

Unarmed Civilian Protection

The Methodology and Its Relevance for Norwegian Church-Based Organizations and Their Partners



2016

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“Unarmed civilian protection represents a transformative shift in how we respond to violence both at the local and global levels.”

Randy Janzen, Chair, Mir Centre for Peace, Selkirk College

“Unarmed civilian protection is underestimated.”

Jan Egeland, Secretary General, Norwegian Refugee Council (former UN Under-Secretary General)

“We need to bump up unarmed civilian protection. It has a huge potential that needs to be exploited. (...) I would love to see Norway take the lead on rethinking peacekeeping in the UN system.”

Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini, Co-Founder and Executive Director of International Civil Society Action Network, Co-Drafter of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

Contents

List of Abbreviations	5
Executive Summary	6
1. Introduction	8
2. The Concept: Definitions and Scope	11
3. Who Does What?	18
4. How: Principles and Pragmatics of Unarmed Civilian Protection and Accompaniment	33
5. Practicalities	46
6. Relevance to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda	54
7. Where Do We Take It from Here?	60
8. Conclusion	69
Appendix 1 - Summary of A Source of Hope	73
Appendix 2 – Additional Literature on Protection and Accompaniment	76
Bibliography	78

List of Abbreviations

CPT	Christian Peacemaker Teams
EA	Ecumenical Accompanier
EAPPI	Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel
EWER	Early Warning Early Response
FTR	Family Tracing and Reunion
GBV	Gender Based Violence
HRD	Human Rights Defender
HROC	Healing and Rebuilding Our Communities
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFI	Iglesia Filipina Independiente
IPO	International Protection Officer
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NDF	National Democratic Front
NEPP	Norwegian Ecumenical Peace Platform
NP	Nonviolent Peaceforce
NPA	New People's Army
NPO	National Protection Officer
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBI	Peace Brigades International
PDG	Peace and Democracy Group
PEPP	Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform
POC	Protection of Civilians
PO	Protection Officer
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SWEFOR	Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation
UCP	Unarmed Civilian Protection (or Peacekeeping)
WCC	World Council of Churches
WPT	Women's Protection Teams

Executive Summary

Unarmed civilian protection (UCP) is one of the most effective responses there is to one of the greatest, consistent challenges of our time: The killing of civilians in warfare. As opposed to other approaches to reconciliation and peaceful resolution to conflict which indirectly target violence, UCP is *directly* aimed at stopping violence. Simply through being present, and through using their presence strategically, international civilians deter violence, protect local civilians and support the efforts of the locals to protect themselves and plan for a peaceful future.

The most utilized element of UCP is accompaniment. Results from accompaniment and other UCP methods include significant drops in gender based violence, locally facilitated peace agreements or ceasefires, reduced levels of violence in camps for internally displaced people, reduced levels of humiliation of civilians at military check-points, an increase in children's access to education, an increase in access to health care, accurate and timely information delivered to key humanitarian actors, and multinational companies pulling out of investments that cause breaches of human rights law.

The main actors in the accompaniment and UCP field of work utilize a variety of means to protect civilians. The means include protective presence, monitoring and documenting, internationalizing local abuse, building relationships with all stakeholders, building and supporting local civic capacities, and facilitating dialogue. Accompaniers and protection officers create spaces where local actors themselves can find the best approaches to peace.

UCP is especially relevant for the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. If the excruciating needs in conflict-affected areas are to be met, it is time to spend more energy on the women who suffer from violence in conflict contexts. This means that governments need to involve themselves heavily in stimulating, protecting and providing space for civil society. UCP is an effective and efficient approach to achieving this. By its very nature, UCP involves women and supports them in their peace endeavors. UCP addresses all four pillars of the WPS agenda: Prevention, protection, participation, and peacebuilding and recovery. UN Women's 2015 Global Study specifically mentions UCP as a useful approach to achieving the goals of the WPS agenda.

The need for protecting civilians and for fostering locally owned peace initiatives has not been greater since World War II. Civilians flee in ever greater numbers from conflict areas because they are not safe where they are. Humanitarian organizations should spend more energy on what causes the need for humanitarian aid, and involve themselves in nonviolent methods of increasing the security of civilians. They should do this because they can, and because they have the moral authority to do so as humanitarian actors.

Recommendations

Recommendations to humanitarian organizations in general and Norwegian church-based organizations in particular:

- Increase the utilization of the methods available to protect civilians from violence in current project contexts.
- Consider setting up a new unit or organization with a specialized mandate for accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection.
- Start a dialogue with your government on funding of these activities.

Recommendations to governments in general and the Norwegian government in particular:

- Start budgeting specifically for civil society actors' accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection.
- Systematize the documentation and strengthen the sharing of best practices of such protection among the actors that have received and currently receive funding.
- Support processes in the UN system that paves the way for increased global investment in accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection.

1. Introduction

The main victims of war are civilians.¹ That is the case today and it has been for a long time, in spite of a variety of measures to prevent violent conflict from harming civilians. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed after the Second World War, and the Fourth Geneva Convention (the “civilians’ convention”) was adopted. The body of international humanitarian and human rights law has grown ever since. Since the establishment of the United Nations, the world has seen a number of military peacekeeping missions in conflict affected countries. Norway alone has sent out more than 100,000 soldiers with the aim of keeping the peace and thus protect civilians.² In spite of these measures, civilians are still the main victims of war. This implies that we are not taking the problem seriously enough, we are not spending enough energy on it, and, perhaps most importantly, we are not being creative or open-minded enough when searching for the most effective means of preventing the victimization of civilians.

One approach that is slowly gaining recognition is unarmed civilian protection (UCP). It is an approach that is building on the lessons learnt since the ‘shanti senas’ (‘peace armies’) of Gandhi and on the international civilian accompaniment of human rights defenders in Latin America and other places where civilians have been under threat for living in their ancestral lands or for fighting to secure their rights. UCP is being used and tested in some of the world’s most violent places, and as we will see in chapters 3 and 4, it is proving to be effective. Unarmed civilians, both internationals and nationals, use their protective presence to deter violence, foster dialogue and build and support local capacities for peace.

This document is a presentation of UCP and accompaniment, with a proposal for how Norwegian church-based organizations and their partners can utilize UCP or aspects thereof in order to be a more effective force for peace where they work. Through examples from the field we present how unarmed civilians protect local civilians from being harassed, humiliated, violently attacked, raped or killed. This is not a theoretical exercise; there are real people out there succeeding in this every day, trusting in their own ability to hinder violence through nonviolent means. Furthermore, the methodology is there, available for anybody willing to learn.

Norwegian churches and church-based actors currently do involve themselves in areas of violent conflict intending to contribute to a reduction of violence. Churches in Norway have solidarity relationships with churches in conflict areas, and in some cases cooperate with them on developing peacebuilding or reconciliatory projects. Many church-based actors are involved in the accompaniment program of the World Council of Churches in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), and some work to promote interfaith dialogue in countries where attacks on religious minority groups occur. With the

¹ (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2010)

² (Forsvaret, 2012)

exception of EAPPI, however, there is little emphasis on *direct* violence prevention. There is specifically not a coherent, strategic and systematic effort among church-based actors to become the most reliable and successful partners in the fight against violence. The objective of this report is to gather some of the learning and experiences of the most relevant actors working on direct violence prevention, and to suggest options for the way forward for Norwegian churches and church-based organizations. Hopefully it will contribute to their ability to implement, in any context they encounter, the most effective tools available for preventing and reducing violence.

Background and Methodology

The research behind this report is a continuation of the introductory report “En kilde til håp” (A Source of Hope),³ published by the Norwegian Ecumenical Peace Platform (NEPP)⁴ in 2014. As a consequence of the report, NEPP established a working group⁵ with a mandate to further explore this field of peace work so that the NEPP members could assess if they would be willing and able to take on this type of work. That exploration resulted in this report.

The working group has interviewed people in central positions of organizations involved in accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection, studied reports from these organizations, and visited two organizations in the field, in order to understand in more detail how they work, on which principles their work builds, and which challenges they face. *The question guiding our research has been this: How can one work within the field of accompaniment and/or unarmed civilian protection in order to reduce violence as effectively as possible?* In this document we will present our findings and discuss how Norwegian organizations can utilize them. Although several people have been involved in the research, the document is written by Tor Kristian Birkeland, and the responsibility for any shortcomings lies with him. The document is structured in the following way:

Structure of Report

In chapter 2 we go through some definitions and the scope of unarmed civilian protection (UCP). The term ‘unarmed civilian protection’ was not used in the “A Source of Hope” report, mainly because the term was then only one of several terms describing a set of activities meant to protect civilians from violence. Recently the term has emerged more consistently to describe an approach to protection which encompasses most of the activities a team of unarmed civilians can do to protect civilians in an area

³ Available (only in Norwegian) at <http://www.norkr.no/index.cfm?id=415315>. A short summary of the report in English can be found in Appendix 1.

⁴ The five member organizations of NEPP are Caritas Norway, Digni, Norwegian Church Aid, Church of Norway Council on Ecumenical and International Relations, and Christian Council of Norway.

⁵ The working group has not consisted of the same people throughout the project. Members have been Stein Villumstand (NCA), Jeanette Olsen (Caritas), Elray Henriksen (NCA), Gina Lende (Church of Norway) and Tor Kristian Birkeland (Christian Council of Norway/NEPP). Lende and Birkeland have been in the working group throughout the project.

of conflict, to protect the civic space needed for sustainable solutions to conflict, and to strengthen the peace efforts of local civilians.

In chapter 3 we present five organizations involved in accompaniment and UCP. They are the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation (SWEFOR), Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT), Peace Brigades International (PBI), the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), and Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP). SWEFOR, CPT and PBI will be somewhat superficially treated, whereas we will go more in depth on EAPPI and NP, whom we visited in the field.

In chapter 4 we discuss how the different actors practically relate to the principles that guide their work. We will assess how those principles actually work in practice, and how pragmatic solutions are found to dilemmas involving limited resources. We examine nonpartisanship and impartiality, the utility of being external vs. internal, language and communication, issues relating to identity, and the advantages of a voluntary vs. professional service.

Then we look at the practicalities in chapter 5, and present the organizations' different approaches to recruitment, salary, training, mental health care, evacuation, funding and decision making.

Chapter 6 is arguably the most important chapter in the report, because it explains how UCP is supporting the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. It is difficult to imagine an agenda with a more promising potential for just peace than WPS. The fact that the UN Security Council passed resolution 1325 in 2000, and has passed several related resolutions since, signifies a shift – albeit a frustratingly slow shift – towards a more holistic approach to peace than the military and diplomatic approaches. Our findings indicate that UCP is a good, effective and relevant contribution to that shift.

Chapter 7 is our final chapter, where we present some suggestions for how members of NEPP could utilize UCP in their work. We look specifically at four cases that have been brought to our attention by NEPP members, cases in South Sudan, Burundi and the Philippines. Our assessments of these cases are intended to serve as an inspiration for further investigation into whether and how to utilize UCP in the respective contexts. They may also inspire the NEPP members to explore other contexts in which to utilize UCP.

2. The Concept: Definitions and Scope

Since the publication of *A Source of Hope*, the term ‘unarmed civilian protection’ (UCP) has emerged as a useful term to describe a set of methods implemented with the objective to prevent violence, increase safety and security, and strengthen local capacities for peace. The term has been coined by the organization Nonviolence Peaceforce (NP), and encompasses the variety of activities undertaken by the organization. The most recent definition of UCP is: “...the practice of deploying professionally prepared unarmed civilians before, during, or after violent conflict, to prevent or reduce violence; to provide direct physical protection to civilian populations under threat; and to strengthen or build resilient local peace infrastructures.”⁶ Organizations similar to NP operate with similar concepts, but refer to them by different terms, such as ‘protective accompaniment,’ ‘peace observation’ or simply ‘accompaniment.’

The visualization in figure 1 is useful for explaining both the complexity and the interconnectedness of the various elements of UCP. There are four main UCP methods, and each of them has specific applications:

1. ‘Proactive engagement’ has the following applications:
 - a. Interpositioning
 - b. Protective accompaniment
 - c. Protective presence
2. ‘Monitoring’ has the following applications:
 - a. Ceasefire monitoring
 - b. Rumor control
 - c. Early warning, early response
3. ‘Relationship building’ has the following applications:
 - a. Confidence building
 - b. Multi-track dialogue
4. ‘Capacity development’ has the following applications:
 - a. Supporting self-sustaining local UCP infrastructures
 - b. Training

⁶ (Duncan, 2015, p. 4)

The goal of UCP is to create or strengthen the space needed for local civilians to determine their own peaceful future. UCP is a set of methods that enhance each other in working for this goal. The methodology of UCP has been developed by experienced peace practitioners who have been involved for many years in civilian peace, accompaniment and protection efforts. UCP can in theory be applied in any context where there is violence, including where there is ongoing warfare, as long as the presence of the UCP practitioners actually has a deterring effect on violence. One could say that it is a result of lessons learned since the time of Gandhi. This does not mean that UCP is a perfected or finalized approach to reducing violent conflict, as the lessons are still being learnt.



Figure 1: The goals (center) and different methods and activities of unarmed civilian protection. (Duncan, 2015)

In this report we refer to ‘accompaniment’ when referring to internationals accompanying locals who stand up to injustice or oppression. In the places where accompaniment is utilized, the local actors benefit from companions who can communicate with the out world. They are able to prevent shrinking of the civic space because the authorities and other actors are concerned with their international reputation.⁷ If one asked Peace Brigades International (PBI), the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), SWEFOR or Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) they would say that they mainly do *accompaniment*, i.e. protecting civilians by accompanying them in their day-to-day life or in their work for justice, human rights and against oppression. Through their protective accompaniment, they are able to monitor the behavior of the stakeholders, and can document human rights abuses or other offences.

Much of the difference between the organizations in this field lies in how they define their approach, and how they understand the relationship between the different elements of their approach. For instance, core elements of PBI’s ‘protective accompaniment’ model are relationship building and capacity building (security trainings), and to some extent monitoring activities. These are also core elements of UCP, but PBI does not refer to this as UCP. The difference in the approaches may be explained by the contexts in which they have been developed. The actors involved in accompaniment have mainly responded to situations of injustice and oppression, such as that suffered by indigenous or other discriminated populations in Latin America, or people with very limited self-determination, such as the Kurds or the Palestinians. The organization behind UCP has operated in warlike contexts (Sri Lanka, the Philippines, South Sudan), and has developed an approach aimed at reducing the violence generally in a region. The examples in chapters 3 and 4 will make clearer what this field of work entails, and which results one may expect.

Similar but different: NORDEM and NORCAP

There are two entities in Norway offering similar, but different services: NORDEM (Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights)⁸ and NORCAP (Norwegian Capacity). As the full name reveals, NORDEM’s emphasis is on democracy and human rights. NORCAP’s emphasis is on humanitarian protection.

NORDEM is doing invaluable work to contribute to good governance and solid democracies around the world. “NORDEM is a civilian capacity provider specialised in human rights and democratisation. NORDEM’s main objective is to enhance the

⁷ (Mahony, 2006)

⁸ The information about NORDEM in this section is gathered from the NORDEM website and from the 20 years anniversary publication (NORDEM, 2013).

capacity of international organisations working in these fields. NORDEM recruits, trains and deploys qualified personnel and is fully funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”⁹ On the surface, this may sound similar to UCP, but there are key differences:

Government vs. Civil Society

When NORDEM refers to “international organizations,” it is using the political science and international law term used to refer to organizations created by and working for states, that is, *intergovernmental* organizations. The main recipients of NORDEM capacity building are the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN. These organizations, in turn, use their capacity to strengthen government institutions. NORDEM may also second personnel to UN missions to build capacity in government institutions. The capacity building done by UCP practitioners, on the other hand, is mainly concerned with local civilian, non-state actors, communities and organizations.

Indirect vs. Direct Protection

When NORDEM works to ensure human rights for civilians, this is done through government institutions. NORDEM contributes to strengthening the position of human rights and international humanitarian law within law enforcement and the military of states. This in turn reduces human rights abuses, and it contributes to crucial elements of a well-functioning criminal justice system, such as witness protection programs. NORDEM thus contributes to protection indirectly, whereas the UCP approach to protection is more direct. The physical presence of UCP practitioners in the field directly protects the civilians in their immediate surroundings.

Track 1 Diplomacy vs. Track 2 and 3 Diplomacy¹⁰

NORDEM was created by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, giving the responsibility for its implementation to the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights at the University of Oslo, and its target group is intergovernmental organizations and government institutions. To simplify, NORDEM was made by track 1, for track 1. UCP on the other hand is mainly concerned with the lower tracks of diplomacy. Although building relationships with track 1 is clearly within the scope of UCP, the type of support that NORDEM provides for track 1 is not.

⁹ (Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, n.d.)

¹⁰ We here refer to John Paul Lederach’s three tracks or levels in society: Government, mid-level and community leadership, and the grassroots.

Top-down vs. Bottom-up

Having already made the point of track 1 vs. track 2 and 3, this point may be superfluous, but it may also further help distinguish between the two methods of work, namely: When working through track 1 diplomacy, one is hoping for change to come from the top, from the government. When working through the lower tracks, one is hoping for change to come from the bottom, from the civil society.

The other Norwegian entity that may give associations to UCP is **NORCAP**, which “enhances the capacity of the international community to prevent and to respond to humanitarian challenges.”¹¹ NORCAP is a roster¹² managed by the Norwegian Refugee Council, specializing in rapid deployment of expert personnel to humanitarian emergencies around the globe.

Humanitarian Protection vs. Unarmed Civilian Protection

An important aim of NORCAP is to support *humanitarian protection*, also known as *Protection of Civilians (PoC)*,¹³ which concerns the legal and physical measures to protect vulnerable groups from violence. This is similar to UCP because protection is the aim of the activities, but different in its approach to achieving ‘protection.’ “Protection can be defined as a concept that encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law. Within the context of UCP protection is mainly understood as direct physical protection from imminent violence.”¹⁴ What most clearly distinguishes UCP from humanitarian protection is the strategic use of *proactive engagement* and *relationship building* (see figure 1), that is, using one’s physical, unarmed presence as a source of protection, and actively building relationships with all stakeholders in order to foster dialogue and retrieve information.

Government vs. Civil Society

Most of the NORCAP personnel are sent to UN agencies, while some are sent to the African Union, the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), the International Monitoring Team in the Philippines, the governments of Lebanon and South Sudan, and other governmental or intergovernmental agencies. UCP, on the other hand, is a response to the limited space of civil society to peacefully resolve a violent situation. UCP is mainly concerned with supporting civil society.

¹¹ (NORCAP, 2012)

¹² A roster is a list of persons awaiting their periods of duty. Roster members have other jobs, but are ready to be deployed to international operations on short notice.

¹³ «PoC» is also used in the field to refer to refugee and IDP camps. For instance, one might hear «There are currently two PoCs in Juba,» which means that there are two IDP camps there.

¹⁴ (Oldenhuis, Carriere, Furnari, Frisch, & Duncan, forthcoming, p. 185)

Rights vs. Relationships

NORCAP supports the efforts of UN and other intergovernmental agencies to protect civilians, through a rights-based approach. In this endeavor, NORCAP “subscribes to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee endorsed definition of protection as ‘all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, including human rights law, international humanitarian law, and refugee law.’”¹⁵ Within UCP, the key approach to protection is relationships with the stakeholders.

Humanitarian Emergency vs. Violent Context

Humanitarian protection refers to both situations of armed conflict and situations of natural disasters, whereas UCP is only utilized in contexts afflicted by violence. Humanitarian protection asks “How can we ensure the rights of civilians according to international law in this emergency?” UCP more narrowly asks “How can we reduce the violence experienced by civilians?”

The way in which the differences are described here are meant to underline the differences. There are of course times when the work of NORDEM and NORCAP overlaps with that of UCP practitioners. The work of NORDEM and NORCAP should, however, not be confused with UCP. In important ways, the contributions to peace of NORDEM and NORCAP and those of UCP practitioners mutually strengthen and complement each other.

Definitions: Violence and Nonviolence

Before moving on in our discussion, there is a need to explain what we mean when using the terms ‘violence’ and ‘nonviolence.’ We find the definitions of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and Nonviolent Peaceforce useful in this regard:

Violence is a particular response to conflict. It is the behavior that involves the use of force intended to dominate, hurt, damage or kill someone or something. Violence can be physical, sexual, psychological and emotional. These types of violence are usually called direct violence. This is inflicted directly from one person to another. Violence can also be indirect, such as cultural violence or structural violence. The dehumanization of other cultures is a form of cultural violence. Structural Violence refers to violence that is

¹⁵ (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2014) The Inter-Agency Standing Committee coordinates the world’s key UN and non-UN humanitarian agencies.

built into social, political or economic structures. Unjust or violent structures are often an underlying cause for secondary violence (e.g. oppressed minority groups may resort to physical violence as a response to unequal access to economic resources).¹⁶

Nonviolence is a framework that consists of a specific ethical and political philosophy, principle, and practice. In its most basic form can be defined as the use of peaceful means, not force, to bring about political or social change. As an ethical philosophy, nonviolence upholds the view that moral behavior excludes the use of violence; as a political philosophy it maintains that violence is self-perpetuating and can never provide a means to a lasting peaceful end. As a principle, it supports the pacifist position that war and killing are never justified. As a practice, pacifists and non-pacifists have used nonviolence to achieve social change and express resistance to oppression.¹⁷

¹⁶ (Oldenhuis, Carriere, Furnari, Frisch, & Duncan, forthcoming, p. 187)

¹⁷ (Oldenhuis, Carriere, Furnari, Frisch, & Duncan, forthcoming, p. 184)

3. Who Does What?

We have researched how a selection of the internationally best-known actors currently provide accompaniment and civilian protection. In this chapter, we will explain the “what,” the actual activities that each organization does. We will go through each organization one by one, and in the next chapter – the “how” part – we will discuss the principles that guide their work one by one, with examples of how the organizations relate to the principles.

We have not been able to make field visits to all the actors – some we have only interviewed (Christian Peacemaker Teams and SWEFOR) or visited in the headquarters (Peace Brigades International).¹⁸ We visited the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program for Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) and Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) in the field. EAPPI was selected because several of NEPP’s members are already involved in this initiative, and because EAPPI emphasizes accompaniment. NP was chosen because it is one of very few organizations that emphasize UCP, it is based on paid staff instead of volunteers, and it is intended to be able to take on large scale operations. NP thus stands out in several ways from other actors in the field. Those we did not visit in the field we will briefly present first, before going in depth on those we visited in the field.

SWEDISH FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION (SWEFOR)¹⁹

SWEFOR (Kristna Fredsrörelsen in Swedish) was founded in 1919 by pastors who broke away from the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society because they did not find the organization radical enough. Accompaniment is part of a larger portfolio of peace related work, and SWEFOR currently has “peace observers,” as they are called, in Guatemala (since 1998), Mexico (since 1999) and Colombia (since 2003). The accompaniment in Guatemala started after a request from a Guatemalan employee that SWEFOR should support the local work to establish a truth commission. SWEFOR responded by sending observers to follow this advocacy work, and through this the need for further accompaniment became apparent.

SWEFOR receives requests for accompaniment from civil society actors, and will send observers if they work on human rights or other legal issues and if they only use nonviolent means. In some cases SWEFOR has concluded, after an assessment, that accompaniment will not have an effect and has thus declined the request. There is also

¹⁸ We interviewed International Coordinator of PBI, Laura Clarke, in the PBI office in London on October 17, 2014; Program Secretary of SWEFOR, Sandra Eriksson, on Skype on June 11, 2015; and Program Director of CPT, Muriel Schmid, in Oslo on June 22, 2015.

¹⁹ Unless otherwise noted, the information on SWEFOR is based on our interview with Sandra Erikson on June 11, 2015.

an example of an accompanied actor, the Zapatistas, becoming less firm on its nonviolent stance, leading SWEFOR to detach itself from it. There are 22 peace observers in total in Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico, and they write blogs and articles and send letters to the authorities in the three countries and to Swedish authorities. The peace observers also establish relationships with the relevant authorities legally responsible for ensuring the human rights of the citizens. This means that they talk to the military and police authorities because they are governmental, whereas they do not establish relationships with paramilitary actors. The peace observers in Guatemala and Mexico stay for a minimum of one year. In Colombia, the conditions are less tough since the peace observers live in Bogota, and they stay there for a minimum of two years. Upon return to Sweden, the peace observers go on speaking tours and visit schools, churches and organizations to talk about their experiences.

CHRISTIAN PEACEMAKER TEAMS²⁰

Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) is historically linked to the Mennonites, Quakers and Church of the Brethren, and seeks to embody the gospel and its emphasis on peace and social justice. The organization was created in the mid-1980s after Ron Sider, a renowned Mennonite theologian, challenged the participants of the world Mennonite conference to live up to the Christian commitment to peace. The aim was to form and train an «army» of peacekeepers. The organization still uses military terminology, such as 'reservists' and 'corps.' CPT currently has programs in Hebron (Palestine), Iraqi Kurdistan, northern Colombia and in Canada (with indigenous communities). CPT goes exclusively to places where they are invited, with the following preconditions: The local group that invites them is committed to non-violence; some form of organization must already be in place; and the CPT budget allows it. The CPT teams are very autonomous, but protective presence and accompaniment are definitely key parts of each team's work. The aim of the work is "a long-term transformation of the conflict through transforming civil society."²¹ CPT may follow women's organizations and support civil society initiatives, create spaces for meetings, echo and amplify local voices, and use passport privileges for the benefit of the local communities.

One example of amplifying local voices is from Colombia, where the CPT team joined forces with other organizations to assist the *campesinos* of Las Pavas (ASOCAB) in their struggle against the palm oil consortium Labrador. Pressuring Labrador directly was impossible because it was unknown and invisible to most Europeans and North Americans. The campaign decided to target Body Shop, which decided to stop buying its

²⁰ Unless otherwise noted, the information on CPT is based on our interview with CPT Program Director Muriel Schmid on June 22, 2015 and subsequent correspondence.

²¹ E-mail from CPT Program Director Muriel Schmid on April 5, 2016.

palm oil from a member of the consortium. This member, Daabon Organics, in turn withdrew from the consortium.²²

Another example is from Iraqi Kurdistan:

In 2013 CPT began to accompany and amplify voices of farmers whose land ExxonMobil took (or tried to take) for oil operations. In the area of a Shawre valley, with ancient sites and home for nearly 30 villages, some farmers, who are also university teachers, lawyers and activists, organized themselves to fight non-violently against the oil search of ExxonMobil in the valley. They formed a group called: Organization for protection of environment and general rights. They educated themselves and began educating others in the valley on issues of land rights and dangers of oil companied operations. CPT accompanied them to a public action, in which they blocked roads for the oil company cars, and amplified their voices through media, stories and a video film. Exxon Mobil stopped the exploration and left the area.²³

The concept of “undoing oppression” has become key for CPT. “Undoing oppression” comes from the idea that violence needs to be identified at every level. CPT is not only reacting to physical violence, but also trying to identify all types of violence, cultural and structural, including inside each team member himself or herself. The teams have weekly workshops on “undoing oppression,” in which they reflect together on what it means to come as externals and have clear views on for instance violence and gender. Other questions for reflection are: “What does it mean to support local processes with regards to oppression?” “What is my own contribution to oppression?” “What are my privileges?” These reflection exercises guide the work of CPT as a whole.

The approach of CPT has evolved from a rather strong emphasis on interpositioning to an approach that is less confrontational. In 2007, CPT engaged in a process to transform the organization and address the questions of oppression and privileges, in particular race, within the organization. As a result, CPTers understand their presence in very different terms than they did at the beginning, and CPT’s mission statement changed from “Getting in the Way” to “Building Partnerships to Transform Violence and Oppression.”

Among the organizations examined in this report, CPT is the only one to have experienced the loss of one of their practitioners while on duty. In 2005, the US citizen Tom Fox was taken hostage at gunpoint in Baghdad together with three other CPTers. The other men were rescued after 118 days of captivity. Fox was murdered on March 9, 2006.

²² Vriesinga, 2015.

²³ E-mail from CPT Program Director Muriel Schmid on April 27, 2016.

PEACE BRIGADES INTERNATIONAL

The Principles and Mandate document of Peace Brigades International (PBI) states that the organization

...was founded in 1981 to undertake the task of peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building under the discipline of nonviolence. It draws inspiration from Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy and experience in the field of nonviolent social change, strengthened by similar movements throughout the world. As a third-party force it applies methods of nonviolent intervention in situations of conflict to establish peace and justice.²⁴

According to International Coordinator Laura Clarke, the term 'peace-keeping,' which was used in the original 1992 version of the document, would probably not have been used today. Rather, the aim is "to create space for peace and to protect human rights."²⁵ The four "general principles" of PBI are nonviolence, international character (it aims to represent the international community), non-partisanship, and a non-hierarchical model of organizing and decision-making.

PBI currently has a field presence in Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico and Nepal, using adapted approaches for the specific context and requests of local civil society. PBI provides support for human rights defenders (HRDs), increasing their security, amplifying their demands, disseminating information to a broad spectrum of key actors on their work, facilitating spaces for dialogue and carrying out policy advocacy aimed at strengthening the international policy framework for HRD protection. PBI maintains regular dialogue with authorities, calling for improved protection for HRDs as well as proper investigations into the attacks against them. Within this work PBI includes key stakeholders among the international community such as embassies, international nongovernmental organizations, networks and international organizations. PBI also facilitates high-level dialogue between civil society and authorities that bring disparate groups of organizations towards unity on important points, while increasing their impact and collective weight.

PBI's signature method, used in its Latin American projects and Kenya, is international protective accompaniment, understood as a set of instruments and tactics to protect HRDs and to maintain and expand their space to continue their human rights work. It involves the direct international presence of volunteers on the ground combined with a range of associated networking, communications and advocacy tools applied at the local, national, regional and global levels. Physical accompaniment of the HRDs is combined with dialogue with government authorities and armed forces, advocacy and

²⁴ Peace Brigades International, 2008.

²⁵ Ibid.

outreach work with the international community, and activation of emergency support networks.

The organization has established emergency support networks, which are individuals in civil society, lawyers, parliamentarians, diplomats or government ministers around the globe, who can be called upon to exert international pressure “in response to the most pressing and serious issues faced by defenders”²⁶ accompanied by PBI. On the ground, PBI communicates with other likeminded organizations such as Christian Peacemaker Teams, International Fellowship of Reconciliation (of which SWEFOR is a member), and Witness for Peace. PBI also has a good relationship with Amnesty International, to which it passes information it cannot use itself for security reasons.

PBI typically initiates its work by responding to a petition for accompaniment from a local organization. Sometimes the request is clearly outside of the PBI mandate, and sometimes there is potential for PBI’s accompaniment to be effective. If so, a full-scale and in-depth exploration may be undertaken to assess the feasibility of opening up a new field project. A number of aspects will be assessed, including:

- What are the needs of the HRDs and how severe are the risks they are facing?
- Is there a civil society movement locally?
- What is the general political and human rights situation? What is at stake politically? Is the government of the country responsive to international pressure and can enough pressure be generated to dissuade aggressors against attacks on HRDs?

If advocacy is unlikely to trigger a response from the international community PBI’s accompaniment will not have sufficient deterrence effect. The security situation will also be assessed, as open warfare is not a place where PBI believes it can do much work. Moreover, a prerequisite for any activity is that there is funding.

In addition to protective accompaniment per se, PBI activities include training and capacity building of local HRDs in relevant fields including security, advocacy, dealing with the effects of stress and psychological pressure, and reconstruction of the social fabric.

PBI’s presence in Indonesia and Nepal stands out because the work there no longer involves protective accompaniment. The model was used in Indonesia for 12 years from 1999 but PBI withdrew its field teams in 2011 because of legal registration problems,

²⁶Peace Brigades International, n.d.

the evolving needs of HRDs and the political context in Papua, which became so sensitive that even the Red Cross was denied access. PBI was the last international organization to leave. A new Indonesia project was launched in 2014, in partnership with a local human rights organization, to provide capacity building to HRDs to strengthen their ability to document, report and advocate on human rights abuses and develop sustainable self-protection strategies. This work is undertaken by a small team of professionals and does not involve volunteers.

PBI's work in Nepal has also evolved in response to changing needs on the ground coupled with impediments to legal registration. Protective accompaniment was provided to HRDs from 2005 to 2012. Since then the focus has been on developing and implementing an online protection tool to map and distribute human rights and security incident reports. As in Indonesia, this work is carried out by specialized staff in partnership with a local organization.

THE ECUMENICAL ACCOMPANIMENT PROGRAM FOR PALESTINE AND ISRAEL²⁷

The Program and Its Vision

After a call for solidarity from the church leaders in Jerusalem, the World Council of Churches (WCC) started a consultation process in 2001 to find an appropriate way to respond. The consultation process ended with a mandate being given to the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (of the WCC) to “[d]evelop an accompaniment programme that would include an international ecumenical presence based on the experience of the Christian Peacemaker’s Team (sic).”²⁸ In August 2002, the first group of Ecumenical Accompaniers (EAs) was sent to the West Bank, after inspiration from an example of accompaniment in the village Yanoun in the West Bank earlier that year. Villagers who had been driven away by violent Israeli settlers were able to return after Israeli and international peace activists decided to come and live in the village.²⁹ “WCC member churches have since recruited over 1,400 Ecumenical Accompaniers (EAs) from 25 countries to serve 3-month terms in placements around the West Bank. Working closely with local communities, Israeli and Palestinian human

²⁷ The NEPP working group represented by Stein Villumstad and Tor Kristian Birkeland visited the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program for Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) in the West Bank in November 2014. We spoke with the program leadership in Jerusalem, the placement teams in the Jordan Valley, Yanoun village, Jerusalem, Hebron and Bethlehem. We also spoke with members of the local reference group and an officer from The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Unless otherwise specified, the information in this section is derived from conversations with Jet den Hollander, Local Programme Coordinator and Nader Muaddi, Advocacy Officer, in Jerusalem, November 18, 2014.

²⁸ As quoted in Eskidjan & Weiderud, 2012.

²⁹ EAPPI, n.d. a.

rights groups, and international agencies, EAPPI has maintained a constant presence in the region ever since.”³⁰ EAPPI’s vision is “a future in which the occupation of Palestine has ended and both Palestinians and Israelis enjoy a just peace with freedom and security based on international law.”³¹ According to the program leadership in Jerusalem, EAPPI almost has a monopoly on protection of this kind in the West Bank, since the program covers more or less all of the West Bank while other organizations are smaller and represented in only a few places.

Components and Principles

EAPPI has six “key principles of accompaniment”: Protective presence, monitoring of human rights violations, standing with local peace and human rights groups, advocacy, principled impartiality and nonviolence.³² Although it is not explicitly stated, our perception is that the two main means to reach the end are protective presence and advocacy, and that the other components can be listed under these two. Furthermore, some of these “principles,” i.e. monitoring, presence, and advocacy could be better described as “methods,” whereas principled impartiality, nonviolence, and standing with locals are principles that the EAs adhere to when implementing the methods.

What: Protective Presence, Monitoring and Advocacy

The accompaniment directly enables two things: Protection and monitoring. **Protection** derives from the fact that the presence of internationals to some extent deters the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), police and Israeli settlers from committing abuses, because they know they are being monitored. **Monitoring** is enabled through the presence, and the EAs directly observe and investigate human rights abuses and breaches of international humanitarian law. Credible and high-quality documentation is a prerequisite for effective **advocacy** work, which is the purpose of monitoring. In this way, the protective presence and the advocacy are mutually dependent on each other; protection comes as a result of advocacy, and advocacy is made possible from the presence.

EAPPI is part of a “protective cluster” including UNICEF and other UN agencies, and other actors with similar mandates. An officer from The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Hebron categorically stated that the OHCHR and other UN offices are dependent on EAPPI to do their job properly for two reasons: EAPPI have constant ears and eyes on the ground, and the EAs have the ability

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ EAPPI, n.d. b.

³² EAPPI, n.d. c.

to react and report timely. He mentioned an example of an under-aged boy who is caught stone throwing. EAs are able to obtain information about his age immediately and report to OHCHR, in which case they can intervene and prevent that the boy is brought to jail, since this is against the law. If he, on the other hand, has already been taken to the police station, he will be interrogated and will have to spend considerable time in custody.

The EAs do not do interpositioning, where one physically places oneself between two parties to prevent violence from taking place between them. EAPPI advises its EAs to refrain from behavior that may provoke someone. This means being present and monitoring events as long as the safety of EAs is not threatened. The background for this decision is that internationals who do place themselves in the middle of violent action (some international actors in Palestine do this) do get attacked, harassed, arrested and deported. At the same time, EAPPI does not have any hard and fast rules on this. The EAs must use their own discretion, but they are not supposed to be human shields. The EAs we spoke with regarding this agreed with the EAPPI approach, and emphasized the importance of visible presence as deterrence.

The EAs are frequently asked to be present in court cases in the Israeli courts, but as a rule of thumb they do not attend such cases. There are, however, three exceptions to this rule: Cases involving children, cases regarding displacement and cases involving contacts with which one has a working relationship. This is a capacity issue, but it also reflects the need of being in control of what sort of resistance to the occupation the program is associated with.

The monitoring and protective presence target three ways in which the occupation affects the Palestinian population: *Access, displacement and violence*. **Access** refers to a number of services and freedoms that the Palestinians are entitled to under human rights law, such as education, health care, religious practices etc., and the EAs monitor and document the degree to which they actually have this access. This includes accompanying children to school, making sure that the school has not been closed by IDF, accompanying people on their way to a clinic or hospital, documenting land grabbing, documenting the closing of mosques and monitoring Israeli checkpoints. A Jerusalem EA told us that a Palestinian at Qalandia checkpoint had said: "When you're here, they're nice, when you're not here, they're not nice." The Bethlehem EAs have access to a telephone hotline to Israeli authorities that they can call when an unacceptable situation arises at a checkpoint. During our visit, there was a situation with closure of the gates and panicked people climbing on top of each other. EAs called the hotline and soon after the gate opened. The EAs document the number of people going through the checkpoint, the number of gates that are open, average time for

passing through the checkpoint, and submit the data to Israeli authorities and relevant UN agencies.

Displacement happens mainly as a result of house demolitions, and the documentation frequently depends on what the displaced report. In such cases, exaggerations may occur and it may be difficult for the EAs to establish with complete certainty what has been demolished or destroyed. Monitoring **violence** is less of a challenge with regards to accuracy, since the number of people injured or brought to hospital can be counted and documented. One discovery of the program has been that the protective presence has a direct effect on violence, but not on displacement. It is advocacy work that may prevent a house demolition by increasing its political cost, but once the demolition is on its way the presence of EAs does not prevent it.

The monitoring enables EAPPI's advocacy work, which is done directly by EAPPI staff in Jerusalem and Geneva, by the EAs while in their placements and when the EAs return to their home countries. The EAs commit themselves to writing articles, blogs and newsletters, and upon return, they commit to giving presentations to different audiences, such as congregations, church groups and civil society organizations. According to the EAPPI website, "[a]dvocacy is the tool for increasing international action for change. We share our eyewitness testimonies with faith leaders, decision makers, media, civil society, and business officials, so that they change public policy toward ending the Israeli occupation and achieving peace in Israel and Palestine."³³



An EA accompanies Palestinian children to school in Hebron. Photo: EAPPI/S. Broekhuizen.

³³ EAPPI, n.d. d.

NONVIOLENT PEACEFORCE (NP)³⁴

The Organization and Its Vision

Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) is, according to its mission statement, “a global civil society organisation that works with people affected by violent conflicts to enhance their security and dignity through unarmed civilian protection (UCP) and by helping to transform the world’s response to conflict situations.”³⁵ Its vision is: “A worldwide culture of peace where conflicts within and between communities and nations are managed through nonviolent means.”³⁶ NP was constituted in 2002 in Surajkund, India, by an international group of peace advocates. In fall 2003, NP had its first team in Sri Lanka. Since then it has been engaged in South Caucasus, and is currently engaged in South Sudan, Myanmar and the Philippines. It is also currently assessing Ukraine and a Syria response. The organization is a response to what local peacemakers have repeatedly stated over the years; that isolation is lethal and that international accompaniers extend the lives of peacemakers and amplify their work.³⁷

Components and Principles

NP has four guiding principles:

Nonviolence: We believe nonviolence to be the strongest possible force for change towards peaceful settlement of conflicts.

Non-partisanship: We do not take sides nor advocate for partisan positions in any conflict. Instead, we are guided by the sum of international laws and norms, including International Humanitarian Law, Refugee Law, Human Rights Law, and relevant UN Resolutions.

Primacy of local actors: We facilitate and create safer spaces for local actors to work out their own solutions to their problems.

Civilian-to-civilian: Our work is carried out by civilians for civilians, and is grounded in communities affected by violent conflict.³⁸

³⁴ The NEPP working group represented by Tor Kristian Birkeland and accompanied by Bishop Arkanjelo Wani Lemi of the South Sudanese Africa Inland Church, visited Nonviolent Peaceforce in South Sudan in December 2015. We spoke with the leadership in Juba, visited the protection teams in Juba and Rumbek, and also met in Juba members of other protection teams. Unless otherwise noted, the information about NP comes from interviews and conversations with NP staff: Co-founder Mel Duncan on Skype on October 21, 2014, Country Director Florington Aseervatham, Deputy Country Director Christopher Holt, and several members of the protections teams during our visit to South Sudan in the period November 30 to December 4, 2015.

³⁵ Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2015, p. 2.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Nonviolent Peaceforce, n.d. a.

³⁸ Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2015, p. 2, emphasis in original.

What: Unarmed Civilian Protection and Humanitarian Protection in South Sudan

NP runs the most diverse protection program in South Sudan. It was invited by two local organizations in 2010 to assist with violence prevention before and during the 2011 elections, and has grown from 5-6 staff to 155. The country leadership is in Juba, and NP has nine protection teams in six (out of ten) states: Upper Nile state (Ulang and Wau Shiluk), Jonglei state (Waat), Unity state (Bentiu and Yida), Northern Bahr el Ghazal state (Nbeg), Lakes state (Rumbek) and Central Equatoria state (two teams in Juba). The situation in South Sudan is continuously shifting, so NP closes and establishes its field sites according to the needs on the ground. In addition to the nine protection teams, there is a civic engagement team in Juba, focusing on civil society support. The Ulang and Waat teams are in opposition-controlled areas, and the rest are in government-controlled areas. NP refers to its field staff as Protection Officers (POs), and distinguishes between National and International Protection Officers (NPOs and IPOs, respectively).

Although NP is known for pioneering UCP, it has adjusted its mission in South Sudan to accommodate the need for humanitarian protection/PoC. The NP teams that work in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) have humanitarian protection as the main part of their portfolio. In IDP camps the focus may be on measures to reduce gender based violence (for instance through making sure that toilets can be locked and that the areas around the toilets are lit up), on child protection (providing spaces for them to learn and to play), and on case management (finding particularly vulnerable individuals who need special medical/health attention, and connecting them with service providers). NP is also heavily involved in family tracing and reunion (FTR), which aims at identifying children and bringing them to their parents. There are approximately 10.000 children in South Sudan who have been separated from their parents. NP undertakes FTR as part of a group of organizations led by Save the Children. When we were leaving South Sudan, a protection officer came with us to the airport to pick up an eight year-old boy who had been identified in Nasir in Upper Nile state. His family had sought protection in the IDP camp in Juba, and NP had been asked by Save the Children in Nasir to assist with the reunification.

When asked whether the emphasis on humanitarian protection rather than on UCP in some sites could be called a mission creep, the country leadership agreed that it was to some extent a mission creep, but not necessarily in a negative way. It was the context of the country that forced an expansion of mandate on NP. Also, it is very difficult to raise funds for direct protection, accompaniment, and the other core parts of UCP. Funding is readily accessible for child protection, GBV work, and other tasks already on the donors' lists. Regrettably, the rules set by the donors do not always make sense. The country leadership gave the example of a donor that would fund child protection, but would not

fund any organization that had connections with military forces. This would make the task of liberating child soldiers, clearly a child protection task, impossible.

NP in South Sudan performs most of the elements of UCP illustrated in figure 1. In the following, each of the elements in figure 1 will be emphasized in the text. With regards to **proactive engagement**, it depends highly on the local context when the different sub-elements are utilized. One example of **protective presence** that NP informed us of was done in 2012 after an attack on the Murle population by members of the Nuer and Dinka tribes in Jonglei. After the violence, 600 injured persons from all tribes were brought from Pibor in Jonglei to a hospital in Juba. The hospitalized Murle were threatened by the hospitalized Nuer in Juba, who said they would “finish the job.” Protection Officers (POs) from NP followed the transport from the Juba airport to the hospital, and stayed at the hospital around the clock for 95 days. No violence occurred during NP’s presence at the hospital.

Protective accompaniment has been used for instance by the Bentiu team. Female IDPs who went outside the IDP camp to fetch firewood ran a high risk of being raped by soldiers. Numerous instances of rape occurred. After having been asked by a group of women for help, NP started patrolling the areas outside of the camp that the women had pointed out as high-risk areas for gender-based violence (GBV). In order to make clear that they were NP, the POs waved flags and blew whistles so as not to be mistaken for enemy soldiers. No women who had been accompanied by NP had been raped since the patrolling started.

Interpositioning is quite rare, and happens only when the other forms of proactive engagement fail. A protection officer stationed in Bentiu was in Juba when we were there, and he told us about a recent incident when soldiers had come out of the bush when a group of POs, one national and three internationals, had accompanied women fetching wood. One soldier attacked the National Protection Officer (NPO), striking her with a stick. The International Protection Officers (IPOs) quickly intervened, placing themselves between the soldier and the NPO. The situation escalated, and the soldier levelled his gun on the NPO. The IPOs positioned themselves between the soldier and the NPO and managed to calm down the soldier, convincing him to let the NPO return to the camp. The Bentiu team leader was certain that several women would have been raped that day if the firewood patrol had not been there. At the time of our visit, the Bentiu team was reassessing its firewood patrols, and wanted to increase the number of POs in each patrol (four was not considered to be enough), and to only include internationals in the patrols (see more on this assessment under the “Externals vs. Internals” discussion in chapter 4).

In all its sites, NP actively **builds relationships** with as many stakeholders as they can. The **confidence building** part of this entails the protection teams building relationships with the stakeholders, and also between the stakeholders. The **multi-track dialogue** part refers to facilitating dialogue between relevant stakeholders once their confidence in NP and each other is sufficiently strong. For instance, the Rumbek team is working in the local communities in Rumbek Center and Rumbek East counties. The team proactively builds relationships with all levels of the government system, from the governor (state level) to the commissioner (county level) to the payam administrators and sometimes the boma and village level leaders (a payam consists of a number of bomas, which consist of a number of villages). They also build relationships with the different levels of traditional leaders, from the paramount chief to the executive chiefs to the sub-chiefs. Since the violence in Rumbek is mainly between the young cattle herders of the different clans, and the military and police are not seen as stakeholders, the Rumbek team only meets the military and police through the county commissioner and does not prioritize building a strong relationship with them.

One example of dialogue work from the Rumbek team is a case involving the murder of a chief by the son of a chief of a different clan. The paramount chief of the culprit's clan agreed to hand over the culprit to the police. This was negotiated by the commissioner. NP then performed shuttle diplomacy between the clans to avoid revenge killings and an escalation of the conflict. They met with the leaders in two payams more than 100 times between August 2014 and July 2015, when finally face-to-face dialogues were held. The dialogues ended in an agreement signed by both paramount chiefs and two commissioners. NP will monitor the agreement, but does not have a formal role in its implementation. The community and local government are formally responsible for monitoring. Between July and the end of November 2015 there was very little mass mobilization, which had been commonplace before July.

Under the headline **capacity development**, NP in several locations in South Sudan has facilitated the creation of Women's Protection Teams (WPTs) as a way of **supporting self-sustaining local UCP infrastructures**. "These teams work with a variety of UCP methods, including accompaniment, dialogue, rumor control and early warning/early response. Some help with the return, integration and protection of children who have been abducted."³⁹ When we visited the Rumbek team, they had planned a GBV and management training for a local WPT team. The training had to be cancelled because of the eruption of violence in an area between Rumbek town – where the NP team was – and the payam where the WPT was. The NP team explained that it is challenging to plan for trainings in Lakes state because violence tends to erupt in an unpredictable way between cattle herders. A team member told us that although the WPTs are a good contribution to the local capacities for peace, they are not as self-sustained as they are

³⁹ Duncan, 2015, p. 17.

intended to be. Typically the women are engaged for two to three years, and then they lose their dedication. Another challenge is that the women who join the WPTs are relatively privileged to begin with, since the WPTs are on the payam level. If they had been on the village level, more unprivileged women would have been reached. This, of course, would have involved far more women, and would thus have been far more demanding on the resources of the local NP teams.

The NP teams also provide *trainings* in a variety of topics related to strengthening local capacities for peace. The target groups of the trainings will typically be women, chiefs, youth, soldiers, church leaders or other stakeholders who may have a positive effect on the conflict dynamics. Topics include gender sensitivity, UCP, early warning early response (EWER) and management. The trainings provide communities with a space for critically thinking about their own behavior and thought patterns. As an NPO of the Rumbek team explained: “During a UCP training you will realize that you have thought and behaved in a way that increased conflict levels. We are now laying the foundations through trainings. When more people advocate for peace, it will bring peace.” The trainings also have the effect of building confidence in NP and making clearer what NP is trying to achieve in the community.

With regards to *monitoring*, the Rumbek team did not have a formal role in *ceasefire monitoring* in the aforementioned conflict that ended in an agreement in July 2015, since this was left to local actors. But it is clear that the gathering of information that NP performs has a monitoring effect. Every activity that a team performs – a patrol, a training, a meeting – requires the writing of an “activity report,” and the team also summarizes its activity reports in weekly reports. The reports are submitted to the country leadership, who read the weekly summaries and go to the activity reports if they need more information about something. The total amount of information gathered by all the NP teams in South Sudan is therefore quite substantial, and functions as a (mainly informal) monitoring mechanism. In Mindanao in the Philippines, the NP has been given a formal monitoring role in the agreement between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

A member of the Juba team explained to us how they perform *rumor control*. Revenge is the traditional way of dealing with conflict, and there is therefore a lot of fighting within an IDP camp. This violence begets rumors. The team gave the example of a person that was taken to the hospital after fighting, and rumors about his death started. NP went to the hospital and got confirmation that he was alive, and passed this information back to the camp, thereby decreasing tension. The team also actively verifies information about violence taking place outside the camp, because what happens outside the camp has a direct effect inside. NP helps clarify what has actually

happened. A protection officer who had worked in Pibor shared another example of rumor control. She explained that during a period of fighting between three groups, the rumors flourished about the whereabouts of the groups and where they would strike next. Through the patrolling of the NP teams in Bor and Pibor, NP learned about troop movements and were able to verify rumors.

The country leadership explained how NP's *early warning, early response* (EWER) training of the local population in Koch in Unity state, had enabled them to set up a EWER mechanism that was put in motion when violence erupted in the area. According to the country leadership, a large group of people was able to save their lives because of this. Another example is from Yirol in Lakes state. The local community had been trained in EWER and sounded the alarm when cattle herders from different clans were about to start a major fight. The local NP team – several national protection officers and one international – set out for the camp where the fighting would take place. Because of the presence of the international, the leader of the one group called off his men. He did not want to do “something bad” in front of an outsider. The fighting was postponed until the chiefs could come in the morning. The chiefs mediated a deal and violence was averted.⁴⁰

The actors involved in accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection have many traits in common, although they may emphasize their activities differently. The difference in emphasis seems to be highly dependent on context and objective. For PBI, SWEFOR and EAPPI, the emphasis is strongly on accompaniment in a context where it may be risky to demand basic rights, but which is not signified by open warfare. The accompaniment is a solidarity effort with human rights defenders or people who experience systematic breaches of human rights or international law. In a similar way, CPT is a solidarity initiative with the oppressed. NP has a broader scope, aiming at violence reduction more generally. This includes accompaniment, and in some instances NP has performed “pure” short-term accompaniment projects, but it also includes a number of other activities that create and support nonviolent opportunities and efforts for resolving conflict. This broader approach enables NP to operate in warlike situations.

⁴⁰ Duncan, 2015, p. 15.

4. How: Principles and Pragmatics of Unarmed Civilian Protection and Accompaniment

Having presented what the different actors within the field of UCP and accompaniment do, we will in this chapter discuss the “how,” the principles that guide the work, how those principles actually work in practice, and how pragmatic solutions are found to dilemmas involving limited resources.

Nonpartisanship and Principled Impartiality

None of the actors we have come across in our research describe themselves as ‘neutral.’ That term is seen as implying not only neutrality towards the parties involved in conflict, but also neutrality towards the behavior of the parties. In other words, if you are neutral you cannot cry “foul” in cases of war crimes or human rights abuses. The actors have thus chosen the terms ‘nonpartisanship’ and ‘principled impartiality’ to describe the fact that they do not have any views on the content of the conflict, and will not contribute towards any specific solution, but they may take a clear stand on human rights, international law and the means with which the parties fight.

EAPPI – Principled Impartiality

EAPPI uses the term ‘principled impartiality,’ which builds on the perception that breaches of human rights must be pointed out regardless of who the perpetrators are. The emphasis of EAPPI is on ending the occupation (which according to international law is illegal) and on human rights abuses, and EAPPI does not see itself as pro-Palestine or pro-Israel. Cooperation can and does happen with any actor that works against the occupation and human rights abuse, on both the Israeli and Palestinian side. There is, however, a clear geographical bias. Human rights breaches are more frequent, predictable and systematic in the West Bank, hence the EAPPI presence there. Since the program only has Ecumenical Accompaniers (EAs) in the West Bank and not in Gaza and, for instance, Sderot (an Israeli town targeted by rockets from Gaza), it can be said to be partial in terms of choice of geographic location. In addition, the background for the program is the Israeli occupation and breach of international law and UN resolutions. “Ending the occupation” was a starting point for the churches’ call for EAPPI, and therefore the program is of necessity Palestine-biased.

The question of impartiality is complex and challenging, and the Jerusalem office is guided by its stance for justice and human rights when making its assessments. One

example of a difficult assessment is of an EA who filmed a violent attack by Palestinians on an Israeli settler. The EA was sent home to avoid her testifying against the attackers in court. This was done because it was assessed that the Palestinians would not have been tried fairly in an Israeli court.

An impartial actor should in principle be able to communicate with all and any parties to a conflict, but this is a challenge when it comes to communicating with Israeli settlers. Based on previous experiences the Jerusalem office believes that communicating with settlers will be seen by the beneficiaries as collaboration with their oppressors. Earlier, every placement team of EAs had a midterm visit to a settlement to expose the EAs for the settler point of view, but this was stopped when the settlements asked EAPPI to pay for the visits. All the EAs visit Haifa in Israel during their stay, for one or more days.

There are two types of settlers in the occupied territories; Economic and ideological. The economic settlers have moved into the settlements because it comes with economic benefits from the Israeli government. The EAPPI experience is that it is possible to have a constructive dialogue with this type of settlers. The ideological settlers are there because of their political and/or religious beliefs, and according to the Yanoun team, constructive communication with them is much more challenging. In their specific case, it is seen as impossible because the settlers have blocked the road access to the settlements.

The relationship between EAPPI and the authorities is complicated. There is no particular history of working with the Palestinian authorities on a central level, while cooperation is taking place locally. This cooperation does not bear with it any obstacles to ending the occupation, whereas the opposite is seen to be true regarding cooperation with Israeli authorities. The Yanoun team pointed out that there really are no legitimate authorities in the occupied territories; The Israeli authorities are clearly illegitimate as occupiers, and there has not been an election in the Palestinian territories since 2006, and that election happened under occupation and can thus not be regarded as free and fair. The Palestinian authorities are therefore not legitimate.

EAPPI does not have any formal permission to operate in the occupied territories, but Israeli authorities tacitly accept the presence of the program. When asked why there has not been a formalization of the EAPPI presence, the local reference group in Jerusalem explained that this has to do with the schizophrenic nature of the state of Israel. On one hand Israel wants to be a free democracy with rule of law, while on the other hand Israel keeps breaching international law by occupying the West Bank and Gaza, where human rights abuses and possibly war crimes are committed regularly. The

elements of Israel that emphasize democracy, combined with international pressure, keep Israel from throwing out all foreigners from the occupied territories. EAPPI does not want to jeopardize this tacit permission by trying to formalize it. It could be denied, in which case the program would probably not be able to continue. Furthermore, by asking Israel for permission to stay in the occupied territories one would implicitly acknowledge and thus legitimize Israeli authority in the area, which EAPPI does not want to do.

Nonviolent Peaceforce - Nonpartisanship

Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) uses the term 'nonpartisan' to describe how they relate to the parties in a given conflict, and the content of this term is very similar to 'principled impartiality': Although NP will not choose a partisan side in a conflict, the organization will be clear towards the parties on human rights and international humanitarian law, UN Security Council resolutions, children's rights, etc. It is crucial for NP to keep the communication lines with all stakeholders open. As co-founder of NP, Mel Duncan, explained to us: "Nobody has to like us, but we have to have communications with everybody."⁴¹ Sometimes this communication will be secret because of the sensitivity involved, but NP is transparent about the fact that they sometimes will communicate in secret with the different actors.

In South Sudan, NP is spread out in six of the ten states, with an emphasis on where the needs for protection of civilians are greatest. There are NP teams in two opposition-controlled sites (Ulang in Upper Nile and Waat in Jonglei), whereas the other teams are in sites controlled by the government. This does not mean that the other sites are necessarily related to the large conflict between the government and the opposition. Violence takes place not only related to the large conflict, but also between different clans and tribes in local pockets of the country, frequently for non-political purposes. For instance, in Rumbek in Lakes state, the violence that takes place is mainly between Dinka cattle herders of different clans and subclans, typically as revenge for previous violence. The National Protection Officers (NPOs) who are from the Rumbek area have to be cautious about where they go, and will not go to given area with the rest of the team if people from their own clan may be attacked there. This was demonstrated during one of the patrols we accompanied. The team was driving through Rumbek town and was to drive a few kilometers north, to a clinic. One of the NPOs stepped out of the car in Rumbek town because a person from his subclan (Rup) would not be safe in the area to which we were going. The day after, he explained to us: "I got out of the car because although I intend to be nonpartisan, people will identify me with the Rup side."

⁴¹ Skype interview on October 21, 2014.

NP's ambition to be clear on principles while being nonpartisan is challenging when the local understanding of those principles is limited. The criminal justice system cannot be said to be working in South Sudan, and in Rumbek there is a general sense of lawlessness. At the same time, there is a cultural sense of what justice is, and a sense that people who commit offences should pay a price for that. The version of justice that the population sees coming out of the criminal justice system, is not considered to make people pay sufficiently for their bad deeds. If a mistake has been made, or an accident occurs, people will turn themselves in to the police to avoid revenge. The local population connects the criminal justice system to 'human rights' and interprets human rights to mean that crimes will have no consequences and no punishment. There is also a confusion of terms, and a lack of understanding of the difference between the UN and human rights. The NP team in Rumbek frequently receives the question "Are you human rights?" by which the locals mean to ask "Are you from UNMISS?"⁴² Being clear on human rights in such a context, as opposed to the Israel/Palestine context, seems to not mainly be a challenge with regards to nonpartisanship, but with regards to education of the public.

For the NP team in Rumbek, nonpartisanship is mainly about talking to and visiting all sides involved in a given conflict. "The communities understand that we are nonpartisan when we visit both or all sides," explained one of the National Protection Officers. During our visit, the team discussed whether or not to visit the wounded at a hospital after fighting had broken out the day before, in which 18 people were killed. The fighting had happened between the Rup and Gony clans, with subclans and allied clans. The team members discussed this amongst themselves, and the decision was made not to go, since only the wounded from one side would be there. The wounded from the other side were in a different hospital far away and in various clinics, to which it would be unsafe to travel. Making a "balanced" visit to the wounded was not considered to be feasible, and visiting the one hospital would endanger the perception of NP as nonpartisan.

Externals vs. Internals

Does it matter whether the actors involved in protection and accompaniment are externals or internals, or is it enough for externals to support the local work with funding and capacity building? Our findings are that the protection part is frequently dependent on externals, whereas there can be tasks related to other aspects of UCP that only locals can do. Externals do not in all contexts have to be internationals, but internationals will generally be considered as externals. The question of external vs. internal is also related to the issue of nonpartisanship. As we have explained in the

⁴² UNMISS is the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

above section, the National Protection Officers (NPO) in NP would not be seen as nonpartisan in the case of visiting a community in conflict with his own community.

Deterrence

In the West Bank the local population that we met were very clear about the deterring effect that internationals had. According to the villagers in Yanoun, encroachments and attacks by the surrounding Israeli settlers can only be prevented by international presence. They told us: “Since the internationals are here, our children can sleep better at night.” When we met with the principal of Cordoba school in Hebron, we were given the impression that the future of the school was totally dependent on the presence of external observers (represented by EAPPI). The Bedouins we met at Nuweima, close to Jericho, told us that Palestinian NGOs had attempted to come and stand in solidarity with them, but with little effect. According to the Bedouins Israel does not worry about what a Palestinian organization might say, but if internationals come, Israeli authorities behave differently. This perception, that the EAs have to be internationals, corresponds with the findings in the 2008 evaluation of EAPPI.⁴³

A clear example from the experience of NP of the deterring effect coming from externals is the firewood patrol example in Bentiu, mentioned in chapter 3. After the incident where the NPO was attacked, and where the interpositioning of the internationals (IPOs) de-escalated the situation, the conclusion of the NP team was that the accompaniment of women collecting firewood should only be performed by internationals. This, however, could cause communication problems with the soldiers, because the internationals generally do not speak Arabic. The NP team in Bentiu therefore considered including a NPO from another part of South Sudan for communication purposes, as long as the NPO would be regarded as nonpartisan. Another example illustrating the effect of externals is the Yiról example in the above section, where the leader of the one group did not want to do “something bad” in front of an outsider. Most of the NP teams are a mix of NPOs and IPOs, but the teams in Koch, Leer and Mayandit in Unity state (which were all closed sites at the time of our visit) had to consist of only internationals. Those teams used locally hired translators.

Although externals have a strong protective or deterring effect, NP is clear on its principle of ‘primacy of local actors.’ The externals are not there to “fix” a local problem – the local problem must be solved by locals themselves. The externals are there to protect and increase the space available to the locals for finding peaceful solutions. Christian Peacemaker Teams is also clear on the authority of the local actors. The locals set the terms for the CPT presence and can terminate it at any time.

⁴³ Palestinian Counseling Centre, 2008.

Mutual Dependence

The relationship between the internationals and the locals within each protection team is one of mutual dependence. The NPOs in the NP teams have a superior understanding of the context, the culture and the language. They are able to assess the eruption of violence and the risks associated with visiting a community or holding a training. They also have much better access to information about increases in tension between local communities. Those NPOs who have had to flee themselves, will frequently have family members across the country, and through regular telephone conversations with family members they will be very well informed of what is going on around the country, which is useful first-hand information for NP. The IPOs bring with them the protection of being externals, and they frequently have formal qualifications in law or conflict resolution. The protection and qualifications that the IPOs bring, and the risk assessment skills that the NPOs bring, make the NP teams seem quite effective in their work.

Sometimes whether one is external or internal also affects the ability to establish relationships with stakeholders. A member of one of the Juba teams told us the following regarding the attempt to build a relationship with a general in the government army (SPLA): “We started building a relationship with a general at the SPLA compound not far from the IDP camp. One time we brought one of the National Protection Officers with us, but the general found it inappropriate to build a relationship with a South Sudanese in that way; He would only meet internationals. So we had to accept that, and only internationals met him.” The same team member also explained that this has a cultural and gendered side, because white males enjoy a special kind of respect in South Sudan. IPOs who had served in Sri Lanka before coming to South Sudan had told him that the difference between how male and female IPOs were received was hardly noticeable in Sri Lanka.

Sometimes it is the other way around, and only internals will be able to do the job. A Juba team experienced this when fights were breaking out just outside the IDP camp. NP tried to figure out what the fighting was about, but those involved did not want to speak with the *kwajas* (white people) because they assumed they would report to UNMISS. In order to find out what was happening, the task was left to the NPOs, who were able to find out that the fighting had to do with competition regarding the selling of alcohol and transportation services (*boda bodas*) to the IDPs in the camp.

Christian Peacemaker Teams seeks to hire personnel from the local communities whenever possible. Nationals have a knowledge of and familiarity with the culture that help the teams “understand complexities and nuances that escape the attention and understanding of international team members (...) This applies to language, but goes far

beyond that to deeper cultural and historical issues.”⁴⁴ Internationals, on the other hand, generally have better access to international audiences and decision-makers. When travelling, they do not have the visa problems that nationals often face when travelling abroad. They usually also have better access to economic resources. According to CPT, nationals request international accompaniment because it makes them less vulnerable.

Encouraging Local Capacities for Peace

In a context of war and tension, it can be quite demanding for an insider/local to take the initiative towards building social capital. At the same time, there will always be some sort of social structure and key individuals who could have an impact if they were able to constructively use their influence. NP has therefore facilitated the creation of Community Protection Teams inside the IDP camps, where local leaders can influence situations of increased tension between groups within the camp. These teams are trained in techniques that will be useful to deescalate tension. Once these teams are in place and trained, the need for externals decreases. But externals being a third party with no inherent interest in the outcome of local conflicts may be able to set in motion violence reducing processes that otherwise would not have been initiated.

In a country like South Sudan where the education level is generally low, recruiting locals to the NP teams will in most cases mean educating them to be able to function well in a system that depends on written information and analyses, and on familiarity with conflict resolution skills, human rights, international humanitarian law, and gender sensitivity. Although most of the NPOs will have some level of tertiary education, their work experience from NP provides them with skills that are highly needed in a country that is struggling on so many levels.

Language and Communication

Language is an important aspect when discussing the qualities of externals vs. internals. Information gathering requires talking to the local population, which demands either knowledge of the local language, or the ability of the locals to speak the ‘lingua franca’. In many cases the internationals will need a translator, which always brings with it a number of assessments. Should the translator be male or female? How highly qualified does the translator need to be? Will he or she convey the exact message, or will his or her own opinions color the message? Does the personality or the ethnic background of the translator matter? How much will be lost in translation? Locals will not have this problem, and can communicate freely and in detail with their fellow locals in their

⁴⁴ E-mail from CPT Program Director Muriel Schmid on April 21, 2016.

mother tongue. A problem may be, however, that the locals are not as nonpartisan as they want to be – or say they are – and will be able to withhold information about local dynamics that their protection team needs. This was mentioned by one of NP’s staff as a challenge. The team had experienced that information had surfaced about tension or violence between two groups, and it had become clear that the NPOs had known about it without informing the team. Again, the interdependence between the externals and the locals becomes clear; the internals need to be inspired by the nonpartisanship of the externals, and the externals need the deep understanding of the local context of the internals.

Language is also an issue in the EAPPI program. Few EAs speak Arabic, and this can occasionally be a problem. For the first Jordan Valley team it was a great benefit to have an EA who spoke Arabic who could build relationships with the local leaders who were unacquainted with EAPPI. But if all or most EAs spoke Arabic it would change the nature of the program; it is supposed to be solidarity that anybody can take part in. This demands the use of translators, and currently this job is mainly left to the local drivers. In one of our visits the driver had certain challenges translating the appropriate meaning of what was said. At times he wanted to make his own interpretations instead of translating questions to the relevant persons. This underlines the need for properly trained translators. The idea of combining driver duties with translation is acceptable, but it should probably be combined with translator training. The Jerusalem office told us that putting in place better translation routines was one of the things on their to-do list.

Another aspect relating to communication is power. When only a few people in a community are able to speak English and communicate with the accompaniers or protection officers, these individuals have power over the communication. There is a balance between allowing local leaders to be leaders, and trying to extract a broader range of reflections within the community (including women). Such “monopoly” of certain contact persons in a community may not create a proper understanding of the local dynamics.

Identity

The different actors within UCP and accompaniment have different approaches to the identity of their organizations. In the West Bank, the EAs wear vests with the EAPPI logo, a cross and a dove, and the text “World Council of Churches” and “Ecumenical Accompanier” written on them. Does this mean that EAPPI is a Christian program? The local reference group in Jerusalem was clear that the program is not Christian, although it is initiated and implemented by the churches. It is not meant to be a purely church

related program, and they said that this has perhaps not been communicated clearly enough. But the fact that the program is run by the churches should not be hidden; being open about the identity of who is behind the program is only clarifying and contributes to building trust. The EAs we spoke with regarding this did not seem to have an opinion on whether it was an advantage or disadvantage for EAPPI to be run by the churches. In the Jordan Valley the Christian churches are few and far between, and a reference to local church partners would therefore not make much sense. In Jerusalem, the EAs make efforts to build and maintain relations with the churches that called for the program. It is difficult to cover all churches during a team period, but the current team has decided to emphasize quality (a certain frequency and depth) rather than quantity. Overall it seems that the Christian identity of the program does not affect it negatively. We cannot argue that the Christian identity is an advantage, but the fact that it is easy to understand who is behind the program seems to serve as an advantage.

According to Sandra Eriksson in SWEFOR, their Christian identity is an advantage in Latin America, but not in Sweden. In Latin America, the church is perceived very differently than in secular Sweden. There is a continuous discussion among the members of SWEFOR whether there should be more emphasis on the nonviolence itself, or more on the theology behind it. The members are both Christians and non-Christians.

During the first years of Christian Peacemaker Teams, there was a requirement for all CPT members to be Christians, and one had to show the support of one's Christian community before joining a team. This changed ten years ago when the first Muslim CPTer joined the organization and became an associate member. Since then, CPT has been engaged in the process of reevaluating the relationship between its Christian identity and its desire to be more and more inclusive of different spiritual and religious identities. In each context, CPT may emphasize differently its Christian identity.

According to Mel Duncan of Nonviolent Peaceforce, it would have been a problem to have only Christians in the NP teams in Mindanao in the Philippines because of the large Muslim population, and the fact that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is a Muslim movement, whereas the rest of the Philippines, including most people in the government, identify as Christians. NP is a completely secular organization, but the different faiths of its staff serve as inspiration for the work.

Voluntary vs. Professional Work: Payment, Duration of Stay, Age, Qualifications

Most of the organizations emphasize solidarity and the voluntary nature of the work, and facilitate a people-to-people effort in which anybody can partake with a low cost for the sending organization. Neither SWEFOR nor PBI want to become too professionalized, because the emphasis is on people-to-people solidarity. The exception is Nonviolent Peaceforce, which emphasizes professionalism and paid staff. How the organizations relate to the question of voluntary vs. professional work affects how much the staff or volunteers get be paid, how long they stay in the field, their age and their qualifications. The volunteers usually receive some form of allowance, in addition to having expenses for room and board covered, whereas the staff of NP receive salaries.

Payment

Common to all the organizations is that the work is done at a very low cost compared to for instance UN efforts, and particularly compared to military efforts. It seems clear that this narrows the recruitment base for the protection and accompaniment efforts, and as a consequence one can only choose those who are best qualified among a fairly narrow selection of the workforce. When the pay is low, only those who can afford it, or those who are willing to sacrifice “normal” pay for a good cause, will apply for a position or a program. The country leadership of NP in South Sudan expressed regret about the pay levels, because the protection officers are so qualified and work so hard and with such high risk compared to other humanitarian workers. The pay level is highly dependent on donors, because no donor wants to pay for high salaries. Until UCP gains more recognition, salaries will remain low.

Duration of Stay

The duration of an EA’s presence in the West Bank is currently limited to three months because of Israeli visa regulations. This has both positive and negative sides. A positive aspect is that three months is short enough to allow the EAs to keep the energy level constantly high. They know that their assignment is only for three months, and they therefore give all they have during that time. Furthermore, the living conditions for some of the placement teams are quite demanding, and three months is thus a tolerable length of stay. Another positive aspect of the short duration is that it demands a high number of EAs, who then go back to their home countries for advocacy work. This means that the program “produces” 150 advocates globally each year. The short duration also allows the EAs to get emotionally involved. The Jerusalem office assumed that cynicism among the EAs would increase if the duration were increased. Finally, the

short duration makes it easier to recruit EAs, because it is easier to leave your commitments at home for three months than for a longer period of time. The Jerusalem office repeatedly emphasized the enormous richness and power, with regards to skills, competence and enthusiasm of each of the EA teams. The cumulative capacity of each team was said to be the main asset of the EAPPI program.

A negative aspect of the short duration is that each team has to learn the context every three months. This limits both the understanding of the context and the quality of relationships one can build, and thus it becomes harder to build on previous experience and on the trust that grows between the EAs and the local population. The short duration also demands more training and more frequent recruitment, which is costly and requires more administration. The Yanoun team suggested that a possibility of returning for a second period may be considered. In this way, accumulated experience may be combined with coming back with “fresh eyes”. This would enhance the continuity.

Although the peace observers of SWEFOR stay in the field for at least one year, the organization does emphasize that it is a people’s movement, with the aim of supporting local people in their work. Those who volunteer for PBI also stay for a year, with the possibility of extension.

Those recruited to Christian Peacemaker Teams commit to three years, where they spend nine months of every year in the field, and three months of every year on advocacy and time off. The three-year commitment may be renewed. CPT performs an evaluation of each team member every 18 months.

NP in South Sudan operates with six-month contracts for all their Protection Officers. The work may be more demanding than the new recruits have foreseen, and the six-month contract is an incentive for them to stay for for that long. Occasionally people leave after six months, but a more frequent occurrence when they are placed in a particularly demanding site, is that they ask for a transfer to another site. This is a balancing act, because NP wants strong local relationships and a very good understanding of the context in each team. A protection officer should ideally stay in a community for a year, not only for the success of the program, but for the security of the staff, which is dependent on quality relationships with the local actors and communities. At the same time, the leadership needs to think of the welfare of their staff. Naturally, staff welfare is crucial in a violent context, and the team leaders report on the performance of staff to the country leadership. Five months into the contract, each staff is asked whether he or she wants to continue.

There are no limits to how long a person can stay in the field for NP. The longer people stay, the less NP needs to spend on training of new staff. Our impression was that internationals from affluent countries tend to leave after about two years or less. One European staff who was leaving after a year and six months told us: "I think it's normal and healthy to leave after this time. I would almost say that staying longer is not good. You have to take care of yourself. I'm going home to objectively assess my work here - I think you have to do that from a distance. If I want to return I'll let them know, and there might be a position for me." Internationals from less affluent countries or backgrounds tend to stay longer. This may be because of the economic and career opportunity, but also because the hardship of living in South Sudan is not that much of a hardship to them. As one African international staff explained: "Most Africans seem to have higher resilience in coping with the harsh realities of the social and physical environment."

Age and Qualifications

All the organizations have a requirement for maturity of their staff and volunteers. PBI had an age limit of 25, but was required by EU regulations to remove this because it was found to be discriminatory. EAPPI accompaniers have to be between 25 and 70 years old. NP does not emphasize age, but the international staff will usually have 5-6 years of international experience, and have university degrees. Gender balance and global representation is more important to NP than an even age distribution. The national staff of NP have to be above 18 years old. The organization aims for gender balance, but few female nationals apply. The experience of NP is that they cannot have too high demands when recruiting nationals: NP provides opportunities and builds capacities. They recruit on the sites where they have teams, and nationals are then offered to be transferred to other sites after having served in their home communities.

Recruiting people between 30 and 60 is a challenge for most actors. The organizations who send out volunteers have difficulties recruiting people who have started their careers and earn regular salaries. Furthermore, this type of work is usually not reconcilable with family life, and those who have families will have to leave the families at home. Those who volunteer tend to be students or recently graduated, or retirees. Some of the sending organizations in the EAPPI program have arrangements that encourage people in the middle of their careers to volunteer. For instance, employees of the Church of Norway are able to apply for leave with pay as they volunteer for EAPPI. Although Nonviolent Peaceforce pays its staff a salary, this does not mean that the organization recruits evenly from all age groups. Only about 20-25% of NP staff are above 30 years old. The NP country leadership in Juba did not see this as a problem, as age is not seen to be a qualifying factor. NP focuses on the experience and qualifications

HOW: PRINCIPLES AND PRAGMATICS OF UNARMED CIVILIAN PROTECTION AND ACCOMPANIMENT

of its applicants, many of whom come from UN or OECD positions in conflict contexts, or from organizations like PBI.



From one of the daily morning meetings in the Nonviolent Peaceforce Rumbek team. The team members share information on recent local developments, violent incidences, local politics and other information of relevance. Photo: Tor Kristian Birkeland

5. Practicalities

Having discussed the principles by which the main actors within the field of unarmed civilian peacekeeping and accompaniment steer, we will in this chapter present the main practicalities of getting the job done, such as recruitment, staffing, training, salary/compensation, funding, team dynamics and mental health, and decision making and organizational structures.

Recruitment

In the EAPPI program, recruitment of EAs is the responsibility of each sending country's national coordinators. The Norwegian coordinator is Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), which looks for the following personal traits in an applicant: Good health and the ability to handle stress and unpredictable situations; flexibility – one must be able to live and work in a team under demanding conditions; cultural sensitivity; ability to handle a big work load; should be proactive and full of initiative; loyal towards the Christian profile of the program; aged between 25 and 69 years old. Requested qualifications are: Mastery of English language, knowledge of Arabic and/or Hebrew is an asset; must be able to use a computer and a digital camera; international experience, especially experience with living and working under simple conditions; knowledge of the Middle East is desirable; large network, especially church network, is desirable; experience with writing and giving lectures is desirable. NCA recruits a group of twelve EAs once a year, divided into four teams to be sent out over the course of a year. During the last years there have been between five and nine applicants for every EA which has been recruited, and NCA has to turn down many well qualified applicants every year. The largest group of applicants in Norway is young, well-educated women.

Nonviolent Peaceforce emphasizes gender balance and global representation when recruiting. Age is not seen as a qualifying factor, but internationals will usually have a university education and at least a few years of international experience. Other skills needed in NP are relationship building skills, creativity, multi-cultural understanding, being a team player, and writing and computer skills. Sometimes NP will recruit based on nationality, religion, or other identity markers based on the needs on the ground. In South Sudan, lawyers enjoy a special form of respect, particularly international lawyers. As one National Protection Officer in the Rumbek team explained, "No prophet is welcomed in his home town." NP assesses applicants through written applications, a one-hour interview, a psychological review and a 6-10-day mission preparedness training.

NP also cooperates with volunteers in the field, who are not part of the NP structure. These volunteers take part in the early warning, early response mechanism, and NP trains them for this purpose. In the US, NP also recruits volunteers to help with fundraising, grant writing, research and communication/PR work.

Peace Brigades International does not demand any formal human rights qualifications though these are an asset. More and more young professionals entering this field of work see PBI as a good entry point or as an opportunity to gain invaluable experience. Volunteers need to have excellent communication and diplomatic skills, a high level of maturity, personal initiative and motivation, and a willingness to work in consensus and resolve conflict non-violently. Fluency in Spanish is a requisite for the Latin American projects. All volunteers have to commit for at least one year. Applicants attend initial orientations in their home country where available to find out more about PBI and what field service involves. After this, they submit a written application to their field project of choice, are interviewed and undertake written assignments. The final stage of the application process is a week-long in-depth training and selection program.

More than two decades ago, Lisa Schirch wrote the report “Keeping the Peace” in response to a request from the churches in what was then southern Sudan.⁴⁵ That report has many similarities to this, with a presentation of activities civilian peace teams may undertake in conflict contexts. It contains a compilation of characteristics that organizations involved in accompaniment and UCP look for in new recruits. The list can be recommended to anyone looking further into recruitment of personnel to an accompaniment or UCP mission.⁴⁶

Training

The EAs of EAPPI initially go through one and a half week of training, they get to visit two other placements for a duration of two nights each, and there is a “midterm week” of additional training and exposures during their three-month deployment. There are differences in screening and training in the different sending countries, and according to the Jerusalem office, a more coherent routine with regards to both screening and training could be beneficial. The development towards a more global recruitment base requires a more systematic awareness and training in cultural sensitivity within the teams. European and North American EAs sometimes have unreasonable demands for formal qualifications, and may have quite rigid ideas about how things should be done. EAs from other parts of the world tend to be more tolerant regarding different ways of

⁴⁵ Schirch, 1995.

⁴⁶ See pages 73-79 of the report.

doing things. There is currently not much emphasis on cultural sensitivity during the training of EAs, but it has been identified as a need.

NP will train its protection officers based on need and opportunity. Sometimes it is possible to keep the staff at the training site for several weeks, whereas at other times the needs in the field demand briefer mission preparedness trainings so that the protection officers can get to work. Those who only get basic mission preparedness training (about ten days) will be called back for more training in specific topics at a later stage. Topics include stress management, trauma management, case studies, simulations, and personal security. Cultural sensitivity is not a formal part of the training, but nationals will provide cultural perspectives during the trainings.

In order to apply for CPT training one first has to participate in a 10-day delegation going to one of the CPT projects. Upon acceptance there is a month-long training that includes nonviolent resistance, intercultural skills and “extensive sensibility to undoing oppression work.”⁴⁷ The trainings are held twice a year, often in Chicago where the headquarters are, but also in various locations globally.

Both PBI and SWEFOR include self-study and written assignments as part of the training of volunteers. PBI’s pre-deployment training week is followed by further training once in the field.

Salary and Compensation

NP is the only organization that provides salaries for those involved in protection efforts, whereas only the administrators and leadership of the other organizations receive salaries. NP operates with different “job groups,” such as officer level groups, managers, directors and support positions. Nationals and internationals in principle have the same salary, but nationals in South Sudan are usually less qualified and thus have a lower salary. Nationals are encouraged to apply for higher positions when they gain experience and competence. The entrance level pay for a national officer with low qualifications is USD 800, whereas the team leaders of the protection teams receive USD 3500. The team leader positions are open to nationals, and NP in South Sudan has one team leader (out of nine) who is a national. Although the salary is not very high, NP does not experience recruitment from high-cost countries as a challenge.

EAPPI does not pay EAs salaries, and each country sets its own rules for how they compensate their EAs. As an example, the Norwegian EAs receive a monthly

⁴⁷ E-mail from CPT Program Director Muriel Schmid on April 21, 2016.

compensation of NOK 9000 (around USD 1100), which is in the higher end of the scale. All local expenses are covered while in the placements.

PBI covers all volunteer costs in the field and pays stipends but how much varies from place to place. Volunteers from low-income countries may be entitled to some financial support to attend the pre-deployment training. SWEFOR covers room and most of the board for its peace observers, and pays them 5-6000 SEK a month. CPT only gives out stipends to their team members.

Funding

In the EAPPI program, the national coordinators pay for their own EAs in addition to an overhead to the Jerusalem office. For the Norwegian contribution this means that NCA receives funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, different donors support different aspects of EAPPI. Accompanying children to school is classified as an “access to education” measure, and particularly UNICEF supports this work. The UNICEF support makes it possible to recruit EAs from the global south, where the member churches of the World Council of Churches (WCC) usually cannot fund their own EAs. The Jerusalem office is currently researching the funding possibilities under similar schemes with different donors. It frequently happens that the funding is not secured until the last moment, which reduces the quality of recruitment, screening and training.

Humanitarian actors in Palestine tell EAPPI that the program has the most eyes and ears on the ground, that the information they receive from EAPPI is very useful, and that they would benefit from an increase in EAs in Palestine. Such an increase is dependent on funding, which seems possible, but the greater challenge is to secure funding for the necessary administrative support that is needed to uphold a responsible and high-quality program. The advocacy component requires systematization of data and processing within the framework of highly professional communication strategies. This is resource demanding, and donors tend to hesitate when asked to support such functions. The lack of funding for administration and other tasks that are not performed by the EAs, leads to a large work load for the staff at the Jerusalem office. This limits the amount of time they can spend on exploring alternative courses of action, new donors and new partnerships.

NP in South Sudan receives most of its funds from governments (Dutch, Swiss, US, UK), EU, UNICEF, private foundations and to some extent private donations. Much of the funding is short term, which hinders long term planning, leads to much reporting, and to energy being spent on looking for more funding. Much of the funding is also tied up to specific tasks, such as children’s protection and GBV work. This limits the extent to

which NP can perform its core task, UCP, and shifts the work towards humanitarian protection. It also makes welfare of the staff a challenge. NP had one welfare staff earlier, but had to cancel this position because of lack of funding.

PBI receives funding from several European governments, and Germany is the largest supporter. Funding also comes from the European Union and from private foundations and development agencies. The organization does not accept funding from the US government because of the historical role of the US in Latin America. SWEFOR receives its funding from the Swedish government. In Colombia it comes through the embassy, which has complicated matters when the large Swedish corporation Scania has been criticized for its behavior there. CPT finances its work through individual donors (55%) and through contributions from the three supporting church communities.⁴⁸

Team Dynamics and Mental Health

In the EAPPI program, each team of EAs receives a visit from a team facilitator twice during the three months. The team facilitator has as his/her task to make sure that the teams function well and that personal issues are taken care of. The teams also receive two visits from field officers who provide professional guidance on the tasks at hand.

NP in South Sudan does not have staff that specializes in team dynamics. For stress and trauma management, all of the staff can use a service called Interhealth, where one can Skype with psychologists. The country leadership views this service as “expensive but worth it,” and they actively encourage their staff to use the service when they see signs that indicate such a need. The availability of these services makes it possible for staff to deal with issues professionally, and it helps them assess their experiences. The service also reduces the turnover of staff, since the strengthening of their mental health enables them to stay longer in the field. If a team experiences traumatizing events, the members will be brought to Juba for thorough processing.

One NP team leader explained that he always felt that he could rely on the Area Program Coordinator (midlevel management) for challenges within the team. He shared that it was frustrating when the team members do not react to incidences or assignments in the way they should. His experience was that facilitating an open group conversation within the team could be a challenge in South Sudan because of the gender dynamics. It is difficult for a man to facilitate a conversation with women, and vice versa. He also said that the nationals seemed to trust the international staff and

⁴⁸The Mennonites, the Quakers and the Church of the Brethren.

would tell the team leaders about personal issues directly, whereas they were hesitant about sharing in a group.

An international protection officer in NP said that the information flow across the organization is very good, so the team members do not feel like they are isolated within the teams. They attend the same trainings and know each other and stay in touch across the country. This means that people can discuss issues and problems with whomever they are comfortable discussing them. This benefit, however, seems to be more valid for international staff than for national staff. The country leadership expressed regret that the national staff across the organization mainly know their own teams, and are less connected with other teams across the country. The country director said it would have been a great peacebuilding measure to bring together all the national staff, from the Dinka, Nuer, Murle and other tribes, and that this was his dream, although it was too costly to be realized any time soon.

PBI provides psychological support to its volunteers through in-house staff and/or local providers of such services. It also benefits from the pro bono services of an international network of therapists specialized in supporting people working in complex political and security environments.

Evacuation

Nonviolent Peaceforce was the only organization we spoke with about evacuation in cases of violent outbreaks. Under which circumstances should an actor who is there to protect civilians evacuate? For NP this decision does not come lightly and will be taken after a specific assessment of each situation. One example is from one of the IDP camps in Juba, where fighting broke out in the summer of 2015 between two different Nuer tribes, reflecting the bigger political context. UNMISS advised all the humanitarian organizations to leave the IDP camp. NP decided to stay, and became the only organization to do so. The IDPs communicated clearly that the NP presence made them feel safer. NP reported health, water and nutrition needs to the organizations that had left. The team engaged with the IDP community inside the camp to find a solution, and was careful to engage with both sides. They also facilitated conversations with the UN Police and undertook shuttle diplomacy to involve all stakeholders. An agreement was signed about a week after the fighting started. The team leader of the Juba team told us that there had been a similar situation earlier, when international humanitarian workers had been beaten inside the camp. UNMISS had advised the organizations to leave, which they did with the exception of NP. The fact that NP stayed in both of these situations strengthened their relationship with the communities.

The NP site in Koch in Unity state at one point had to be evacuated because all the humanitarian organizations left when fighting broke out. In that case, NP did not have a choice whether or not to evacuate because at its current size the organization is dependent on other actors to organize flights for supply and personnel in and out of the area. If the humanitarian agencies evacuate, the flights are cancelled and NP cannot set up its own flights. When asked whether NP otherwise would have stayed in Koch, the country leadership explained that this would depend on a variety of factors. A protection team needs to be able to actually have a violence-reducing effect. Access to military leaders, for instance, is a prerequisite for that to happen, and if this communication cannot be maintained there is no point in staying.

Each NP team has a “hibernation kit,” which is a big box in which they stock canned food, water, sugar, chlorine tablets for water purification etc. If violence breaks out, the team may need to isolate themselves, and they have to be able to survive for a while without exiting the compound.

Decision Making and Organizational Structure

The EAPPI program is governed jointly by four main categories of people: The international program coordinator and his/her assistant at the WCC office in Geneva; the local program coordinator with his/her staff in Jerusalem; the local reference group in Israel and Palestine, and the national coordinators. They all meet at the annual meeting, which is the superior decision-making body. The annual meeting also elects three people from the local reference group, three from staff and three national coordinators to sit in the Core Group. The Core Group is to ensure implementation of the decisions made at the Annual Meeting, and it meets once, six months after the Annual Meeting.

From the beginning it has been unclear who has the final say in EAPPI with regards to several types of decisions, and this has been the source of what at times resembles a power struggle. The local reference group is not formally part of the governance structure; they are invited to the annual meeting, but they are not under any obligation to be present. This creates a gap between the external actors and the local partners that called for the program in the first place. At the same time it is clear that key local stakeholders exert substantial influence over decisions, and have in some cases overturned decisions made by the annual meeting. The local stakeholders seem to have this influence while simultaneously not being overly committed to the program. This duality may be explained by a sense of marginalization in the structure.

The relationship between staff and the different levels of governance/reference persons in EAPPI is not as clear as one would expect. It seems that the local program coordinator should have been given a clearer mandate and sense of lines of responsibilities. The decision making processes seem less predictable and participatory than they should be, and thus there are no clear indications of where “the buck stops”. There was a committee appointed by the annual meeting 2014 to address these challenges.

Both PBI and CPT operates with consensus decision making and a flat structure, giving as much weight to the process of making a decision as to the final result. The aim is to seek widespread or full agreement, resolving or reducing the objections of the minority to achieve the most agreeable decision to all. Consensus strongly involves those who will carry out the decision, and thus increases their ownership of the decision.

“The highest decision-making body of PBI is the General Assembly (GA), which meets every three years, takes key strategic decisions and appoints the International Council. The GA is made up of volunteers and staff representatives from PBI country groups and projects.”⁴⁹ The International Council consists of eleven board members and is responsible for governance. There is also an International Operations Council, responsible for operational issues, which consists of staff from projects and from country groups (the national branches that send volunteers).

Nonviolent Peaceforce is set up hierarchically, and the leaders have the final say in decision making. Decisions are, however, always made after a high level of input from and consultation with everybody affected by the decision. “In this context it has to be like that,” one protection officer explained to us. The organization is set up with a head office in Brussels, an office in St. Paul in Minnesota, and its top decision making body is the board of directors.

⁴⁹ Peace Brigades International, n.d.

6. Relevance to the Women, Peace and Security

Agenda

Ever since the UN Security Council passed resolution 1325 in 2000, humanitarian and peace agencies as well as governments and UN agencies have struggled to fill that and the seven related resolutions with meaningful content.⁵⁰ Who can make the decisions needed to increase “representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict”?⁵¹ What does it mean to “incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations” or to “adopt a gender perspective”?⁵² What are the most efficient means to “protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict”?⁵³ Fifteen years after resolution 1325 was passed, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon gave UN Women the task of assessing its implementation. This resulted in the publication of the Global Study in 2015.⁵⁴ The report is rather clear in its conclusion that more attention must be given to the women who actually suffer from violent conflict, they must be included in decision-making more systematically, they must be protected more efficiently, and civil society must have a substantially greater role in this endeavor. In this chapter we argue that UCP is a good response to the conclusions of the Global Study.

Militarized Response

The women, peace and security (WPS) agenda is mainly the result of civil society lobbying in the UN and in the Security Council. “[T]he groundwork, the diplomacy and lobbying, the drafting and redrafting was almost entirely the work of civil society.”⁵⁵ As a consequence of this one would expect that civil society was given a major role in the implementation of the resolution, but this has only haphazardly happened. “In the countries of the European Union and other western societies, women, peace and security has meant, primarily, the representation of women in the security sector, training of the security sector on women’s issues and a strong emphasis on preventing sexual violence in conflict, primarily in Africa.”⁵⁶ European countries thus seem to have acted as if resolution 1325 is as important to implement in their own militaries as in conflict affected countries. Furthermore, it is mainly in their own militaries that the participation part of the WPS agenda has been emphasized. The UN Women’s Global Study is quite clear: “Attempts to ‘securitize’ issues and to use women as instruments in

⁵⁰ The seven related resolutions are 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), and 2242 (2015).

⁵¹ Resolution 1325 (2000), 2000, p. 2.

⁵² Resolution 1325 (2000), 2000, pp. 2-3.

⁵³ Resolution 1325 (2000), 2000, p. 3.

⁵⁴ Coomaraswamy, 2015.

⁵⁵ Cynthia Cockburn, *From Where We Stand War: Women’s Activism and Feminist Analysis* (London; New York: Zed Books, 2007), 132, as quoted in Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 30.

⁵⁶ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 28.

military strategy must be consistently discouraged.”⁵⁷ The study repeats numerous times that 1325 is not mainly a tool for the military, but a holistic approach to sustainable peace: “Ultimately, for advocates of sustainable peace and security interlinked with development and human rights, the value of the women, peace and security agenda is its potential for transformation, rather than greater representation of women in existing paradigms of militarized response.”⁵⁸

The uniformed personnel of UN peacekeeping missions tripled between 2000 and 2015, while civilian personnel only grew by half.⁵⁹ Simultaneously, however, the UN Security Council has become increasingly explicit regarding expectations to involve civil society. ‘Civil society’ is not mentioned at all in resolution 1325, while in the latest related resolution, 2242 (2015), it is mentioned six times.

Security Council resolution 2122 (2013) recognized with concern that without a significant implementation shift, women and women’s perspectives would continue to be underrepresented in conflict prevention, resolution, protection and peacebuilding for the foreseeable future, and as such encouraged Member States, regional organizations and United Nations entities to start reviewing existing implementation plans and targets.⁶⁰

If the excruciating needs in conflict-affected areas are to be met, it is time to spend more energy on the women who suffer from violence in conflict contexts. This means that governments need to involve themselves heavily in stimulating, protecting and providing space for civil society in conflict-affected countries. As we have seen, unarmed civilian protection is an effective and efficient approach to achieving this. UCP – by its very nature – involves women and supports them in peace endeavors, protection and in information gathering.

The Pillars of WPS and Unarmed Strategies

Throughout the Global Study there are numerous calls for increasing women’s participation on all levels, increasing support for civil society, and reducing the emphasis on military approaches:

- ...the overwhelming opinion of women living in [conflict affected] areas as well as women practitioners working in the field was that force alone cannot be the answer. There must be greater emphasis on prevention, more empowerment of women peacebuilders while respecting their autonomy, and more resources placed to make strategies of prevention realizable. Conflicts must be prevented and if they are inevitable, they must become more humane.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 15.

⁵⁸ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 135.

⁵⁹ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 134.

⁶⁰ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 236.

⁶¹ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 21.

- ...women all over the world reiterated to us that military responses should be used sparingly. (...) They argued that prevention and protection through nonviolent means should be emphasized more by the international system, and more resources should be dedicated to this endeavor.⁶²
- Member States should (...) support and invest in participatory processes, social accountability tools and localization initiatives⁶³ to link global, national and local efforts and ensure the voices of the most affected and marginalized populations inform and shape relevant responses and monitoring of progress.⁶⁴
- Lasting peace is not achieved nor sustained by military and technical engagements but through political solutions (...). The avoidance of war rather than its resolution should be at the center of national, regional, and international effort and investment (...). Unarmed strategies must be at the forefront of UN efforts to protect civilians.⁶⁵
- Empowering women to end and prevent conflicts is essential and urgent.⁶⁶

It is our understanding that the “significant implementation shift” called for in resolution 2122 should include increased support for unarmed civilian protection and accompaniment. The WPS agenda has four pillars – prevention, protection, participation, and peacebuilding and recovery - and as we have seen, UCP addresses all of these pillars. Through proactive engagement, relationship building, capacity building and monitoring,⁶⁷ UCP prevents local outbreaks of violence and strengthens the capacity of local communities to react to increases in tension. “The Global Study emphasizes the importance of short-term prevention measures such as early warning systems and intensified efforts at preemptive dialogue at the local, national and international levels.”⁶⁸ Trainings in early warning, early response is part of the portfolio of Nonviolent Peaceforce in South Sudan, and it has shown itself efficient in saving many lives in for instance Koch in Unity state (see page 32). The local dialogues facilitated by NP in Rumbek resulted in an agreement that stopped mass mobilization for several months (see page 30).

“The top priority beyond 2015 identified [by the Global Study] across regions is women’s full and equal participation in all conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes.”⁶⁹ The study “contains research that comprehensively demonstrates that the participation of women at all levels is key to the operational

⁶² Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 25.

⁶³ Localization initiatives are initiatives to concretely implement the WPS agenda on a local level and bring voices from the local level to higher levels.

⁶⁴ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 250.

⁶⁵ Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2015), para. 84, as quoted in Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 150.

⁶⁶ UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in the foreword of Coomaraswamy, 2015.

⁶⁷ See figure 1 in chapter 2, and the examples of the implementation of these elements in chapter 3.

⁶⁸ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 15.

⁶⁹ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 309.

effectiveness, success and sustainability of peace processes and peacebuilding efforts.”⁷⁰ The study further elaborates:

As one report highlights, ‘women activists and grassroots organizers of Afghanistan, Nepal, Liberia, or Somalia are the best navigators of their own cultural and political terrain. They know which issues are most important.’ Yet, 15 years after the adoption of resolution 1325, we still lack effective systems for regular engagement and consultation with such women’s groups to ensure that their knowledge, experience, and capacities are supported and are informing national, regional and global level policy-making.⁷¹

Engagement and consultation with local women’s groups are integrated elements of UCP. However, how does one approach the question of participation when there seems to be no local women’s organizations or groups to contact? NP has begun solving this problem by facilitating the creation of Women’s Protection Teams, which receive training in management skills, gender perspectives, early warning, early response, and other relevant skills. The WPTs are then able to discourage revenge attacks, seek information, discourage child marriages (which tend to increase in violent conflict contexts, adding yet another burden to women), speak out against GBV and voice the concerns of women in the community. In other words, UCP is a useful tool when building the “effective systems for regular engagement and consultation” that the Global Study calls for.

On protection, the Global Study reminds us that Security Council resolution 2106 “underlines the important roles that civil society organizations, including women’s organizations, and networks can play in enhancing community-level protection against sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations.”⁷² The study specifically mentions unarmed civilian protection as a useful approach: “Unarmed civilian protection (UCP) is a method for the direct protection of civilians and violence reduction that has grown in practice and recognition. In the last few years, it has especially proven its effectiveness to protect women and girls.”⁷³ Both the Women’s Protection Teams and the Community Protection Teams that NP has established enhance the local capacities for community-level protection against sexual and other violence.

Track 1 Approaches vs. UCP

In formal peace processes there has been some, incremental, progress on participation of women, and the concerns and special needs of women are mentioned more frequently now than before resolution 1325 was passed. As for UN peacekeeping missions there has been a slight increase in female military personnel, but the numbers are still very low: From one percent in the early 1990s, to currently three percent. On

⁷⁰ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 15.

⁷¹ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 303. The quoted report is Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, «Women Building Peace : What They Do, Why It Matters» (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007).

⁷² Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 301.

⁷³ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 153.

gender-based violence, an international normative framework is developing. Some say this may have prevented crimes, while others argue that the developments have had “no significant difference for women on the ground.”⁷⁴ If we compare these numbers and achievements to those of UCP and accompaniment, we find that the latter approaches are in a completely different league. In Peace Brigades International, 64% of volunteers are women.⁷⁵ In Nonviolent Peaceforce the number is 43%.⁷⁶ Furthermore, as we have described in chapter 3, proactive engagement and the protective accompaniment of women have proven to be very effective in South Sudan.

Another reason why an implementation shift of the WPS agenda should include increased support for UCP is the fact that UN military peacekeeping has frequently been scandalized by rape and sexual exploitation by UN military personnel. The latest example of this is the peace mission in the Central African Republic, where UN soldiers paid girls as young as 13 years old for sex, sometimes paying as little as 50 cent. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has called the problem of sexual exploitation a “cancer in our system.”⁷⁷ The Global Study states that “this issue remains the major controversy that brings the UN, and the entire international community, into disrepute in the eyes of public opinion.”⁷⁸ There is of course no guarantee that UCP practitioners will never exploit locals sexually, but some aspects indicate that it is unlikely to occur. First of all, proportionally more than ten times more women serve in UCP than in military



SWEFOR peace observers in Guatemala. SWEFOR’s observers are majority female. Photo: SWEFOR.

⁷⁴ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 14.

⁷⁵ Peace Brigades International, n.d., p. 14.

⁷⁶ Mel Duncan, interview, October 21, 2014.

⁷⁷ Røst, 2016.

⁷⁸ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 17.

peacekeeping, and “not a single female peacekeeper has ever been accused of sexual exploitation and abuse on mission.”⁷⁹ Considering the thousands of peacekeepers who have served in UN missions, this statistic is quite telling. Secondly, being part of a gender-balanced group in itself correlates with less sexual violence.⁸⁰ Furthermore, UCP practitioners will arguably be less inclined to commit rape because they are by profession and training nonviolent. Since UCP practitioners, as opposed to soldiers, never use violence, they do not have to distinguish between situations when they can legitimately use violence and when they cannot.

Funding and Civil Society Response

If, then, UCP is to be bolstered, how can this actually happen? Two obvious elements are funding and the readiness and willingness of civil society to take on the task. “Though there is a great deal of rhetoric supporting women, peace and security, funding for programmes and processes remains abysmally low across all areas of the agenda.”⁸¹ Furthermore,

...resolution 2122 encourages concerned Member States to develop dedicated funding mechanisms to support the work and enhance capacities of organizations that support women’s leadership development and full participation in all levels of decision-making, regarding the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), inter alia through increasing contributions to local civil society.⁸²

This means that governments must start believing their own rhetoric and “put their money where their mouths are.” The Global Study specifically recommends the UN and member states to “scale up their support to unarmed civilian protection (UCP) in conflict-affected countries, including working alongside peace operations.”⁸³

But funding is of no help if the civil society is not ready to take on the task. There are only a few actors deeply involved in unarmed civilian protection, and the needs are far from being met. While the actors who are already involved need to be strengthened and supported, there is some hesitancy about growing uncontrolled. The country leadership of NP in Juba wants to expand the UCP work, but is simultaneously wary about reducing the quality of the work, which may happen if the organization grows too quickly. Civil society organizations should start incorporating UCP techniques into the peace related work that they already do, and enter into this field of work with all the vigor that the local needs demand. This, and a further discussion on funding in the Norwegian context, is the topic of the next and final chapter of this report.

⁷⁹ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 141.

⁸⁰ Sexual Assault Prevention and Awareness Center, n.d.

⁸¹ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 14.

⁸² Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 301.

⁸³ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 157.

7. Where Do We Take It from Here?

Having studied accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection, the question is: How is this useful information for organizations that are involved in peace work and civil society strengthening? Is it relevant for organizations other than those that are already providing accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection? In this chapter we will discuss four cases of peace work in three countries in which Norwegian organizations are involved, and suggest one or more approaches to protecting and supporting the local peace work that is already being done. These discussions are only the beginning of, or an inspiration for, what should be a thorough assessment done together with local partners. We will in the end also discuss a more ambitious alternative: The establishment of a new organization that, like Nonviolent Peaceforce, will be able to provide unarmed civilian protection in areas of the world where civilians live under the threat of violence.

Burundi – Peace and Democracy Groups

In 2003, a trauma healing approach called Healing and Rebuilding Our Communities (HROC) was created in Rwanda, to “help communities that were severely affected by the genocide and years of hatred” by having survivors and perpetrators of the 1994 genocide participate together.⁸⁴ Burundian Quakers later adopted the approach, and during the 2010 elections in Burundi, the organization HROC-Burundi, part of the Quaker Peace Network, developed Peace and Democracy Groups (PDGs). The PDG members first attended an HROC workshop, and then “organized themselves into election response teams. They were given cell phones to contact the call-in center with reports on issues in their local community.”⁸⁵ After the elections had been held, the PDGs did not end their efforts, but “continued to meet as saving and lending groups but also continued to respond to community violence (...) in different communities.”⁸⁶

There are currently 15 PDGs in operation in Burundi, five of which are in Bujumbura Mairie, and the rest are spread out in different provinces. One of the groups in Bujumbura is located in the Buterere zone, one of 13 zones that make up the city. PDG Butere consists of 18 members from different groups of the community: Hutus, Tutsis, Twa, Christians, Muslims, men and women.⁸⁷ The group is – according to its own members – seen to be impartial, which makes them able to connect with the different sides in the current conflict.

⁸⁴ Healing and Rebuilding Our Communities, n.d.

⁸⁵ HROC-Burundi, n.d.

⁸⁶ HROC-Burundi, n.d.

⁸⁷ HROC-Burundi, n.d., p. 2.

When tensions rose in Burundi in relation to the 2015 presidential election, demonstrations broke out in several places, among them Buterere. At one point protesters prepared to attack the home of a police officer accused of killing people from the opposition. Neighbors asked the PDG to intervene and talk to the protesters. Two of the PDG members met with seven representatives of the protesters, and convinced them that attacking the police officer and his family would only make matters worse. They agreed not to attack the police officer, but asked the PDG to go and talk to him as well. In spite of concern for their own safety – the police officer was a feared man – they went to see him. The police officer agreed to stop ordering attacks on the opposition if they stopped “being violent.” This intervention substantially reduced the violence and killings in Buterere.⁸⁸

In October 2015, PDG Buterere facilitated a series of one-day “peace dialogues” in which people could come together, discuss the need of living in peace in Buterere, and some people asked for, and received, forgiveness for causing tension and violence. The dialogue resulted in the setting up of a community committee, which could be called upon to find a solution in the event of increased tension locally. The PDG also verifies information and reduces unsubstantiated fleeing of populations through rumor control.⁸⁹

In spite of seemingly successful work resulting in specific reduction of violence, not all the PDGs have been able to continue their work. According to the coordinator of the Quaker Peace Network Burundi, the work has discontinued because of the lack of a system or a network where the PDGs can connect to each other and share information and inspire each other. All the work is done on a voluntary basis, and the groups are struggling to get their expenses covered for their mobile phones and travel. The groups are not coordinated centrally, but operate autonomously, which the coordinator of the Quaker Peace Network characterizes as a weakness. According to him, the work should be properly coordinated and supported.

It seems to us that the PDGs are already implementing several of the elements of unarmed civilian protection, and that the work of the PDGs should be strengthened and supported. The PDGs seem to be able to maintain a nonpartisan approach, but according to the coordinator of Quaker Peace Network, the PDGs would still benefit from international presence: “When only Africans do the work, the respect isn’t there as much as when someone from the outside is there. When they see internationals, they see the embassy and the organization, and they see that they have the capacity to let information be known outside.”⁹⁰ The partners of HROC-Burundi should investigate this further, and humanitarian organizations that have had to end or pause their work in Burundi because of violence may benefit from opening up a dialogue with HROC

⁸⁸ HROC-Burundi, n.d., pp. 2-3.

⁸⁹ HROC-Burundi, n.d.

⁹⁰ Skype interview with Quaker Peace Network Burundi Coordinator Elie Nahimana on February 29, 2016.

Burundi to explore how PDGs could protect the civic space available for their operations. HROC-Burundi may benefit from and work more effectively by expanding its methodology to include more of the UCP elements.

The Philippines – Solidarity with Lumads

The Philippines has for years experienced conflicts between mining interests and the local population. Sometimes the conflicts are violent. One community that recently has experienced violence and killings is the Lumad indigenous community in Mindanao in the south of the country. The areas that the Lumads claim as their ancestral domain overlap with parts of the Caraga region, which the government has designated as the “mining capital of the Philippines.”⁹¹ Between October 2014 and September 2015, 26 Lumad leaders have been killed by paramilitary actors, and the attacks have caused thousands to seek refuge in the cities of Tandag in the north-east and Davao in the south-east of Mindanao.⁹²

“Tribal and environmental groups have accused the military of using these paramilitaries, who are tribal members and thus familiar to local residents, to help clear ancestral areas to pave the way for mining companies and other business interests.”⁹³ The accusations seem to be accurate. The paramilitaries claim that the New People’s Army (NPA) – the militia of the National Democratic Front – operates in the area, and that the Lumads are supporting them. During an attack by a paramilitary group on a Lumad school on September 1, 2015, the director of the school was killed in his office, and two community elders were killed in the schoolyard in front of students and teachers. The paramilitaries shouted at the crowd that they should stop supporting the NPA, and accused them of hindering economic development in the area: “Because you have listened to these leaders and have stopped the mines from coming we remain poor, we could have a better life.”⁹⁴ An international fact-finding mission conducted in the end of October 2015, concluded, “there were no signs whatsoever of ideological conditioning nor indoctrination and political propaganda in the structuring of the classrooms, textbooks and other learning materials and lesson plans found in the schools.”⁹⁵ According to Human Rights Watch, the Philippine military bears a partial responsibility for the acts of the paramilitary groups in the area.⁹⁶

The Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform (PEPP), the largest network of church leaders in the country, responded to the September 1 killings by sending a delegation to visit the affected communities and offer “sympathy and solidarity from PEPP to the families

⁹¹ Human Rights Watch, 2015.

⁹² Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform, 2015.

⁹³ Human Rights Watch, 2015.

⁹⁴ Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform, 2015, pp. 5-6.

⁹⁵ International Fact Finding Mission, 2015. The fact finding mission was «mainly composed of church people and professionals, human rights advocates and sectoral activists» (p. 5).

⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch, 2015.

of the victims.”⁹⁷ A bishop from the Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI) church, who joined the fact-finding mission mentioned above, was later elected as the convener of a provincial level PEPP group for the Surigao del Sur province, which encompasses the town where the Lumad school was attacked. The purpose of the local PEPP group is to facilitate ecumenical solidarity with the Lumads.

PEPP has been a partner of the Norwegian Ecumenical Peace Platform since the mid-2000s. PEPP members in Mindanao are providing sanctuary, relief and other services to Lumad evacuees. Their response to the Lumad situation led the bishops of especially IFI to seek a more proactive intervention. At a meeting in February 2016, Fr. Christopher Ablon proposed to include accompaniment as a component of the Mindanao Lumad Ministry program established a few months earlier (Fr. Christopher had in 2011 served as one of the first two Filipino accompaniers to the EAPPI program). Soon thereafter the Lumad Accompaniment Program was approved and is now run by the IFI Mindanao Bishops’ Conference. The first team of accompaniers was deployed in late June 2016.

At the time of writing, the program is in an exploratory phase. The only church involved so far is IFI, and the accompaniers reside in Lumad homes. The program is gathering experience regarding the security of the accompaniers, and regarding possibilities of establishing housing for them. The financial future of the program is unclear, and this naturally affects how the program develops. According to Fr. Christopher who currently



Accompaniers at a Lumad home, sharing a light chat with the child of their host. Photo: Lumad Accompaniment Program.

⁹⁷ Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform, 2015, p. 2.

leads the program, the IFI will accept other churches to join the effort when the program is ready, meaning when they have gained some experience and have a clearer view of the needs on the ground. They may also invite foreigners to become accompaniers. Fr. Christopher believes the program, after gaining sufficient experience on considerations like security and accommodation, would benefit from a mixture of Filipino and foreign accompaniers.⁹⁸

It seems that this effort has the potential of bearing fruit on a number of levels. The most direct and obvious result would be protection of Lumads. It would also be a gateway to build and support the local Lumad peace and protection efforts. Furthermore, if PEPP as a whole involves itself in the program, it would provide PEPP with first-hand information about the situation on the ground, and on the involvement of NPA, paramilitaries and the Philippine military in the violent incidences in the area. This knowledge would be useful in the efforts to pressure the government and the NDF to reach a peace agreement, which is one of PEPP's main goals. PEPP involvement in the accompaniment program is not a far-fetched idea, as Fr. Christopher is also the PEPP Mindanao Coordinator.

In its assessment of whether and how to include internationals in the accompaniment program, IFI could benefit from consulting with Nonviolent Peaceforce. NP already operates in Mindanao and has a formal monitoring role with regards to the peace agreement between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. NP thus has years of experience with having both Filipino and international protection officers, and may also be a useful resource for IFI regarding further learning of applicable UCP methods in addition to accompaniment.

South Sudan – a Civil Society Organization

After decades of war, South Sudan gained its independence on July 9, 2011. In the course of two years, the mood in the young country changed from optimistic unity to tribal hostility among other conflict lines, resulting in the outbreak of war in December 2013. The major war, led by Vice President Riek Machar and President Salva Kiir on opposite sides, has been accompanied by a number of more or less deadly conflicts throughout the country between different tribes and clans, with or without political content. There have also been pockets of peace, communities that for different reasons have been unaffected by the war.

One local civil society organization⁹⁹ works to strengthen civil society and to grow the organization by establishing new teams and training new and old members in how to run an organization, how to set up activities with budgets and accounting, and different

⁹⁸ The information on the Lumad Accompaniment Program was retrieved through a Facebook chat with Fr. Chris Ablon of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente on August 15, 2016.

⁹⁹ Because of security concerns, the names of the organization and of individuals are withheld in this report.

elements of good governance, human rights law and international law. At one point during the conflict, a family member of one of the leaders of the organization was killed, without anybody taking responsibility for the killing. This created a lot of general fear, because the motivation for the killing was unknown. It was hard to discern whether the killed person had been the main target and that the threat therefore was over, or whether the killing had been a step in a larger campaign to remove or silence a group of people.

Another incident involved the kidnapping of one of the employees of the organization, who was kidnapped for her computer skills. A group of soldiers wanted her to help them access information that they did not have the skills to access. Another person was also abducted together with the employee, and the other person was killed. The employee was told that she would suffer the same fate if she did not cooperate. She managed to escape at one point, and fled the country. This incident left the organization without someone with the same level of computer skills.

The result of these events is that several staff with their families now live in different places than their home state, including some abroad, and they take turns returning to the head office and stay for a couple of weeks to keep operations going, albeit on a much lower level. They no longer hold trainings, they do not bring in external trainers, and they do not gather large groups of people in one location. The organization currently spends project funds on keeping their staff evacuated, debriefs and crisis management, and flying staff in and out of the headquarters. This means that less funding can be spent on the programs.

Our assessment is that this organization would probably benefit from accompaniment by internationals. An international partner organization of the local organization has experienced that when they have been present, the staff of the local organization has been under less threat, and they have felt much safer. This sense of safety has enabled them to think about their work instead of worrying about their personal security. Furthermore, it is probable that the experiences of protective presence of Nonviolent Peaceforce in South Sudan can be applied in this situation. A gradual approach to protective presence by international partners could be a fruitful endeavor. Such an effort should probably be expanded gradually to all the elements of unarmed civilian protection in order to determine which tasks can be left to locals and which must be performed by internationals.

South Sudan – Church Leader Mediation Efforts

The churches in South Sudan have traditionally played an important role in peacemaking and mediation between belligerent groups in the country. The South Sudan Council of Churches has repeatedly called for peaceful solutions to the large-scale current political conflict, and church leaders have also mediated in local conflicts. When church leaders have mediated or facilitated dialogues, they have usually been externals in relation to the specific conflict, meaning that they have been from a different part of the country and from a tribe not involved in the conflict.

Bishop Arkanjelo gave us an example of mediation efforts in Jonglei state. Together with Bishop Paride Taban and other church leaders, he travelled to an area where fighting had broken out. Peacekeepers from the UN mission drove the church delegation as far as they had permission to drive, and the church leaders got out of the cars and walked the rest of the distance until they arrived at the town where the fighting had started. There they entered a church. Soon the militia leaders heard of their presence, and came to talk to them. The church leaders were able to mediate an agreement between the warring parties, walked back to the point where the UN soldiers had dropped them off, and waited there until they were picked up.

This example illustrates the preventive effect church leaders may have in South Sudan under the right circumstances. In this case, the presence of the church leaders created a protected space where the parties could come together and use words instead of guns. This protective effect of church leaders can be systematically utilized. According to Bishop Arkanjelo, the churches currently mediate and facilitate dialogues, but they do not strategically exploit the protective effect of their presence. The bishop noticed a similarity between UCP and the promise of Jesus to be with Christians until the end of time. "Jesus said he would *be* with us. He didn't specify what he would do. He emphasized being. This is similar to UCP."

In a concluding conversation with Bishop Arkanjelo during our visit, we agreed that a follow-up measure for the churches in South Sudan could be to train church leaders in UCP. The church leaders could then assess how this could be used in their peace work, share experiences and identify further follow-up measures. The bishop emphasized the potential of implementing UCP through the church because of its omnipresence throughout the country: "No matter where you go and which village you come to, you will always find a church. Even if the government is not represented there, the church is there." In the process of assessing how to utilize UCP, the churches may also discern in which cases there is a need for internationals and in which cases there is no such need. International partners then have to be prepared to support these efforts and respond to the needs that are identified.

A New UCP Organization

Members of the Norwegian Ecumenical Peace Platform gathered in February 2016 in Oslo to discuss the preliminary findings of the working group on accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection. The participants at the meeting seemed intrigued by what they heard, and were eager to see our assessment of the four cases we have discussed in this chapter. They were less enthusiastic about the prospects of establishing a new organization with a mandate to provide UCP when invited to do so by civil society actors in areas that suffer from violent conflict. There may be many good reasons not to create a new organization, but both NORDEM and NORCAP are examples of good, new initiatives that have flourished in a world with arguably plenty of organizations. Jan Egeland was the person who had the idea of establishing NORDEM when he was State Secretary under then Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg in the early 1990s. On the occasion of the 20th anniversary, Egeland was interviewed about the decision to establish NORDEM. He explained that they had critically assessed the question, and “decided to stop asking ‘Can it go wrong?’ and instead ask ‘Can it be successful?’ Today we’ve perhaps gone too far in the direction of a society of audits and evaluations. Are people again more scared of making mistakes than of creating something completely new? I think the answer may be ‘Yes’. So there are a lot of good ideas that never materialize.”¹⁰⁰

When we asked Mel Duncan, the co-founder of Nonviolent Peaceforce, about his thoughts on creating something new versus supporting the actors that are already involved in the UCP field, he said: “What we need is to promote the concept of UCP and add to the body of practice. Our numbers are now so tiny, whereas the threat against civilians is huge. We need lots more groups in this field. What's important is the methodology: Others need to pick this up and expand on it.”¹⁰¹ This could of course be done through the approaches we have suggested in each of the four cases, but those efforts would be implemented by separate actors that may have other priorities than the global learning process on UCP. A unified organization implementing UCP in different places in the world would more easily be able to gather experiences and transfer lessons learned from one site to another. It seems natural that such an organization would take over the Norwegian contribution to EAPPI, play a constructive role in strengthening that program administratively, and transfer lessons from the global community of accompaniers and UCP practitioners to the program.

An important effect of sending Norwegians out to protect civilians and create space for peace nonviolently, is that they will bring this competence back with them when they return. Over time, we may have a large number of civic-minded people with experience from nonviolently preventing violence under very violent circumstances. This may have an effect on our own culture. Especially today, when the relationship with Russia has

¹⁰⁰NORDEM, 2013, p. 9.

¹⁰¹Skype interview, October 21, 2014.

soured and the main Norwegian response has been to rely on NATO and increased military spending, it seems important to actively search for and invest in alternative approaches to peace.

Can It Be Funded?

The work cannot be done without funding. There is a need for funding of the actual work, but also funding of research. Are the politicians ready to do this? In 2015, the Norwegian government spent NOK 47.6 billion, or 1.5% of its GDP, on military expenditures.¹⁰² Of this, NOK 878 million was spent by the military research institute Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).¹⁰³ What is the objective of this spending? Any politician will tell you that the objective of having a strong military is not to actually *use* violence against those who might be a threat to us, but to *deter* them from using violence against us. In other words, military spending enables a *violent means of direct violence deterrence*. In addition to this, the state employs a number of means of *indirect* violence deterrence/prevention, two of which are diplomacy and economic means.

Information on the funds spent on *nonviolent means of direct violence deterrence* (which accompaniment and UCP is) is not gathered neatly anywhere. Information about Norwegian foreign aid can be found on Norad's web page. Among the five accompaniment and UCP actors portrayed in this report, we found only Peace Brigades International in Norad's statistics of all foreign aid in 2015 (including aid from the Ministry of Foreign affairs and other ministries).¹⁰⁴ PBI received NOK one million for their project in Colombia. Although EAPPI did not turn up in the search, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) did receive a grant for its work in the Palestinian territories, in which NCA's EAPPI contribution was included. The Norwegian EAPPI contribution in 2015 was NOK three million.¹⁰⁵

In addition to these expenditures, the government also funds research. The Norwegian government spends around NOK 24 billion on research and development annually.¹⁰⁶ As we have seen above, NOK 0.9 billion, or close to 4%, of this is spent on military research. Research on nonviolence has in relative terms almost not occurred in Norway before the Peace Research Institute of Oslo started its project in 2012.¹⁰⁷

The point of presenting these numbers is to illustrate the budget priorities in Norwegian politics. Billions have been spent on military measures in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq

¹⁰² Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2016.

¹⁰³ Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, 2016, p. 32.

¹⁰⁴ Norad, n.d.

¹⁰⁵ E-mail from NCA's EAPPI coordinator Liv Snesrud on July 3, 2015.

¹⁰⁶ Amundsen, 2015.

¹⁰⁷ The project was titled «Effective non-violence? Resistance strategies and political outcomes» and lasted from January 2012 to December 2015, according to the PRIO web site.

(and soon Syria) without any evidence that the military contributions in the long run have reduced violence for the population. In fact, 2015 was the most dangerous year for civilians in Afghanistan since the US-led invasion started, with more than 11,000 civilians killed or wounded.¹⁰⁸ Norway's military efforts in Afghanistan cost a total of at least NOK 11.5 billion.¹⁰⁹ Simply pulling out of Afghanistan cost the Norwegian armed forces more than a billion NOK.¹¹⁰ How much reduction in violence has been achieved per NOK spent on military measures? The reduction has in fact been less than zero. "The number of civilians killed has *increased* year by year."¹¹¹

The point here is not to suggest that the use of military force cannot prevent violence. Indeed, it is quite imaginable that a military intervention can force a ceasefire upon parties to a conflict who would otherwise have fought each other violently. Neither is the point to suggest that military spending is to throw money out the window. The point, rather, is to bring to light the seemingly inexplicable difference in spending between violent and nonviolent approaches to violence deterrence. A rational cost-benefit analysis would hold up the achieved long-term results against the money spent, equally for violent and nonviolent approaches. Rational budgeting would then let the cost-benefit analysis affect the priorities between violent and nonviolent approaches to violence deterrence. This is clearly not happening today. The Norwegian government should sharply increase its funding of nonviolent means of direct violence deterrence, and its funding of relevant research.

In the afterword of the 20th anniversary publication of NORDEM, the director wrote, "there is every reason to believe that the need for international support to democracy and the rule of law will only increase in the future."¹¹² Considering the level of violent conflict in the world today, and the degree to which it affects ordinary civilians and their ability to determine their own futures, the same must be said to be true for UCP. Whereas Norway has had NORDEM for 20 years, however, UCP is an almost unknown practice here. UCP is lagging behind. We need to catch up.

¹⁰⁸ Moslih, 2016.

¹⁰⁹ Afghanistanutvalget, 2016.

¹¹⁰ Engebretsen, 2013.

¹¹¹ Afghanistanutvalget, 2016, p. 9. My translation, emphasis added.

¹¹² NORDEM, 2013, p. 56.

8. Conclusion

There are things we know and things we do not regarding violence and armed conflict. Although there is no consistently measured data,¹¹³ we know that violent civilian deaths in war far outnumber military deaths.¹¹⁴ We also know that excess civilian deaths in conflict areas (that is, deaths *indirectly* caused by war) far outnumber violent civilian deaths. Finally we know that armed actors in many contexts behave better towards civilians when they are being watched.¹¹⁵ Our assumption in this report has been that this knowledge compels us to act, and that when choosing a course of action one should look for what most effectively will take us to our goal. Unarmed civilian protection has a potential that the world is only beginning to realize. Norwegian churches and church-based actors should learn and, in the appropriate contexts, implement the UCP elements that they currently do not implement, and thus add to the global body of practice.

Several Norwegian church-based actors are involved in the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel. This program is different from other efforts made by the churches and organizations, because it is neither humanitarian emergency work, economic development work nor peacebuilding work narrowly defined. It is closer to peacekeeping work: Civilian volunteers travel to Israel and Palestine to stay for three months in a Palestinian community, in order to deter violence through their presence.

In this report we have described and compared different actors within accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection, and presented how the method – using international presence to deter violence and humiliation – is successful in other contexts in addition to the one in the West Bank. We have also described how the international presence can be exploited for more than accompaniment. When the presence is used strategically the activities include relationship building, capacity building, dialogue facilitation, establishment of early warning, early response mechanisms, rumor control, and other efforts that mutually support each other, reduce human suffering and create a space for local civilians to work to ensure their own peaceful futures. The sum of these activities is what has been called unarmed civilian protection.

UCP and accompaniment save lives every day. We have seen how the protection officers in South Sudan have prevented rapes of women fetching firewood. We have seen that many people have been rescued because of an early warning, early response mechanism put in place by Nonviolent Peaceforce, also in South Sudan. In the West Bank, according to a Palestinian who spoke with an accompanier, the Israeli soldiers at

¹¹³ Roberts, 2010.

¹¹⁴ Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs, Brown University, n.d.

¹¹⁵ See, for instance, Mahony, 2006.

CONCLUSION

the checkpoints are “nice” when the Ecumenical Accompaniers are there to watch, whereas they are “not nice” when the EAs are not there.

Furthermore, we have shown how accompaniment and UCP is a highly relevant contribution to the Women, Peace and Security agenda. We have seen that UCP is an efficient and effective approach to support the participation of local women particularly, and civil society in general, in peace and security measures. We have seen how protection officers from Nonviolent Peaceforce were able to protect women in South Sudan in a way in which UN soldiers could not. UCP addresses all of the four pillars of the WPS agenda: Prevention, protection, participation, and peacebuilding and recovery. The 2015 WPS Global Study specifically recommends the UN and member states to “scale up their support to unarmed civilian protection (UCP) in conflict-affected countries (...)”¹¹⁶

The evidence that accompaniment and UCP does in fact reduce violence, should compel actors who are concerned with alleviating human suffering to involve themselves more heavily in this field of work. Organizations distribute medicine, offer health services, provide education, provide sources of clean water, teach families about nutrition, and support human rights activists, because they know it will reduce human suffering. They know it will make the world a little more just. In the same way, humanitarian actors should employ the tools they know will reduce violence against civilians in conflict areas. They should either do this in their current capacities, or establish new organizations with this mandate, whichever most efficiently serves the purpose.

The work cannot be done without funding. We have shed light on the current funding of the Norwegian military, of military research and of military interventions abroad, describing this as funding of *violent means of direct violence deterrence*. In comparison, the current funding of *nonviolent* means of direct violence deterrence, with corresponding research, is marginal. There should be coherence between budget priorities and long term results, but in the case of military interventions there is no such coherence. Rational public spending requires a cost-benefit analysis of both violent and nonviolent means of violence deterrence, held up against long term results with regards to violence reduction. Surely, rational budgeting based on such a cost-benefit analysis would increase the Norwegian government’s spending on nonviolent approaches to violence reduction.

If Norwegian churches and organizations made the decision to involve themselves more heavily in accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection, *and* funding was available,

¹¹⁶ Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 157.

the only element missing would be people willing to do the work. Would recruitment of such people be successful? We have not done scientific surveys to investigate this, but we have an indicator that may shed light on the question. Former Ecumenical Accompaniers met in Oslo in January 2016 to establish a network of EAPPI alumni. They were given a very brief oral presentation of the research of the Norwegian Ecumenical Peace Platform into accompaniment and UCP, and were asked whether they would be interested in applying for such a service elsewhere than in the West Bank. Almost all of the 30-40 participants raised their hands.

It seems there is ample recruitment potential in Norway in general, and among EAPPI alumni in particular. The 2014 report “A Source of Hope” ended with a quote from scripture: “The harvest is plentiful, but the workers are few.”¹¹⁷ It seems, however, that it is not the amount of workers that is stopping us from scaling up our nonviolent response to violence. What is?

¹¹⁷ Luke 10:2.

Appendix 1 - Summary of "A Source of Hope"

The concept of civilian peacekeeping builds on the Indian/Gandhian tradition of Shanti Senas (peace armies), which since the time of Gandhi have been active in local communities in India to prevent violent outbreaks. The starting point of the current, international civil society peacekeeping was a 1983 visit by North Americans to a village in Nicaragua. The village had recently been attacked by a militia group, and dead bodies were being carried away as the visiting group arrived. One of the visitors asked if the villagers feared another attack, upon which a villager replied: "They are not going to attack as long as you are here." This inspired the visitors to organize their *protective presence* and put it into system.

Peacekeeping is one of three main strategies for managing and reducing violent conflict. The two others are peacebuilding and peacemaking. *Peacebuilding* refers to changing, removing and replacing the factors that contribute to violence in a context, that is, to remove or transform the root causes of a violent conflict, so that the perception that violence is necessary disappears. *Peacemaking* refers to activities that facilitate truces and peace agreements that are kept by all sides. *Peacekeeping* refers to activities that in a practical and direct way reduces the violence in a community, and prevents renewed outbreaks of violence.¹¹⁸

A common understanding of peacekeeping is that this is mainly a military task. One might argue that the threat or use of violence is the only thing that can deter conflicting parties from resorting to violence. Experience has shown, however, that unarmed civilian peacekeepers in some cases can protect civilians and prevent violence more efficiently than military peacekeepers can. Civilian peacekeeping has another advantage over military peacekeeping: It avoids sending the signal that violence, rather than relations and dialogue, is a useful way in which to respond to conflict. A third advantage is that military peacekeeping demands a formal permission from the government to operate, whereas civilian peacekeeping may be possible with less formalities, sometimes only with a tacit approval. A fourth advantage is that civilian peacekeeping almost achieves gender balance (more than 40% female peacekeepers), compared to military peacekeeping where only 3% of the peacekeepers are women. Finally, the costs of civilian peacekeeping is far lower than that of military peacekeeping.

The internationally best-known specialized actors in the field of civilian accompaniment and peacekeeping are Peace Brigades International, Witness for Peace, Christian Peacemaker Teams, Swefor, the World Council of Churches' Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel and Nonviolent Peaceforce. Of these one might say that Nonviolent Peaceforce stands out because of its broad organizational constituency, its lack of attachment to any one religion or country, and the fact that it was founded in 2002 (and is thus a young organization) as a result of a research project which gathered the learning and experiences that had been done globally by civilian peacekeepers until then.

¹¹⁸ There are no single «correct» answers when defining these terms. These definitions are meant to clarify what is meant by peacekeeping held up against the other two strategies.

How and why does civilian peacekeeping prevent violence? It works through a number of nonviolent means and sources of power, which for different reasons cause the violent perpetrators to refrain from violence. Specifically the presence of civilian peacekeepers may work in the following ways:

- The ability to *internationalize*: “International accompaniment can succeed in deterring attacks because the decision-makers behind these attacks seldom want a bad international image. They don’t want the world to know about what they are doing. They don’t want diplomats making them uncomfortable mentioning human rights problems in their meetings. They don’t want to read in the international press that they are being called monsters or criminals. They will avoid all that if they can.”¹¹⁹
- Bringing an *uncertainty factor*: Whereas the perpetrators earlier have acted on the assumption of impunity, it becomes uncertain what the consequences of an external witness will be. The perpetrator has to stop and assess this.
- The *moral influence* when peacekeepers vigorously defend the principle that civilians are illegitimate targets in armed conflict.
- The *legal authority* that peacekeepers bring when they are trained in human rights and international humanitarian law.
- The *alarm network*: Peacekeepers may have a global network of journalists, lawyers, activists, members of parliament and others who through a coordinated effort may inflict substantial pressure on governments or militia groups that commit illegalities.
- The *commitment and sacrifice* that peacekeepers show, tell the perpetrators that the peacekeepers are there to stay and they will not be scared away.
- The *identity* of peacekeepers is an important source of power. Depending on the context, the identity of religious leaders, elders, women, those who are “insider partial” or “outsider impartial” may have a tension reducing effect.

The *protective effects* of the presence of civilian peacekeepers can be regarded as twofold: Firstly, it *limits the ability to inflict violence*. The ability to inflict violence is reduced because the abuser has to take into account the presence of peacekeepers when deciding whether or not to commit an offence. Actions that had acceptable consequences before the peacekeepers came (that is, impunity), may have unacceptable consequences when peacekeepers are present (punishment, bad reputation, etc.).

Secondly, the presence of peacekeepers *increases the space for civilian action*. Civilian members of a local community may have to be very careful about how they address the problem of violence in their context. At the same time, no one is better able to address

¹¹⁹Liam Mahony as quoted in Schweitzer, 2008, p. 159.

violence and human rights abuses than the local people themselves. By the protection that derives from their presence, peacekeepers increase the space in which civilians can operate; the local population may act in ways that would otherwise be too risky.

Civilian peacekeeping entails a number of tasks, and peacekeepers take on a variety of roles when performing these tasks. There is a tension between the preference for *activism* and the preference for *impartiality*. Remaining impartial is a challenge for both military and civilian peacekeepers after having stayed in a conflict setting over time. At the same time, impartiality is considered by many to be a prerequisite for being able to perform well. Organizations that focus on accompaniment tend to problematize impartiality because it excludes the possibility to take a clear stand to help the oppressed and to remove structural violence.

The role of *observer and monitor* may be considered as a middle ground between activism and impartiality, depending on how it is performed. There is a long list of events that should be documented in a conflict context, and peacekeepers have to tread carefully to ensure balanced reporting. In addition to observing the behavior of the warring parties, it has also been effective to monitor the money flow and transactions. For instance, accurate information about diamond transactions have led to guidelines in this business to reduce the problem of financing violence through the purchase of "blood diamonds." Accurate information about the flow of arms is also useful both for assessing security risks and for holding arms exporting states accountable.

Further action civilian peacekeepers may take include conveying contact between stakeholders; informing about human rights and international humanitarian law to prevent abuse and crimes; sounding the alarm to the diplomatic community about imminent crimes or refugee crises; rumor control; and accompanying specific vulnerable groups.

Most international aid in one way or another are efforts to reduce human suffering and death. In a variety of ways aid work increases access to health care, education, credit and clean water, and by doing that the structural violence is reduced. Civilian peacekeeping stands out by its emphasis on reducing direct violence. The field of civilian peacekeeping is currently underfunded, under-researched and therefore not performed as widely and well as it should. The needs for nonviolent responses to violence and the need for protection of civilians are far from met. NGOs, donors and governments should therefore spend more time, energy and resources on expanding this crucial contribution to a more peaceful world.

Appendix 2 – Additional Literature on Protection and Accompaniment

We have here gathered a collection of literature describing unarmed civilian protection and accompaniment, or aspects thereof. Many of the publications are used as sources in this report. They are listed in chronological order.

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Downloadable here: http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/images/publications/Securing_space_for_local_peacebuilding.pdf

Janzen, R. (2014, December). *Shifting practices of peace: What is the current state of unarmed civilian peacekeeping?* *Peace Studies Journal*(3), pp. 46-60.

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Mahony, L. (2013). *Non-military strategies for civilian protection in the DRC*. Fieldview Solutions.

Downloadable here: http://www.fieldviewsolutions.org/fv-publications/Non-military_protection_in_the_DRC.pdf

Mahony, L. and Nash, R. (2012). *Influence on the Ground: Understanding and Strengthening the Protection Impact of United Nations Human Rights Field Presences*. Fieldview Solutions.

Downloadable here: <http://www.fieldviewsolutions.org/publications/influence-on-the-ground>

Schweitzer, Christine (ed.) (2010). *Civilian peacekeeping. A barely tapped resource*. Intitut für Friedensarbeit und Gewaltfreie Konfliktaustragung/Nonviolent Peaceforce. IFGK-Arbeitspapier Nr. 23.

Downloadable here: <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/about-3/about-12/112-research-civilian-peacekeeping-a-barely-tapped-resource>

Schirch, L. (2006). *Civilian peacekeeping. Preventing violence and making space for democracy*. Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute.

Downloadable here: http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6778~v~Civilian_Peacekeeping__Preventing_Violence_and_Making_Space_for_Democracy.pdf

Schirch, L. (1995). *Keeping the peace*. Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute.

Online Collections of Relevant Publications:

Fieldview Solutions, Publications: <http://www.fieldviewsolutions.org/publications>

Nonviolent Peaceforce, Academic Publications: <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/about-3/about-10>

Peace Brigades International, Resources: <http://www.peacebrigades.org/resources/>

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