







Evaluation of Nonviolent Peaceforce Program in the Philippines



IP (40%) and Muslim areas

-  Muslim area
-  More than 40% IPs
-  Muslim area and more than 40% IPs

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Fixing what you have is better than waiting to get what you don't have

He who sows shall reap

Where there are poor, there are rich. But where there is justice, they are all brothers

Arab proverbs

The illustration on cover page depicts population density of Muslim and Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao, UNDP 2003

Disclaimer

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ACRONYMS

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AoR	Area of Responsibility
APC	Area Programme Coordinator
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
BCJP	Bangsamoro Center for Just Peace in the Philippines Inc.
CBHR	Community-Based Human Rights
CCCH	Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
CPC	Civilian Protection Component
CPP	Conflict Prevention Program
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ECD	European Commission Delegation to the Philippines
EWER	Early Warning / Early Response
FC	Field Coordinator
FO	Field Office
FTL	Field Team Leader
GCRV	UNICEF's Monitoring & Reporting Mechanism on 'Grave Childs Rights Violations'
GPH	Government of the Philippines
HR	Human Rights
ICG	International Contact Group
ICG-NP	NP International Governance Council
ICP	International Civilian Peacekeeper
ICPM	International Civilian Protection Monitor
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMT	International Monitoring Team
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IP	Indigenous People
JCCCH	Joint Coordination Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
JCMP	Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Post
LGU	Local Government Unit
LMT	Local Monitoring Team
MFT	Maguindanao Field Team
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MinHRAC	Mindanao Human Rights Action Center
MMI	Magungaya Mindanao Inc
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOGOP	Moslem Organization of Government Officials and Professionals
MPC	Mindanao Peoples Caucus
NCFT	North Cotabato Field Team
NCP	National Civilian Peacekeeper
NCPM	National Civilian Protection Monitor
NP	Nonviolent Peaceforce
NPP	Nonviolent Peaceforce in the Philippines
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
OO	Overall Objective
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
PNP	Philippine National Police
PP	Project Purpose
QRT	Quick Response Team
RPP	Reflection on Peace Practice
SOCKSARGEN	South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Sarangani provinces and General Santos City area
UN	United Nations
UNYPAD	United Youth for Peace and Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Mindanao conflict is probably the most protracted among the low-intensity wars affecting a continuum of Asian countries from Nepal to Papua New Guinea, with disastrous effects on a series of generations that have suffered recurrent episodes of destruction, displacement and hopelessness. Ideology, religion, ethnic and separatist insurgencies match the varied backgrounds, composition and evolution of these human communities since the 1960s, all of them sharing common elements of perceived injustice and historic disregard for their own people's claims.

At least three organized insurgencies are now active in the southern Philippines. According to various sources more than 100,000 lives have been lost as a result of the conflict, with untold misery and innumerable people uprooted or displaced in their own land, many times with little prospects of returning to their original villages after successive war episodes. The increasing complexity of the Mindanao conflict makes it difficult picturing the many factors intervening, however the symptoms are there for the unfamiliar eye to see: the pervasiveness of acute poverty next to successful private sector and state-run high investment development projects; persistent eviction, displacement and landlessness among marginalized people next to big corporate plantations; the emergence of lawless elements in parallel to private armies to defend mining, agribusiness and industrial elements; widespread feuding, clan disputes and proliferation of firearms; among others. All of these issues point to clear socio-political and economic explanations for this long-standing war. The historical elements cannot be overstated, from colonial rule to poor governance, from mass migration to uncoordinated resettlement, to unbalanced ownership and control over actual and recently discovered natural resources in the entire southern Philippines. With a population exceeding 23 million in 2010, the region is home to most of the country's Muslim (or *Moro*) populations, composed by 13 ethno-linguistic groups plus two dozen tribes of non-Malay indigenous peoples (IP) known as the *Lumad*, numbering 4.5m and 1.2m respectively. Although scantily present in some Muslim areas, descendants of Christian and Chinese settlers from northern parts of the Philippines make a 70% overall majority in Mindanao. The concept of a '*tri-people*' solution has developed since the 1990s on the possibility for the three peoples (Moro, Lumad tribes and settlers) to live together, whereas the basically 'economic development' perspective, or the federalist 'political-constitutional reform' alternative, or the radical self-determination and 'secession for the creation of a new Moro state' are manifestly supported or plainly denied by the different parties to the conflict.

Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) is an international NGO whose mission –according to its By-laws- is to build and deploy a trained, international unarmed civilian peacekeepingforce wherever they are thought to be needed. These non-partisan, non-violent peacekeepers with varied backgrounds and expertise are sent to conflict areas –in five countries so far- to prevent death, destruction and protect human rights, thus creating the space for local groups to struggle in the absence of violence, enter into dialogue and seek peaceful resolutions to their conflicts. In practical terms NP intends to promote, develop and implement unarmed civilian peacekeeping as a tool for reducing violence and protecting civilians in situations of violent conflict.

NP in the Philippines (NPP) was formally launched in 2007 by invitation of various civil society organizations (CSO) after two years of intermittent presence in the country, time spent at making contacts and gauging how its principles of non-violence, non-partisanship and non-interference could be adapted and contribute to the protection of civilians affected by the Moro conflict. During the time intervening, NPP has experienced a remarkable evolution both in terms of engagement with the different stakeholders and delivery of peacekeeping and conflict prevention strategies as well as noteworthy internal organizational development features, operational procedures and an enhanced profile resulting in a full-fledged unarmed civilian peacekeeping organization of its own brand, engaged with innovation at civilian protection and conflict prevention activities. Although NP is not officially involved in mediation and conflict resolution, one of the findings of the present evaluation is the role played by NPP in this respect, inside some communities.

As a member of the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team, NPP is part of one of the four pillars of the ceasefire mechanisms of the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace process. The other three are the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) of both the GPH and the MILF, the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), plus the Local Monitoring Teams (LMT), representatives of which bodies have been interviewed during the evaluation. They all agreed that NPP is the only international non-governmental organization (INGO) working with, and living among the Southern, Central¹ and Western Mindanao population, precisely in areas historically most affected by the conflict including those where combat suddenly flares up, as well as those settled by Internally Displaced People (IDP), or *bakwits*². There are certainly other INGOs present in NPP's various Areas of Responsibility (AoR) but none of them having set up operational field offices and permanently deployed staff like NPP has done. Certainly the worthiest finding of this evaluation is that during the last four years NPP has significantly grown in presence, credibility and effectiveness at peacekeeping endeavors that include the creation of peace structures, officially endorsed ceasefire monitoring, extensive training, capacity building of local organizations, establishment of early warning systems and human rights activities, inter and intra –community dialogue, multi-faceted civilian protection and enhanced, reliable leverage with government authorities, insurgency leaders, aid agencies and foreign diplomats.

In terms of standard evaluation methodology, judging the material achievements of NPP is inherently difficult given NPP's work is mostly about locally-led social processes and most of the times results can only be measured on a qualitative basis rather than on a quantitative one. Some NPP staff believed that NPP's impact is likely to become more apparent if violence flares again, since the structures created, CPC orientations, presence and acceptance by the population should become more effective during times of crisis. In their view all the work NPP has done during the relatively peaceful last few years is intended to contribute as well if and when general violence erupts again. Either way, in general terms NPP's intervention is of the 'soft'

¹ For the sake of brevity Central Mindanao is a North to South 200x100 km rectangle comprising various provinces of Philippines administrative regions IX, X, XI, XII and ARMM. NPP is also present in Basilan and Sulu island provinces.

² Popular name for Moro populations displaced in Mindanao, derived from 'evacuee' since the Moro-American war 1899/1913

sort –as compared to the ‘strong’ ones implemented by the UN or other official, internationally mandated peacekeeping operations elsewhere, sometimes (if necessary) by force of arms. As an INGO it cannot impose sanctions, but offer encouragement and promotion of dialogue and accompaniment along the road towards peace. However entrenched their positions, experience shows that a change of heart among the contending parties is always possible, so NPP’s work entails calculated risks about who they talk to, and in what circumstances in order to support the probability of this change of heart -in the midst of volatile security conditions and political settings prone to change almost overnight. During the 26 days of this evaluation’s field phase, a string of firefights and ambushes at MILF Areas of Temporary Stay -mostly due to lack of coordination among the ceasefire parties- resulted in heavy casualties for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the subsequent increased tension and deterioration of the situation, threatening to seriously set back the entire process and the enormous efforts to attaining peace invested by so many people.

The approach is examined on NPP’s position regarding *rido*³, the clan feuding affecting most populations in all AoRs, as a key element in the complex web of violence that includes fierce land and resource disputes among clans, profusion of weapons and homemade explosives, enraged political discords and forceful, violent resolution of a variety of grievances old and new against a backdrop of political corruption, misinformation, aggressive corporate maneuvering, biased stances, separatist interests, out-of-control splinter insurgent groups, and wanton banditry by ever-present unidentified gunmen, that for many years have caused untold suffering to civilians caught in between⁴.

It is widely accepted that measuring concrete results and impact of peacekeeping operations is difficult to establish. It is not possible for any organization to claim full credit for an improved situation regarding violence, respect for child’s rights, or reduced IDP figures for example. It should be noted that NP does not intend to resolve the conflict, but the evaluator understands that NPP’s role as a catalyst was almost unanimously acknowledged. Nevertheless the fact that creditworthiness can be only partially attributed to every actor, by and large, the evaluation found throughout the series of meetings with political representatives of the contending parties, military and insurgent commanders, LGU elected officials, religious representatives, local CSOs, UN agencies, and especially the people in the different communities visited, that circumstantial evidence suggests NPP is meaningfully contributing to the peace process. NPP’s presence, monitoring, verification, reporting and promotion of ceasefire observance, conflict prevention activities and protection against human rights abuses, trainings, in addition to facilitation of regularly scheduled, focused, and consistent communications between actors and vulnerable communities on the ground. made possible a series of responses and structures that increased local ownership of the process, prompted confidence building and further peace advancements, and generally speaking alleviated the dire predicament of so many people.

³ “*Ridos* are a state of recurring hostilities between families and kinship groups characterized by a series of retaliatory acts of violence carried out to avenge a perceived affront or injustice”, Wilfredo Magno Torres III, ed., *Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao*, Asia Foundation, 2007, p.12

⁴ References with background information and websites relevant to the Mindanao conflict can be found on Annex 3

OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

This report presents the results of the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Nonviolent Peaceforce Program in Mindanao, for which a field trip was carried out in October and November 2011.

The methodology applied is the standard OECD Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) five criteria⁵, thus helping all readers and NPP partners and funding agencies to familiarize with the evaluation's conceptual framework and terminology -starting from page one. This evaluation is fourfold, further to its original title of 'NP Program in the Philippines': in addition to evaluating the two NPP programs on the Civilian Protection Component (CPC) and the Conflict Prevention Program (CPP), the exercise focuses as well on NPP's recent evolution as a more consolidated INGO and, embedded into these two items there is also the assessment of NPP's strategy and evolving tactics according to events unfolding. References are made to the new UNICEF-funded Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Child Rights Violations (GCRV) project, plus other developments that have occurred since the last evaluation carried out by Swisspeace under the Reflection on Peace Practice (RPP) methodology in February 2010.

One major development since the Swisspeace evaluation is the implementation of the CPC program for which NPP is now officially mandated. Thus the standard Section 3 on Effectiveness criteria has been expanded to discuss the latest developments of RPP's five sub criteria as set forth by Swisspeace previously, examining how NPP has managed at operationalizing the CPC alongside the CPP. The inclusion of these additional factors intend the assessment of the activities carried out by NPP to render a material picture of what are essentially immaterial: contributions to preventing death, destruction and support of human rights aiming to enhance peaceful environments, and increase civilian protection among the program's beneficiaries and stakeholders.

The evaluation tools included written questionnaires, interviews, Focus Group Discussions, and review of written and published materials. The mission started with the arrival of the evaluator in Manila on 15 October and a two-day stay at NPP's Liaison Office in the capital, followed by the program appraisal through a field visit and a string of some 80 interviews of people from different organizations, partners and program stakeholders at 22 different program sites and stakeholders premises. The itinerary covered seven provinces of Central and Southern Mindanao, some 1,500 km, in 18 days of stay. An Impact Assessment Survey (Annex 3) involving a sample of beneficiaries was also administered in a number of *barangays*⁶ in parallel to the evaluation, the results of which shall be annexed to this report at a later stage following compilation and analysis by the NP-USA team. A series of Focus Group Discussions were organized in four program locations in Maguindanao and North Cotabato, involving beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Data was collected from:

- Previous reviews, publications and evaluations.

⁵ Criteria of Pertinence, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability of the action

⁶ A barangay is the smallest [administrative division](#) in the [Philippines](#) and is the native Filipino term for a [village](#), [district](#) or [ward](#). [Municipalities](#) and [cities](#) are composed of barangays.

- NPP reports and monthly team reports.
- NPP Standard Operational Procedures.
- NPP field staff and management staff working on the respective programs (both project staff and other NPP staff).
- Philippine partner groups and organizations.
- Individuals and informal groups NPP has been working with.
- Members of the communities NPP is working with.
- Recommended Representatives of Philippine government, MNLF and MILF, provincial and local government, International Monitoring Team.
- Recommended Representatives of international organizations, UN system agencies and the diplomatic community in the Philippines with whom NPP has been active or by whom NPP has been funded.

Annex 1 shows the series of standard evaluation questions, to which about a dozen have been added according to the evaluation Terms of Reference (ToRs) on which the structure of the report is based. The list of organizations and beneficiary bodies met is provided in Annex 2. Names of the incumbents are not mentioned since a number of them asked the evaluator to be interviewed under condition of anonymity. Annex 3 includes references with background information and websites relevant to the Mindanao conflict. The impact assessment survey (response sheet template in Annex 4) was administered with the presence of the evaluator at three locations along the field trip itinerary: barangays Buayan (Datu Piang, Maguindanao), Pagangan (Aleosan, North Cotabato) and Butig in Lanao del Sur. The results of this data analysis were still being processed by the NP survey designers at the time of finalizing this report.

Due to timing constraints resulting in lack of appraisal of the data gathered by the survey, the immaterial nature of civilian protection and conflict prevention impacts cannot yet be empirically measured. The results of the survey will be uploaded to NP's website as soon as practicable. The evaluator posed the questions contained in the survey response sheet as well as the standard OCDE criteria, plus those on the mission's ToR. These replies, subjective perceptions and statements cannot possibly be subject of empiric analysis, so the evaluation will sometimes appraise activities rather than results which are not clearly attributable, or understood as a clear cut impact of specific NPP undertakings in a cause-and-effect pattern. Thus the overall description and quantification of the activities aims at figuring out –or at least inferring- what the impact intended by the various NPP teams is. Other parts of the report will address quantifiable results the standard way –especially financial and staffing issues- based on bibliography shown in Annex 5. A glossary with standard peacekeeping, protection and conflict prevention terms can be seen in Annex 6. The mission itinerary and a map of Mindanao are included in Annex 7.

The report also contains a series of recommendations on the above topics in more general terms, referring to institutional arrangements, implementation mechanisms and financial aspects for a foreseeable continuation of NPP's presence in Central Southern and Western Mindanao in the midterm. At the end of the field trip the evaluator conducted a debriefing at NPP's Cotabato City main office to present preliminary conclusions to senior management for them to share their comments and observations, some of which the present report takes into account. The mission concluded on 9th of November following a last round of interviews in Manila.

INTRODUCTION

The Mindanao conflict originates along political divisions based on the region's population complex mixture of different ethnicities, religions and social groups. The problem is compounded by the various rebel organizations throughout the last half century that have taken up arms to secede the island from the central government's political control. The cumulative effects of the conflicts have led to bitter divisions within and amongst communities, widespread displacements, and thousands of deaths.

The population of Mindanao is diverse. Central Mindanao is a majority Muslim area but also has a large number of Christian and Indigenous (*Lumad*) communities. The majority of Christians are settlers who migrated from the northern Philippines to relocate themselves in the resource-rich lands of Mindanao. Some sources reckon 80% as the Central and Western Mindanao lands (or ancestral domains) controlled by the Moro population at the end of the 19th Century, reduced to 20% at the beginning of the 21st .

Besides the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippines National Police (PNP), there are multiple armed groups active in the region, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), some elements of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the communist New People's Army (NPA, although somehow marginally), the 'feudal' elites who control the local and regional governments, plus an ambiguous mix of private armies, ideologically oriented paramilitary groups, 'lost commands' and various gangs and lawless elements. All these formations play their respective direct or indirect role in the ongoing peace process between the GPH and the MILF. Another group, labeled a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), has been involved in numerous kidnappings, assassinations, fire fights and bombings on Mindanao in the name of Islamic independence from the predominantly Catholic central government in Manila. So the Central and Western Mindanao regions are vulnerable to at least four different kinds of armed clashes; those either between the AFP and the rebels (MILF or MNLF), the MILF and the paramilitary, the AFP/PNP against lawless groups and ASG terrorists, and local *rido*, some of which originating from MILF and MNLF internecine fights.

The last three years have seen a considerable intensity in the number of IDPs in Mindanao: around 700,000 displaced during 2008, plus roughly half million during 2009 whose return, resettlement or local integration often remains largely undocumented. As of February 2011 Geneva's Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre noted that approximately 15,000 *bakwits* from the 2008 and 2009 offensives still remained in evacuation centers, with tens of thousands more considered as home-based IDPs staying with friends or relatives away from their places of origin. Many people returning home continued to live in fear, some of whom had seen their homes and sources of income destroyed, and their livestock stolen. Critical areas of Mindanao are vulnerable not only to violence between the forces of the AFP and the MILF; there are provinces like Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, the island of Basilan and South Cotabato which are highly exposed to communal and ethnic violence between the Christian and Muslim communities, as well as various lawless elements responsible for bombings, assassinations and kidnappings. Private armies controlled by political warlords operate with impunity throughout Mindanao and threaten the

safety and security of civilians in regions under their respective control. For example, on November 23rd 2009, the private militia controlled by the Ampatuan clan in Maguindanao, allegedly massacred 57 people with the aim of increasing the clan's political control of the region. To underscore the cyclic and multi-focal nature of violence in Mindanao, the clan target of the Maguindanao massacre, the Mangudadatu clan, was also alleged to have been involved in fighting against the MILF in Maguindanao in April 2011, displacing at least 1,733 families.

In a major breakthrough in October 2009, the resumption of formal peace negotiations between the GPH and the MILF was announced. This announcement created new space to explore the possibilities of restarting the peace talks and further broadening the Ceasefire Mechanism Structure to have an overall framework including Ceasefire Monitoring, Civilian Protection plus the establishment of an International Contact Group. In October 2009 both GPH and MILF Peace Panels agreed on the formation of a Civilian Protection Component (CPC) charged specifically with protecting the safety and security of non-combatants. It was also agreed that the International Monitoring Team (IMT), whose mandate had previously expired, will be officially reinstated under newly refined and expanded Terms of Reference that were activated in 2010.

Despite forward movement of the peace process in the first half of 2011, talks between the GPH and the MILF stalled in August when the MILF rejected a government counter-proposal. This was followed by outbreaks of violence in Basilan and then Zamboanga between the MILF and GPH at the time of conducting the present evaluation in October and November 2011. In October, UNOCHA estimated 46,000 people remained displaced in Mindanao, most of them in Maguindanao province. The figure included people still displaced by the 2008 to 2009 outbreaks plus others displaced by clan violence since then, as well as some people affected by flooding in June 2011.

Ever since 2007, NPP's presence in Mindanao, creating capacity by setting up human rights structures, supporting relief efforts, facilitating dialogue and serving to protect non-combatants in conflict areas, led to the invitation by both the GPH and MILF Peace Panels to be the only international NGO out of four NGOs comprising the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team. The other three members are the Mindanao People's Caucus (MPC), Mindanao Human Rights Action Centre (MinRhac), and Maranao Organization of Government and Professionals (MOGOP), all of which NPP keeps close operational relationships with. After NPP's official acceptance to the CPC in 2009, the organization became a custodian of certain responsibilities under the CPC's mandate, engaging a series of target groups including AFP, paramilitaries, police units, the GPH, the MILF, all relevant Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) panel members, plus a number of local civil society organizations and communities that fall within the realm of responsibility of the CPC agreement. In short, the mandate is a recognition and endorsement of NPP as a valuable fixture following its monitoring, communication and coordination with most relevant actors in the peace process, and serves the purpose of the CPC ensuring the well-being of civilians in Mindanao.

The IMT's Civil Protection Component was set up to create an effective mechanism for monitoring, reporting and coordinating protection efforts in order to fulfill the

commitments of the parties with respect to the protection of non-combatants in the conflict-affected areas, as follows:

- Refrain from intentionally targeting or attacking non-combatants, prevent suffering of the civilian population and avoid acts that would cause collateral damage to civilians;
- Refrain from targeting or intentionally attacking civilian properties or facilities such as schools, hospitals, religious premises, health and food distribution centers, or relief operations, or objects or facilities indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and of a civilian nature;
- Take all necessary actions to facilitate the provision of relief supplies to affected communities;
- Take all precautions feasible to avoid incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and danger to civilian objects;
- Ensure that all protective and relief actions shall be undertaken in a purely non-discriminatory basis covering all affected communities.

With the new CPC mandate, NP's CPC program focuses on monitoring, verifying and reporting on the above civilian protection concerns, whereas the Conflict Prevention Program (CPP) focuses primarily on setting up local structures like Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) and Community Based Human Rights (CBHR) groups at grassroots level. The new Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Child Rights Violations (MRM on GCRV) project, funded by UNICEF falls under the CPP in line with NP's overall civilian protection mandate.

1 PERTINENCE

The extent to which the objectives of the intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, general priorities and partners' and other relevant policies.

1.1 What is the present level of relevance of the program?

NPP programmatic activities respond to two different mandates: CPP as standard practice supported by NP's 65 member organizations from five continents, engaged in global peace issues. UNICEF and GPH add to this program, following the signing of an agreement on GCRV monitoring and reporting. On the other hand, the CPC's mandate emanates from its appointment by the GPH and MILF Peace Panels as a member of the CPC of the IMT.

It is widely agreed⁷ that *peace keeping* intends to lower the level of destructive behavior in conflict situations while *peace-making* aims at changing attitudes among the main conflict stakeholders, and *peace building* being about overcoming contradictions lying at the root of the conflicts. NP's mandate is primarily civilian peacekeeping although its endeavors sometimes encompass the other two strategies. NP's International Governance Council (IGC-NP) decides on and oversees the running of the operation. IGC-NP is drawn from and elected by the worldwide network of member organizations at the local, regional and international levels to promote the practice of unarmed civilian peacekeeping.

NP has a consolidated trajectory on peacekeeping practices and policies. Concerning design and overall objectives of both programs, its consistency can be stated in what concerns civilian protection through various unarmed civilian peacekeeping techniques. These include monitoring, verifying, presence, accompaniment, encouragement, bridging and convening parties to meet, sharing information, establishing and strengthening local structures aimed at preventing or mitigating violence, and community dialogues.

NP began discussions on the start-up of operations in Mindanao in 2002, after that year's all-out war, to assess the feasibility of a possible NP program in the coming years. The situation in Mindanao has not really changed for the better ever since 2007, when NP deployed its initial peacekeepers, so the program still responds to the needs of the initial target groups. NP holds itself accountable primarily to the population living in the areas of conflict in which it intervenes. It views itself accountable as well to its individual supporters and member organizations, private sponsors, public sector and institutional funding bodies, and to the international community at large. NP activities in the Philippines appear to be fully supportive to the policies of both GPH and MILF Peace Panels, and consistent with the frameworks within which the program is placed. The quality of the problem analysis and the project's intervention logic are in line with the conditions prevailing in this part of southern Philippines.

The explicit CPC mandate makes NPP a qualified player in the peace process

⁷ Glossary on Annex 6

strategies, as devised by the conflicting parties through the Peace Panels. As per its By-laws, NP's mission statement is "to promote, develop and implement unarmed civilian peacekeeping as a tool for reducing violence and protecting civilians in situations of violent conflict".

The implications of this precise mandate will be elaborated under the Effectiveness criteria on section 3 with regards to the 2010 *Swisspeace* evaluation findings. It should be noted however that NP's actions have peculiarities that distinguish it from other agencies involved in conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, protection and peace activism, with the 'close presence on the ground' as its main differentiating element.

The target groups for the CPC Program include AFP and police units, MILF, paramilitaries, all relevant Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities CCCH panel members, as well as local civil society organizations and communities that fall within the realm of responsibility of the Civilian Protection Component agreement.

CPP target groups include Lumad and IDP communities, peace and human rights activists, local government authorities, armed groups, and various security forces.

The CSOs in particular are playing a highly commendable and constructive role on their part to not let the gains of the peace process slip into disarray. Some partner organizations have placed volunteers in the areas prone to human rights violations. However, the work of CSOs is threatened by political clans and their private militias, prone to violate human rights with impunity as reported in the news. Most of the times they lack necessary technical skills and familiarity with existing national and international instruments to deal with violations of human rights. This feature being part of the problem analysis, NPP through the CPP supports the involvement of active and capable grassroots organizations to further the protection and promotion of human rights.

1.2 What is NPP's understanding of its role in the conflict?

NP peacekeeping is a function consisting in the lowering of the level of destructive behavior, and preventing and alleviating the effects of violence in the local community stage. Even if the concept of civilian peacekeeping is rather new in the international arena, it is defined by NP as achieved by non-military, un-armed civilians with non-partisan stances to the conflict using nonviolent techniques.

The approach taken by NP is that of what could be called 'doing' NGOs, the kind of modus operandi with a focus on field activities to solve on-the-spot situations involving -in NP's case- monitoring, verification and reporting, accompaniment, and confidence building among others, finally aimed at improving security, safety and overall civilian protection, through training and general capacity building of local partners.

While NP in the Philippines has local partners, some of NP's global network member organizations are 'thinking' NGOs -like research bodies producing papers, methodologies and diverse publications, data gathering and generation of ideas through events and conferences, thus contributing to promote peace-related debates. The case in point is the preparation of the Impact Assessment initiated by NP with the

invaluable contribution of some American academics and researchers. The assessment was administered during the evaluation field stage in several communities, the results of which will be annexed to the evaluation report in due course.

Finally there are also 'talking' NGOs amongst NP members, whose advocacy spotlights malpractice and abuses by different actors. Of the three types of activities by NP member organizations, the latter two have made not much of a feedback from their own undertakings, or channeling from NP Brussels to NPP Mindanao operations so far. However, NPP has partnerships with several 'thinking' and advocacy member organizations' support dealing with subjects of immediate relevance to their daily work in the Philippines.

It is understood that reinforced synergy of these three approaches by NP will serve well the case for peace in the Bangsamoro and Lumad lands of Central Mindanao. More explicitly, the evaluator believes that NPP staff shares this understanding as a civilian body in the midst of the IMT framework of military contingent observers. This mandated position entails permanent engagement with armed parties and handling of sensitive information that could be understood as non-impartial by parties affected, at least in some instances. NPP is much aware of these factors and gives utmost importance to the clear understanding of these crucial elements to include in peacekeeper training and refresher activities thoroughly addressing these matters to every new batch of peacekeepers arriving in Mindanao, as well as seasoned international staff and national Filipino staff.

NP's goal to develop unarmed peacekeeping and direct impact as contribution to the human security of populations caught in an armed conflict through non-violent means is instilled in staff by means of training contents and materials facilitated to all new entrants. The evaluator had a chance to look into some training materials for International Civilian Peacekeepers (ICPs) addressing the elements of non-partisanship, neutrality, acceptance, visibility, third party status, etc.. More on this, in section 3.1., as civilian peacekeepers and staff are trained to take advantage of their 'have-nots' i.e. flexibility versus bureaucracy, quick reaction versus official caution, impartiality versus political baggage, and overall 'can do' attitude in the face of hard work conditions.

In terms of timelines, as the CPC mandate will continue whether or not the peace process moves forward and/or the IMT mandate expires, NPP will remain invited to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Mindanao conflict through its CPC program. Its mandate would not expire even after the eventual withdrawal or cessation of IMT activities.

NP line management in the Philippines allows for supervision of staff activities concerning appropriateness and consistency of staff performance according to NP principles, although some loopholes are detected owing to deficiencies of the logical framework matrix and subsequent partial suitability of objectively verifiable indicators of achievement.

1.3 As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?

NPP has prepared logframes that have been successfully submitted to various donors.

The stated CPC intervention logic is:

To fulfill the mandate of the Civilian Protection Component agreement under the International Monitoring Team's official mandate as signed by both the GRP and MILF in order for the peace process in Mindanao to move forward and civilians to remain safe and protected.

Whereas the CPP logic is:

To enhance the respect for human rights and improve the likelihood of sustainable peace in Mindanao, Philippines through international ground support.

For reasons of space the full CPC, CPP and MRM on GCRV logframes are not transcribed on this report but available upon request to NP head office. The approval of the actions by the funding partners attest to their sufficient quality, however some links as to how the activities will achieve results and impact needs reviewing.

The programs' Overall Objectives (OO), Project Purposes (PP) and results are apparent and logical, addressing clearly identified needs. In some cases there is some confusion as to concepts and terminology, so results appear interchangeable with PP, or activities with results for example. They however describe a rather complex operation, basically consisting of three different projects: Conflict Prevention (CPP), MRM on GCRVs (integrated under CPP for management functions) and Civilian Protection Component.

To achieve CPP's OO five main activities have been devised with a breakdown of some 103 sub-activities. MRM on GCRV are included in the logframe by responding to the same intervention logic, with 13 activities and a set of analogous indicators.

The PP is threefold,

1. To reduce the incidents of violence in the areas where NP is present through means of unarmed international civilian peacekeeping, and thereby contributing to the maintenance of the ceasefire.
2. To support unarmed civilian peacekeeping and human rights monitoring/reporting mechanism in remote conflict areas and protect local and international actors that work for peace and human rights.
3. To increase awareness about the human rights situation and mechanisms and enhance the scope and quality of locally-based civil society organizations, local peace workers and human rights activists.

All the above targets are fully valid and consistent with the current situation in Central, Southern and Western Mindanao. PP1's achievements are difficult to verify however due to obvious limitations of geographic and population coverage, lack of information about certain incidents, and insufficient statistics so as to establish baseline data. Some organizations such as Amnesty International and the International Displacement

Monitoring Centre (see Annex 3) show trends to lower levels of general violence during the last two years, as compared to other areas in the country where two communist insurgencies operate.

CPC's OO as signed by both the GPH and MILF foresees 21 activities in the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the IMT.

The CPC's goals are fully described as per the mandate of the Peace Panels:

- 1) Ensure the safety and security of communities, including all non-combatants.
- 2) Monitor and ensure all parties respect the sanctity of mosques, churches and religious places, including schools, hospitals and all places of civilian nature.
- 3) Support relief efforts, especially relating to IDP needs, in communities affected by conflict in Mindanao.
- 4) Strengthen the connections and information-sharing among key actors in the peace process.

Of which points 2 to 4 the evaluator had direct opportunities to scrutinize during the field trip and the interviews carried out at that time, all of whose respondents giving proof –and personal satisfaction, from different perspectives- of the pertinence of the intervention design.

So there are grounds to conclude that the PPs are achievable within the program framework. On the one hand, on the official side the ceasefire being monitored by a mechanism that includes both the government and the MILF, is supported in a considerable way by NPP human and technical resources. Although there can be no empirical evidence of the degree to which NPP presence has contributed to the reduction of ceasefire breaches, NPP interacts with all four elements related to ceasefire objectives, i.e. the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), a number of local monitoring teams (LMT), the multinational International Monitoring Team IMT (staffed mostly by Malaysia) and an ad-hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG). The CCCH has set up Monitoring Posts in the conflict areas, which are manned by government and MILF soldiers as well as with representatives of local civil society initiatives, with whom NPP interplays on a regular basis.

NPP staff are also involved with several hundred local human rights defenders, peace activists or Human Rights monitors who mostly work on a voluntary basis. This capacity building exercise is a remarkable feature in this setup, about which some recommendations are posited at the end of this report.

Since the overall mission of NP in Philippines is to reduce and prevent incidents of violence in areas at high risk of violent conflict, to protect civilians facing imminent threat of physical violence, consolidate ceasefire mechanisms and to strengthen local capacity for violence reduction and protection of civilians, the evaluator concludes that activities, outputs and outcomes planned on the matrix are appropriate to achieve the PP. The array of activities in the logframes cover virtually all of the angles listed above, however the number of activities are somewhat excessive to implement, similarly with

the case of so many indicators. A redefinition of activities, at least regrouping some of them as sub-activities plus a reduction in the number of indicators would greatly systematize and clarify the picture.

CPC's logframe indicators also need further development since only in few cases they are pertinent in quantitative terms. Twenty activities on the logframe show no indicators at all. Concerning performance indicators, many of them are formulated as activities, results or facts sometimes of nearly impossible verification. Capacity development performance indicators require additional rephrasing too. Indicators showing achievement of the PP should not be confused with conflict indicators. Within the framework of the CPC individual project, attention should be directed at changes in patterns of thought and action among the target groups. Changes at this level are useful proxy indicators that can reveal progress in setting up peaceful structures.

The quality of Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs) in the CPP logframe is better, however there are dozens of them making verification of the whole lot virtually impossible, for the time and resources allocated to data gathering and statistical work would exceed any cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless some NPP managers feel comfortable with the number of indicators since the different field sites seek different results, so keeping a high number of indicators is important to them in the assumption that not every item applies for every field site. In general terms⁸ indicators should cover the fields of communication (for example number of NPP interactions in the barangays), cooperation (e.g. implementation of EWER community projects) and reform of structural causes of conflict (such as new patterns of exploitation of productive resources, or resolution of *rido* land disputes). In order to record different perceptions of the conflict situation it is advisable to observe the indicators from the perspectives of different parties to the conflict.

Concerning whether risks and assumptions hold true, the risks facing both projects and NPP staff are clearly identified on the logframes, owing to security, acceptance, volatility and financial conditions.

Security risks concern the possibility for NP staff to work with relative freedom of movement; that any increase in violence would not lead to physical attacks on NP staff and the communities they protect; and lawless elements (paramilitaries and 'lost commands') do not attack NPP personnel.

Acceptance assumptions require NP to continue having the consent to work in target areas by the communities where the programs are implemented, as well as that of all parties involved in the conflict. For this matter, identification of social networks between individuals, households, and barangays could be reflected on new funding proposals concerning the creation of social capital in order for the target groups be asked to specify the criteria according to which they would recognise their region advancing in the direction of peaceful coexistence. This information can be partially extracted from the response sheets of the impact survey assessment indeed.

Volatility risks and assumptions refer to full-scale war not breaking out due to failed peace negotiations; continued recognition of International Humanitarian Law and

⁸ GTZ: *Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management: A practical guideline.*

international standards of respect for human rights by the key parties; that all MILF and AFP commanders respect the mandate of the CPC (for the CPC program) as well as local and provincial governments abide by the agreements between GPH and MILF on this matter; plus other unidentified factors in the wider policy or institutional environments, controllable only by decision-makers beyond NPP's influence.

Financial risks refer to NP's dependence on grant awarding and timely disbursements by various funding agencies, since the current size of its operations and its financial implications are much bigger than anything NP can afford with its own resources.

NPs senior management takes very seriously every possible implication, so assumption and risk management arrangements are in place should any of the above appear close to materialize. All these risks and assumptions remain fully valid. To date none of them have materialized, save the fortunately ended kidnapping of one NP international staff in Basilan in 2009.

Concerning sustainability, it can be said that it is not an integral part of the design, although there is a phase out strategy. On the one hand, NP financing is almost totally reliant on funding from different development agencies and government grants, so in general terms the actions *per se* would be implemented so long as the funding will be forthcoming. Only the skills actually transferred to the partners would last as sustainable features, including the local EWER and CBHR monitoring networks.

On the other hand, as of now no provisions are made for a possible phase out further to the proposed strategy, in the understanding that the peace process is unfortunately far from reaching its end. NP however has thought about elements necessary to consider the mission completed: when a final peace agreement between MILF and GPH has been concluded and levels of violence and perceptions of insecurity by local people are reduced in the course of the implementation of that peace agreement, and/or government and civil society structures are able to fully meet the security needs without external support by NP.

In short, according to its principles, the basic exit strategy for the Philippines program is therefore to ensure that all activities of NP serve to strengthen the ability of local partners, peace process monitoring and implementation structures and state structures to manage violence and protect civilians, without the need for NP interventions.

The evaluator got positive feedback from other smaller or more focused projects already completed by NP with funding from various donors. The *International Ground Support to local Civil Society for Conflict Prevention and Confidence Building in Mindanao* project funded by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from January to December 2010 was positively rated by some of the present evaluation IDP interviewees.

With support from the New Zealand embassy, during the first half of 2011, NP carried out a number of Open Space Forums at various locations in its AoRs, with the theme 'Safe and Secure Communities' to give community members a neutral space to discuss security-related issues. As a result, the GPH Commission on Human Rights somehow 'recognised' NP-trained CBHR monitors in Butig, Lanao del Sur, issuing them with T-shirts and ID cards carrying the CHR logo. There is no easy way to

evaluate the impact of this work further to this endorsement, however it should become more evident over the coming months as communities may experience increased vulnerability and instability resulting from uncertainties over the peace process

1.4 Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?

Since the inception of the programme a number of stakeholders were consulted on problem analysis and specific ways to adapt NP's approach to peacekeeping to the Mindanao conditions. These consultations continue on a permanent basis when the events require adaptation or modification of existing patterns. The most recent case is the mobile team in SOCKSARGEN, where partners and stakeholders have contributed to the team's start of operations.

Coordination, management and financing arrangements are properly defined: the separate field base structures of CPC and CPP are one Field Team Leader (FTL) and one Field Coordinator (FC) to lead the CPC and CPP teams respectively. Under them there are International Civilian Protection Monitors (ICPMs) and National Civilian Protection Monitors (NCPMs) for the CPC and ICPs, plus National Civilian Peacekeepers (NCPs) for the CPP. There is also one finance assistant (shared between the CPP and CPC) plus one driver, caretaker, and night guard, led by their respective Team Leaders. However, this personnel field allocation may vary between NPP field sites.

This structure intends to support both institutional strengthening and local ownership, for which matter NP has completed a comprehensive set of standard operational procedures that include modalities of cooperation with local partners. These arrangements are clear in what pertains to capacity building and ownership in general terms, although some informants from partner organizations stated the convenience of having agreements signed with NP in order to better formalise their collaboration. For example, when they establish structures on the ground, although NP never give funds to local partners to implement their activities; the case may be that some sort of cost-sharing must be devised, dependent upon the resources a particular local partner may or may not have. This support can be in the form of providing transportation costs to the participants at trainings, or arranging meals for attendants at capacity building sessions. Sometimes NP covers the cost for a venue, or provides mobile phone loads to local monitors (in the form of phone credit, not cash) in order to ensure that monitoring of early warning indicators or human rights violations are communicated. In summary, NP provides support in conducting joint activities but will never give funds local partners. This absence of any financial support to partners is an outstanding feature of NP activities as well, in an environment where financial aspects are key to development work.

Most NP's beneficiaries live in rural barangays, as the neighborhood units at the core of local governance in the Philippines are called. Each barangay has its chairman (captain) and council elected by popular vote into office every three years. It is at the barangay level where an important number and scope of NP activities take place via direct monitoring, verification, patrolling, accompaniment and training, the main objective being to localize grassroots conflicts and address them at their early stages through dialogue. Feedback and lessons learnt from barangay experiences are considered for inclusion in the design of peace structures and capacity building

whenever applicable, especially in what concerns the barangay council's processing of all civil cases and complaints for amicable settlement. These all too frequently feature land dispute elements which start displacement of families and clans concerned, as well as to strangers to the conflict.

It has taken time for some partners to understand particular aspects of OO and PP. For example, a couple of the neediest IDP communities interviewed still expected NP to deliver relief items. Also diverse GPH higher officials in Manila and Mindanao actually believed NP was delivering miscellaneous material assistance. So inaccurate perceptions persist at both grassroots and official levels, even if NP staff routinely hand out at least two different leaflets to partners with detailed descriptions of NP characteristics and discuss the various items pertaining to approach to achieving program objectives, plus the mandate given by the Peace Panels.

All informants from the AFP and MILF proved to be well acquainted with NP purposes; however some local government and PNP units on the ground as well as several officials interviewed in Manila showed their knowledge not being so accurate about a number of key NPP attributes: i.e. geographical coverage, some aspects of modus operandi, UNICEF partnership, and interactions with CPC member NGOs.

Most of NPP's engagements regarding setting up structures falls under the CPP program, for which matter a variety of grassroots and local partners have entered in cooperation with NPP. So the timescale and range of activities vary from one place or partner to the next. In general terms these CPP agents are not as much established groups as the CPC members, most of which are organizations with full institutional life. This does not however reduce CPP effectiveness with regard to improvements operated on the population adherent to CPP activities.

Concerning whether the timescale and/or range of activities are realistic with regard to the stakeholders' capacities, several NP local partners respond to this question in diverse ways. To name nine of them, they are the Bangsamoro Center for Just Peace, the Bangsamoro Solidarity Women Forum, the Bantay Ceasefire Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, the Institute for Autonomy and Governance, the Kadtuntaya Foundation, the Mindanao People's Caucus, the Peace Advocates of Zamboanga, Sidaw ko Kalilintad, and Tiyakap Kalilintad; all of which have different backgrounds, strengths and weaknesses that make difficult a single answer to the question. It should be noted however that some of these organizations are perceived as taking strong stances on key political issues. In all cases NP has paid the necessary attention to organization analysis, the political mandate of these organizations and the composition of their staff so as to ensure that the organizations can take on a neutral or moderate, integrating role under these conditions.

To ensure legitimacy and accountability of the NPP project to local civil society and partners, an Advisory Council has been formed with prominent representatives of local peace and human rights organizations. They are stakeholders of the Mindanao based civil society who are working for peace and human rights. The Advisory Council's role is to give advice on plans and strategies, give feed-back on planned activities, act as a confederal or collegial body, recommend new activities and geographical areas to cover, and to review activities. The Advisory Council is scheduled to meet twice a year, or on an ad-hoc basis as the situation dictates.

At the same time armed actors are to be engaged although less formally; the leverage internationals have are instrumental in that respect, as current acceptance of NP's presence by those parties demonstrates.

Regarding CPC specifically, the three local NGO members have different profiles, priorities and capacities too. Two of them have been funded by the ECD following their IMT affiliation; however their capacities in staffing and logistical terms are sensibly lower than NP's.

NP continues to observe well-developed security practices to ensure the safety and security of its staff, and of the people NP works with. There were no major security threats to NPP staff on mainland Mindanao in 2011 as teams maintained their acceptance by local communities and relevant armed actors and politicians. The islands of Sulu and Basilan however continued to experience significant insecurity and instability and therefore international staff did not return to these field sites. This situation appears to be fully understandable by all donors.

1.5 How does NP put its main principles of work into practice?

All interviewees perceive NPP as a non-partisan organization indeed, its neutrality never being put into question before the evaluator. The level of trust and credibility among stakeholders, conflict parties, local and international partner organizations remain at least as high as already noted by the Swisspeace evaluation in 2010.

This independence is greatly appreciated within some official circles in Manila who deem the other three CPC members as being closer to the conflict parties, thus –in their view- NPP contributes at balancing the act within IMT's Civilian Protection Component. This perception does not however affect NP's line of work, to which NP's standards it seemingly sticks with no regard to external opinions.

The factors determining the perception of NP, either the role played by its commitment to non-violence or the religious affiliation of its staff, are multiple. Being the only international NGO with staff living permanently at several field offices, its continuous presence is probably the most defining element in the perception by third parties of NP's forward positioning. Depending on the interviewees, insights on multiple-way relationships, unimpaired permanent access to all parties, quick reaction time, proactive stance and handling of information come next. Finally a broader variety of opinions –from professionalism, dedication, empathy, overall sense of being protected or effectiveness- were reported by informants according to more subjective factors in their interpretation of facts.

Surprisingly NP's commitment to non-violence is for most of the interviewees not a distinguishable feature of NPP work, beyond the fact that every one of them agreed to this disposition. According to the majority of interviewees the variety of religious affiliations of NP staff (especially the Muslim ones) definitely adds to the quality of interaction with Moro beneficiaries, partners and stakeholders in parts of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and other Islamic areas.

As to how does the work of NP connect to NP's mission statement, the matter seems

more for NP executive staff and member organizations to assess, rather than the external evaluator. This does not prevent the evaluator from considering the NP mission statement, that establishes the primacy of working with local CSOs, in particular grassroots organizations whose membership have been directly affected by the conflict. To this end the evaluation showed that NP is usually well known to the different communities visited, their trust in its staff being clearly perceived by the evaluator.

With the NP Guatemala mission already finished, the Sri Lanka operation close to phasing out, and both South Sudan and Caucasus only recently begun, the Philippines operation is now both the cornerstone and showcase of NP worldwide. The evaluation shows that the items above are routinely pursued by NP staff, while impressive progress has been made at evolving NP from its rather elementary stage three years ago into the full blown civilian peacekeeping operation that it is today resulting from the vision, commitment and efforts of most of its field staff.

There is however little acquaintance of the average NP staff regarding the NP Main Office's role in Brussels further to its participation in the recruitment process. Except for those having served longer periods or those who have worked with NP at other country missions, the sense of belonging to a multifaceted organization such NP should be enhanced. The reassignment of the current Philippines Country Director to Brussels should be taken advantage of in order to get NP field staff more familiarized with the organization principles.

2 EFFICIENCY

How well the various activities transformed the available resources into the intended results (or outputs), in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness.

2.1 How well is the availability/usage of means/inputs managed?

The ongoing operation's financial aspects are planned on a monthly basis, NP staff being able to plan and deliver on that timeline. They cover varying AoR: for CPC, all the vulnerable areas or requested for action by the Peace Panels; for CPP, the teams will cover identified and selected conflict-prone communities within the availability of resources on the ground. No financial resources are ever expected by NP from partners. Some concerns have been raised by senior management as to the effective availability of the forthcoming EC grant, whose possible delay would definitely affect the implementation of activities from March 2012 onwards.

Staffing costs take the biggest share of program expenses. A study carried out in 2011 by the new HR Manager among all international agencies and NGOs based in Cotabato City, showed that NP's salary scale for internationals ranks within the bottom segment (25% quartile), the UN system being the highest (75%-100%). This means that NP international staff is among the lowest paid, contrasted with similar assignments in Central Mindanao. NP staff who had recently worked as international Red Cross expats for example, reckoned their income was 35% lower than what they earned before.

For local staff, NP salaries are in the middle/higher range if compared to other INGOs. Considering the relatively low per head international staffing costs, and the essentially high importance of this fact by virtue of what NP does: i.e. deploy people. A review of the salary scales should be carried out as soon as practicable in order to ensure staff retention.

ICPs for the CPP program have been deployed in three batches, on top of the staff initially assigned to start up. Their range of professional skills, age and gender varying, they have been mobilized according to plan. The number of ICPMs (40) and NCPs (20) to deploy in the field according to the CPC Program logframe has not been accomplished though, and a higher than recommended rotation of international staff has been recorded. At the time of finalizing this evaluation report NP was halfway in the process of recruiting a new batch of internationals, advertised worldwide on various development work job offer websites.

Concerning procurement, it is the requesting officers who start the expenditure cycle according to their previously submitted fortnightly plan. NP staff appear to be making their best efforts to buying provided (or available) inputs at planned cost, or lower than planned when economies of scale permit. Their knowledge of international market prices and respective authority approval ceilings -rather tight compared to other agencies now operating in the AoRs-, plus the involvement of national staff planning and procurement processes for domestic supplies, facilitate access to goods and services at local rates without overcharges, diligently making the purchasing system adequately efficient.

In what pertains to transparency and accountability on program resources management, at the beginning of NP activities only a disbursement book and a file with original receipts were used for recording and justification of expenses. In May 2009 a Finance Department was formally established following for the hiring of three already experienced finance staff. Their first tasking included the installation of generally accepted accounting principles, and segregation of duties whereby the standard cycle of transaction (reviewing, recording and approval) was entrusted to a chain of three different individuals for requesting, certifying and authorizing all payments.

The current Manual on Financial Policies and Procedures (updated early in 2010) appoints two Finance Officers for dealing separately with CPC and CPP activities based on books of account for every grant and a general ledger purposely devised for NPP needs. Monthly reports are automatically generated.

All finance operations are centralized at the Cotabato City office. Bank accounts are held in Philippine Peso (PhP) currency, as well as respective grant currencies. Exchange from grant currency into PhP is effected on a monthly basis, according to needs. Generally Forex losses are generally not eligible costs to most donors.

As to contractual procedures, no major procurement or tendering activities are implemented. Rental contracts at prevailing market rates have been signed to two offices, one training center, one staff house, four management staff apartments and eight field site offices. Allowances are provided to expats with accompanied status.

Hiring contracts are straightforward. National staff are transferred their dues into local accounts, while internationals get a fraction of their salary transferred into their overseas banks while the rest remained in local bank accounts. At the time of writing the Finance Department was administering 24 expat plus 52 local staff work contracts, the latter of which 40 regular and 12 short-term.

Vehicles are bought second hand after mechanical check-ups with some kind of refund guarantee by the vendor. The evaluator has grounds to believe that contractual procedures are clearly understood by all staff involved, and that they facilitate the implementation of the program.

The 2010 Swisspeace evaluation final text addressed no input audit or monitoring aspects. On regular monitoring of inputs so as to encourage cost-effective implementation of activities, internal audits through NP's Brussels office were conducted in 2007 and 2008, when only five expats and eleven national staff were working for NP.

In 2009 NP underwent a general external audit on the accounts prior to the arrival of the new team, prompted by NP's Brussels office for the new Finance Department to start on a clean slate, commissioned to Makati-based Sison, Carrillo & Perona (SC&P) audit firm. In 2010 an audit on EU grants was carried out by Puningbayan Inc of Manila as well as a second overall external audit, again by SC&P.

All three audits resulted in reports showing no remarks by the auditors. At the time of

writing NP was undergoing auditing of its Norwegian grant.

2.2 How well is the implementation of activities managed?

Logframes are routinely used as a management tools, together with activity schedules for each Field Office (FO). Work plans and resource schedules are used by the program management. Line management is the standard system, with two senior managers supervising staff and field office CPC and CPP activities respectively. NP has modified its organizational chart twice following adaptations to changing scenarios, a third reorganization currently in progress to accommodate new senior staffing plus the anticipated opening of a new Zamboanga FO.

The two program logframes are separately broken down into field-specific 'logframes' plus monthly workplans for each FO. Their layout includes a reporting schedule of internal daily reports, weekly and monthly reports to the IMT on ceasefire violations and verifications (for CPC program), plus separate CPP and CPC specific activity reports on training, forums, quick impact response and others as per monthly workplans. Reports are shared via e-mail with the Cotabato City main office for review and processing.

Concerning implementation of activities as initially scheduled, few delays were noticed during the evaluation while the means for their eventual rectification were apparent. As described elsewhere on this report, the CPP programmatic work counts three different subcomponents:

- Community Based Human Rights with reporting, monitoring & documentation plus CBHR training activities.
- Child Protection with monitoring/reporting specifically on six Grave Child Rights Violations as defined by UNICEF by means of proactive presence; facilitation of response through linkages, accompaniments, awareness, and capacity building to detect child rights violations at the barangay level (MRM on GCRV).
- EWER (Early Warning & Early Response) with frequent monitoring patrolling; regular exchange of information; rumor control, trainings; regular updating meetings; and facilitation of dialogue.

Basically all activities are implemented on an ongoing basis, their planning usually focused on barangays identified and prioritized as hot spots, and related to the availability of resources, perspectives of participation of partners and beneficiaries. Thus if for any reason the activities cannot be implemented as originally planned, the rather short FO planning cycle normally allows retrying over the next month or so. Although some delays were recorded, the evaluation showed no activity final cancellations.

The CPC schedule of activities responds to alleged ceasefire violations, as they happen. Besides planned monitoring and community orientations, the program has primarily reactive, unplanned activities regardless of the number of breaches actually monitored. No cases of overlapping ceasefire ruptures have taken place lately. Having

independent logistical means, NPP's four FO staff teams are able to attend up to four incidents simultaneously, if needed. On the other hand, the CPC is also proactive in terms of monitoring and having access to early warning information because of structures established through CPP-EWER program.

All activities are monitored from Cotabato City main office, in many cases requiring approval or endorsement by the senior management and the Manila office. Although CPP activities have been reframed, no need to update objectives has been proposed in order to adapt to changes in the operational context, except perhaps due to expansion of activities after the involvement on MRM of GCRVs with UNICEF and the foreseen opening of a new FO in Zamboanga City.

No external results-oriented monitoring has been arranged so far by any donor. Projects funded by the EU's Instrument for Stability (IfS) are scheduled to undergo a mid-term external evaluation in February 2011. NPP projects are funded by IfS instead of the more frequently used CSO calls for proposals.

The ongoing nature of the program has adapted well to changing political priorities at the Local Government Unit (LGU) and MILF levels. General elections took place in the Philippines in 2010. NP makes its best efforts to have peace structures recognized at the LGU level from the planning stage. Once the structure is established they are formally introduced to them, to gain legitimacy. Yet the involvement of LGUs is mainly a declaration of intentions since no fiscal commitment or contribution agreements have yet materialized. In general terms NPP programs have adapted well to the changing political environment at the field level.

At the central level though, even during the previous presidential term, NP efforts to building peace structures were not explicitly recognized by the GPH, which is not eager to accept that a foreign outfit (besides the officials IMT and ICG) could contribute to the peace process in ways other than officially mandated ones. This was clearly stated to the evaluator at various interviews with government officials in Manila.

Concerning eventual synergies, the one-way channel of information provided to the IMT from the CPC does not allow for this kind of relationships to be created, except with the other three CPC members. For its part, the CPP shares updates and info with UN agencies under the Protection Cluster of the Mindanao Humanitarian Team chaired by UNOCHA. Overall, NPP being the only organization active in its field, shares information with ICRC, UNOCHA, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, UNFPA as well as with partner NGOs.

Probably the most important NPP contribution to facilitating the work of other actors is by sharing the abundant, updated security conditions in most of its AoR where the safety situation is permanently challenged by *rido*, violent political rivalries, common criminality, the presence of the so-called 'lost commands', and private armed groups.

2.3 How well are outputs achieved?

CPP outputs relate to a wide variety of protection and humanitarian issues such human rights violations and abuses, killings, disappearances, indiscriminate shelling and bombing, house burning and looting, political violence and harassment, house to

house searches, as well as population displacement. The team intervention sequence follows the timing of alert communications by multiple informants regarding alleged occurrences of these events.

Weekly reports normally clarify whether the findings point to politically motivated events, or to *rido*. The reading of the different FO reports gives a detailed, grim picture of how prevalent and frequent human rights violations are in Central Mindanao -of which a great majority goes unnoticed or unreported by both local and national media.

Some CPC outputs are monitoring and verification reports to IMT, written independently from the other NGO/CPC members. All separate reports are merged into one by the IMT before it is sent to the Peace Panels. As to their level of satisfaction no feedback to CPC members is provided by either IMT or the panels on quality, accuracy or pertinence of the reports. A recommendation on this subject is posited at the end of this report.

Regarding CPP matters, reports on well developed, comprehensive templates cover all substantive and practical aspects of cases reported. Special mention to IDP and returnee needs: protection, security, shelter, WASH, health, education, and livelihood that are conveyed to different relief agencies active in the AoRs.

Coordination through joint weekly planning, bi-weekly meetings, daily discussions, information sharing and joint meetings with stakeholders and selective verification missions take place in order to try and link both CPC and CPP programs, particularly concerning IDP and returnee assessments, capacity building, and accompaniments.

The key question is whether the outputs achieved are likely to contribute to the intended results. Univocal, cause-and-effect relations are laborious to establish when it comes to immaterial things, like results actually spelled out in the logframes about 'reduction of potential tensions that could cause violence', or 'key stakeholders being brought together to form a synergy that allows violations and grievances to be more effectively addressed'. Or when research and statistical tools are too cumbersome to implement, or simply nonexistent like results foreseen on (sic) 'deaths and injuries related to unexploded ordinance and other security issues decreased as the Security Component of the IMT conducts clearing operations with CPC information assistance'.

It seems to the evaluator that some of the results listed in the logframes are either overambitious, however good the quality of the identification of key stakeholders and target groups (including gender and vulnerable groups analysis) and of institutional capacity issues. As already explained elsewhere on this report, the activities are conducted in a thoroughly commendable way, but a review of the logframes should better set priorities. For example it is not clear cut how to establish a cause and effect relationship for CPC Results 1.4, 1.5, 2.3, 3.2, 3.4, 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4 as well as Results Two and Four on the CPP matrix as well.

When more quantifiable, objective results are sought it appears that achieved outputs have consistently contributed to enhancing respect for human rights and improve the likelihoods of sustainable peace in Mindanao, through international ground support. This refers to counts of individuals who have participated in or benefited from NPP activities throughout the years.

2.4 How well are the Partner Contributions / Involvement working?

Reference has been made to the Advisory Council in 1.4 above. This semi-permanent consulting body contributes to enhance efficient program implementation.

Informal, routine liaisons and ad-hoc meetings take place in a variety of instances with different actors for example on security and logistics issues, participation in public events, contributions to different initiatives, etc..

No additional inter-institutional structures like steering committees or monitoring systems have been devised, except those formally appointed inside the IMT as described elsewhere in this report. Some of the interviewees stated the convenience of the information conveyed to the IMT could be made available for the public opinion to know about ceasefire developments in real time, as well as NP findings on human rights, and specially access to reports produced by the new incident database under development by NPP. In other words, some people interviewed would like to know what is going on with the IMT and CPC altogether, since keeping the information confidential is perceived by some of the representatives of third party organizations as somehow hiding details (and to some respondents, the truth) from the population. This however cannot be matter of fact, since this limitation stems from the CPC mandate which requires NPP to directly report to the IMT only

3 EFFECTIVENESS

How far the project's results are attained and the program's specific objectives achieved, or are expected to be achieved.

3.1 How well is the program achieving its planned results?

The broad spectrum of activities that NP has implemented over the last four years allow for different levels of accomplishment of results. Concerning CPC planning:

a) Documentation of the mistreatment of civilians is processed and sent to the IMT Head of Mission, thereon to the ICG, the CCCH Secretariat, and to the Peace Panels. These results are effectively achieved on a continuous basis although no follow-up or feedback is provided to NP. Periodical reporting on specific violations and other situations affecting the safety of civilians are submitted by NPP CPC personnel as flash, daily and monthly reports on the safety of civilians in NPP's AoRs.

b) The intended presence of planned numbers of civilian protection monitors in communities (40 ICPMs plus 20 NCPMs) has not materialized according to the logframes, in that this number has not been simultaneously deployed to the field. There is also a shortcoming on the foreseen 13 active field sites.

c) Civilian protection is readily available in the forms of quick response, referrals, accompaniments and physical presence. These are also largely achieved, although accurate figures on numbers of non-combatants accompanied cannot be easily ascertained. Figures of daily patrols into communities are well documented and matched by odometer and fuel consumption records, and positively appraised by the evaluator during the field trip. The two predicted Quick Response Teams (QRT) have not been formally arranged although all NP staff is on standby for immediate assignment, should circumstances require. During the field phase of the evaluation one QRT was deployed on immediate assignment: when the need arose in Naga, Zamboanga, and the QRT was deployed immediately after the green light was given by the provincial governor.

d) It is not easy to assess whether a decrease in the level of violence in most vulnerable communities is due exclusively to a regular CPC monitoring presence. An increase or decrease in violence surely has a number of causes beyond CPC activities. What is being achieved in so broad geographical and sociological scenarios can partially be appraised by the frequency and depth of actions; however some objective data on intra-community violence by some Moro community members such as women and children can be recorded by direct inquiry only, presumably for cultural reasons. Anyway NP reports incidents of violence in its AoRs and the amount of data collected by ICPMs regarding vulnerable communities is steadily growing. NP also prepares conflict maps and stakeholder analyses.

e) As stated in the previous paragraph, results of activities addressing rumors or other misinformation or lack of information are not easily evaluable. High levels of stress among the populations add to uncertainties on the objectivity of provision of enhanced security and encouragement for communities to disregard rumors at once as well as

feel safer or other psychological elements. Nevertheless rumors that are reported to NP teams are followed up and documented in monthly reports to the IMT. Patrolling contributes to deactivate rumors by means of discussions with community leaders and the population in general. The rumours are responded to by verifying information and correcting misinformation, which is then passed back to the community

f) The evaluator saw that school and religious leaders certainly get relevant inputs from the monitoring process. All imams interviewed said they talk about NPP at Friday prayer sermons, while teachers include conflict related topics in their didactic units.

g) Concerning the decrease of disturbances caused by armed actors at places of a civilian nature, NP has been successful at temporarily solving occupation of barangay offices; however they have been reoccupied because of military logic - i.e the barangay facilities belong to the GPH in the first place. Some NP staff told the evaluator about a series of successes regarding ending occupations; however the lack of time and space prevented the evaluator from analysing NPP's entire interventions in places of a civilian nature over the last few years. According to UNICEF's Manila staff, no occupation of schools or health posts have been reported since the beginning of their MRM on CGRV action.

h) Concerning improvements of freedom of movement and protection of relief workers in critical areas because of the assistance by NPP and its fellow CPC members, the quality and certainty of situation reports and security information gathered and disseminated by NPP is extremely well valued by all actors consulted. Meetings are held on a regular basis with UNDSS, which in turn shares the information supplied by NPP with all international agencies and NGOs based in Cotabato.

i) As to the ability of relief operations to operate unmolested with CPC assistance, no incidents of disruption of relief work appear to have happened yet.

j) NPP teams provide monthly reports to relevant actors and organizations with IDP assessments, their situations and needs. This is the way NPP supports delivery of relief items, sometimes to *bakwit* communities neither detected previously nor officially acknowledged by LGUs.

k) NPP teams provide accompaniment and presence whenever requested by IDPs to return to their places of origin, and safely remain there. *Bakwits* in the process of returning IDPs are monitored on a daily basis at critical locations -while weekly monitoring is effected at other less vulnerable areas.

k) The evaluator saw key stakeholders being brought together at NPP offices to discuss pending issues and grievances on their own. By facilitating neutral spaces for community meetings, discussions help to address the concerns of civilians on a variety of matters.

l) In general terms, violence reported by the CPC to the IMT prompts activities to address it in troubled barangays. NPP holds bi-monthly coordination and strategic meetings with other IMT members.

m) Concerning the decrease in deaths and injuries related to unexploded ordinance,

the evaluator could not assess this due to a lack of interviews with staff from the Security Component of the IMT that conducts clearing operations, sometimes with CPC information assistance.

n) The difficulty in measuring concrete results notwithstanding, by and large the evaluator found that regular meetings with LGUs, military commanders, local police, insurgents and other armed actors as well as the different communities have objectively increased local ownership of the peace process in terms of self-confidence and attitudes at personal and community levels. Scheduled, focused, consistent communication between actors on the ground and vulnerable communities are key to confidence building and further peace advancements, however by its own nature no meter can be devised to assess the results of this mechanism.

As to CPP:

o) Probably the most appreciated result of NPP's presence is the perceived increased safety of civilians in patrolled areas. Without a single exception, all informants gave the highest value to monitoring patrols, particularly those living in conflict prone areas as well in camps and transit sites. In general terms achievements include decreased incidents of violence in areas where security is most at risk, quicker responses to needs of the most vulnerable groups, improved HR monitoring and possible decrease in HR violations. The presence of CPP teams normally enhances protection of IDP leaders and surely helps understanding of needs and challenges to *bakwits* by local and international NGOs. Because of the lack of financial contributions by NPP, no evidence could possibly be gathered on improvements of material living standards for IDPs, or better access to social services, or increased rate of resettlement back to communities of origin.

p) The core CPP mandate revolves around reducing levels of violence and potential tensions that could cause violence. Unfortunately, *rido* has much to do with this. A number of successful NPP interventions on a handful of *ridos* were heard about by the evaluator, however minor or at least less serious cases that did not evolve into bloody confrontations. The lowering of escalations caused by rumor spreading can be inferred from this activity as well. As a preventive measure the teams are establishing EWER structures along with local partners; structures result in NPP teams receiving quick information that may be shared with other stakeholders for prevention of conflicts. Recipients of such information include the other IMT components (especially the Security Component) through CPC team.

q) Another clear result is the increased awareness of human rights and operational mechanisms to prevent human rights violations brought forth by CBHR projects. The likelihood of peace and stability through civilian participation should be attributed to these capacity building and organization activities, at least at the barangay level. The evaluation concludes that the number of partner CSOs working on protection of human rights and prevention of violations is increasing. At the barangay level, empowerment of peace committees may come from NPP presence and advice. NPP human rights reporting appeared adequate and effective as per current standards. There was also evidence of a comparative increase of self-perceived empowerment amongst local peace workers and human rights activists trained by NPP and its partners. On the other hand no evidence could possibly be gathered on CPP effects at reducing

numbers of possible extra judicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions.

r) Regarding elevated confidence and credibility of local civilians' activities as a result of improved safety, this result belongs to the group of intangibles as well as those referred to in the logframes as 'more open spaces for activists to work in communities without international protection'. The same applies to raising knowledge and skills in non-violent conflict transformation methods. Some evidence was apparent in the larger numbers of women working in NGOs –although mostly non-paid work- and increased cooperation and networking amongst NGOs. It is fully clear however that NPP has contributed to better access of local NGOs to international actors and agencies. NPP also reports on its effectiveness at connecting local NGOs and Human Rights activists to the GPH Commission on Human Rights (CHR)

s) Even considering its recent start, the prospects for the MRM on GCRV project are good for the creation of protective environments and the establishment of structures through which violations will be mitigated, monitored, reported and responded to, based on UNICEF's methodology. It is however early to assess any augmentation on the number and quality of CSOs working for the protection of child rights and prevention of violations, any comparative increase of empowered child rights workers, and especially a reduced number of GCRVs. Reporting and monitoring systems are already in place, to the explicit satisfaction of UNICEF officials.

The above having been said however, improvements need to be made in what concerns OVIs and targets, as well as the way they are being reported against: OVIs in both logframes cannot be called SMART⁹ because quite often their formulation in qualitative, vague or subjective terms makes it necessary for some acknowledgement of the role of personal perception in their interpretation. Furthermore, a number of them depend on the way events are understood in media reports and public surveys etc, which likely bring about various influences external to the program, for example in cases of the growing tensions between AFP and MILF that followed the October 2011 firefights, rumors on MILF troops mobilization towards Basilan, and the like.

This does not impair NPP from reporting against the indicators in a detailed and comprehensive fashion. NPP report templates include sections covering practically every activity listed in the logframes, which in turn contemplate most of the manners armed conflict may take place, so NPP the accuracy and scope of reporting is appropriate and attuned to circumstances.

Concerning staffing matters, after the initial arrival of the first NP staff in Cotabato City in 2007, new arrivals entered on a person-by-person basis until the first batch of internationals was deployed in mid-2009. The second batch came in May 2010, and the last one in October 2010. Many of the Filipino staff have been working from two to four years now, the latest significant recruitment for the entire Financial Department taking place in May 2009.

Staffing is seemingly the weakest point of NPP, not because of a lack of professional quality of its members -which by any standards is remarkably good. The Swisspeace evaluation already noted the high turnover of personnel during the two previous years.

⁹ SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound

This situation seems to be repeating itself in terms of rates of people moving out: Nearly half of those deployed in May 2010 did not renew their contracts, and only four remain from the twelve whom arrived in October last year. Fourteen people have left since June 2011. A key grant was delayed for eight months at that time, resulting in payroll difficulties. It appears that duty station hardship conditions, lack of recreational facilities in these parts of Mindanao, and even fear of kidnapping influenced some of the staff's decision to leave.

Hiring is carried out by the Cotabato City main office with support from NP's Brussels headquarters. The process is not at all taken lightly since, besides the usual fulfilment of qualifications and experience asked for in the job descriptions, candidates need to complete a number of questionnaires on which the salary and living conditions are clearly described. Regardless, staff quit the organization, so full information on work specifics does not prevent the retention of staff from being a constant issue that debilitates the organization, affecting operations and cost-effectiveness. Among other things, adaptation and the learning curves need being restarted all over again by the replacements, and the costs of deployment are not always recoverable; although if any international staff break a contract before the completion of one year, he or she is required to pay back the cost of the ticket and the in-country-training as per the employment contract.

The evaluator cannot endorse Swisspeace's overall perception that most staff joined NPP very early in their professional careers, using NPP as a stepping stone to better paid posts with other international non-governmental organizations. Moreover the observation –at that point in time- was that most of the international and national staff had very little or no management or planning expertise and experience at all. This view cannot be assumed either, because the picture now looks very different to what appeared to be last years: every personnel interviewed during this evaluation –and all but one have been engaged during it- showed academic and professional qualifications as well as previous experience of high value to both NPP's and the program beneficiaries' expectations. In particular, expatriates who have worked with similar organizations, many times at hardship postings including NP's Sri Lanka operation and other demanding assignments in Africa. Only two of them openly recognized they were there mainly to gain experience for their next job's applications and to be more likely to succeed at prospective organizations.

The perception of the evaluator is that the issue of comparatively low pay is reasonably a major cause of voluntary contract terminations, especially if other job opportunities emerge during the time of service with NPP. More competitive benefit packages have been requested individually, on which matter a formal proposal was sent to Brussels in June 2011 with no reply as of February 2012.

NP's Philippine chapter is now well underway in the reorganization process that will surely change how the organization operates. After the failed attempt at introducing a Deputy Country Director, a new organizational chart has been developed wherein two senior managers (program and operations) will be inserted between the current Country Director and the two program managers. These changes are not only reinforcements for they come after a period of shared thinking on how to go about new resource mobilization and perspectives for project development. The recruitment process was ongoing at the time of this writing, the posts being advertised on various

websites with a number of staff applying internally.

Both CPP and CPC teams are separately manned by assigned personnel as clusters in each of the FOs, except for the CPP team operating in SOCKSARGEN which is deployed from Maguindanao on an ad-hoc basis. Although there are no international staff due to security reasons, both the Sulu and Basilan offices are operational: The Sulu office retain 2 staff – one dedicated to the CPC and one to the MRM on GCRVs project, while the Basilan office staff is dedicated to the new MRM on GCRVs. Personnel assigned to either team in principle are not interchangeable, although eventual support can be expected from colleagues when so required. Line management is properly implemented in general, with only a few cases reported of top-down bypassing, especially on urgent matters.

Some staff commented on mounting workloads after the departure of international staff quitting the organization, and the doubling of area covered such as the unification of the Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur provinces under the Iligan FO jurisdiction. The General Santos office experiences periodical difficulties when dealing with all its tasking especially in cases of sick leave and Rest & Recreation. One of its members could not take his annual leave because of tight schedules. Long travel distances to reach remote locations in this three-province AoR overstretch the team's mobility capacities, even if selected hotspots are given priority.

Some teams complained about stringent security rules, as enforced from the Cotabato City main office with no easing even after requests were made to lower some security regulations. Others were dissatisfied about the explicit paragraph on their NP ID cards stating that the organization will pay no ransom to kidnappers, considering the clarification not necessary. This is something the evaluator cannot appraise because of NP internal policy reasons and the fact that, save the spring 2009 kidnapping of an ICP, no serious security incident has happened again -probably owing to the new security standards prepared with help from an external advisor.

NPP has nearly finalized its library of manuals, guidelines, policy briefs, administrative and human resource practices, reports, performance indicators, forms, templates and standard operational procedures outstandingly well. Over fifty internal documents – reading material and fill-in forms- have been designed and tested to cover all purposes of daily operations.

The adequateness of recruitment, training and preparation of international staff and the management team for their jobs has been unanimously highly rated by the interviewees, the contents and duration of training periods seen properly devised for the new arrivals to get acquainted with the Mindanao situation. Locals are requesting some supplementary training, or arrangements be devised for them to continue their education such as by allowing them to attend conferences, seminars and formal trainings held in their AoRs –sometimes during office hours, or have registration fees paid for by NPP.

There are two types of NP training: Core Mission Preparedness Training (CMPT) is contrived to send international civilian peacekeepers into conflict zones in countries other than their own. Its contents address elements of non-partisanship, neutrality, acceptance, visibility, third party status, etc, which particularly applies to ICPs. The

training also focuses on cultural sensitivity -as not only are the internationals from different extractions, but more importantly they are trained to enter and work in different cultural environments.

Considering the different educational and professional backgrounds of NPP staff, lack of sufficient experience by a number of personnel on management subjects is to be expected. The growth of NPP grants and resources imply further requirements from funding agencies with respect to results and accountability. Training of new batches of recruits should enhance Project Cycle Management issues with a view to steering the initiatives towards outputs, results, outcomes and impact. Familiarity with subjects like logframes, indicators, verification tools and reporting are required by most donors and partners alike, in order to standardize NPP procedures.

Whilst elements of CMPT may also apply to local staff, it has been specifically designed to address the peculiarities of deploying expatriates. Current local staff qualify for this training (they have attended in the past) if they were being deployed as an CP in other NP country programs. In the past, local staff from Sri Lanka have attended CMPT, and later been deployed in the Philippines and South Sudan. If current Filipino staff would like to work in another country program, they can apply for ICP positions, and then will attend CMPT.

On the other hand In-country Training (ICT) applies to all staff, conducted for both locals and internationals. It appears that all current programmatic staff in the Philippines has attended one of these trainings, addressing some of the elements which are also covered by CMPTs such as civilian peacekeeping strategies, but particularly addresses the Mindanao context, and the types of projects NPP conducts in the Philippines. Filipino staff are not considered ICPs but NCPs instead.

In a different vein, one item constantly raised by personnel was food in the office, especially by Filipino staff. One could say that enjoying the sharing of food is part of the national culture: it is customary that food be brought around when three Filipinos meet. All local staff plus some expatriates requested NPP to provide meals for the staff to have their lunch together, as a topping to salaries as well as development of some sort of table fellowship. Concerning working conditions away from the office, restrictive per diem eligibility regulations and long travel hours resulted in allegedly embarrassing situations- when it came to lunch times- among staff, drivers and colleagues from other organizations traveling along.

The provision of scheduled meals could also help building a feeling of home for expatriate ICPs/ ICPMs living in the Philippines. Even if staff knew beforehand about inherent difficulties for strangers living 24/7 under the same roof, individual arrangements and non-sharing of lunch and dinner breaks may generate cumulative stress among staff; especially on Sundays when most of the time security restrictions and lack of vehicles oblige them to remain in the premises. Sitting together at lunch is a normal practice in several organizations with profiles similar to NPP.

The multinational and multicultural composition of the teams plays a significant role for the outcomes of their work. At the time of this writing NPP international staff came from Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, DR Congo, Ghana, India, Kenya, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, UK and USA, with a wide majority of citizens

from developing countries who in many cases had either themselves and/or their families experience displacement and war. This is certainly basic in their commitment to NPP, so many times perceived by stakeholders as hardworking, unconditional and sometimes even termed 'passionate' work attitude. The national staff comprise of Moro, Christian and Lumad from a variety of provinces in the three regions of the Philippines. NP staff without exception believe gender not to be an issue in the workplace at all, with women staff representation appropriately balanced. The three top organization positions are held by men, with three women in the management team.

Concerning fieldwork, participation of Muslim women is still a challenge, however work with females is targeted on virtually every aspect of the program, from logframes to focus in gender aspects of internal displacement, to attendance of women in trainings and work groups organised together with partner CSOs. NPP is actively supporting the new MPC Women Contingent based in Aleosan. In February 2012 NPP was also setting up a CBHR structure in Marawi with the Philippine Muslim Women Council as a local partner, composed of 34 local all-female monitors.

All personnel interviewed said Human Resources relations have very much improved since the arrival of the new Human Resources Manager.

Concerning geographical coverage, in principle all planned target groups have access to program results with no factors preventing the target groups from accessing NPP services -except those deriving from logistical considerations. The combined Central Mindanao AoRs cover a land surface similar to Switzerland, home to a population in excess of 5 million inhabitants. The main five provinces hold a population density of 134 inhabitants per square kilometer, slightly less than half the average of the Philippines.

The recently started Civilian Protection Component activities in SOCKSARGEN render an accurate picture of what NPP influence is like in startup operations. The mobile team's objective is to establish a functional system and effective mechanism for monitoring, verifying and reporting on compliance (or non-compliance) of the parties to their commitments under international and national humanitarian and human rights laws, to take effective care to protect civilian populations and their properties against dangers arising from armed conflict areas. On the other hand, SOCKSARGEN CPP is covered by the Maguindanao FO. For this matter it should be described how both CPC and CPP programs interplay: Basically they use the same area profiles and conflict and stakeholder mappings, some times interchanging resources and personnel when necessary. Workplans and activities are carried out so as to avoid duplicating visits to same localities simultaneously. Contacts and information sharing takes place on a continuous basis to ensure both programs are on the same level, and follow-ups taken by the appropriate team. They jointly organize common events like Community Forums.

On communication with Cotabato City main office, both teams coordinate themselves to ensure that the same information is not communicated by different people. Coordination is effected with regards to leave and Rest & Recreation plans, to ensure no task is left without a responsible person

On CPP matters NPP maintains channels of communication and interaction with an

array of stakeholders, concentrating efforts in barangays that have been flagged as hotspots. This multiplicity of contacts has proven the cornerstone of NPP's acceptance, however the limits in the size of their operation, remoteness of many communities and availability of resources narrows down access to services both ways. Concerning the CPC, monitoring assignments are prompted by circumstances as they unfold, NPP being able so far to cope with logistics and mobilization expenditures although some worrying funding constraints could possibly loom over the short term horizon.

3.2 As presently implemented what is the likelihood of the PP to be achieved?

When asked whether the projects are achieving the outcomes and ends as expected in their formulations, it should be taken into account that all funding agencies work on a yearly program cycle basis, where there is no obvious timeframe or deadlines for peace to be achieved. In this respect the evaluator was able to appraise that overall the activities were carried out in ways consistent to what had been proposed to donors. Even if the MRM on GRCV project started only recently, feedback from UNICEF officials was positive. In general, terms the program have adapted well to changing external conditions to ensure benefits for the target groups. Fortunately no major risks as identified in the logframes have actually occurred so far, with the assumptions fully realized for the time being.

The *rido* question remains always open because of its wider implications and tendency to interact in damaging ways with the secessionist conflict, by bringing about additional forms of armed violence. NPP reports tell how many armed confrontations involving insurgent groups and the army are actually triggered by local *rido*. These hostilities greatly contribute to human loss of life, widespread suffering and long-term internal displacement that frustrate the peace process.

Since *rido* falls outside NPP's mandate, but some of its partners deal literally on a daily basis with these kind of occurrences, the establishment under NPP auspices of community-initiated networks for monitoring of conflicts in the making, and mechanisms for quick response based at the barangays are helping resolution of ongoing *ridos*, preventing them from escalating into bigger conflicts, or interaction with previously existing ones that could get out of control. In other words, NPP responds to *rido*, albeit carefully by engaging partners, contacting ground commanders where necessary, providing presence and influence by engaging key stakeholders, monitoring the civilian ground situation, *rido*-generated IDPs and so forth.

NPP has been instrumental at enhancing and supporting the growth of hybrid institutions or systems composed of ad-hoc and more formal structures utilized by barangay captains, elders and communities to managing conflicts, getting some recognition of their existence by third parties as well. NPP is also looking for potential and recognized community and religious leaders able to mediate in civil law contentions outside NPP's scope of activities. This effect on *rido* is probably the most positive NPP contribution to improving the environment of non-political violence at the community level. As an organization and at field site level, all staff are very aware that *rido* is at the base of the most frequent and biggest amounts of violence and civilian displacement.

3.3 How does NP relate to other national & international actors in the Philippines?

Interactions with ICRC, INGOs and UN agencies happen on a needs basis, sometimes ad-hoc, or case by case basis, most of the time on exchange of information on barangay developments and security situations. NPP is also part of the Mindanao Humanitarian Team and Protection Cluster, whose scheduled meetings are regularly attended.

Concerning NPP's work with people associated with different parties to the conflict, like the various ethnic, religious, gender, age or class groups in the society, the evaluation covered six provinces in Central and Southern Mindanao, a north to south strip of land home to Muslim Maranao and Maguindanao ethnic groups that constitute MILF's most important stronghold on the island. Other different ethnic groups live in Sulu and Basilan, the only two FOs that the evaluator could not visit due to security constraints. A number of various Christian settler groups from the Visayas and Luzon have mixed up during the second half of the 20th century in the region, preserving little of the previous identities from their islands of origin. These are the three largest human groups, of which the Moro are fragmented into many clans. NPP maintains relations with all of them -although most prominently with Muslims.

Interactions with the Lumad are less intense or frequent because their scarcer presence in AoRs, following the general pattern of Lumads getting less attention and support from international actors in Mindanao, than the rest of people affected by the conflict.

Children are largely overlooked in peacekeeping processes even if they suffer disproportionately in war. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child obliges states to take measures to ensure the protection of children's rights both in peace and war time. UNICEF's Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism is the outcome of years of attention on the context of children distressed by armed conflict, aimed at preventing GCRV.

In August 2011 NPP and UNICEF signed a Project Cooperation Agreement for MRM on GCRV in NPP's AoRs. By way of the UNICEF initiative, NPP is directly involved in monitoring, documenting and generating a response against GCRVs. With a duration of one year, it is the first and only signed in the Philippines for the time being.

MRM includes three components of monitoring, reporting and response to six GCRV:

- Killing and maiming of children
- Recruitment and use of children
- Attacks on schools and hospitals
- Rape and grave sexual violence
- Abduction of children
- Denial of humanitarian access

The agreement covers salaries for 13 monitors (of whom three international) plus some training, logistics and overheads. UNICEF decided this modality of cooperation

because NPP's capability to operate in no-go areas for UN agencies due to security constraints, as well as facilitation because of the similarities with the mandate NPP already has with the CPC of the IMT.

A number of incidents have been reported by NPP including occupation of schools by armed troops, and one case of a child murdered by gang men. NPP reports are to be compiled by UNICEF as verified reports to the UN Secretary General. NPP is to support MRM strategies for linking the gathering of spotted cases with immediate response. UNICEF officials in Manila expressed their satisfaction with the Project Cooperation Agreement results so far.

The evaluator asked different informants on indicators of instances where NPP's presence, or the behavior of any of its employees, may have done harm or contributed to conflicts. Not one case was reported to the evaluator: Abiding to the principle of confidentiality seems to have always been the case, as per standard NP norms on events interpretation and sharing of information with third parties.

3.4 Swisspeace Effectiveness evaluation 2010

In early 2010, NP commissioned Mrs. Cordula Riemann of the Swisspeace Foundation to carry out an evaluation of the NPP project in the Philippines. Swisspeace is a practice-oriented peace research institute whose mission statement is analyzing the causes of violent conflicts and developing strategies for their peaceful transformation.

Swisspeace is affiliated with Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP), an international collaborative learning experience on practical peace work initiated and organized by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Based in Cambridge, Massachusetts USA, more than two hundred organizations together with over 1000 peace practitioners were involved in its first research phase, looking into 26 case studies from 1999 to 2003. RPP puts center-stage the question of how can international agencies engaged in peace practice make their efforts more effective. The RPP Matrix is one of the main analytical instruments which help strategic planning, monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of a program.

RPP focuses on the criteria of Effectiveness based on a definition that does not coincide with DAC's concerns as to how much the project's results are attained, and the project's specific objectives achieved, or are expected to be achieved. It does not use logframes, OVIs or anything similar to Project Cycle Management tools. As a matter of fact, according to some RPP authors (sic) 'there are no internationally accepted standards for effectiveness in peace building as such. Where evaluative conclusions are attempted in the average peace building evaluation (which is not the norm) they are generally based on implicit norms or expectations possessed by the evaluation team'. So one major question arises as to the applicability of RPP methodology as an all-encompassing evaluation tool to any specific project. In their pursuit for objectivity, evaluators are supposed to use a commonly accepted framework where concepts and terminology are standardized.

Swisspeace's background conflict and political context analysis of Mindanao are fully valid these days (see evaluation report on NP website) as well as most of its conclusions and recommendations. It should be noted though that NPP's approach to

field activity continues being –in RPP terminology- a ‘more people’ than ‘key people’ type of operation. The evaluation offered the ground an opportunity for collaborative sharing and learning on the latest thinking of conflict analysis and strategic program design, and monitoring in peace building under the RPP.

The case in point being that NPP’s efforts are based on planned, time bound, donor-led, specific-objective set activities, while RPP’s scope comprises wider peace dynamics. RPP methodology collects five criteria (sub-criteria indeed, if considered within DAC’s evaluation template) of effectiveness which helps to analyze and understand whether a program or peace effort had or will have tangible effects, however without full consideration of the mandate (or self-imposed limitations) of the actors involved in the operation object of the evaluation.

Eighteen months ago Swisspeace concluded that NPP fulfilled only two of its five effectiveness criteria, nevertheless clarifying that a peace building effort or program is considered effective if one or more of the five criteria are met. It was also understood that the more criteria were complied with, the more effective the program’s rating. On the other hand the second clarification read that it was ‘beyond the scope of this evaluation to unpack the different definitions of key terms in conflict and peace research, such as *peace keeping* and *peace building*, and how they are used in the NP family’. The report reflected without critically challenging the different use of terms by NP staff and partner organizations.

Even if the author of the present evaluation is not fully familiar with the RPP process, conceptual framework, tools and terminology, one conclusion of the evaluation is that NPP now appears to be accomplishing two additional RPP criteria, numbers 2 and 5 on top of the already conceded numbers 3 and 4. This looks even more important given that NPP is undergoing a noticeable consolidation and expansion of resource availability, scope, depth and coverage of field and liaison activities at the time of report-writing, that could explain why the organization is reaching out for the two new criteria, for:

Criterion 1 is met ‘when the effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances in situations where such grievances do, genuinely, drive the conflict’. This one is beyond the mandate of NPP, basically a civilian peacekeeping organization is by its nature outside established political institutions, even more so when impartiality is one of its basic principles.

Criterion 2 is accomplished ‘when the effort contributes to a momentum for peace by causing participants and communities to develop their own peace initiatives in relation to critical elements of context analysis’. The present evaluation finds that this criterion has been already realized by way of miscellaneous, ongoing trainings that are laying the ground for the communities to reflect, self-organize and act in the wake of knowledge acquired from NPP and its partner CSOs. Absolutely every organization consulted stated that NPP’s role at proposing, advising and giving shape to local grassroots organizations as well as establishing participative bodies for NGOs had created new dynamics in many barangays, in particular those branded as hot spots.

Criterion 3: The effort prompts for ‘people increasingly to resist violence and provocations into violence’ was considered met by the Swisspeace evaluation

previously. This current evaluation exercise confirms Dr. Riemann's perception.

Criterion 4: The effort results in 'an increase in people's security and in their sense of security'. Just like the previous one above, this was confirmed by Swisspeace earlier, and is a part of the present evaluation findings as well.

Criterion 5 materializes 'when the effort results in meaningful improvements at inter-group relations, reflected -for example- in changes in group attitudes, public opinion, social norms, or public behavior'. There are a number of individual and social psychology elements to this criterion; however the this evaluator has been able to perceive those traits among participants in training sessions, and respondents to the impact assessment surveys AFP, PNP and MILF personnel besides NPP's overall confluence with various avenues of peace work in Mindanao. Dr Riemann accorded NPP partial fulfillment of Criterion 5, the current evaluator believing it is being fully achieved during the time intervening between the two evaluations, at least in some barangays; clarification notwithstanding on the application of different definitions of key terms in conflict and peace that could prevent the fulfillment of this criterion from being confirmed by academics and full-time RPP experts.

The Swisspeace evaluation concluded that the formulation of objectives of NPP's project was too general, vague and difficult to measure, the overall goal of NPP's program remaining unclear and open to speculation. To this perception Swisspeace made the caveat that 'the unspecific formulation of objectives and the overall goal of NP in the Philippines may be best explained by the very dynamics of start-up phase of NP's Philippines program and the implicit wish of NP to accommodate for the multiple interests of very different local stakeholders'.

The evaluator subscribes both statements and finds that certainly the availability of documentation describing fundamental NPP operational details was insufficient at the time of Dr. Riemann's mission, though not so anymore since the drafting of the various program logframes submitted and approved by NP donors, plus subsequent updates of www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org have normalized the alleged documentary deficit.

4 IMPACT

Extent to which the objectives of the project have been achieved as intended, in particular the planned project overall objective.

4.1 What are the direct impact prospects of the program at Overall Objectives level?

The overall objective of CPC is to fulfill the mandate of the Civilian Protection Component agreement under the International Monitoring Team's official mandate, as signed by both the GPH and MILF in order 'for the peace process in Mindanao to move forward and civilians to remain safe and protected'.

NPP becoming an official part of the peace process structures is presumably the most evident, long term impact; especially so when the CPC component would stay put in the future even if the IMT were discontinued for whatever reason. Even if the CPC mandate is going to be reviewed after two years, for now NPP is mandated without expiry date, to ensure the safety and security of civilians and their communities, particularly all non-combatants. The way things stand now NPP has earned a sufficiently good reputation so as to keep itself indefinitely invited to belong to the CPC by the Government and MILF Peace Panels.

In turn, the overall objective of CPP is to enhance the respect for human rights and improve the likelihoods of sustainable peace in Mindanao through ground support. Different to the CPC's, the mandate of CPP is co-terminus with that of the other CPC members.

However difficult to assess or measure in absolute objective terms, the ongoing support to human rights training, monitoring and reporting mechanisms is perceived by the evaluator as resulting in increased, lasting awareness in various populations in Mindanao regarding the human rights situation there. Individuals interviewed unanimously stated the enhancement of the degree, scope and quality of work of locally-based civil society organizations, local peace workers and human rights activists. Discussions at focus groups revealed beneficiaries that clearly identified examples of improvement in their personal security, livelihood, access to isolated farmland, and the general environments in their barangays.

Appraisal of the impact of programs of this nature is frequently indeterminate, particularly in its early stages. Openness to monitoring inside the communities, the value of NPP's presence, accepting the influence of training and fora at the community level, the benefits of conflict prevention work, and the resolution of *rido* for example, can be acknowledged only when all actors are in a position to engage with one another after their confidence has been successfully raised. This is particularly true when it comes to getting the views of some individuals in positions of authority, who 'don't talk to people' themselves, or who are personally involved in *rido* cases. The evaluation showed abrupt differences in the level of familiarity of some interviewees holding seniority positions, when compared with other peers at similarly high positions. In other words, some people knew the details; others cared only about capitalizing on the political implications of NPP's work without caring much about what the actual delivery of it actually was. This relates due to attention paid by RPP to 'key people', a

matter on which some recommendations are made in the final chapter of this report.

On the 'more people' side of the RPP equation in the Swisspeace methodology, a certain level of permanence can definitely be credited to efforts made to embed the programs in the primary partner's local structures, community-based organizations and beneficiaries working to prevent violence and protect human rights on the ground. Even if NPP does not resolve *rido*, the organization can however (as part of a EWER project for example) support civil society partners to engage in a *rido* dialogue.

An important direct impact of NPP's programs seems to have taken place with NGOs, CSOs and other institutions that were implementing action plans incorporating some ideas or components proposed by NPP staff, out of its programmatic approaches to peacekeeping and conflict prevention. The NPP training programs are expected and confirmed -especially by volunteers- to contribute to further capacitate developments of civil society, especially in far-flung locations where logistical access is very limited because of remoteness, acute *rido*, or serious safety hindrances.

Another important impact -aside from accompaniment- is linking people to authorities or agencies. NPP has contributed to improvements building innovation and capacity for drafting of project proposals by its partners in order for them to have access to diverse funding schemes; having as well identified supplemental bodies that in the future could benefit from NPP support in this matter.

Neither of the last two impacts falls under the peacekeeping concept when defined in dissociate terms; however these impacts are to be considered as lasting, particularly among the youth that make up most of the voluntary work.

Last but not least, NP staff security is based on the acceptance and trust by the local community. There is no other way to reach any security status similar to the one NPP has built for itself than close knowledge of the communities in which they work. People in the communities seeing unarmed, uniformed civilian peacekeepers freely moving around and going about their business unhindered must certainly have an impact among the overall population, especially the most vulnerable and children.

Other impacts appear likely on the overall peace process as well. In common parlance peace building seems to bear on overcoming contradictions lying at the root of the conflicts. A number of national and international organizations describe their activities in conflict zones as peace building, including the provision of technical assistance for democratic development, promotion of conflict resolution and reconciliation, DDR of former combatants, strengthening the rule of law, improving the standard of living and protecting human rights, and security sector reform.

The role of NPP in the midst of the complex Mindanao low-intensity war has been depicted in previous sections of this report. NPP is also concerned about the fact that while the Muslim-Christian strife of two peoples (plus the many Lumads) seeking the same land and limited resources of Mindanao dominates the coverage of the media, clan conflicts are certainly more disturbing in people's daily lives, particularly of those residing in traditional Moro locations and areas bordering with Christian settlements. NPP is fully aware that so many times rural dwellers are more worried about the persistence of clan feuding and its utterly destructive impact on their communities,

rather more than the collision between the state and rebel groups in Mindanao. Internecine conflicts equate to implosion of the traditional social fabric of Mindanaons, to which there seems to be no alternative, or end in sight.

The underlying strategy of the CPP is to empower citizens to constitute a critical mass of people very much bearing upon a valid, just resolution of the conflict. These (mostly volunteer) actors are the ones that can induce a change in policies by both contestants. Once again, the RPP 'more people' approach, because 'key people' simply cannot solve (for example) the myriad of *rido* going on. Even if *rido* issues are most of the times clearly off the mark of NPPs mandate, the daily contact with *rido* situations makes NPP wonder how to go about such distressing phenomenon.

In general terms there is no official policy support provided to mitigate *rido*, other than the MILF and MNLF's high command cautious approach when it involves its own affiliates, AFP and/or local political actors. It is unlikely that the GPH will get involved in solving *rido*, or that international cooperation resources will be made available for *rido*-related matters. But *rido* victims and people displaced by its outbursts still need protection, patrolling, accompaniment, links and the rest of the services provided by NPP -even if their predicament is not directly caused by struggles of a political nature.

It can also be added that the people trained by NPP, mostly local partners, are taking initiatives in resolving *rido*. This is the indirect result of NPP's capacity building with immediate results on conflict mediation. The case of MOGOP, one of the CPC members dealing mostly urban-based cases of *rido*, gives a clearer understanding of how getting involved in *rido* issues does not mean losing track of the political aspects of conflict prevention and protection of civilians.

NPP's contribution to the organizational development of CSOs is key to its modus operandi. NPP is also conscious that *rido* is often unpalatable to many Philippine, international, multilateral, official and non-governmental organizations. But looking back NPP sees that its work - particularly with Maranao and Maguindanao ethnic groups- could well be the embryonic phase for outsiders supportive of *rido* resolution to step in, for the sake of protecting civilians.

In other words, NPP finds itself at some stage where the refinement of their ideas could end in development of proposals and support to individuals and organizations willing to deal with this kind of infighting in parallel to the similar, usually destructive, politically motivated frays.

For this matter another important impact could be derived from the ongoing set up of an incident database, prepared by an external consultant, with inputs from various NPP reporting sources and mechanisms. One of the key challenges for those who are following the GPH-MILF peace process e.g. international community, researchers and other interested parties, has been the insufficiency (or sheer absence) of data regarding the status of the peace process - meaning, how it is evolving in the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao. Traditionally there is a noticeable tendency for people not to report crimes to authorities, although according to some studies those who have suffered kidnapping went to the police. Those who reported murders or homicides went either to the barangay captain, the police or their clan leader. In the Autonomous

Region of Muslim Mindanao¹⁰ (ARMM) murders and homicides are reported either to the barangay captain or their clan leader, but not to the police. In non-ARMM areas, the reverse is true – murders and homicides are reported to the police rather than to the barangay captain or a clan leader. Many of these crimes are blatant human rights violations, adding other forms of violence in Mindanao to violence resulting from the GPH-MILF conflict, this being addressed by the peace process. The explicit examination of the link between both kinds of violence and the role played by NPP in overall reporting of violent incidents resulting from the security situation directly related to the conflict, falls beyond the scope of this evaluation. However, last years' reports from reputable human rights organizations show a decrease of violations by the contending 'official' parties while other kinds of violent crime grew steadily.

Certainly some data is independently available from both the GPH and MILF; however the information is often restricted or limited to formal requests on specifics. Sometimes the information is skewed towards the interests of either party, when one may tend to project lower levels of violence to show that an area is 'stable,' or another one could exaggerate on the number of IDPs to gain more sympathy during cases of military action, etc. not to mention the role played by the media, interest groups and third-party political affiliations. This is part of well-known propaganda war practices.

NPP acknowledged that what was needed was a set of objective, independently elaborated information sets that would strive to render a more accurate picture of the ground situation in Mindanao. Considering that NPP is actually present at the very epicenter of the conflict areas, it was recently decided to try out a database system to serve as a repository of day-to-day incidents related to the peace process. The database will record ceasefire-related incidents, clan feuds, and civilian protection incidents in order to generate statistics, trends, and eventually analysis, for the consumption of key audiences as well as NPP's own programs.

Right now, the database system also helps in supporting the circulation of the Mindanao Updates, a bi-monthly newsletter created to provide incident-related data and other details for an external audience. In addition, any relevant information like numbers of IDPs recorded per month, details of any particular incident and NPP intervention therein, etc, can readily be accessed through the system without having to manually go through the paperwork of previous reports.

The database system itself is for NPP internal use at the moment, considering the sensitive nature of the contents and details of the incidents that NP records on the ground. NPP is very careful with handling and disseminating information involving GPH-MILF-related conflicts because the very mandate NPP carries as a direct participant in the GPH-MILF peace process architecture as member of the CPC. At the inception stage of the discussions on the database, there were nevertheless suggestions for some sort of an online version, initially to allow the NPP field teams' access to the data; discussions on the matter have not yet crystallized as the undertaking is still in its initial stages, the test running having started in late 2011.

Presumably there is no other group at the moment cataloging this kind of information aimed at rendering how the ground situation develops.

¹⁰ 15th region of the Philippines, located in the southern portion of Mindanao. Includes the mainland provinces of Lanao del Sur, Marawi City, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Basilan, covering 4% of the country's total land area.

4.2 How is NP perceived by its partners, IMT and key authorities involved in the peace process?

Interpretations of NPP's perceptions vary according to political points of view and specific interests or needs of different groups. To civilians and partners, NPP's program is an exceptional resource in support of their plight. *Bakwits* emphasize their appreciation of accompaniments and linkages to relief organizations. To every MILF personnel interviewed, NPP is perceived as the only organization that can provide protection and training in a neutral fashion at barangays populated by its adherents. LGUs also highly value EWER and CBHR activities. The IMT's military observer role relies on NPP as the major player in the CPC's non-military aspects. Diverse GPH officials have variant opinions, with the common element of NPP as a liaison with the MILF: key contributors to mutual understanding at barangays of mixed population, promoters of culture of peace, restrainers of violence, balancing act in the CPC's majority of 'leftist' or pro-MILF non-governmental organizations, among others.

NPP is an outstanding source of information on conflict incidents and overall security in specific places and hotspots. This information is usually shared with different interested parties and extremely highly appreciated by them, within the boundaries of confidentiality. In Manila, diplomatic circles and international development agencies view NPP as a reliable informant on the latest developments in Mindanao.

NPP's actual presence is also an indicator of security and work conditions in the field. The temporary withdrawal of ICPs from Basilan and the Sulu provinces is an indicator for other actors to understand the environment at any specific place and point in time. NPP does its best at protecting civilians through its three ongoing programs. No individual or group protection needs were detected among partners so far.

In general terms there are grounds to conclude that NPP's results are significant, based upon clearly defined objectives, and worth the effort. Results are significant in what concerns verification of HR violations and its storage on a database instrumental at mapping trends based on the enhanced capacity of partners to understand HR, particularly in Maguindanao. The strengthening of existing structures (or creating them where none previously existed) in most cases NGO and CSO capacity building, helps to support partners in the creation and/or expansion of volunteer structures, particularly in farthest locations at the inner parts of the provinces. Normally a CSO will select prospective monitors whom NPP will capacitate and at a later stage, link to national and international organizations. These networks of trained monitors linked to other organizations and ceasefire mechanisms constitute the structures that, beyond monitoring tasks, try to ensure representation of women, increase understanding of rights and responsibilities among government stakeholders, as well as provide accompaniment and linking for victims and partners. The preparation and approval of a number of logframe matrices place these results inside the Project Management Cycle formats commonly accepted by development agencies.

Concerning effort worthiness, the answers received by most informants are unambiguously positive. This question relates to the efficiency aspects as well.

Concerning strategies that can be identified and were effective in achieving the

project's objectives, a farmer's view could give a picture of what NPP strategies have been to reach the point where it finds itself: getting hold of what every farmer needs to best do its job, a good pair of boots, and a good hat.

The good boots are NPP's community and political linkages: By strengthening relationships with different segments of the communities and their political representatives, NPP has earned broad support, based on credibility. That support has in turn increased its momentum for making progress and diversification of NPP's mission activities, from the initial invitation of a handful of CSOs to relevant, full-fledged mandates implemented in a sizeable territory. The good hat is an effective program design by increased use of standard methodologies, to gain a portfolio conducive to delivering a variety of services to NPP's intended beneficiaries, in some instances by learning from practice.

These are the key lessons learned by NP in the Philippines regarding successful strategies and work methods. There are however certain external factors that could jeopardize the program's direct impact, especially as re-escalation of hostilities could take the overall conflict situation back to square one. Civilian peacekeeping requires political support, expressly from conflicting parties. A change of perceptions of NPP, its role and mandate could have a negative effect on the continuity of the organization in ground operations. As discussed in the sustainability section below, NP is struggling for funding its Philippines operation, sometimes applying to donor's budget lines that are not initially intended for peacekeeping ends, at a time of serious cuts in development aid appropriations by many funding agencies and governments.

4.3 Impact Assessment Survey

Evaluation field activities included the administration of an Impact Assessment questionnaire to three different communities, of which only a sketch of the results are rendered in this report while waiting for a thorough, formal study by the devisers of this all-important tool. The main author of the survey (in Annex 4) is Dr. Kenneth Solberg, who holds a Ph.D. in Psychology. A licensed psychologist in the state of Minnesota, his career has primarily been in academic settings teaching research methods, statistics, psychometric methods and other classes.

In the fall of 2010, Mr. Solberg and Mrs. Kara Beckman began a series of discussions with NP about the feasibility of developing a method to provide a quantitative assessment of the impact the organization was having in the sites in which it was deployed. The collection and reporting of this kind of data would potentially be of great value to NP as it promotes its work and seeks support. Although conducting such a project presented many challenges, NP made a commitment to support this work. It was decided to develop assessment instruments for use in the Philippines and South Sudan, hoping that these projects will be the start of an ongoing and systematic effort on the part of NP to conduct quantitative assessments of its work. The ultimate goal is an instrument which can be used for outcome assessment in various settings with only minor modifications. In Minnesota, one primary collaborator has been Mr. Mel Duncan, NP's Co-founder.

The survey itself has been kept short, and the questions themselves were written using the most direct and simple language possible in order to help maintaining

consistency across various translations, and ensure that individuals of varying educational levels and cultural backgrounds could understand the questions. Participants were requested to indicate responses using variations of a visual analog scale. Visual analog scales are often used in medical settings for ratings of patient pain and discomfort, and can be used with young children and non-literate populations. The only words used in the response scale are indicators of agreement or disagreement used to anchor the scale. The use of a single visual scale aims at helping to maintain consistency across languages, settings, and participants. The survey was translated into four languages besides English.

NPP's Field Coordinators and Field Team Leaders were responsible for implementing the survey process. They worked closely together in communities where both programs were operational. The actual interviewing was conducted by NPP national staff. The primary target respondents to the survey were regular community members and civilians which NPP is working to protect from violence. A cross-section of people including men, women, young and elderly people as well as religious and community leaders participated in the survey. Those under 18 were excluded for ethical considerations. The survey was developed targeting average citizens, not partners.

The evaluator participated in the first three different locations where the survey was administered: in barangays Buayan (Datu Piang, Maguindanao), Pagangan (Aleosan, North Cotabato) and the village of Butig in Lanao del Sur, close to the Bushra MILF camp. In all occasions the survey was read to respondents in their native language. The string of survey sessions was to be administered in various barangays in which NPP is present, has activities, has conducted monitoring and/or verification visits in the areas of both Lanaos, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and SOCKSARGEN. A small number of barangays where NPP has never worked were also selected, for comparison reasons.

Once all of the barangay surveys are completed, survey forms will be independently translated back into English. Then the survey responses will be tabulated on a spreadsheet, and analyzed using the SPSS statistical software. An analysis of the psychometric properties of the scale will be conducted, including an assessment of the reliability of the scores and the dimensionality of the constructs assessed by the instrument. Analyses will also be conducted comparing the responses of different communities (especially those with and without an NPP presence) and comparing different groups of respondents, based on gender, occupational role, age, and so forth.

To the evaluator, these specific methodological aspects of the Impact Assessment instrument appear to fulfill the standard requirements of this kind of research. More details about the survey's contents on Annex 4.

5 SUSTAINABILITY

Whether the positive outcomes of the project and the flow of benefits are likely to continue after external funding ends

5.1 Financial / economic viability

NPP activities are funded almost entirely on a project-by-project proposal basis, to various funding partners. If the services have to be supported institutionally, funds are to be made available by outside donors since NP's own financial capabilities cannot afford the Philippines operation. It so happens in Mindanao that most small, community-based groups are organizationally fragile. A discontinuation of funding from these donors would definitely entail a proportional diminishment of activities. Partner NGOs have the human and technical resources needed for process sustainability, but are dependent on NPP's presence for a number of activities.

Local authorities are formally involved in some program processes although most of them claim to have few resources to support NPP actions. Some activities are not affordable for the target groups and local partners either. Looking forward to achieve some sort of sustainability, NPP assisted some local partners when necessary with drafting proposals, of which at least two in a successful manner.

NPP has informed one of its donors, the European Commission Delegation in Manila, that its cash flow projections require funding to be forthcoming by March 2012, otherwise CPC activities would shrink because of a lack of resources.

5.2 What is the level of ownership of the program by target groups and will it continue after the end of external support?

NPP operates in an environment where certain competition over resources, mandates, geographical areas and recognition goes on between local civil society organizations. Some partner organizations regret that NPP does not contribute financial resources; this dynamic is taken into consideration when it comes to engaging partners so as not to exacerbate the situation. Nonetheless it is an element which proves challenging as local organizations often have their own agendas for working with NPP, or for conducting various activities.

For the sake of neutrality, NPP policies do not contemplate membership in networks and umbrella organizations like the many already active in Mindanao. NPP's program is reasonably embedded in local structures, as far as NPP's mandates eventually permit.

To name a few, NPP has established a common platform for strategic cooperation with the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS), the Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) and the Network Members of Mindanao People's Caucus (MPC) like United Youth for Peace and Development (UNYPAD), Kadutaya Foundation Incorporation (KFI), Ginapalatak (G7) and Tulung Lupah Sug (TLS).

These organizations operate with NPP on various levels, including assisting or taking part in trainings, providing links to various key local actors, requesting accompaniments by NPP personnel when they find it necessary because of the

security environment, and strategizing on future collaborative activities. Since NPP does not contribute financially to the operations of its partners or target groups, there is no reason to infer that NPP's eventual phase out would seriously affect or diminish ownership in the broader sense, except for the transfer of know-how.

5.3 What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between program and policy level?

NPP tries to create peace structures to support the process in Mindanao, as described elsewhere in this report. It should be noted however that none of the GPH officials interviewed acknowledged significant achievements in this respect (probably as a matter of policy vis-à-vis foreign actors) besides the IMT Civilian Protection Component, with the exception of CBHR structures adopted by the CHR according to some AFP informants, this to some degree only. During the Zamboanga Sibugay firefights in October 2011 between the AFP and the MILF's 113rd Base Command, the evaluator saw first-hand the direct request of the provincial governorate for an assessment by NPP in the aftermath of the combats, as a matter of urgency instead of through usual IMT channels. This is somewhat a new policy emanating from one local government at a time when the IMT's role has been put into question by some AFP and Manila-based politicians.

On the other hand, MILF senior staff consistently stated their support to the two NPP programs, being fully aware of their neutrality. NPP is working outside the relevant national and insurgency policies, from which it has requested no particular help. In material terms, NPP civilian personnel do not have the same framework support as IMT military observers, or UN, EC and JICA personnel. NPP works as an international NGO, without support from governmental institutions, tax exemptions or any other benefits that could be granted by governmental mechanisms. Immigration status of staff and dependents is properly facilitated by GPH authorities.

The CPP program is now making its best efforts to ensure the adoption of EWER structures within the Disaster Risk Reduction agencies of the GPH.

5.4 How well is the program contributing to institutional and management capacity?

As its stated principle, NP believes that a conflict can only be solved or transformed by those directly involved in it. Its role as an international intervener is to support the parties in conflict to do so by means of nonviolent capacity development. NPP does not seek solutions, but focuses more on civilian peacekeeping as a tool for reducing violence and protecting civilians in situations of violent conflict. To this end, training, awareness and self-organization are crucial. NPP supports the peace process, in the case of the CPC as a member of the IMT, to maintain stability on the ground in order to help create an enabling environment for peace talks to succeed. The CPP aims to support civil society (directly and through its partners) to become robust so that they can work for local self-protection.

Probably one of the main concerns regarding the continuation of NPP's operations is the availability of adequate levels of suitable qualified human resources able to keep supporting program partners in terms of technical, financial and managerial skills.

Concerning the meaning of sustainability in the case of NPP's programs, it is self-explanatory that being an official member of the CPC provides sustainability beyond the duration of the IMT's mandate. In short, if the mandate is revoked there is no sustainability to talk about. The CPP sustainability is related to socio-cultural factors instead. The ongoing program is in tune with local perceptions of needs; it respects local power-structures, status systems and beliefs. But NPP interventions do not directly try to change any of these, regardless of how well accepted the changes would be either by the beneficiary population or by any others. Assessment of these changes with regards to capacity and lasting structures is a long-term matter. Discussions with NPP partner organizations showed that there is not sufficient or systematic recording of outcomes of training and capacity building activities or detailed follow-ups of the trainees after completing their sessions to see how the new peace structures fare. This adds to substandard reporting practices among some of them. Efforts in these respects would critically enhance quantification of results and views on actual duration of structures. Otherwise, possibly the best indicator that NPP is working with partners towards achieving their own individual enhanced institutional capacity is its analysis focusing on promoting awareness regarding factors considered insufficiently present at this time in Mindanao, like capacitating grassroots awareness of rights to protection, human rights and international humanitarian law, but that are implemented by local individuals and groups instead of outsiders and international organizations, however welcome they may be.

6 CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

6.1) Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the program strategy?

NPP's CPC team developed a catalogue of the most frequent violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) to be monitored, including violations of women's rights. NPP has also trained staff in applying the SPHERE Minimum Standards in Disaster Response to NPP's activities in the field. These are applied when conducting needs assessments, in particular those of IDPs. In addition, IDP assessments are carried out by Focal Group Discussions with women and children in order to capture their specific protection needs. To assist in this endeavour NPP has established cooperation with some local women's groups (MPC Women Contingent, and Philippine Muslim Women Council) as described in 3.1 above.

6.2) Is the program respecting environmental needs?

The nature of the programs, with extensive logistics, monitoring patrols and road trips leaves a corresponding carbon footprint, to which no alternative can be devised.

6.3) Visibility

NPP office in Makati gives regular updates and briefings on the peace process and the security situation in Mindanao to various diplomatic missions, several of whose representatives expressed recognition of their usefulness.

NP and NPP acknowledge donor participation in publications such as its website (see Annex 3), Quarterly Newsletter, Annual Reports as well as communication with local partners at the field level, meetings, fora, workshops, seminars, etc..

Visibility in communities where NPP works includes the establishment of sub-offices, wearing of uniforms, dissemination of printed matters, monitoring patrols, visits to IDP camps and other rural areas, accompaniments and joint activities with local partners as well as joint patrolling with the IMT Security, for instance.

There is little visibility of NP Brussels office at the field level. The majority of persons met during the evaluation had not met any Brussels representatives on mission to Mindanao, nor could most of them recall when it was that the last two such visits had taken place.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

Requests by both of the armed actors for NPP to be part of the official peace process for the conflict shows that NPP is playing an important role in increasing civilian protection, preventing conflict and reducing violence in Mindanao in a non-partisan way.

NPP is entering a new phase with regards to scope and breadth of its activities by means of expansion of operations, acquisition of new grants, restructuring of the organizational chart, hiring of new senior staff, opening of a new FO in Zamboanga, arrival of a new batch of international staff, and completion of the long tour of duty of its Country Director and his reassignment to Brussels, among others. All of this is taking place in an environment where a final peace agreement has yet to be signed, skirmishes still persist in many areas of Mindanao, thousands of IDPs continue bearing the brunt of the armed conflict and rido, and the role of the IMT is being questioned.

Some of the recommendations of the 2010 Swisspeace evaluation have been reasonably followed (Nos 1, 2, 4, 5 and 8) whereas the remaining are still valid in terms of strategy and organizational consolidation. It is clear to everyone that NPP cannot resolve many of the problems afflicting the islands; however the following recommendations are posited in order to increase NPP's footing to promote human rights, provide protection to civilians and discourage violent conflict in its areas of responsibility.

Institutional Arrangements

- Following the replacement of the Country Director and seeking continuity to the current approach to NPP institutional development, the new NPP structure should continue strengthening and expanding its linkages with key actors and communities on the ground, especially at the Manila level (Commission on Human Rights, Philippines Congress and Senate, Department of Social Welfare and Development DSWD, AFP and PNP General Commands).
- In order to improve the quality of submissions, request support from NP member organizations on project proposal preparation and /or other undertakings in a fashion similar to the Impact Assessment Survey.
- Redefine the specific objectives of each program and reduce their number by merging or deletion of some, so as to have less specific objectives but several results instead.
- Further develop operational guidelines with the three other CPC members.
- Systematize follow-up of activities with NPP partner organizations.
- People vulnerable to being displaced on multiple occasions, often in a relatively short-space of time should have their voices heard with NPP support as a peacekeeping organization.

Implementation Mechanisms

- As NP's work is mostly about locally-led social processes, most of the times results can only be measured on a qualitative basis rather than on a quantitative one. This is the case in self-evaluations and final reports submitted to donors. There is however a wealth of statistical data on NPP activities dispersed on various reports not only to the IMT but to different donors as well such as like Belgium, New Zealand and EUD. An effort at compiling, systematizing and sharing this quantitative information would certainly enhance NPP's profile and perceptions about its achievements vis-à-vis decision makers, stakeholders, target groups, academia, researchers, the general public and future evaluations.
- For this matter the newly devised incident database should not only see its development supported, but its contents made available to qualified institutions and individuals with due regard to protection and/or anonymity of the individuals included in the database.
- Non-sensitive information supplied to the IMT should be shared with other stakeholders in order to upgrade their knowledge of developments and status of ceasefire status in real time.
- Information on displacements originated by rido and its political aspects should be made available to the media as soon as they last more than an a few days or weeks, so as to increase the GPH's awareness of concrete situations and exercise its duty to protect citizens. The MILF should also be asked to intervene when rido flares between its own ranks or is not resolved.
- The findings of the Impact Assessment Survey should be made public as well, providing additional information for researchers on sociological aspects of civilian protection and conflict prevention in Mindanao.
- Familiarity with subjects like log frames, indicators and verification tools are required by most donors and partners alike in order to standardize NPP procedures. Training of new batches of recruits should enhance Project Cycle Management issues with a view to steering the initiatives towards outputs, results, outcomes and impact.
- Next funding proposals should improve quality of performance indicators and delete general proposals of activities not likely to be carried out according to previous experience.
- Review the indicators and place them at the right level of the logical framework distinguishing between output indicators (at result level) and outcome indicators (at specific objective level).
- Improve some vagueness on reports to ECD.

- Conduct period surveys about international staff expectations and perspectives regarding continuing employment in the organization.
- Take steps to ensure longer permanence of staff.
- UNICEF Manila staff explicitly recommends that MRM-GRCV focal points arrange debriefing sessions to field staff for them to release stress.
- The volatility of the situation in Western Mindanao and its physical distance from Cotabato City makes it advisable to specifically train new recruits on Quick Response Team (QRT) deployments to the new Zamboanga FO, should they be necessary.

Finance

- Predictability of financial flows is essential to planning and effectiveness. Ask donors to establish mid-term forecasting of financial contributions.
- The above uncertainty is directly related to the improvement of working and salary conditions of staff.
- Ask donors for increased percentages of grants administrative costs in order to build a cushion to counter bottlenecks in case forthcoming grants take longer to disburse than expected.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

ANNEX 2: LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS MET

ANNEX 3: SELECTED WEBSITES

**ANNEX 4: RESPONSE SHEET FOR SURVEY FOR EVALUATION OF NONVIOLENT
PEACEFORCE PHILIPPINES**

ANNEX 5: BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ANNEX 7: FIELD TRIP ITINERARY AND MAP OF MINDANAO

About the evaluator

ANNEX 1 EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

Data was collected from:

- Previous reviews, publications and evaluations.
- NPP reports and monthly team reports.
- NPP Standard Operational Procedures
- NP field staff and management staff working on the respective programs (both project staff and other NP staff)
- Philippine partner groups and organizations.
- Individuals and informal groups NP has been working with.
- Members of the communities NP is working with.
- Recommended Representatives of Philippine government, MNLF and MILF, provincial and local government, International Monitoring Team.
- Recommended Representatives of international organizations, UN system agencies and diplomatic community in Philippines with whom / for whom NP has been active.

The list of persons met is provided on Annex 1. At the end of the field trip the evaluator conducted a debriefing at NPP Cotabato City main office to present preliminary conclusions to senior management for them to share their comments and observations, some of which the present report takes into account. The mission concluded on 9th of November following a last round of interviews in Manila.

The methodology applied is the standard OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) five criteria, thus helping all NPP funding agencies to familiarize with the evaluation's conceptual framework and terminology -starting from page one. To the series of standard evaluation questions another 22 have been added according to the evaluation ToRs, on which the structure of the report is based:

- To assess the advancement of the Mindanao Project towards its key objectives;
- To evaluate the two programs that NP Philippines undertakes: conflict prevention and civilian protection;
- To assess how the two programs are complementing each other to attain their respective and the overall Mindanao project objectives;
- To collect substantiated and quantifiable information on how the project improves the security of civilians and reduces violence
- To gain an understanding of how a representative sample from the project partners and beneficiaries (targeted communities, partner organizations, community based organizations, political actors in the Philippines, international actors) view the project, its relevance and achievements;
- To get an understanding how the project structure and set-up including the practices and policies impacted the project's objectives and achievements;
- To assess the relationships involved in implementing this program: a) between wider NP and NPP, b) NPP and the partner organizations, c) between NPP Main office and field offices, d) between NP and the funders; e)

between NPP and key parties in the conflict; f) between NPP and international actors;

- To assess the appropriateness of how the project evolved over time;
- To make suggestions for the future of the project, and identify priority areas for engagement.

For which matter two dozen evaluation questions were specified in the following terms:

1. Outcome and Impact Assessment

1.1 What is NP's understanding of its role in the conflict?

e.g.: (How) does NP understand its position in the conflict and to the different actors? How much is this understanding shared by NP staff? How has the project adapted to the ever changing political environment? How successful and meaningful have been these adaptations? Which are NP's criteria for closing the project?

1.2 How is NP perceived by its partners, IMT and key authorities involved in the peace process? e.g.: How is the project seen/interpreted by the local partners? Does the project tackle the protection needs of the local partners and/or citizens whom NP seeks to service? Are there indicators of instances where NP's presence, or the behavior of certain of its elements, may have done harm (contributed to conflicts)?

1.3 How does NP relate to other actors (recommended national & international) in the Philippines? e.g.: How is the NP's role seen/interpreted by other groups NP is having work contacts with in the Philippines? To what extent is NPP working with people associated with different parties to the conflict – with the various ethnic, religious, gender, age or class groups in the society? Are there indicators of instances where NP's presence, or the behavior of certain of its elements, may have done harm (contributed to conflicts)?

1.4 What is the impact of NP's work? e.g.: Are the results significant? Are they based upon clearly defined objectives? Are they worth the effort? Which strategies can be identified and were effective in achieving the project's objectives? What are the key lessons learned in the Philippines regarding successful strategies and methods in NP's work? What is the impact of NP's work on the wider conflict? Is there one? If so, how does this happen, what aspects of the work contribute to this?

1.5. General assessment of NP in the Philippines e.g.: To what extent does the multinational / multicultural composition of the teams play a significant role for the outcomes of the work? To what extent does gender play a role in the work of NPP? Assessing NP's success in meeting the objectives set for the Philippine project. What would achieving sustainability mean in the case of NP's project? Are there indicators that NPP is working towards achieving it? Are there indicators for any influence NP's commitment to nonviolent intervention has had on the policy or practice of its partners or other groups / individuals NP is working with?

2. How organizational factors influence our performance

How is the efficiency of NP's work assessed? e.g.: Efficiency and effectiveness of the work and cooperation of the different components of NPP (management - teams, roles within teams, roles within management, participation of staff in decisions, clarity on style of management). Efficiency and effectiveness of the cooperation between the components of NP outside the Philippines and in the Philippines (general direction and supervision, fundraising, PR, IGC Committees, etc.) that specially effect NPP. Observations regarding human resource management and living and working in the teams, for example staff support, gender issues. Adequateness of recruitment, training and preparation of ICPs and management team for their work. Changes in project structure, system and procedure from the inception of the project to now, and what effect these changes had for the performance on the ground.

3. Principles in Practice

How does NPP put its main principles of work into practice? e.g.: How does NP understand non-partisanship in the Mindanao context? Is NPP seen as a non-partisan, neutral and independent organization? What factors determine how NP is perceived? What role does the commitment to non-violence play for NP's work? What role does religious affiliation play? How does the work of NPP in the Philippines connect to the mission of NP as formulated in its mission statement?

The 'effectiveness' section has been expanded to discuss the five RPP sub criteria as set forth by Swisspeace previously. Conclusions and recommendations in the final section of the report.

ANNEX 2 LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS MET

Interview and site visits schedule Meeting		Location
October 16	Arrival in Manila	
October 17	Manila Briefing Travel arrangements	Manila LO
October 18	Iligan City, Lanao del Norte Team Presentation Team interviews	Lanaos FO Lanaos FO
October 19	Lanao del Sur MOGOP CBHR monitors, Impact assessment survey	Marawi city Butig barangay
October 20	Lanao del Norte & del Sur ECOWEB EWER monitors IDP Kolsihan camp	Marawi city Kolumbugan barangay Kawsowagan barangay
October 21	Lanao del Norte & del Sur MILF ADJHAG LdS MILF CCCH LdS MIDCOP IDP camp Omaira AFP 103 rd Cavalry Battallion Commander Mayor of Kolumbugan	Marawi city Marawi city Marawi city Marawi city Iligan city Kolumbugan
October 22	Travel to Cotabato city	
October 23	NPP Head Office Head of sub-Office Team interviews AFP 6th Division Intelligence Officers	Cotabato city OCHA Cotabato city NPP Head Office NPP Head Office
October 24	Datu Piang, Maguindanao Introduction and Presentation on MFT IDP Beneficiaries Ustad Imam of Datu Piang Grand Mosque MILF JCMP MMI	MFT Datu Piang office Relocation 1, Datu Piang NP office, Datu Piang Kitango, Datu Saudi Macasampen, Guindulungan

Interview and site visits schedule		Location
	Meeting	
October 25	Datu Piang, Maguindanao	
	Focus Group Discussion CBHR	MFT Dapiawan Office
	Partner Forum	MFT Dapiawan Office
	Catholic Parish Representative	Datu Piang FO
	KFI Foundation	Datu Piang FO
	Impact Assessment survey	Buayan barangay
	AFP 6th Division Civil-Military Officer	Datu Piang
	Association of Barangay Captains ABC	ABC Office, Datu Piang
	President	
	Team interviews	Datu Piang FO
October 26	Pikit, North Cotabato	
	Team Presentation CPP/CPC	NCFT Office
	MPC	Aleosan NC
	AFP 40 th Infantry Batallion Commander	Aleosan
	Vice Mayor of Aleosan	Aleosan
	Barangay Captain of Mudseng	Midsayap NC
	MILF JCMP	Midsayap
	UNYPAD	Midsayap
October 27	Pikit, North Cotabato	
	Gap-Hungers	NCFT Office
	MinHRac	NCFT Office
	Bantay Ceasefire	NCFT Office
	JCMP	NCFT Office
	PNP Deputy Chief	Pikit NC
	AFP 7 th Infantry Batallion Commander	Pikit
	Impact Assessment	Pagangan, Aleosan
	Community FDG	Dualing, Aleosan
October 28	General Santos City	
	Preparation for evaluation	NPP SOCKSARGEN Office
	Team Presentation	NPP SOCKSARGEN Office
	Team interview	NPP SOCKSARGEN Office
October 29	GenSan & Sarangani	
	CPC Partner MinHRAC	NPP SOCKSARGEN Office
	CPC Partner MPC	NPP SOCKSARGEN Office
	PNP Gensan Deputy Director	PNP Head Office
	Kalinaw Sarangani	NPP SOCKSARGEN Office
	Religious CSO + Madrasa Coordinator	NPP SOCKSARGEN Office
	AFP 73 rd Infantry Batallion Commander	Maasim, Sarangani
	IMT Team Site 4 (Col. Aziz)	IMT Office in Lagao

October 31	GenSan & Sarangani	
	LMT Sarangani	Gensan
	CCCH MILF LMT Sarangani	Dalio, West Sarangani Polomolok Poblacion
November 1	Cotabato city	
	MILF CCCH Secretariat	Cotabato city
	IMT Headquarters	Cotabato city
	GPH CCCH Secretariat	Cotabato city
	Unypad Executive Director	Cotabato city
November 2	Cotabato city	
	UNDSS Office Chief	Cotabato city
	BCJP Bangsamoro Center for Just Peace	Cotabato city
	NPP Team interviews	Cotabato city
November 3	Travel to Manila	
	Debriefing to NPP Mangement staff	Cotabato city
	Arrival in Manila	Manila LO
November 4	Manila	
	NPP Incident database consultant	Manila LO
	DFA Undersecretary	Manila city
	EC Delegation Programme Manager	Makati city
	OPAP Assistant Secretary	Mandaluyong city
November 5	Manila	
	DFA former ambassador	Makati city
	Mindanao Peace Weavers	Makati city
November 7	Manila	
	Reception at Belgian ambassador's residence	Makati city
	Belgian International Cooperation Agency	Makati city
November 8	Manila	
	Debriefing to NPP Mangement staff	Manila LO
	UNICEF	Manila LO
November 9	Departure from Manila	

ANNEX 3 SELECTED WEBSITES

Nonviolent Peaceforce <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/>

Armed Forces of the Philippines <http://www.afp.mil.ph/>

Moro Islamic Liberation Front <http://www.luwaran.com/home/>

Philippine National Police <http://www.pnp.gov.ph/main/>

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao <http://www.armm.gov.ph/>

http://en.wikipilipinas.org/index.php?title=Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanao

Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process www.opapp.gov.ph

Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines <http://www.chr.gov.ph/>

Mindanao Human Rights Action Center (MinHRAC) <http://blog.minhrac.org/>

Mindanao People's Caucus <http://mpc.org.ph/>

Amnesty International Philippines website. <http://www.amnesty.org/es/contact/607>

Human Rights Watch Philippines website <http://www.hrw.org/asia/-philippines>

Delegation of the European Union to the Philippines www.delphi.ec.europa.eu

Embassy of the Kingdom of Belgium www.diplomatie.be/manila

Swiss Peace Foundation <http://www.swisspeace.ch/>

Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) <http://www.peacebuildingacademy.org/>

http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=RPP&pname=Reflecting%20on%20Peace%20Practice

Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) <http://www.humanrights.asia/about>

International Monitoring Team

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/philippines/documents/press_corner/20100608_02_en.pdf

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Internal Displacement [http://internal-](http://internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8A4B6AFE92D9BB82802570B700599DA1/$file/WP24_Web.pdf)

[displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/8A4B6AFE92D9BB82802570B700599DA1/\\$file/WP24_Web.pdf](http://internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8A4B6AFE92D9BB82802570B700599DA1/$file/WP24_Web.pdf)

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<http://www.afrim.org/ph/programs/Facts%20and%20figures%20on%20the%20Mindanao%20armed%20conflict.pdf>..

MindaNews <http://www.mindanews.com/>

The Philippine Star daily newspaper <http://www.philstar.com>

University of the Philippines <http://www.up.edu.ph/upforum.php?issue=35&i=305>

Maps of Mindanao <http://www.mindanaomaps.com/>

ANNEX 4 RESPONSE SHEET FOR SURVEY FOR EVALUATION OF NONVIOLENT PEACEFORCE PHILIPPINES

Response Sheet for Survey for evaluation of Nonviolent Peaceforce Philippines

[THIS SHEET IS TO BE FILLED IN BY THE PERSON GIVING THE SURVEY. FILL IN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION BEFORE STARTING.]

-
1. Name of person asking the questions _____
-
2. Date the Survey was conducted _____
-
3. Month and year Nonviolent Peaceforce began work in the community. _____
-
4. Name of the community _____
-
5. Approximate population of the community _____
-
6. Language in which the survey was conducted _____
-

[READ THE FOLLOWING TO THE PERSON TAKING THE SURVEY] Nonviolent Peaceforce is trying to measure our work and make it better. You can help by answering some questions. Doing this survey is completely voluntary. It's OK to tell me you don't want to do this survey – it will not affect your relationship with Nonviolent Peaceforce. The survey consists of three parts, a rating scale, a few open ended questions, and some background information. Your name will never be associated with your answers, and everything you say will be held in complete confidence. There are no right or wrong answers. Please respond with what you believe, not with what you think I want you to say.

Do you want to take the survey? *[IF THE PERSON DOES NOT WANT TO DO THE SURVEY, DO NOT PROCEED, AND WRITE "REFUSED" ACROSS THE TOP OF THIS SHEET]*

For this survey, I will ask the questions in the form of a statement to which you can either agree or disagree. Use this rating scale to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement. *[SHOW THE RESPONDENT THE RESPONSE CARD]* I will read the statement to you. Then, you can point to the place on the line which describes what you think and how you feel. If you completely agree with the statement you would point here [INDICATE ON THE RESPONSE SHEET]. If you do not at all agree with the statement you would point here [[INDICATE ON THE RESPONSE SHEET]. If you are in between, and neither agree nor disagree you might point here [INDICATE ON THE RESPONSE SHEET].

For example, do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Over the past few years, my community has become more prosperous.

[HAVE THE RESPONDENT INDICATE HIS OR HER OPINION BY POINTING TO THE RESPONSE CARD]

Remember, you can use the entire scale to indicate your opinion. Point anywhere you like along the scale. Do you have any questions about what to do?

[TRY TO MAKE SURE THAT THE PERSON TAKING THE SURVEY UNDERSTANDS THE RESPONSE SCALE. USE ANOTHER EXAMPLE IF NECESSARY. TRY HARD TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER FOR EVERY QUESTION.]

The first set of questions has to do with changes which may or may not have occurred in your community over the past two to three years. As you answer, think about your community in general, not things which have happened only to you personally.

Now I will read you some more statements. Point to the place on the line to tell how much you agree or disagree with the statement. Listen carefully to how the questions are worded. Ask me any time if you have questions or want me to repeat the statement.

[READ THE STEM PLUS THE QUESTION. WRITE IN THE NUMBER INDICATING THE RESPONSE TO EACH QUESTION]

1. Over the past two or three years:
 2. Stores and shops stay open longer.
 3. There has been less violence in my community.
 4. My community has had more difficulty controlling dangerous rumors. [R]
 5. People in my community have become more involved in keeping peace in our area.
 6. I have developed more confidence in the local government.
 7. My community is less able to negotiate our safety if we feel threatened by armed groups. [R]
 8. Humanitarian agencies are better able to provide assistance to my community.
 9. My community is less likely to respond with violence when there is conflict.
 10. I feel safer going out to visit my friends and neighbors.
 11. I am less able to do my work because I am afraid for my safety. [R]
 12. Schools close more often because of fear of violence. [R]
 13. My family and I feel safer in my community.
 14. My community has become more aware of international organizations and their work.
 15. Different religious groups in my community are better able to work together
 16. More people have left my community because they are afraid of violence. [R]
 17. We are better able to peacefully resolve conflicts between different groups within our community.
 18. We are better able to peacefully resolve conflicts with groups from outside our community.
 19. I worry more than I used to about violence breaking out in my community.
 - 20.
-

[R] Next, I want to ask you a few questions about the work of Nonviolent Peaceforce in your community. For these questions, we are interested in your own personal opinion and experience. We will use the same agree/disagree scale as before to answer these questions.

I know about the work of Nonviolent Peaceforce in my community.

I would consider contacting someone from Nonviolent Peaceforce if my family members or I were worried about violence in my community.

I would feel safe if I went to the office of Nonviolent Peaceforce because I was worried about the threat of conflict in my community.

My family and I feel safer because of the presence of Nonviolent Peaceforce in my community.

My community benefits from the presence of international staff from Nonviolent Peaceforce.

I know about the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and its role in the peace process.

I know about the Civilian Protection Component Program of the IMT and understand how it works

My community has developed a better understanding of the peace process between the government and the MILF.

Now I would like to give you a chance to say anything else you would like to add about the work of Nonviolent Peaceforce in your community. [ANSWERS SHOULD BE RECORDED IN ENGLISH IF POSSIBLE; TRY TO RECORD EXACTLY WHAT THE PERSON SAYS.]

Finally, I need to ask a few questions about you. Remember that your name is not being written down anywhere. [RECORD RESPONSES IN ENGLISH IF POSSIBLE]

What is your age? _____

What is your gender? ___ MALE ___ FEMALE

What is your Occupation? _____

What is your Religion? _____

Have you worked directly with Nonviolent Peaceforce? _____ NO _____ YES If YES, briefly describe your relationship with Nonviolent Peaceforce:

HOW WELL DID THE PERSON TAKING THE SURVEY APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND THE SURVEY QUESTIONS AND PROCESS (CHECK ONE OF THE FOLLOWING);

_____ The respondent seemed to understand most all of the questions and was thoughtful about his/her responses.

_____ The respondent seemed confused, and I don't think he or she really understood how to answer the questions

[NOTE ANY ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE ABOUT HOW THE SURVEY WENT WITH THIS PERSON]

NP Survey Philippines Fall 2011 ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION USED FOR TRANSLATIONS

[RESPONSE CARD ON WHICH PARTICIPANTS WILL INDICATE THEIR AGREEMENT BY POINTING.]

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No, I do not agree with the statement at all.

Yes, I agree completely with the statement.

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ANNEX 6 GLOSSARY

Conflict

A relationship between two or more interdependent parties in which at least one of the parties perceives the relationship to be negative or detects and pursues opposing interests and needs. Both parties are convinced that they are in the right. Conflict is an essential ingredient of social change. What is important is that conflicts should be solved in a peaceful and constructive manner. - In these Guidelines we use a narrower definition of the term “conflict” referring to a situation where there is a potential for violence to occur between groups or where violence has already occurred. These are the conflicts with which development cooperation is increasingly preoccupied.

Crisis prevention

Activities set out over the long term to reduce structural tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak or repetition of violence (also: *conflict prevention*)

Conflict management

Short- and medium-term activities directed at the peaceful resolution of material conflicts and relationship-based conflicts between the various parties concerned; can take place at any stage of a conflict.

Peace

Negative peace – no open use of force but the continued existence of structural violence. Positive peace – encompasses human security and structural stability.

Human security

This includes protection not only against violence but also against other threats to people’s physical wellbeing and livelihoods such as environmental destruction, disease and economic crises.

Impact

The actual consequences of an intervention – whether intentional or unintentional – for the life of the target groups and others involved, over and above the direct project inputs.

Peace-making

Short-term diplomatic, political and military activities aimed at the immediate ending of violent confrontations and bringing about the conclusion of a peace accord.

Peace-keeping, peace enforcement

Observation and enforcement of implementation of a peace accord and of agreed confidence-building measures, if necessary by force of arms.

Peace-building

Medium- and long-term measures aimed at setting up mechanisms of peaceful conflict management, overcoming the structural causes of violent conflicts and thereby creating the general conditions in which peaceful and just development can take place.

Structural stability

“A situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, healthy social and economic conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resorting to violent conflict” (Commission of the European Communities 1996)

Early warning

Systematic observation of a latent conflict using conflict prediction models. The objective is to detect the signs of conflict escalation in good time (early warning itself) and initiate preventive measures (early response, early action).

Conflict analysis

Action-oriented analysis of the causes and dynamics of a conflict and of the starting points for peaceful management and overcoming of the conflict.


Conflict impact assessment

Systematic observation of the positive and negative impacts of development cooperation on the dynamics of a conflict at the project and country level. The term is also used in the sense of risk appraisal.


Source: GTZ, Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management, A practical guideline August 2001.

ANNEX 7 MAP OF MINANAO AND FIELD TRIP ITINERARY

Political map of Mindanao



Evaluation field trip itinerary



About the evaluator

José-María Taberné is a development worker with advanced development studies, Law degree and 25 year's experience in not-for-profit Development Operations & Policy Making specialising in governance & capacity building, Rule of Law, human rights, public administration reform, civil society organizations and Non-State Actors, and refugee protection. Mostly in peripheral environments including strategies for inclusion of marginalised groups in target communities. Additional 5 years in private Law practice, teaching, journalism, advertising, and international trade within the private sector.

As an independent consultant his activity focus on systematic project and programme planning, M&E, management and evaluation within multilateral/ bilateral organizations, NGOs, central and local governments and constituencies in transitional and developing countries.

Further information on

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http://www.transitioninternational.com/?TI_Consultants:Jose-Maria_Tabern%E9

<http://www.solucionesong.org/asesores/2450>