

Final Evaluation Report

Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring Project

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Executive Summary

Findings

This evaluation shows that the civilian ceasefire monitoring project is a [relevant positive contribution to the peace process in Myanmar](#). This evaluation has found encouraging evidence that the CCM contributes to more public participation in the peace process, better protection for communities in the ceasefire areas, and on its level of intervention improved relationships between armed actors and has been successful in addressing specific incidents.

This is confirmed both by the analysis of data collected from relevant stakeholders and findings of the conflict analysis. Different actors emphasized different rationales of why the CCM is relevant: For the state government, the Myanmar army, and the ethnic armed organizations (EAO) the CCM is mainly important as an impartial instance to address violations of the ceasefires; and to make sure that the ceasefires in Mon and Chin states hold. For civil society actors, the rationale of protection is equally (if not more) important to making the ceasefires last: to increase protection of the communities living in the ceasefire areas, and to increase the role of the broader population in the peace process.

Also from the perspective of the broader strategies of the Nyein (Shalom) Foundation (SF) and Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP), the CCM is relevant: CCM contributes to broader public participation in a sustainable peace process and the building of constructive relationships and is thus highly relevant for SF's portfolio. For NP, CCM is a key approach to enhance protection for civilians in armed conflict and strengthen local peace processes, and thus at the heart of their global strategy.

The two states selected for the CCM, Chin and Mon states, have to be considered 'pilots'. The context of Chin and Mon state, and the comparatively low level of armed conflict offer good conditions to test the mechanisms' ability to improve civilian protection, and to collect experiences for future mechanisms in other states. Still, the occurrence of incidents and human rights violations by armed actors make CCM mechanisms relevant in these states.

In terms of [future relevance](#), CCM can be expected to grow in importance. With the signing of the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) by the government, the Myanmar army and some EAOs, CCM has received more attention. There is clear prospects for CCM mechanisms to constructively contribute to the monitoring structures foreseen in the NCA, namely to the joint monitoring committees (JMC).

In terms of [outcomes achieved](#), reaching the point where the two mechanisms are operational in both Chin and Mon state has to be considered a key outcome in itself. As there has been no substantial prior experience with setting up such mechanisms in Myanmar, the steps achieved in both states, in establishing the structures and relationships, and building the capacities of key stakeholders are noteworthy. A total number of 49 village monitors (24 in Chin, 25 in Mon) are reporting on ceasefire violations.

The level of acceptance and understanding of the CCM role can be assessed as good among armed actors, but the coverage in the broader population seems ambiguous. Awareness-raising among armed actors and the broader population has achieved considerable success among the actors that are directly addressed by the mechanism, but not necessarily in the broader population. In some areas, the role of the CCM seems largely known, while in other areas the village monitors reported misperceptions of their role as spies or journalists and have requested for more awareness raising activities, as the sessions so far have only been able to reach a limited number of people. This is especially the case in Mon state, where the mechanism is not officially recognized. Suspicions and misperceptions are thus likely to negatively impact on the village monitors work. Furthermore, the collaboration in networks with other organizations to increase protection of communities has been limited so far.

Both mechanisms are operational in monitoring and reporting. Both mechanisms collect information and feed them upwards; and find ways to bring up incidents in informal exchange with armed actors – even if a formal problem-solving mechanism to address incidents does not exist (Mon state) or the armed actors are reluctant to use it (Chin state). Informal exchange is thus a key tool for the mechanisms. Contrary to this, the practice of using media as a tool to bring up certain incidents as it has been mentioned by

interview partners in Mon state is problematic as it jeopardizes the relationships and trust built with armed actors. Specific examples of how the mechanism has handled incidents so far are encouraging that CCM can contribute to effective responses to ceasefire violations and to increase protection for communities. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that the presence of the mechanisms also led to a positive behavioral change in armed actors when they interact with communities, and that the relationships among armed actors are improving due to the mechanism. In sum, the outcomes achieved indicate that the CCM is making a contribution to support the peace process towards a sustainable peace in Myanmar – as stated in the overall objective. Noteworthy is also that the experience of the CCM seems to have contributed to the text of the NCA and the formation of the joint monitoring committees therein. Together with other documents, the CCM thus also contributed to larger steps towards a lasting political settlement beyond the two states in which the mechanisms were directly operational.

Overall, the [intervention design](#) is sound and shows no evident logical failures. But one problem identified pertains to reach the relevant actors in the Myanmar army both in Chin and Mon state. In Chin state, the local actors of the Myanmar army directly addressed by the mechanism do not have the ultimate decision making power, which lies with the North-West command in Monywa or the Western command in Sittwe Ann. While it cannot be expected from the Chin base CCM to engage with these stakeholder, there is no Union level body that is tasked to do so. A similar problem can be observed in Mon state: Due to the constraints in setting up the mechanism (no official recognition), the establishment of direct links with the Myanmar army has been limited so far. Currently, the Myanmar army is sought to be approached via the state government, which should yield a certain influence over the military. Another point concerns the limited diversity of the staff of the mechanisms: due to their limited ethnic diversity, they are perceived as biased by some actors; and weak representation of women in the mechanisms risks running contrary to the mechanisms goal to increase inclusivity and participation of the broader population in the peace process.

In terms of [implementation](#) of the project, a recurrent issue is the definition of the scope of the monitoring: creating a shared understanding among stakeholders of what the mechanisms should monitor and what not demands continuous efforts. Also, the formal documentation and reporting system of the CCM is considered weak.

The [partnerships](#) among the different organizations (SF, NP, CPTC, and the CCMC Mon) overall worked well and allowed the project to meet the requirements for EU funding. But the division of tasks, and the organizational hierarchies that play into this led to problems in the relationships among the partners involved in the CCM. The reasons for this seem that the role of the individual organizations was not clarified enough, and that these roles were not updated and communicated clearly enough during the implementation of the project.

Recommendations

1. Continue the project into a next phase; and try using the experiences made in Chin and Mon state to expand the scope and to develop similar mechanisms in other states.
On the other hand, this makes adaptations necessary that are beyond the scope of this evaluation. It is thus advised to conduct an analysis and planning workshop at the beginning of the new phase. Pivotal is a careful analysis of how the CCM impacts on conflict at the Union level (as opposed to state level), and how engagement at the union level with relevant stakeholders can be strengthened. This includes exploring options to include the ‘hard to reach’ in the command structure of the Myanmar army, which have been ‘out of reach’ for the state level so far.
2. Further intensify and increase coverage of awareness raising activities, and give the village monitors a greater role in it.
3. Review the diversity of the members of the mechanisms both in terms of ethnic background and Gender of the members.

Overall, increasing the diversity of the mechanisms could be considered as an explicit target to be reached by the end of the next project phase; as identification and recruitment of members of diverse backgrounds is likely to take time.

4. Strengthen the approach of working in networks with other civil society organizations. Building a strong network of CSOs/CBOs, especially in the clusters of Protection, helps to more effectively respond to protection-relevant incidents.
5. Review the theory of change and logframe to
 - give more emphasis on the aspects of civilian protection, by raising it to a higher level goal;
 - include referral of victims of human rights abuses to specialized organizations;
 - increase emphasis on the improving of relationships both with the community and among the armed actors as a pivotal element of an effective mechanism.
6. Clarify a roles and expectations of the involved partner organizations early on in the next phase. Giving the CPTC and the CCMC more independence and planning for a thematic support role for NP and SF is advisable from a strategic perspective. Also, the respective roles of SF and NP in such a setup will have to be clarified: A clear division of tasks and clarification on who will bring in which kind of expertise is advisable.
7. Explore strategies to increase the village monitors security and confidence (one way proposed was to increase their visibility through uniforms or identity cards), and to make their ToR (including guidance on the scope of the monitoring) clearer.

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Abbreviations

AA	Arakan Army
ABSDF	All Burma Students' Democratic Front
ALP	Arakan Liberation Party
CCM	Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring
CCMC	Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring Committee
CNF/A	Chin National Front/Army
CPTC	Chin Peace and Tranquility Committee
CBO	Community-based Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DBKA	Democratic Karen Benevolent Army
EAO	Ethnic Armed Organization
EEF	Evaluating Effectiveness Framework
EU	European Union
JMC	Joint Monitoring Committee
KIO/A	Kachin Independence Organization/Army
KNU	Karen National Union
NCA	Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
NLD	National League for Democracy
MPC	Myanmar Peace Center
NMSP	New Mon State Party
NP	Nonviolent Peaceforce
OECD DAC	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
PNLO	Pa-O National Liberation Organization
RCSS-SSA-S	Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South
SF	Nyein (Shalom) Foundation
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UCP	Unarmed Civilian Protection
ZRO	Zomi Revolutionary Organization

1 Introduction

Swisspeace was contracted by Nyein (Shalom) Foundation (SF) to conduct the evaluation of the Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring (CCM) Project with activities in Mon and Chin state. The joint project of SF and Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) has come to the end of a 2 year term and may enter into a next phase. This project was supported by the European Union (EU), which committed to comprehensive support to the Myanmar peace process. Therefore, the EU supported the Myanmar Peace Centre, which was established by the Myanmar Government, but supplemented this support with other projects with non-state actors, including the project in support of the Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanisms in Chin State and Mon State. This project was financed by the Instrument for Stability, which is per definition a financial instrument which can be mobilised (relatively) rapidly in situations of crisis, but can only finance projects of max. 18 months duration (which can, under certain circumstances, be extended for up to additional 6 months). Hence, a reflection on the current and future relevance, as well as necessary adaptations to the changing conflict context is timely.

Following the submission of swisspeace's offer and the decision by (SF) and Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) to award the contract to swisspeace, meetings were held with the Project Team and the Management level in both SF and NP. These helped to clarify the evaluation focus, process, and expectations held by the different stakeholders. This served as the base for the inception report, which provided a more fine-tuned understanding of the evaluation's aims, methodology, work plan, and updated budget.

The evaluation conducted was a final evaluation, which followed a one and a half year implementation of the CCM project (with a 6 months no-cost extension), and which was preceded by an internal mid-term evaluation and a baseline survey. The preceding evaluations have mainly focused on the achievement of expected results and analyzed progress towards the output level. Building on these findings, the main purpose of this evaluation is broader; namely to assess the relevance and the effectiveness of the project in the context of an evolving peace process. The evaluation of achievement of outputs is thus mainly left to the final reporting that SF and NP are conducting at the moment. Nevertheless, issues in implementation and respective recommendations that are relevant to improve the effectiveness of the project have been included.

Accordingly, the thematic focus of the evaluation can be grouped into 3 different areas of observation that structured the analysis:

1.1 Relevance of the project for the peace process (retrospective)

As stated in the project documents, the Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring (CCM) is thought to contribute to making the ceasefires hold, and in a second step, to making them lead to lasting political settlements. While the role for this objective in contributing to a sustainable peace seems intuitive, the evaluation analyzed if CCM as an approach is suitable to achieve that goal – and situated its relevance in the context of an analysis of the broader conflict context.

Another aspect of this is to put these considerations into the overall strategy of Nyein Foundation, where CCM is one part of a broader program to support the peace process, and this program in turn is another part of the organizational strategy to build a lasting peace in Myanmar. The evaluation thus took into account this larger framework.

1.2 Relevance of the project for the peace process (future outlook)

With the signing of the Nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) on October 15th, 2015 by some groups, and the non-signing by others,¹ Myanmar's conflict situation has clearly changed compared to the time when the project was designed. A broader reflection on the relevance of CCM in today's context – and

¹ Signatories include: the Karen National Union (KNU); Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA); KNU/KNLA Karen Peace Council; Arakan Liberation Party; Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO); Chin National Front (CNF); Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS-SSA-S); and All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF). Important for this report is to flag that the New Mon State Party (NMSP) has not signed the agreement.

also in view of a next project phase – is thus timely. Furthermore, as initial discussions and findings have shown, there are different perspectives on the scope of the project’s monitoring; ranging from focusing on monitoring clashes in order to maintain the ceasefires to improving protection of the civilian population, or to combine both.

Accordingly, the evaluation collected perspectives from different stakeholders on the possible role of CCM in the phase of the peace process to follow over the next years – both in view of the areas that have signed the NCA and those that have not.

1.3 Effectiveness of current structure and soundness of intervention design

Here, the evaluation assesses outcomes achieved, but also will contribute to a refined understanding of how the project contributed to the specific objectives, in order to foster learning for future improvement and project design choices. As described in the ToRs, the project will be evaluated as per project objectives and verifiable indicators. As stated in the logframe, these are:

Overall objective	O1 – "To support the peace process towards achieving sustainable peace in Myanmar"	Ceasefires hold and lead to lasting political settlements
Specific objectives	SO1 – "To build the capacity of local CSOs and broader peace networks to monitor ceasefires and report on violations"	<p>SO1. "Indicator 1": target value: Approximately 2400 stakeholders (including local CSOs and broader peace networks) recognise the need for ceasefire monitoring and support the intervention by nominating 90 community monitors and frequently sharing information on ceasefire violations.</p> <p>SO1. "Indicator 2": target value: 90 community monitors monitor and report on ceasefire violations.</p> <p>SO1. "Indicator 3": Increased accessibility to conflict-affected communities by civil society working to resolve conflict.</p>
	SO2 – "To contribute towards maintaining ceasefires and minimizing conflict in respective areas through local ceasefire monitoring"	<p>SO2. "Indicator 1": Enhanced Ceasefire Monitoring (CM) monitoring/reporting, data-collection mechanisms, information fed directly from the ground to the state and National authorities for direct responses;</p> <p>SO2. "Indicator 2": More efficient responses for stakeholders and target groups to a ceasefire violation;</p> <p>SO2. "Indicator 3": CM's credibility and acceptance within local conflict-affected communities increases and enables CM team to more effectively respond to the needs of the conflict-affected areas in question.</p>

Besides the collection of evidence from different sources on the achievement of the specific objectives, the evaluation here also assessed the soundness of the project Theory of Change, and identified possible gaps. Further, special emphasis was given to identify unintended effects of the project – both negative and positive.

This evaluation report is structured along the lines of the evaluation questions identified in the inception report. After outlining the methodology (section 2), the current and future relevance of the project are discussed (section 3) with regards to the evolving conflict context. Then, the report assesses the project in terms of outcomes achieved, and contributions to higher level objectives as stated in the logframe

(section 4). For this aim, the theory of change (ToC) of the project was re-constructed in light of the evidence collected during the evaluation. Then, questions regarding the implementation and the partnership between the different stakeholders are discussed (section 5). Finally, recommendations based on the findings of the evaluation are formulated, including changes to refine the intervention design and the implementation for the next phase with the help of the experiences made during the first 2 years.

In order to meet internationally agreed professional and ethical standards, this evaluation is following good practices as described in the OECD DAC (2012) guidelines on “Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility”.²

2 Methodology

2.1 Evaluation approach

In line with the discussions with SF and NP, an evaluation approach has been chosen that allows assessing the achievements over the last two years, but even more so focuses on the role of the project in the currently changing conflict context of Myanmar. The evaluation relied on a blend of utilization focused evaluation to ensure the use of the findings for different users, with contribution analysis to collect evidence on how the program contributed to changes in the conflict context.³

This approach is based on similar approaches that are used in SF to track the organization’s success, what should allow for seamless integration and use of the findings with other tools in use. A first step in the process consisted of an update the existing conflict analysis. This provided the foundation to assess the relevance of the project in relation to the conflict context. In a second step, the existing project logic and the project’s theory of change were reconstructed and refined. This helped to capture how the project has evolved in response to its context over the implementation phase, but also to assess the coherence and suitability of the objectives to reach the overall goal. Given that the two years in many aspects were a pilot project⁴, this also served to refine the understanding and assumptions of the project logic for a next phase.

The conflict analysis and the ToC were then used to set the priority areas of observation for the data collection of the outcomes achieved, but also to organize the different findings and to put them in relation to the project’s context.

This approach prioritizes a broader perspective on the project in relation to Myanmar’s evolving situation over a detailed assessment of its implementation. Given the current developments in Myanmar’s peace process with the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement by some groups, and the political dialogue that will ensue, an assessment with a broader perspective seems more appropriate to take stock of achievements so far and identifying future prospects for CCM in this new environment.

2.2 Data collection methods and sampling

In terms of methods used for data collection, the evaluation mainly drew on interviews (using a semi-structured guide) with stakeholders involved in the CCM mechanism, on key informant interviews with external stakeholders, document study, and group interviews with township coordinators and village level monitors.⁵ Where possible, data collected from various sources and through different methods (e.g. focus groups and interviews) was triangulated.

² OECD. (2012). Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility. Retrieved from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/evaluating-donor-engagement-in-situations-of-conflict-and-fragility_9789264106802-en

³ In the relevant literature on peacebuilding evaluation and in swisspeace’ own experience, this evaluation methodology has proven particularly suitable to grapple with the specific challenges of evaluating peacebuilding activities.

⁴ See section 4.1.

⁵ For a full list of interviews conducted, refer to annex 7.1. This list also contains the list of interviews planned, but cancelled due to the limited availability of the interview partners.

In total, formal interviews with 61 people were conducted (15 females, 46 male). This included 21 individual interviews, 10 group interviews, and 1 group workshop.⁶ Further, the data collection also included various informal conversations and interactions with SF and NP project staff, and the secretariats of the mechanisms in Chin and Mon State during the field trips.

In terms of sampling, the data collection was organized into the Union level, Mon and Chin state. While the Union level analysis allowed assessing the broader relevance of the project's approach for Myanmar's peace process, the sites in Mon and Chin were used to assess the relevance and contribution to the peace process specifically for these states. Further, the data collection strategy aimed at covering the different levels involved in the CCM mechanism; namely Union level, state level, township level, to village level. Main informants were people that are directly involved in the implementation of the CCM, and their views were triangulated with external perspectives of individuals and organizations.

Furthermore, in the sampling followed an equity focus: Including the perspectives of women was given priority whenever possible, and the evaluation sought at least a minimal balance in terms of ethnic background in the sample. But as discussed in section 4.2, there is relatively little diversity in the project structure and people that could be interviewed with a differing background are rather rare. Nevertheless, where possible women were interviewed individually with specific follow up question after group interviews, or grouped together in a separate interview group. This allowed at least some data disaggregation according to gender, and identifying differing effects of the project and the conflict on women.

2.3 [Quality and limitations of data collected](#)

But the sampling strategy was also guided by considerations on feasibility and on the security of informants and the evaluation team. To mitigate the problem of possible bias, the limitations in the data collection are thus made transparent in the following paragraphs.

2.3.1 [Data collection from community in ceasefire areas](#)

There was no data collection on the level of the communities in the conflict-affected areas (with the exception of the village level monitors), as this would put both the communities and the evaluation team at risk. Negative repercussions on the work of village monitors were feared especially in Mon state, where the mechanism is not officially recognized by government and the NMSP. A visit by a foreign evaluator would draw a lot of attention towards the work of the monitors that are not seeking wide attention for their work at the moment.⁷ Furthermore, the security situation was especially volatile and difficult to predict as the field visit to Mon state took place only days after the national election. A further consideration that influenced the decision on not including community level data collection in this evaluation is the remoteness of the areas where ceasefire monitoring takes place (especially in Chin state); and the feasibility of access to these in the timeframe of the evaluation.

This limits the evaluation's ability to assess the effects of the CCM on the conflict-affected communities, especially in terms of their perceived security. Statements collected necessarily rely on the accounts of people directly involved with the CCM mechanism; and possibilities to verify or triangulate these accounts were limited. While this can be considered problematic, the collection of data from village level monitors is justifiable under the given constraints.

2.3.2 [Cancelled interviews](#)

A number of interviews for this evaluation have been planned, but have been cancelled due to limited availability of the interview partners. In the period the evaluation took place, both the elections and the intensive phase of the ceasefire negotiations put considerable constraints on the availability of interview partners. Despite considerable efforts, a number of people could not be included in the evaluation.⁸ While

⁶ For a list of the interview partners and their position, refer to Annex 7.1.

⁷ On this point, see section 4.1, p.22.

⁸ For a list of the planned interviews and the interview partners' positions, refer to Annex 7.1.

the number of cancelled interviews was mostly negligible for the level of Chin and Mon state, the sample is relatively small on the Union level. As a consequence, findings from the Union level are limited, and the evidence collected could only be triangulated with a limited number of other perspectives.

3 Relevance of the project for the peace process

In the following, the findings of the evaluation with regards to the project's relevance for Myanmar's peace process will be presented.

3.1 Update of the conflict analysis

To assess the relevance of the project, a basic update of the conflict analysis was conducted with the project team in a collaborative workshop. This mainly relied on the use of force-field analysis; which was used to identify current key factors for peace, as well as the key factors that are restraining/hindering peace for both Mon and Chin state. This was then compared to the conflict analysis underpinning the project proposal to assess if the analysis conducted at the beginning of the project is still valid. Throughout the data collection period, the analysis was further refined and triangulated with key issues and actors that were mentioned by the interview partners.

3.1.1 Union level

After almost 60 years of armed conflict, the newly elected nominally civilian government of Myanmar initiated a peace process. Initially, there have been a range of quick successes by reaching bi-lateral ceasefires with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), which have been fighting for decades for more autonomy and recognition by the central government. But while the opening process of the country was

Figure 1: Clashes in 2013



Figure 2: Clashes in 2014



given a lot of credit by international actors, it also has to be noted that with the breakdown of the longstanding ceasefire with the Kachin Independence Army and the following offensive of the Myanmar army in Kachin state, there also has been fierce fighting over the last years. Furthermore, with the fighting that broke out in Northern Shan State in March, some analysts suggest that Myanmar has even seen more intensive military conflict since the beginning of the peace process than before. In any case, many of the bi-lateral ceasefires reached have been violated by clashes between the Myanmar army and EAOs (see graph), usually with both sides blaming each other.⁹

Since 2013, there have been efforts to bring the bi-lateral ceasefires under a nation-wide ceasefire agreement (NCA), which would include all EAOs and the government. Initially perceived as a quick step on the way to address the political grievances of

⁹ Source: BNI (2015). Deciphering the Myanmar Peace Process 2015. Retrieved from <http://mmpeacemonitor.org/images/2015/august/deciphering-myanmar-peace-process-2015-eng.pdf>.

the EAOs through a political dialogue, the negotiations of the NCA have developed into a longer process. In October 2015, there was a partial signing of the NCA by 8 armed groups and the government. The signatories on the EAO side were the Karen National Union (KNU); Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA); KNU/KNLA Karen Peace Council; Arakan Liberation Party (ALP); Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO); Chin National Front (CNF); Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS-SSA-S); and All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF). Other EAOs did not sign (including the NMSP). This creates a difficult dynamic among the EAOs, and there is a danger of division among EAO groups who have signed the NCA, and those groups that have not. At the same time, there have been reports that the Myanmar army has increased pressure on non-signatories. Also the elections in November 2015 have had an influence on the peace process: Observers have interpreted the hasty signing and increased pressure by the government as a part of the political dynamics around the elections. Furthermore, some of the groups may expect negotiations with the new government after the landslide victory of the NLD as more opportune; and thus are waiting to sign an NCA with the new government.

3.1.2 [Chin state](#)

The ethnic armed struggle in Chin state has a long history since the 1960's, where it began after the abolition of the federal system by the then central Burmese military regime. Similar to other parts of the country, the Chin National Front (CNF) and its armed wing, the Chin National Army (CNA) have been fighting for more autonomy and self-determination. The imposition of Buddhism as a state religion, and the construction of Pagodas to project Buddhism into the predominantly Christian Chin state has played a major role. Since the late 1980s, the Myanmar army has strongly increased its troop presence in Chin state. The geographic isolation of many areas in Chin state has abetted a range of human rights abuses against the civilian population. Accordingly, large numbers of Chin people have fled the country to neighboring India. Unlike other states, the CNF has not signed a ceasefire in the 1990s. It was only in January 2012 when a bi-lateral ceasefire was signed with the central government. The ceasefire agreement goes beyond strictly military matters and contains several development-related parts. Furthermore, it also foresees a civilian ceasefire monitoring mechanism.

Compared to other parts of the country, Myanmar's West has seen little clashes since the signing of the ceasefire in 2011. An explanation often noted in interviews and also by the project team is that there are specific economic interests in Chin state in terms of natural resources, which is one of several key drivers behind clashes in other states. Incursions of the Myanmar army into CNF territory is seen as a potential risk to the bi-lateral ceasefire (and now the NCA). Besides the Myanmar army and the CNF, other groups operating in the area are the Arakan Army (AA), which has been clashing with the Myanmar army in 2015, and the Zomi Revolutionary Organization (ZRO).

3.1.3 [Mon state](#)

Similarly to Chin state, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) has been fighting for more self-determination for over 40 years. But unlike Chin state, the bi-lateral ceasefire signed in February 2012 was preceded by an agreement from 1995. This agreement was negotiated under Thai pressure, and under the impression of the offensive of the Myanmar army against the KNU headquarters at the time. Human rights abuses have been reported on both sides prior to the ceasefire, and have led to major displacement (both internally and to Thailand). The ceasefire agreement has led to a certain development and allowed for more mobility and economic opportunities. Unlike in Chin state here, the ceasefire agreement does not foresee a civilian monitoring mechanism.

Mostly, the ceasefire between the Myanmar army and the NMSP has been respected. However, even if there are no reported clashes between the Myanmar army and the NMSP, the situation is more volatile than in Chin state; especially with the increased troop movements of the Myanmar army after the non-signing of the NCA by the NMSP. Furthermore, there have been clashes in Mon State of the Myanmar army and other EAOs, namely the DKBA, and there are other smaller armed splinter groups that operate in the area. Another factor is criminal groups, mainly involved in drug trade, that add another layer of complexity to the situation. Furthermore, large scale infrastructure projects have reportedly increased land confiscations, which to some part seem to benefit the Myanmar army. Also, there is significant labor-

migration in the area, which is noted by interview partners as potentially problematic: Incoming migration into Mon state mainly from the dry zone, and outgoing migration mostly into Thailand.

3.2 Relevance of the project for the peace process

Relevant evaluation questions:	
Q1	Is the overall objective and approach of the CCM project relevant for the peace process? How do different stakeholders assess its relevance? Which key factor of the conflict identified for this stage of the peace process is it addressing?
Q2	Does the intervention link to/ align with other projects/programs and to Nyein's broader strategy?

In assessing the relevance of the project, it has to be emphasized that all stakeholders unanimously stated the high relevance of the civilian ceasefire monitoring mechanisms for the peace process. Given the range of different stakeholders interviewed, ranging from armed actors over government to village level monitors, this unanimous appraisal of the mechanism – both in Mon and Chin state – is noteworthy. An explanation for this may be that the ceasefire monitoring mechanism aims at different goals that are of importance for different stakeholders.

“If we want 100% peace, we need the ceasefire monitoring”
- member of Mon state parliament

the range of different stakeholders interviewed, ranging from armed actors over government to village level monitors, this unanimous appraisal of the mechanism – both in Mon and Chin state – is noteworthy. An explanation for this may be that the ceasefire monitoring mechanism aims at different goals that are of importance for different stakeholders.

For the state government and the Myanmar army, the primary function of the CCM mechanisms in Chin and Mon state they mention is to stabilize the ceasefire. For these stakeholders, having a mechanism that monitors and documents violations, and allows addressing them before such violations evolve into clashes is the dominant rationale. Accordingly, their discourse is constructing the mechanism as a technical and impartial instance that gives the armed actors the means to sort out problems in relation to the ceasefire.

Main element of this discourse is that civilians are playing a secondary role. Civilians, and also CSOs are important observers because they are seen as not having interests in the conflict – or, in the words of an interviewee, “they do not carry arms”. In this sense, the mechanism they stand for has also to be ‘impartial’ to be an institution credible to both sides. This then translates into emphasizing ‘impartiality’ as the criteria for a mechanism effective in fulfilling its role.¹⁰

“without the CCM mechanism, we would not get the information we need”
- member of Mon state parliament

What is striking about the perspective of the state government and Myanmar army representatives interviewed is that they clearly understand ‘peace’ or ‘conflict’ as something that is decided ‘above’; at Union level. Orders from above have priority, and are also brought up as a justification for violations of the ceasefire agreement like incursions into EAO controlled territory without prior notice. In this sense, the government and military officials on the level that are directly involved in the mechanism are also subjected to constraints that they can manipulate only to very limited extent. In this understanding, the CCM mechanism then helps to solve and manage possible conflicts that arise from orders ‘from above’. But it does not address the source that is creating these problems, namely the understanding that some military matters that are embodied in the ‘orders’ from above are more important than the ceasefire.¹¹

“sometimes, confidential things happen, and we have to take action immediately without informing the other side”
- Border affairs & security minister, Chin State

¹⁰ On this point see section 4.2, p.22.

¹¹ It remains to be seen if this perception will change over time with the introduction of the NCA. As the NCA is concluded on Union level, the agreement and its bodies are at least formally given the same relevance for the union level as interests that the Myanmar army is defending.

It becomes clear from the statements of the interviewees on the government and Myanmar army side, that there is a clear imbalance in how the Myanmar army interacts with the ethnic armed organizations: While the EAOs are understood as being important actors in one specific area, the Myanmar army is presented as the actor who is important on Union level, and thus, whose tasks and broader agenda are more important than the only regionally relevant interests of the EAOs.¹²

From the perspective of the EAOs, the role of the CCM is perceived in a different way. For the CNF representatives interviewed, the incursions of the Myanmar army into their territory without prior notice are a sign that they “do not respect” the CNF’s territory. Accordingly, the CCM mechanism is a tool to bring these violations up in the discussion with the government and the military. But also the community perspective is more clearly taken into consideration in the CNF’s discourse: although also the CNF’s discourse emphasizes the importance of an “impartial” mechanism, of primary importance from their perspective is that the monitor is respected by the community. In this perspective, the CCM is not primarily a mechanism that supports the armed actors in keeping the ceasefire; but rather a mechanism that protects the communities.¹³ Also in the discourse of the NMSP representative interviewed, the protection aspect of the CCM for the communities is more present. On the other hand, the NMSP representative interviewed mainly saw the role of the civilian population to participate in the peace process in the political dialogue, and not necessary in taking an active role in the ceasefire.

“the two parties talk first, the civilians’ perspectives will then be included in the political dialogue”
- internal affairs representative, NMSP

On the other hand, for civil society actors, and also for people that are doing monitoring or are otherwise involved in the mechanism, the rationale of protection is equally (if not more) important to making the ceasefires last: to increase protection of the communities living in the ceasefire areas, and to increase the role of the broader population in the peace process.

Historically speaking, ceasefires’ successes in building peace have been limited in Myanmar. Especially the ceasefire round of the 1990s, where several of the ethnic armed organizations have concluded ceasefires with the government, has left a sour taste: These ceasefires have not been followed by more comprehensive peace agreements, which were supposed to address the grievances of the EAOs in their quest for political recognition by union government. Neither have they brought the promised ‘development’ and improvements in the basic access to services for the population in the ceasefire areas. As a consequence, the ceasefires of the 1990s are seen as having brought some stability, but not in the sense of a sustainable, positive peace – rather in the absence of open fighting (negative peace). Another effect of these ceasefires was increased access of the Myanmar army to formerly unreachable areas under EAO control, and the building of business links with some of the commanders of the EAOs. In this sense, these ceasefires are perceived as elite driven, without much benefit beyond the small elite that signed the ceasefire.

This historical background also shapes the perception of the current round of ceasefires. Even if the current ceasefires have been signed under different circumstances with a reform-oriented government, this does not mean that these ceasefires will automatically enjoy more credibility in the larger population. After decades of armed conflict and the recent experience of ceasefire break-down and fierce fighting in other states (e.g., Kachin), a mechanism aiming at making ceasefires last and building trust is highly relevant.

In this view, the CCM’s role is to ensure that the ceasefires do not ‘derail’ until the political dialogue – which is supposed to address the larger, underlying grievances of the EAOs – is completed. Also, ceasefire monitoring should contribute to the political dialogue taking place in a climate of reasonably good relationships to a) find solutions to the protracted problems in an inclusive manner and b) to have a

¹² On this point, see also section 4.2.

¹³ This understanding has implications on the criteria for the selection on monitors, see section 6.2.

realistic chance of seeing them implemented in the future. For both points, broader public participation will be necessary; and the networks created with the CCM will be of utmost importance in supporting an inclusive political dialogue.

Broadening public participation via civilian ceasefire monitoring is thus an adequate strategy to give a population largely excluded from the peace process a more active role. In the ceasefire areas, possibilities for participation in politics or the peace process are limited. The CCM thus conveys a sense of empowerment not only to the communities with monitors, but

“ Why I am doing this? It is the only chance for us to participate in the peace process”
- village monitor, Mon State

also to the monitors themselves. While being largely powerless in face of the Myanmar army or EAO soldiers before, the mechanism gives them a more important role, and a certain standing to act on the armed actors' behavior by monitoring and reporting incidents. This is especially the case for women, who typically bear the brunt of the consequences of armed conflict, but have even less possibilities to act compared to men in the same communities.

“ women and children bear the brunt of armed conflict, the ceasefires are most important for them”
- women CSO, Chin State


Having an adequate women's representation in the CCM thus could contribute to empower women in their communities, and giving them a greater probability to have their voices heard in the peace process. As a women CSO representative pointed out in Chin state, the societal structures that reproduce Gender inequalities are best changed by providing opportunities for women to become active in ways that challenge the roles constructed along Gender lines. Hence, if the role of women in the mechanism is adequately strengthened, the CCM potentially plays an important role in empowering women in their communities.¹⁴

Finally, all members of in the mechanism agreed that the situation for the communities before the ceasefires was dire, and that they suffered a range of human rights abuses by the Myanmar army, but also the armed groups. Accounts of forced labor and portering; beatings and torture for information extraction; sexual violence and gender-based violence; as well as confiscating communities' belongings from the time before the ceasefires are still vivid. They make clear that a mechanism that aims at monitoring armed actors behavior, reporting and addressing incidences is highly relevant to improve the protection of communities in the ceasefire areas. Not least because there was and is no other institution that these communities would trust with ensuring their protection.

“ If there is conflict, there is no development here”
- CCM township committee member, Mon State

¹⁴ On this point, see section 6.2.

In the bigger picture of Nyein Foundation’s organizational strategy, the civilian ceasefire monitoring plays an important part in three aspects: improved human security and improved relationships among armed actors; both achieved through increasing public participation in the peace process (see graph below).



Firstly, increasing public participation in the peace process is one of the overall strategies of Nyein Foundation towards an inclusive state that protects diversity, and towards a culture of sustainable peace. Giving civilians an active role in monitoring the ceasefires is thus clearly in line with this broader strategy.

Secondly, CCM is a key factor in having ceasefires respected, and hence, in reducing armed conflict and violence in the country. In combination with the strengthened protection that CCM provides to communities in conflict affected areas, this also has to be seen as a contribution to an improved human security.

Thirdly, civilian ceasefire monitoring also aims at improving relationships between armed actors, the government, and civil society. This is a key step in Nyein’s intervention logic, which sees the building of constructive relationships among different actors as an important part of influencing policy and institutions.

Overall, it becomes clear when looking at the broader theory of change of the Nyein Foundation that ceasefire monitoring in itself is only addressing a few aspects on the way to build sustainable peace in Myanmar. But it addresses key steps to build peace and is coherent with the organization’s intervention logic. The civilian ceasefire monitoring project is thus a highly relevant part of Nyein’s portfolio.

When assessed against the broader strategy of NP in Myanmar, but also on a global level, the CCM project is of high relevance. In its global strategy¹⁵ 2015-2020, NP states that its two main strategies are to “[e]nhance protection for civilians in armed conflicts and strengthen local peace processes. We will expand our programme implementation by increasing field activities, enhancing civilian participation in peace processes, and building local protection capacities”, and to “[m]ainstream UCP [unarmed civilian protection] policy and practices as an effective response to violent conflicts. We will step up our advocacy to advance unarmed civilian protection by influencing decision makers, advancing the methodology, and promoting greater adoption of unarmed civilian protection by others across the world stage” (p.2).

For both strategies, the CCM project offers perfect strategic fit: Firstly, supporting the establishment of the mechanism in Chin and Mon state and its significant component of civilian protection, as well as the embedded building of capacity of the members and bodies of the mechanisms on all levels are perfectly in line with the first strategy. Secondly, the strong component of raising awareness among communities and decision makers that are embedded in the CCM are fitting the second strategy; and the successes of the CCM to establish civilian monitoring in the broader peace process and the NCA can be considered as successes for the second strategy.

For Myanmar, this project has offered an ideal entry point to provide support and expertise to civilian ceasefire monitoring bodies in Myanmar. The experience that NP brought in from the Philippines has served as a valuable backdrop to put CCM in Myanmar in perspective with experiences made in another context, but also to provide reflection on necessary adaptations to make CCM effective in the context of Myanmar. Furthermore, the experiences made with establishing the mechanisms in Chin and Mon state also offer valuable lessons for the organization to expand its activities into other states.

Overall, the project has a high relevance for the peace process, and possibly even more so to increase protection of the communities. What has to be taken into consideration is that this project has to be mainly understood as a pilot. Civilian ceasefire monitoring in a formally institutionalized way has not existed in Myanmar before.¹⁶ The basic rationale of the selection of Chin and Mon state are based on criteria that allow making experiences and generating learning, and not in the first place for the greatest need for civilian ceasefire monitoring. Accordingly, the relevant criteria in the selection of Chin and Mon have been the existence of a written, bi-lateral agreement and the absence of high levels of conflict. Also questions of feasibility, and the level of complexity played a role in the selection: both Chin and Mon have a relatively low number of active armed groups in conflict with the Myanmar army (in comparison to e.g., Northern Shan state). Furthermore, that the CPTC was already included in the bilateral ceasefire agreement as a monitoring body in Chin state offered good conditions

Chin and Mon state are the so-called “low-risk” places for re-sparking armed conflict that offer good conditions to test the mechanisms’ ability to improve civilian protection, and to collect experiences for future mechanisms in other states. Over the reporting period, there have been no clashes observed between the armed actors. When asked about what they see as the greatest problem for the community in Chin and Mon state, interviewees external to the mechanism would not mention ‘to make the ceasefires last’ as the first priority. Rather, topics like widespread drug abuse, economic problems – like the low rubber price), or the migration patterns are more prominently mentioned, relegating the ceasefire to one problem among other, mainly development related problems.

On the other hand, all of these stakeholders agreed that the high level of human rights abuses before the (bilateral) ceasefires were of major importance, and that the conflicts had dire consequences for the communities (both in terms of their protection and economic development, see below). Also today, the levels of human rights abuses that are committed by the armed actors show that there is a clear need for civilian ceasefire monitoring.

¹⁵ Document available at <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/about-3/about-9>.

¹⁶ In informal ways, civilian monitoring of armed actors has taken place in different locations for a considerable time. Examples can be found in Kachin and Karen state.

Thus, the perception of the risk probability of Chin and Mon state of going back to armed conflict are generally low.¹⁷ Some government actors have given the explanation that Chin state is not of strategic importance, and the CNF a relatively small actor (compared to stronger EAOs that are “backed by foreign powers”). What is predominantly mentioned to explain the relatively calm and stable situation in Chin and Mon – as compared to other regions of the country – is the absence of economic interests of the Myanmar army in these states. As none of the two states has significant natural resources (which triggers a different conflict dynamic in other states), clashes following the economic interest of the Myanmar army are not existing in the way they do e.g. in Northern Shan state or in Kachin state. Problems arising from economic interests in Chin and Mon are mainly linked to human rights abuses, large scale land acquisitions and land confiscations, but not in the sense of fighting over access to e.g. precious minerals.

In comparison to other states, Chin and Mon state are not the states where there is the largest need for CCM in Myanmar. But they are cases that have a significant need for CCM (especially to monitor human rights abuses by the armed actors), and they offered good conditions to be used as pilots, where first experiences with CCM in Myanmar are made. For the future direction of the CCM and the already planned expansion of civilian ceasefire monitoring to states that have active armed conflict, this thus raises the question of how to adapt the mechanism and its procedures for a “hot” conflict zone with recurring clashes.¹⁸

3.3 Relevance of the project for the peace process (future outlook)

Relevant evaluation questions:

- Q3 What were the most important context changes in the past project period that had implications for the relevance of the project in the future?
- Q4 In the light of these issues and context changes how relevant will be the CCM project, its thematic focus and its approach/modalities in the near future? What steps are necessary to increase/maintain its relevance in the future?
- Q5 How has project evolved and adapted during the implementation period to respond to changes in the context?

The most important change in the context since start of the project is clearly the partial signing of the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) by the government and 8 EAOs,¹⁹ and the provisions for civilian ceasefire monitoring that are included in the new agreement. Furthermore, also the elections that will bring a new, NLD dominated government into office and into the state parliaments are likely to impact the work of the CCM.²⁰

The Joint Monitoring Committees (JMC) that are foreseen in the NCA will clearly shape the future of the CCM, but have also been influenced by the CCM mechanism developed under this project itself: The Myanmar Peace Center has mentioned the mechanism established as a positive example of how to address ceasefire monitoring. Further, the positive experience with the CCM was used in the negotiations to make the case for civilian ceasefire monitoring, and has contributed to the integration of civilian ceasefire monitoring in the NCA.

¹⁷ Although it has to be noted that in Mon state, increased troop movements of the Myanmar army have been observed after the decision of the NMSP of not signing the NCA. This is interpreted by stakeholders interviewed as a strategy to increase pressure on the NMSP to sign the NCA, and increases the probability of clashes.

¹⁸ See next section.

¹⁹ The CNF is among the signatories, the NMSP is not.

²⁰ On this point, see section 4.2 below.

As is clear at the moment of writing, the JMCs will involve actors from both sides, and a respected individual from civil society, and will allow for independent civilian monitors. While this is a clear commitment to the role of civilians in ceasefire monitoring, it is not yet clear of what the participation of civil society will look like in detail. In the ideal case, the civilian individual will appoint a CSO or institutionalized network to monitor and report incidences. This organization would have to be accepted by the state security forces and the respective EAO, and would have an official mandate to monitor.

If the existing CCM mechanisms are considered as this organization (as is very likely in Chin state), an official mandate would potentially give the existing mechanisms a greater legitimacy, and more confidence in the fulfilling of its tasks. On the other hand, a lot depends on the exact terms of reference for this mandate, as the existing mechanisms might also be constrained to the exact tasks specified in these ToR, which could give it less scope for action than under the previous, bi-lateral ceasefire.

“ it will not be a perfect world, but having this mechanism is better than nothing”
- CNF 2nd secretary, Chin State

An imaginable worst case scenario from the perspective of the CCM would foresee that the JMC relies on individuals for the monitoring which could potentially disintegrate the tried and tested network structure of the CCM; by replacing an effective structure with a less effective one (based on individuals).

Furthermore, a broader concern that pertains to the partial signing of the NCA is also valid for the CCM: With the signing of only a limited number of groups with whom clashes have been less frequent than with most of the non-signatories, the NCA establishes a differential treatment of EAOs and risks to contribute to a split among the so far relatively coherent alliance of the ethnic armed organizations. Some observers have interpreted this as another instance of the historically prevalent ‘divide and rule’ strategy of the Myanmar army; and fear a weakened position of the remaining non-signatories in the negotiations. Furthermore, the probability of a successful and inclusive political dialogue that is able to address issues that are essential for the sustainability of a longer term peace risks being decreased if the process is excluding some actors.

This raises the question of the CCM’s effects beyond the states where it is present and for the conflict dynamics in Myanmar as a whole. In the considerations of expanding the CCM to other states, the holistic view of the conflicts in Myanmar is thus of high relevance; and the implications of where the CCM is present and where not are of high importance to mitigate the risk of involuntarily contributing to problematic dynamics in the peace process. A holistic, union level perspective will be pivotal to assess potential effects of the CCM on the overall peace process. Also, the further expansion will need additional reflection according to the intensity of armed conflict in other states. As it has been mentioned above, the CCM has been operational in 2 states that have shown relatively low conflict intensity. While these 2 pilots certainly hold important experience and learning for a possible expansion to other areas, a range of questions will have to be answered on how the mechanism will operate in areas where clashes are frequent, and which adaptations to design and implementation will have to be made.²¹

4 Effectiveness of current structure and soundness of intervention design

Relevant evaluation questions:

- Q6 Which important outcomes could be achieved during the 2014-15 project phase?
- Q7 Are the objectives of the project adding up to a coherent ToC? Which gaps / inconsistencies need to be addressed?
- Q8 Has the project led to any unintended effects, either positive or negative?

²¹ Both NP (Kayin) and SF (Kachin) have collected other experiences with CCM in other states that they can draw upon in this process.

4.1 Outcomes achieved in the 2014-15 project phase

In this section, the outcomes achieved in the 2014-15 project phase are collected and assessed. This collection is structured along the objectives and respective indicators as stated in the logframe. Together with the assessment of the soundness of the intervention design in the next section, this allows formulating recommendations to improve the planning for results for the next phase.

In assessing the outcomes, it makes sense to clearly distinguish between Mon and Chin states that are in different phases of setting up the monitoring mechanism. The process of setting up was clearly easier in Chin state, where the CCM was part of the bilateral ceasefire agreement, and thus enjoyed an official mandate, as well as a broader recognition by the armed actors from the outset. In Mon state, the CCM is not institutionalized in the bilateral ceasefire agreement, and still not officially recognized by the government and the NMSP. In the absence of an official mandate to monitor the ceasefires, a lot of lobbying and awareness raising among key stakeholders had to be undertaken, which took considerably more time for setting up the monitoring mechanism. Accordingly, using the same benchmark for Chin and Mon state would not allow for meaningful assessment of achievements of the overall project.

Overall, the current situation can be summarized as having achieved the establishment of the mechanism in Chin state, with promising outcomes in handling specific incidents; and as having concluded a longer process of establishing the mechanism in Mon state, where the mechanism could only be considered operational for a few months at the time of writing this report. Given the difficulties faced in the establishment of the structure – especially in Mon state – reaching the point where the two mechanisms are operational in both Chin and Mon state has already to be considered a key outcome in itself. Here, considerable steps have been achieved in both states, in establishing the structures and relationships, and building the capacities of:

- the state secretariat
- the state level committee
- the township coordinators
- the township level committee
- the village level monitors.

Regarding the specific objectives, the following outcomes have been achieved by the project:

Specific objective 1	Indicators
SO1 – "To build the capacity of local CSOs and broader peace networks to monitor ceasefires and report on violations"	SO1. "Indicator 1": target value: Approximately 2400 stakeholders (including local CSOs and broader peace networks) recognise the need for ceasefire monitoring and support the intervention by nominating 90 community monitors and frequently sharing information on ceasefire violations.
	SO1. "Indicator 2": target value: 90 community monitors monitor and report on ceasefire violations.
	SO1. "Indicator 3": Increased accessibility to conflict-affected communities by civil society working to resolve conflict.

To assess the outcomes with regards to the indicators for specific objective 1, accounts of different stakeholders triangulated with other data was used to infer the success for this objective, as more rigorous quantitative collection of evidence on awareness level of different stakeholders (especially in the communities in the ceasefire areas) would not have been feasible.²²

²² E.g., a questionnaire with an adequate sample would be faced with considerable methodological considerations given the problems stemming from the security situation, and the problems of language, and the lack of official recognition of the CCM in Mon state; as the collection of data in the attempt for baseline construction has shown. Accordingly, the evaluator concluded that the gains in credibility of evidence would most likely be outweighed by other methodical flaws and thus not worth the additional risks and costs associated with large scale quantitative data collection.

For indicator 1, as already stated above,²³ all external stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation recognize the need for civilian ceasefire monitoring. But it makes sense to disaggregate this finding into the different entities interview to get a better understanding of the project's success.

Firstly, the state level authorities have been successfully targeted to build relationships and to lobby for the CCM. This is due to the considerable efforts of the state secretariats in both states, but also to the efforts taken by senior staff of Shalom and NP to build relationships with high level actors in the beginning. In Chin state, these activities seem to have led to a high level of recognition for the need of CCM that was evident in the conversations with the border affairs and security Minister, the chief of the police, and the representatives of the CNF. Especially the Chief of police, who had taken part in an exposure trip to the Philippines,²⁴ seemed convinced of the approach and has shown considerable levels of knowledge and a good understanding of the relevance of CCM for the peace process. In Mon state, the chairman of the state government showed a good understanding of civilian ceasefire monitoring and clearly recognized its value. The same applies to the representative of the NMSP that was interviewed

“we respect the CCM, but are not ready to take them on board yet”
- internal affairs , NMSP

during the evaluation. In Mon state, it became evident from the conversations that stronger resistance and doubts had to be overcome in order to win support of key actors for the CCM compared to Chin state. Especially the initial concern that the CCM mechanism would be used to “spy for the government” had to be overcome first. Overall, there still seems to be an ambivalent stance of the stakeholders in Mon state towards the CCM: while its activities are tolerated, the key stakeholders in the government and the NMSP do not seem ready yet to fully embrace the mechanism. Additionally, given the lack of an official recognition and mandate in the bilateral ceasefire agreement, no direct ties exist to the Myanmar army. In the current situation, the Myanmar army is mainly accessed through the state government. Clearly, this is setup can only be considered as an intermediary solution resulting from the longer time needed to build trust with key actors; but is insufficient for the future – especially when the new government will take office.²⁵

On the level of the communities and the broader population, the level of awareness of the CCM reached is more doubtful. The communities have been instrumental in selecting the village monitors – implying that at least the community leaders recognize the need for civilian ceasefire monitoring. A total number of 49 village monitors (24 in Chin, 25 in Mon) are reporting on ceasefire violations (indicator 2). But beyond the monitors and community leaders, the recognition and acceptance of the CCM by the communities in Chin state is ambiguous. Formal awareness raising has taken place and reached a total of 1432 people in Chin state, and a total of 1298 in Mon state.²⁶ In general, these activities seem to have reached a certain success, but not the desired coverage of awareness and recognition of the CCM.

While in some communities, the role of the CCM seems largely known, other village monitors have reported misperceptions of their role as spies or journalists and have requested for more awareness raising activities, as the sessions so far have only been able to reach a limited number of people.²⁷ Furthermore, some village monitors have reported that even after awareness raising sessions, some community members did still not believe that the CCM was without a hidden spying agenda. Building trust in the CCM in the communities seems to show the limits of awareness raising in convincing communities and building trust. Noteworthy though is the improvement of the acceptance by the communities that took place after the successful handling of an incident in Paletwa township (see below).

In a similar vein argued the village monitors interviewed in Mon state, who face even more suspicion than their colleagues in Chin

“we have to show to the community what we can do first”
- village monitor, Mon State

²³ See section 3.2.

²⁴ Although not the exposure trip financed under this project.

²⁵ With the new government dominated by the NLD, the links of the state government itself with the Myanmar army will have to be built first. Working through the government to access the Myanmar army in this setup is less realistic to develop enough leverage to address specific incidents. On this point, see also section 4.2.

²⁶ Additionally, awareness has been raised in stakeholder meetings with government, army and armed group for 584 people in Chin state, and 52 people in Mon.

Chin- number of people from stakeholder meeting with govt, army and armed group (584) For a more detailed breakdown of the different numbers, please refer to the final report of the CCM project.

²⁷ This reflects a finding already stated in the internal mid-term evaluation.

state. They noted that the best way to overcome the community's suspicion would be to prove their worth in handling a specific incident. Given that there is no official recognition for the CCM, they usually do not identify themselves as monitors to the broader community.²⁸ This in turn results in increased suspicion, and they fear that they could be reported to the village authorities for their monitoring activities. Also, many community members fear to openly support the project, or to participate.²⁹ This situation raises concerns for the village monitors safety in doing their work, and is likely to negatively impact on their confidence of doing their job. Accordingly, it should be followed up as a priority in the next phase.

In terms of a better access to communities in the ceasefire areas by civil society organizations (indicators 3), the mechanism itself and the entities linked to it seem to indeed enjoy a better access to the communities in the ceasefire areas. While the mechanism itself provides better access for these Organizations, it would be desirable to also extend this access to other CSOs external to the mechanism. The development of stronger networks with other CSOs in terms of referral is still limited, and it did not seem to have been given priority in the current implementation. Accordingly, outcomes relating to indicator 3 are limited so far.

Specific objective 2	Indicators
SO2 – "To contribute towards maintaining ceasefires and minimizing conflict in respective areas through local ceasefire monitoring"	SO2. <i>"Indicator 1"</i> : Enhanced Ceasefire Monitoring (CM) monitoring/reporting, data-collection mechanisms, information fed directly from the ground to the state and National authorities for direct responses;
	SO2. <i>"Indicator 2"</i> : More efficient responses for stakeholders and target groups to a ceasefire violation;
	SO2. <i>"Indicator 3"</i> : CM's credibility and acceptance within local conflict-affected communities increases and enables CM team to more effectively respond to the needs of the conflict-affected areas in question.

Regarding indicator 1, a primary outcome is the actual establishment of the mechanisms in Chin and Mon state. Both mechanisms are operational in monitoring and reporting. Both mechanisms collect information and feed them upwards. In Mon state, given the lacking official mandate of the CCM, information on incidents are shared informally with the government and the NMSP. This means that incidents are not officially reported and filed, but rather brought up in informal conversations. Given that a problem-solving mechanism in Mon state is inexistent, this solution seems pragmatic until there is a more official mandate including a problem-solving mechanism – even though unsatisfying in the long run.

Contrary to this, the practice of using media as a tool to bring up certain incidents as it has been mentioned by interview partners in Mon state is clearly problematic on different levels. From the perspective of the mechanism and its affiliated organizations, these are: a) it is potentially jeopardizing the relationships and trust that have been built with key actors over time and with considerable effort; b) it blurs the line between human rights activism and civilian ceasefire monitoring by using many human rights activists' methods of data collection and naming and shaming in the media; c) it may negatively impact on SF's and NP's relationships with key actors in the peace process necessary for other projects.

From the perspective of the victims of incidents, it raises questions with regards to the protection of the persons involved (e.g., the publicity of media reports on rape cases may not be in the interest of the victim). This is particularly problematic as the professional structure and know-how to counsel and advise victims on possible steps is lacking in the mechanism, and referral structure to CSO actors specialized in such cases is currently limited. Finally, it also raises questions from a rule-of-law perspective: If the

²⁸ Other monitors of Karen Women Empowerment Group (KWE) and Gender and Development Institute (GDI) active in Karen state are not officially recognized either; but they do more clearly identify themselves as monitors (e.g. with distinctive T-shirts). On the other hand, they do not identify as ceasefire monitors, but refer to themselves as "peace monitors" or "protection monitors".

²⁹ This finding was also already stated in the internal mid-term evaluation.

incident is collected and reported in the media, this makes the monitor or the respective committee the judge, the jury and the executioner that are lacking accountability towards any other body that would provide checks and balances.

But also in Chin state, where the CCM has an official mandate and there is a problem solving mechanism, the informal way of reporting incidents seems to be preferred by the armed actors. Although

“ there is no need to meet, there are no incidents.”
- Chief of police, Chin State

the problem-solving mechanism exists, it has never been formally used so far.³⁰ This seems to reflect an attitude of government authorities in Chin state that was evident in the interviews; namely that there are no incidents that would make a formal meeting necessary. In the interviews, the government side acknowledged

the need for and the importance of the CCM, but they seem reluctant to go through the formal procedures foreseen to deal with incidents. It is unclear if this indicates that the CCM is not perceived as a priority at this time, or if the government is only reluctant to use the formal problem-solving mechanism. In any case, it shows that the civilian protection aspect of the CCM is not openly acknowledged by the government authorities, as human rights abuses actually have been reported. It remains to be seen in the future if this attitude can be overcome by further building the relationship with these actors.

Regarding indicator 2, a few examples of how the mechanism has handled incidents are encouraging that CCM can contribute to effective responses to ceasefire violations. Most prominently figures an incident in the village of Kung Pyin in Paletwa township, where community members have been arrested and tortured by state security forces in August 2014. The state secretariat immediately engaged with key actors, and the village monitor assisted the victims. The colonel addressed in this issue assured to act on this incident and transferred the responsible officer. This shows that the mechanism has the capacity to act fast on serious incidents, and to find solutions that increase protection for the community.

In Mon state, the monitors have not yet responded to a great range of incidents, as the mechanism has only been operational for a few months. Nevertheless, a positive example of a response has been mentioned in the conversation with village monitors: In Thanbyuzayat township, Myanmar army soldiers were camping in a rubber plantation, and communities nearby did not dare to go to the plantation for work or collecting firewood. After the village monitor reported this to the state secretariat, the issue was brought up and the soldiers received order to move on shortly afterwards. Although small in scope, activities like this can make a big difference for the protection of the communities and are encouraging that also the mechanism in Mon state is able to solve problems related to the ceasefire.

Furthermore, the CNF representative interviewed has explicitly stated that the ceasefire monitoring also leads to a behavior change in EAO in their interaction with communities. Village monitors also noted that

“ we are more careful in our movements, knowing that we are watched”
- CNF representative, Chin State

the armed actors tread more carefully when entering villages, and have ceased many of the abusive behaviors of the past. Evidence is inconclusive if these changes can be attributed to the CCM. On the one hand, most village monitors and township coordinators that reported an improved security situation for the communities have specified that these changes have begun after

the ceasefire signing, but before the establishment of the CCM. But there seems to be at least a contribution of the CCM pointing in the same direction: one of the CNF representatives mentioned that the meeting called by the state secretary – in which most incidents reported and discussed were related to troop movements and unannounced incursions into the other armed actors' area – had been followed by a period of less violations.

Also in terms of the relationship between key actors, there seems a contribution of the CCM: While the state security forces assure that the relationships to the CNF are good because both sides “respect the agreement”, the CNF representative sees a clearer contribution of the CCM to the improving relationships.

³⁰ An exception was 1 meeting that took place this year, but which were not called by the Border affairs and security minister (as foreseen), but by the CPTC. This meeting was then not referred to as the problem solving mechanism by the state government.

For the discussion of the outcomes on indicator 3, refer to the discussion of indicator 1 of specific objective 1 above (p. 17).

In sum, the outcomes achieved indicate that the CCM is making a contribution to support the peace process towards a sustainable peace in Myanmar – as stated in the overall objective. Having the two mechanisms set up and operational is an achievement that cannot be overstated, and examples of how the mechanism has responded to incidents are encouraging. Also the relationship building with key actors seems to make progress. On the other hand, that outcomes were not achieved on the higher levels, namely that the official problems solving mechanism is not used by key actors raises the question in terms of the intervention design (see next section), and whether the use of the formal mechanism is a necessary outcome for the mechanism to be considered successful.

Furthermore, noteworthy is also that the experience of the CCM seems to have contributed to the text of the NCA and the formation of the joint monitoring committees therein – together with the documents foreseeing a ceasefire monitoring mechanism that were drafted in view of a bilateral ceasefire between KIA and the government in 2013 (which never materialized). In this sense, the CCM has also contributed to larger steps towards a lasting political settlement beyond the two states in which the mechanisms were directly operational.


4.2 Coherence of current design

Overall, the intervention design is sound and shows no evident logical failures. The following considerations are the result of integrating evidence collected on project outcomes to assess whether the assumed steps in the intervention logic actually have occurred. Secondly, the conversations with stakeholders on different levels of the CCM both in Chin and Mon state are used to identify the importance of certain assumed effects and rationales of the CCM that are present. This is then used to make the intervention design more reflective of the current understanding of the CCM's intervention logic for the next phase – as opposed to the understanding at the time of the project design.

The main elements when assessing the coherence of design are the logframe and the theory of change of the project. Here, a clear improvement of the intervention logic is noteworthy when comparing the logframe, which was developed in the initial project proposal, and the theory of change, which was developed in the context of the Nyein Foundations “evaluating effectiveness framework” (EEF) beginning of 2015. The difference in coherence between the two is most likely due both to the experiences and the improved understanding of civilian ceasefire monitoring in Myanmar's context on the one hand, and the higher level of details that a theory of change brings when compared to the logframe.

In the logframe, the specific objectives are too narrow for the range of effects the CCM wants to contribute to. The raising of awareness of the communities is present on indicator level, but could be given a more prominent position, considering that it is pivotal to involve the communities in the project. Further, neither the improvement of the protection situation of the communities, nor the improvement of relationships among key stakeholders are present as specific objectives. Then, there is a large gap between the specific objectives and the indicator for the overall objective. The indicator for the overall objective, “ceasefires hold and lead to lasting political settlements” is both outside the sphere of influence of the project and not reflected in the project's activities. Finally, indicator 3 for specific objective 2, “CM's credibility and acceptance within local conflict-affected communities increases and enables CM team to more effectively respond to the needs of the conflict-affected areas in question”, is difficult to operationalize and measure in its current form.

A few of these points have been addressed in the theory of change for the project (see graph below), which was developed by SF as a part of their internal EEF, but not in collaboration with NP. In this theory of change, intermediary steps towards the goal are more detailed, concrete, and reflect a more nuanced understanding of the project's intervention logic. Here, the main points of criticism are that improved civilian protection is barely visible, and that the responses to incidents are not present as an intermediary step.



One flaw in the design has been uncovered by the finding that the problem solving mechanism in Chin state has never been used so far, and that the border affairs & security minister is reluctant to use it. It is related to the need to have the key actors with actual decision making power and direct influence over the soldiers involved in the mechanism. The strong hierarchies on the side of the government make it less likely to contribute to longer term behavioral changes in the Myanmar army – if the top level of the military is not involved in the CCM. While it may be possible to find situational agreements and solutions with lower level ranks, the broader directives stem from higher up in the military hierarchy. And these directives are often deemed more important than state-level ceasefire considerations under the justification of

“ If something is decided at Union level, we must obey”
- Member of Mon state parliament

national interest or confidentiality. For Chin state, such directives stem from the North-West command based in Monywa (Sagain Region) or the Western command based in Sittwe Ann (Rakhine state). Neither of them is directly involved in the mechanism. While it cannot be expected from the Chin base CCM to engage with these stakeholder, there is no Union level body that is tasked to do so.

A similar problem can be observed in Mon state: Due to the constraints in setting up the mechanism (no official recognition), the establishment of direct links with the Myanmar army has been limited so far. Currently, the Myanmar army is sought to be approached via the state government, which should yield a certain influence over the military. Given that the bilateral agreements were signed between EAO and government (and not with the Myanmar army), and that the Myanmar army actually should be under the control of the government, this approach also aims to strengthen the stance of the government towards the army.

But if the state government actually has direct influence over the Myanmar army is questionable; and it will become even more questionable when a NLD dominated government will take office. In this situation, the state government and the Myanmar army cannot be meaningfully thought as one conflict actor; they have been antagonist players for decades. In the best case, there will be a delay until the NLD government has built relationships with the Myanmar army in Mon state. In the worst case scenario, the two actors will act as antagonists, creating a dynamic that will be difficult to handle for the CCM (even if it reinforces the need for CCM). If the current set up of mainly trying to influence the Myanmar army through the government is continued, there will be a gap in the best case, and the influence will be non-existent in the worst-case scenario. On the other hand, the approach of the Myanmar army through the government makes sense from a statebuilding perspective: It emphasizes that the Army should be under the control of the government, and also strengthens the stance of the government towards an army that has been operating largely autonomously in the past.

Another point pertains to the credibility of the mechanism to the different stakeholders, but also to the rationale of strengthening inclusion in the peace process: the diversity of the people working for the mechanisms. In Chin state, the majority of the monitors are Chin, and the majority of are men. The first fact has been noted by the border affairs and security minister to impact on the credibility of the reports collected by the monitors, as they are easily perceived as biased. The second point impacts on the effectiveness of the mechanism in achieving inclusion in the peace process, and on the raising of the voice of women. While there recently have been improvements in the share of women in the mechanism after internal advocacy efforts, the current numbers are still far from the ideal representation of women.

“ they are Chin. So they are less likely to report on the CNF, but very likely to report on every detail about the tatmadaw”
- Border affairs & security minister, Chin state

Considerations on possible unintended effects are included in the reflections on the future relevance of the CCM and on implementation issues.³¹

5 Issues in implementation and partnership

Relevant evaluation question:

Q9 Which challenges have been faced in terms of the mechanism and the practical implementation of the project? Which adaptations have to be considered for the future?

An important challenge that the CCM has faced both in Chin and in Mon state concerns the understanding of the scope of the monitoring. To create an understanding of what exactly the CCM

³¹ See sections 3.3 and 5.

should monitor has been challenging so far; especially on the level of the village monitors. The latter have often shown a will to include monitoring criminality or even the activities of CSOs in their area, which is clearly beyond the mandate of the CCM. On the other hand, ceasefire related incidents and non-ceasefire related incidents are often difficult to disentangle, and it seems difficult to justify to the community why a monitor would act on one – and not the other. What comes as a clear risk in following the broader understanding of CCM is the danger to set up a mechanism that is a parallel structure to the police force. Although the police force currently does not effectively ensure protection in the ceasefire areas, creating a parallel structure substituting the police force is likely to do harm from a statebuilding perspective, and to expose the monitors to a new set of risks.

On the level of partnerships, the relationship between the Chin CCM team and SF has not been without problems. Their origins are mainly to be sought in the division of tasks that has been agreed by the CCM team, SF and NP. Given that the CPTC did not have the organizational and administrative capacities necessary to meet the standards of an EU-funded project, it was agreed that SF would be in charge of the administrative tasks and supported by NP. De facto, this led to the situation that CCMT has to get (financial) approval from SF to conduct specific activities. Given the structure of the project inside of SF, which also involves several levels of hierarchy, this led to a slow response time and frustration on the side of the CCMT. This long process to get (financial) approval for specific activities also creates a lack of transparency in terms of secured funding and on the way it is used; and thus, fuels further possible conflict; and reinforces the wish for a partnership allowing for more independence of the CCMT.

Finally, the documentation and reporting system of the CCM is reported to have weaknesses, mostly due to unsystematic storage and filing, as well as a strong language barrier especially for the Chin village monitors, who often neither fluently speak Burmese, nor Hakha Chin.

6 Recommendations

6.1 Overall relevance

As this evaluation has shown, the civilian ceasefire monitoring project is a highly relevant contribution to the peace process in Myanmar. This evaluation has found encouraging evidence that the CCM contributes to more public participation in the peace process, better protection for communities in the ceasefire areas, improved relationships between armed actors and has been successful in addressing specific incidents. The primary recommendation at the end of the project cycle is thus to continue the project into a next phase; and to use the experiences made in Chin and Mon state in developing similar mechanisms in other states.

On the other hand, this makes adaptations necessary that are beyond the scope of this evaluation. It is thus recommended to conduct an analysis and planning workshop at the beginning of the new phase. Pivotal is a careful analysis of how the CCM impacts on conflict at the Union level (as opposed to state level), and how engagement at the union level with relevant stakeholders can be strengthened. This includes exploring options to include the ‘hard to reach’ in the command structure of the Myanmar army, which have been ‘out of reach’ for the state level so far.

6.2 Improving effectiveness and design

A main point for the participation of the communities, but also for the effectiveness of the work of the monitors is the awareness of the broader population on the topics of CCM. Given the levels of awareness and coverage reached now, it is recommended to [further intensify and increase coverage of awareness raising](#) activities, and especially to give the village monitors a greater role in it. Having a more important role in the awareness raising activities could improve their outreach and the perception of communities of the role of the village monitor. Additionally, other forms than the typical workshops could be explored, in the style of the CPTC’s (unimplemented) idea to use students as multipliers in their home communities.

This could also help to reach different groups in society that are usually underrepresented in workshop settings.

Further, it is recommended to [review the diversity of the members of the mechanisms](#). Not only in terms of ethnic background of the members, but also in terms of Gender. A more diverse monitoring force representing different ethnic backgrounds working together for peace would be:

a) more credible for stakeholders and

b) send a much stronger signal for peace than a mono-ethnic force ever could. A more diverse force that would include people of Bamar background to monitor the Myanmar army, and not exclusively rely on people of ethnic background, would potentially give more legitimacy to the reports that are filed on incidents. Also, creating a homogenous mechanism that exclusively relies on people of ethnic minority background risks to reproduce a key conflict driver: the perception that ethnicity 'naturally' opposes Bamar and the ethnic minorities. Transcending ethnicity with more diversity in the mechanism would also be a contribution to changing attitudes towards other ethnicities within and outside of the mechanism.

Practically speaking, teams should still be representative of their environment. But already the inclusion of a rather symbolic percentage of people of different background would send a strong signal. Therefore, a system that aims at including a percentage of people of other ethnic backgrounds on each level could be considered; e.g. 100% of ethnic minority origin at village level, 90% at township level, and 80% at state level.

Further, the inclusion of more women in the mechanism is highly recommended. If the role of women in the mechanism is adequately strengthened, the CCM potentially plays an important role in empowering women in their communities. Furthermore, there are more pragmatic considerations that speak for a larger inclusion of women in the mechanism: Village monitors have reported that women can build trust with communities faster than their male counterparts; and also gives the mechanism greater access to female victims of violence, to offer civilian protection and to gather data to verify incidents.

Overall, increasing the diversity of the mechanisms could be considered as an explicit target to be reached by the end of the next project phase; as identification and recruitment of members of diverse backgrounds is likely to take time.

Also, it is recommended to strengthen the approach of working in networks with other civil society organizations. Building a [strong network of CSOs/CBOs](#), especially in the clusters of Protection, helps to more effectively respond to protection-relevant incidents. A system to refer cases to specialized actors can result in a strong improvement of how incidents are handled, without necessarily having to build the necessary skill sets to handle these cases in all the monitors. Also, it would give the village monitors a means to address other problems in their community without directly taking action upon it themselves – which might oppose their mandate.

The following graph represents a proposition of what an [improved ToC for the future mechanism](#) could look like. The main points that have been adapted are:

- more emphasis on the aspects of civilian protection, by raising it to a higher level goal;
- inclusion of referral of victims of human rights abuses to specialized organizations;
- more emphasis on the improving of relationships both with the community and among the armed actors as a pivotal element of an effective mechanism.



This theory of change could then translate into the following hierarchy of goals and indicators:

	Objectives	Indicators
Overall objective	To contribute to stable ceasefires and improved civilian protection	
Specific objectives	SO1: to contribute towards maintaining ceasefires and minimizing human rights violations in respective areas	I1.1: # of ceasefire violations I1.2: Behavior of armed groups when interacting with communities I1.3: Quality of relationship among armed actors, as assessed by key stakeholders
	SO2: to contribute to minimizing human rights violations and improve protection of civilian population	I2.1: # number of human rights violations I2.2: Ratio of victims of human rights violations referred to specialized organizations I2.3: self-perceived security of the communities
	SO3: To set up an effective civilian ceasefire monitoring mechanism and build relevant	I2.1: Ratio of incidents effectively addressed by the armed actors

	capacities	I2.2: Ratio of incidents reported and brought up with armed actors (formally and informally) I2.3: Coverage of areas by ceasefire monitors judged adequate by all key stakeholders
	SO4: Increased awareness among civilian population to enable active participation in the peace process and contribute to increased protection	I4.1: # of stakeholders (including local CSOs and broader peace networks) recognizing the need for ceasefire monitoring and supporting the intervention by nominating # of community monitors and frequently sharing information on ceasefire violations. I4.2 Initiatives taken by the communities to contribute to improved protection

Both the adapted ToC and the logframe above have to be considered as propositions, and will have to be refined in a collaborative and inclusive manner with the project team and the secretariats, in order to get to a shared understanding of the intervention logic of the program and to ensure use. Also, the level of rigor in the data collection for the measurement of the indicators will have to be discussed – e.g., whether the construction of baselines for some indicators would be feasible.

6.3 Improving implementation

The future partnership between all organizations (SF, NP, CPTC, and CCMC) involved will require clarification for the next phase; the earlier in the planning, the better. It is recommended to have a meeting where roles and expectations can be clarified. Giving the CPTC and the CCMC more independence and planning for a thematic support role for NP and SF is advisable from a strategic perspective. In this view, after setting up the mechanism, the partnership with the mechanism should evolve and also allow SF and NP to reduce their involvement to focus their attention on setting up new mechanisms in other states. In this sense the mechanisms can develop into sustainable organizations, which can ensure monitoring of current and future ceasefire agreements independently of SF and NP. For the CPTC and the CCMC, this step (if taken) will need significant investment in staff with experience in dealing with international donor organizations to live up to the latter's standards. Otherwise, the gains in independence could be replaced by an additional external management organization tasked by the donor to ensure administrative and financial overview over the project. Therefore, it might be advisable to consider more independence of the CPTC and the CCMC as an objective to be achieved during or towards the end of the next project phase, but not as a given from the outset.

Also, the respective roles of SF and NP in such a setup will have to be clarified, as both organizations' role will be to further build the capacities of the mechanism. A clear division of tasks, and clarification on who will bring in which kind of expertise is thus advisable.

For the village monitors, it is recommended to explore strategies to increase their security (one way proposed was to increase their visibility through uniforms or identity cards), and to make their ToR (including guidance on the scope of the monitoring) clearer. This could be achieved by actively involving the village monitors in the drafting of their ToR (e.g. after 3 months of service). Further, village monitors expressed wishes for more or better material (cellphones, motorbikes, rain jackets). Some also wished for a salary that would cover their livelihood.³² While not all of these wishes may be feasible to fulfill, it is recommended to have an open discussion with the village monitors on what can be provided – and what not – to increase the transparency of these decisions.

³² Currently, the village monitors receive only an honorarium.

7 Annexes

7.1 List of formal interviews and group interviews conducted

7.1.1 Shalom

- Director, female
- Assistant director programs, female
- 5 members of project team (group workshop), 3 females, 2 males

7.1.2 Nonviolent Peaceforce

- Country representative, male
- Acting head of program, female
- Project officer, chin, female

7.1.3 European Union

- Program Manager, EU Delegation Yangon, male

7.1.4 Union Level

- 2 CSFOP working committee members, 1 female, 1 male
- 88 generation representative, male

Cancelled:

- MPC representative
- 2 EAO representatives
- National CSO Network

7.1.5 Mon State

- CCM secretary and CCM vice-secretary (group interview), 2 male
- 4 members of the CCM state level committee (group interview) 1 female, 3 male
- 3 township coordinators (group interview), 3 male
- 5 members of the township level committee (group interview), 5 male
- 4 village monitors (group interview), 4 male
- 3 village monitors (group interview), 3 female
- Chairman of the Mon state parliament, male
- Member of the Mon State parliament, male
- Representative of NMSP, head of internal affairs and member of the board, male

Cancelled:

- Security & border affairs minister
- Finance and planning minister

7.1.6 Chin State

- CCM secretary, male
- CCM assistant secretary, male
- 5 members of CPTC, 1 female, 4 male, (group interview, followed by individual interview with 1 female
- 3 Township level coordinators (group interview), 3 male
- 3 village monitors, 1 female, 3 male, (group interview, followed by individual interview with 1 female
- 3 village monitors (group interview), 3 male
- 3 local CSO representatives, 1 female, 2 male
- CNF 2nd secretary, male

- CNF liaison officer, male
- Security & border affairs minister, male
- Chief of Police, male

7.2 [Semi-structured interview guide](#)

The following questions were used as a generic interview guide, which was adapted for each interview according to the specific stakeholder and the evaluation's information needs.

7.2.1 [Relevance](#)

- How is the current situation of the ceasefire in [Mon/Chin/Myanmar] state?
- What is the biggest problem/ challenge regarding the peace process that you face in [Chin/Mon/Myanmar]?
- What are the biggest challenges for the communities, and specifically for women?
- What should be done about it? What actors have a role to play?
- What is the role of CCM in it? Why is it the CCM's role and not the role of other entities?

7.2.2 [Future relevance](#)

- What important changes have taken place in [Chin/Mon state] over the last 2 years? What is different?
- How do you see the future? What do you think will be the future challenges in the peace process in [Chin/Mon/Myanmar]?
- What will the biggest challenges to come for the communities, and specifically for women?
- What should be done about it? What actors have a role to play?

7.2.3 [Practical](#)

- What were important moments of success in the project?
- What were the challenges faced in the project?
- Did you notice any effects of the project you have not expected (positive or negative)?

About swisspeace

swisspeace is a practice-oriented peace research institute. It analyses the causes of violent conflicts and develops strategies for their peaceful transformation. swisspeace aims to contribute to the improvement of conflict prevention and conflict transformation by producing innovative research, shaping discourses on international peace policy, developing and applying new peacebuilding tools and methodologies, supporting and advising other peace actors, as well as by providing and facilitating spaces for analysis, discussion, critical reflection and learning.

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