles and pages of international NGOs on Sri Lanka*

Amnesty International: <http://web.amnesty.org/>

Bastian, Sunil, The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses – The Case of Sri Lanka, University of Bradford, Centre for Conflict

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Resolution Working Paper 2, Bradford August 2002, Order at Bradford University, Department of Peace Studies, <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace/pubs/pubs.htm>

Coy, Patrick G., "What's A Third Party To Do? Nonviolent Protective Accompaniment in Sri Lanka with Peace Brigades International". Paper presented at the 35th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association Washington D.C., March 28-April 1, 1999

European Centre for Conflict Prevention, The Peace Process in Sri Lanka. The need to involve civil society actors, A seminar organised by the European Centre for Conflict Prevention, November 13,2002, <http://www.conflict-prevention.net/>

Harris, Simon, Lewer, Nick, Operationalising Peacebuilding and Conflict Reduction. Case Study: Oxfam in Sri Lanka, University of Bradford, Centre for Conflict Resolution Working Paper 11, Bradford August 2002, Order at Bradford University, Department of Peace Studies, <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace/pubs/pubs.htm>

Human Rights Watch: <http://hrw.org/reports/world/srilanka-pubs.php>

Peace Brigades International: <http://www.peacebrigades.org/lanka.html>.

Refugee Council United Kingdom: [www.gn.apc.org/brcslproject](http://www.gn.apc.org/brcslproject)

Witharana, Dileepa, Community Peace Work in Sri Lanka: A Critical Appraisal, University of Bradford, Centre for Conflict Resolution Working Paper 12, Bradford August 2002 Order at Bradford University, Department of Peace Studies, <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace/pubs/pubs.htm>

*Glossary of Abbreviations and Names*

AHAM= a community based organization working with children in the Trinco district.

CBO = Community-based Organisation

CSO = Civil Society Organisation

DRMU = Disaster Relief Monitoring Unit of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka

Erik Solheim: Norwegian Special Envoy

FCE = Foundation for Co-Existence

FTM = Field Team Members

GoSL = Government of Sri Lanka

HR = Human Rights

ICRC = International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP = Internally Displaced Persons

JHU = National Heritage Party (party of Buddhist monks)

JVP = Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Maoist party, in coalition with SLFP) People's Liberation Front

LTTE = Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (led militarily by Velupillai Prabhakaran)

MPC = Mutur Peace Committee

MT = Management Team

NACPR = National Advisory Council on Peace and Reconciliation

NESOHR = North East Secretariat of Human Rights

NGO = Nongovernmental Organisation

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PAFFREL = Peoples' Action for Free and Fair Elections

SLA = Sri Lankan Army

SLFP = Sri Lanka Freedom Party (governing party. Prime Minister is Mahinda Rajapaksa)

SLMM = Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. (Set up under the cease-fire agreement to monitor breaches of the agreement. Staffed mainly by Scandinavian military personnel in civilian clothes. Ca 50 personnel)

TC = Team Coordinator

TNA = Tamil National Alliance (LTTE presenting party in parliament)

UNICEF = United Nation Children's Fund

UNP = United National Party (concluded cease fire agreement with LTTE in 2001/2002, had majority until elections in 2004- Prime Minister was Ranil Wickremesinghe)

ZOA = Dutch NGO working with local staff in Sri Lanka.

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