Unarmed Civilian Protection in Europe

Lessons Learned From the Past and Current Practices

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Abstract

This report summarizes information on projects of and good practices in Unarmed Civilian Protection on the European continent. It draws on three sources: a literature review of projects and approaches to protect civilians in general, or activists specifically, against violence since 1945; information from interviews; and insights from a series of six online meetings held in February 2021.

Executive Summary

Unarmed Civilian Protection or Protective Accompaniment (UCP/A) is the practice of deploying specially trained unarmed civilians before, during, or after violent conflict in order to prevent or reduce violence, to provide direct physical protection to civilian populations under threat, and to strengthen or build resilient local peace infrastructures.

Several years ago, Nonviolent Peaceforce embarked on a process to research and discuss good practices as well as challenges in what NP calls Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP/A).

This concept encompasses a range of approaches through which civilians protect other civilians against violence, without using violence themselves. The four stages of the research process are:

1. Conduct case studies in four areas of the world where UCP/A is being practiced: South Sudan, Colombia, the Philippines (Mindanao) and Israel/Palestine.
2. Convene six regional facilitated consultation groups, with Europe being the last one.
3. An international UCP/A Good Practices conference which will be held in two parts – on zoom toward the end of 2021 and hopefully in person in June 2022.
4. Publish, disseminate and evaluate findings.

Methodology

The original plan to conclude phase 3 of the Good Practice process with a final workshop covering the continent of Europe in 2020 had to be revised due to Covid-19 and the planned face-to-face workshop abandoned. Instead, it was decided to engage in a multi-step process to study the experiences with UCP/A in Europe, including three main elements:

1. A literature review with the purpose of gathering information on projects that took place in Europe in the second half of the 20th century;

2. 15 interviews with practitioners, conducted by a research team consisting of Ellen Furnari, Cécile Dubernet, Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Christine Schweitzer;

3. Six 2-hour online meetings conducted over the weekend of 19-21 February 2021. The four topics of these online meetings, besides an introductory and a closing meeting were:

- Working for the rights and security of refugees
- Monitoring, observing and protecting against violence by police and other state agencies
- Working with tensions in communities to prevent or reduce violence
- Unarmed civilian protection in contexts of war

This report incorporates the information collected in the literature review, the interviews and the online meetings.

UCP/A in Europe

The conflict issues that European organizations looked at in this Good Practice project dealt with:

- Wars (mostly civil wars)
- Violence and rights' violations against minorities, refugees and People of Color (PoC).
- Dealing with police violence (an issue that overlapped largely with the first two categories).
- Tensions and conflicts in communities, and
- Organized crime (this last category was only considered in the literature review using the example of the Mafia in Italy.)

It has not been easy to identify organizations and projects that could be summarized under Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP/A) without any hesitation. There have been some in the past – the Cyprus Resettlement Project in the early 1970s, some of the monitoring and protective presence done

during the Northern Ireland civil war between the 1970s and 1990s, some of the work during and after the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and some more ad hoc initiatives seeking to protect refugee shelters in the 1990s. For the current situation however, the research team found it challenging to identify projects that could clearly count, or would self-identify, as UCP/A or accompaniment projects. The question of where to draw boundaries between what NP calls UCP/A and other kinds of activities came up more strongly in Europe than in the other workshops.

There are some organizations that have undertaken activities that are usually counted as central for UCP/A, like protective accompaniment and presence. Most of them were, or are, active in situations of civil war or dealing with refugee issues – Cyprus Resettlement Project, Balkans Peace Team (BPT) and many others in the Balkans of the early 1990s, Christian Peace Teams (CPT) currently in Greece, Operation Colomba (OC) in Kosovo and Albania. But they do not concentrate as heavily on physical protection as some organizations in other regions, for example in Latin America, do. Many of them combined protective accompaniment and presence with dialogue promotion, as well as activities that could be rated as social work (for example running a youth center) or physical reconstruction.

Except for CPT, the groups currently working with refugees see their work more as acts of solidarity and witnessing, and reject the term "protection" to describe their work. The reasons seem to differ: Some may have experienced that they are not able to effectively protect refugees from police, and therefore speak rather of witnessing. Others point out that protection is a function and task the State has to take care of, and that their role is to monitor that the State fulfills its obligations in this regard. This is different in the described cases in the early 1990s where protection from right-wing mobs was the objective.

Monitoring of protests and of police behavior sometimes had an element of intervention to prevent or stop violence but more often it was about gathering information to be put into reports afterwards, and using these reports either to open dialogue with the different parties, or to use them for public relations work or in legal proceedings.

The same observation can be made for the civilian governmental missions by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or European Union (EU) that monitor ceasefires or boundary lines in civil war contexts but whose mandate is about reporting, not direct intervention or protection of civilians.

Work in communities, the last category we identified, focuses largely on prevention and bringing parties in conflict together. We researched, interviewed and invited to the workshops several representatives of such organizations but found that in most cases, there was no accompaniment, protective presence, monitoring or any focus on keeping individuals or communities from harm.

A special case is the protection work by Nash Dom in Belarus both in context (civilian movement against a dictatorship) and methods (blaming and shaming of civil servants). Another special case is dealing with organized crime in Italy where people tend to rely on (in the end, violence-based) protection by the police and putting public pressure on the criminal networks through mass protests.

Good Practices and Challenges

We identified a number of good practices. Most of them had already emerged in earlier workshops as well:

- Long-term presence and projects are very valuable.
- Maintain transparency in regards to the work, especially when working on different sides of a conflict line.
- Do not attempt to speak for people or assume that you know what they need, respect their agency.
- Wear some kind of identification or physically keep a distance to make the nonpartisan role clear.

- The importance and value of writing reports was emphasized.
- Use staff with experience in earlier projects.
- Interventions should start early and be sustained.
- Speak the local language(s).
- Communicate and demonstrate nonpartisanship when monitoring protests and demonstrations.

As to challenges:

- One of the main challenges many NGO projects faced was lack of funding and in consequence lack of administrative strength to run the projects well.
- Access to the countries was another challenge for the NGOs – for Serbia they required personal invitations by activists; in other places they worked on a tourist visa.
- Political developments at higher level or orders from "High up" prevent influencing t police on the ground. Sometimes violence is intentional.
- Access to higher-level decision-makers seemed more difficult than in other countries where UCP/A takes place.
- It is hard to find enough volunteers willing to commit for a longer period.
- It is difficult to build relationships with extremist (right-wing) groups.

Acronyms

AFSC – American Friends Service Committee

ARK – Antiratne Kampanje, English Antiwar Campaign, Croatia

ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina

BPT – Balkan Peace Team

BSV = Bund für Soziale Verteidigung (Federation for Social Defence, Germany)

CAJ = Committee on the Administration of Justice (Northern Ireland)

CDC - Community Development Centre (Northern Ireland)

CNA = Centre for Nonviolent Action (Serbia / BiH)

CPT = Christian Peacemaker Teams

CSCE = Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (since 1995, OSCE)

ECMM = European Community Monitoring Mission

EU = European Union

EUMM = European Union Monitoring Mission

FRY = Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

HRO = Human Rights Observers (French-British organization)

IALANA = International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

IDP = Internally Displaced Person

INNATE - Irish Network for Non-violent Action Training and Education

IPEG - Irish Parades Emergency Committee

IPRM = Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (EUMM Georgia)

IPPNW = International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

KFOR = Kosovo Force (the NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo)

KVM = Kosovo Verification Mission

MAN - Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente

MNI = Mediation Northern Ireland

NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO = Nongovernmental Organization

NP = Nonviolent Peaceforce

OC = Operation Colomba (Operation Dove, Italy)

OEFD = Österreichische Friedensdienste (Austrian Peace Services)

OSCE = Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PFC - Pat Finucane Centre (Northern Ireland)

PoC = People of Color

RUC = Royal Ulster Constabulary

SMM = OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

SOP = Standard Operating Procedures

UCK = Kosovo Liberation Army, Kosovo

UCP/A = Unarmed Civilian Protection/Accompaniment

UN = United Nations

UNDP = UN Development Programme

UNFICYP - *United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus*

UNHCR = UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF = UN Children's Fund

UNMIK = UN Mission in Kosovo

UNPA = UN Protected Area, Croatia

UNPROFOR = UN Protection Force, Croatia, BiH and Macedonia

VPP - Volunteer Project Pakrac (Croatia)

WPRT = World Peace and Relief Team

WRI = War Resisters' International

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1. Introduction
by Christine Schweitzer and Cécile Dubernet

The tradition of active nonviolence and nonviolent intervention in violent conflicts has roots in Europe, side by side with the Indian subcontinent and North America. Christian pacifists like the Quakers, Mennonites and Leo Tolstoi have played a role in the development of this tradition, as well as the European reception of Gandhi's work in India in the 1920s and 1930s. The earliest known peace army project was initiated in the UK by the feminist Pastor Maud Royden who wanted to organize an interpositionary force to intervene in the war between Japan and China in 1932.[1]

Violent conflict has not been absent from the continent of Europe, the latter understood in a broad sense including Turkey which has a European and an Asian part. Geographically speaking Europe is a small continent with a rich history, multiple cultures, and languages. For much of the modern era, European kingdoms, people, and states have been at war with each other. They fought especially over religious, territorial and minority issues. Borders have been contentious issues and the borders of Europe itself, especially to the East remain a matter of perception.[2] Over the last 75 years however, much of Europe has been peaceful. Apart from some military coups (Greece, Turkey), open political violence has occurred in Northern Ireland, in the former Yugoslavia, in the Basque Country, Ukraine and in the Caucasus. Structural violence by contrast (exploitation, discriminations, deep inequalities, environmental damages, coercive political regimes) remain widespread. An active European civil society has been wrestling with both open conflicts and less visible forms of violence.

In recent years, European institutions and stability have fragmented. The European Union (EU) project stalled, and the UK decided to leave it; relationships with Russia deteriorated over the Georgian and Ukrainian wars; European countries lacked solidarity in dealing with financial crises and with increased numbers of refugees coming from the Global South and the Middle East. Citizens were frightened into accepting significant restrictions in their freedoms in the name of the 'war on terror'. In the last year, responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have increased both isolation and inequality.

However, when looking at the history of or Unarmed Civilian Protective Accompaniment, from here on abbreviated as UCP/A[3]- and loosely defined as the practice of civilians protecting other civilians against violence, without using violence themselves - most of the activities carried out by Europeans in this field of direct protection were directed towards conflicts on other continents. This has included work in Africa, Asia and in particular Latin America to which many European activists were drawn as an expression of solidarity with the socialist movements on that continent. Currently European volunteers are a very strong contingent in many organizations engaged in UCP/A. The focus here however is what is happening in Europe, not what is done by European organizations elsewhere.

1.1 The Good Practice Project

Several years ago, Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) embarked on a process to research and discuss good practices as well as challenges in what NP calls Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP/A). This is the practice of civilians protecting other civilians against violence, without using violence themselves. The four stages of the process are:

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[1] See for a detailed history Weber, Thomas (2000): 'A History of Nonviolent Interposition and Accompaniment.' In Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders. A Recurrent Vision. ed. by Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua and Weber, Thomas. Honolulu: Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace:45-72.

[2] In this report, we have decide to include in Europe, countries such as Turkey or regions such as the Caucasus

[3] Today, we are aware that UCP/A is often practiced by activists and communities themselves. It is not only about nonviolent intervention. However, the international discourse came late to recognize that; for a long time the parameters were those of "intervention" by external parties.

1. Conduct case studies in four areas of the world where UCP/A is being practiced: South Sudan, Colombia, the Philippines (Mindanao) and Israel/Palestine. The researchers reviewed the work of more than twenty local and international organizations, and identified and described 77 UCP/A good practices. Their findings were published in the book "Wielding Nonviolence in the Midst of Violence", edited by Ellen Furnari.

2. Convene six regional facilitated consultation groups made up of UCP/A practitioners, field partners, and academics for three-day sessions to review their work, analyze findings of stage one and validate good practices and emerging themes; as well as identify dilemmas or challenges raised but not answered by the cases. The first such workshop took place in Manila in December 2017, the second in Beirut in June 2018, the third in Nairobi in November 2018, the fourth in the USA in October 2019. The fifth took place in Bogota in January 2020, reviewing UCP/A work in Latin America. [4]

3. Assemble the first international UCP/A Good Practices conference -- gathering practitioners, field partners, beneficiaries, policy makers and academics to discuss the findings of the case studies and consultation groups. And to validate UCP/A good practices that can be scaled up and replicated as well as to improve upon existing practice. The organizations currently practicing UCP/A have never all met together. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, it has been decided to conduct the conference in two parts: An online event at the end of 2021, and a face-to-face conference probably in June 2022.

4. Publish, disseminate and evaluate findings. After the good practices are identified, analyzed and validated in stages 1-3, they will be disseminated to all of the organizations currently practicing UCP/A for integration into training materials. Findings will also be presented to potential new practitioners, policy makers and funders including the United Nations Department of Peace Operations, UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, UN Friends of Protection of Civilians, regional organizations including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union, the European Union, and the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Civil society networks will also be included, like the West African Network for Peace Building, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, self-protecting communities and other local groups that attended one of the workshops, the Alliance for Peacebuilding, Frontline Defenders, War Resisters International and others.

The original plan to conclude phase 3 of the Good Practice process with a final workshop covering the continent of Europe had to be revised due to the Coronavirus pandemic that spread throughout the world in 2020, and the plan to organize a face-to-face workshop had to be abandoned. Instead, it was decided to engage in a multi-step process to study the experiences with UCP/A on the European continent, which involved three main elements:

1. A literature review focused on information about projects that took place in Europe in the second half of the 20th century so that the limited number of interviews could focus on the current situation. This review, written by Christine Schweitzer, has partly been integrated in this report on UCP/A in Europe.

2. 15 interviews with practitioners, conducted by a research team consisting of Ellen Furnari, Cécile Dubernet, Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Christine Schweitzer (see 10.4). The interviews were conducted mostly via Zoom, and were largely individual encounters (although some were group interviews). They were long, in-depth conversations, designed to listen extensively to the actors and to get a sense of postures, perceptions, and principles beyond the recording of activities.

3. Six 2-hour online meetings conducted over the weekend of the 19-21 February 2021. The four topics of these online meetings, besides an introductory and a closing meeting were:

- Working for the rights and security of refugees

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[4] The documentations can be found here: http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/what-we-do/about-3/new-report-good-practices2

- Monitoring, observing and protecting against violence by police and other state agencies
- Working with tensions in communities to prevent or reduce violence
- Unarmed civilian protection in contexts of war

The original intention had been to focus the interviews and the workshops on current projects. In the end we decided that it was important also to discuss work that had been done in times of civil war although this meant going back in time.

1.2 The Projects Included in the Study on Europe

As in the other Good Practice workshops, it has been a challenge to survey and identify all projects that could be considered to be "Unarmed Civilian Protection/Accompaniment" (regarding issues with the term "protection", see the section below). In the end, the limits in access and knowledge of the research team whose four members live in France (Cécile Dubernet), UK (Berit Bliesemann de Guevara), the U.S. (Ellen Furnari) and Germany (Christine Schweitzer), probably meant that we missed organizations or projects in countries which we did not know or hear about.

The literature review

The projects described in the literature review were chosen with the personal bias of the rapporteur who wrote her dissertation on the West Balkans and has been active in a number of peace organizations – War Resisters' International and the German NGO Federation for Social Defense in particular. Some of the cases described here were already included in the Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility Study of 2001[5]. She studied others for her dissertation on civil society interventions in the former Yugoslavia.[6] There are two exceptions: Particularly in the last two Good Practice workshops in North and Latin America, the issue of organized crime and how to protect people against violence by criminals had been raised as a major issue. Therefore, it seemed for example interesting to examine what would be learned from the struggles against the Italian Mafia - if anything that could be considered UCP/A could be found in that struggle Parts of the literature review have been included in this report, but not all. Those cases where no clear alignment with the concept of UCP/A could be discerned have not been transferred to this report here.[7]

The review looks solely at projects and work that took place since the end of World War II, although it might have been interesting to include earlier times as well: protection of civilians by unarmed means definitely played a role in World War II, but for such case studies interested readers should refer, for example, to the studies by Jacques Semelin.[8]

1.3 The Report

The current initiatives that we identified, interviewed and invited to the online meetings are small, often with fragile structures, and somewhat invisible under encompassing labels such as 'humanitarian' or 'solidarity'. Our research efforts therefore have only scratched the surface of past and current civilian engagement for the protection of others.[9] Yet, we believe that it is crucial to report on them in a structured and analytical way. First because they bear witness that European citizens are engaged in peace efforts in their own cities and territories. And it is important to

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[5] https://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/blog/blog-items/111-nonviolent-peaceforce-feasibility-study [25.09.2020].

[6] Schweitzer, Christine (2010).

[7] Readers interested in the literature review can write to Christine Schweitzer (CSchweitzerIFGK@aol.com) and ask for a PDF.

[8] See for example: Semelin, Jacques (1993)

[9] Several, notably English NGOs that we contacted did not respond. We also had no contact with organizations working with Roma people, etc.

contribute to the documentation of this history. Second because engaging these civil protection actors has been a creative experiment from which we can all learn. Writing is part of the research process and enables reflection and further work. Third because we believe that creating a community of practice starts with taking stock of where we come from, of where we stand, as well as acknowledging our differences.

Last not least, this report includes material from some current or very recent initiatives that we were not able to cover in our interviews. These are governmental missions of recent years – the EUMM in Georgia and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. It seemed doubtful that it would be possible to interview participants of these two missions, so this report includes material that is publicly available.

The report is ordered in the following way: Chapter two includes material primarily from the literature review as well as from interviews and from the online session on nonviolent intervention before, during and after civil wars. This includes information on an early project of nonviolent intervention on Cyprus which was probably the first one in Europe that ever took place. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 cover the four topics of the online meetings. Within each topic, the projects are presented in chronological order. The report ends with a literature review on governmental civilian peacekeeping.

This is a different order than the standardized order of the earlier Good Practice workshop reports.[10] They begin with "Outlining the framework of UCP/A", followed by "Tactics of protection" (the activities) and ending with "Managing UCP/A projects". These three headlines however have been taken up in the Conclusions of this report (chapter 7).

The summaries at the end of each of the online meetings, based on notes taken by Huibert Oldenhuis, contain not only good practices and challenges, but also suggestions. These suggestions are also listed, although the rapporteur has taken the freedom to reformulate some, and list some under good practices if it was clear that the suggestion was based on the practice of an organization.

1.4 Semantic Issues: Protection and Good Practices

From the interviews, a pervasive sense of care emerged. Actors in the field were concerned with the protection of others, be they nationals like war survivors and veterans after armed conflicts, minority citizens (religious, ethnic, lifestyle), refugees, etc. The interviews therefore confirmed that there are today, in Europe, a range of civilian mobilizations that could be explored under the heading of "Unarmed Civilian Protection/Accompaniment". At the same time, the interviews brought to light several semantic issues.

As a starting point, we understood "UCP/A" to be a practice rooted in both nonviolence as principle and local communities as a starting point; a practice whereby physical presence is used as a strategic asset to concretely decrease situations of violence. It includes observation, accompaniment and other forms of engaged presence, local mediation and rumor control, and interpositioning. It also entails emerging hybrid practices related to the use of empirical and internet-based tools like the use of statistics for legal suits, databases for the documentation of human rights violations, early warning platforms etc. [11]

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[10] See https://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/what-we-do/developing-and-expanding-the-field

[11] For example the work of Protection International. One could refer in particular to the manual on surveillance: Surveillance and *counter Surveillance for Human Rights Defenders and their Organisation* (Brussels 2014) 32 Pages, URL: https://www.protectioninternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Online-NO2_SURVEILLANCE-AND-COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE-FOR-HUMAN-RIGHTS-DEFENDERS-AND-THEIR-ORGANISATION-310315.pdf

Also much work is emerging on rumor control and digital issues. The concept of 'digital wildfire' has been developed by the OSCE in 2013: World Economic Forum (2013), *Digital Wildfire in an Hyperconnected World*, Report, URL: http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2013/risk-case-1/digital-wildfires-in-a-hyperconnected-world/ If you want more references on this them let me know.

Yet, and this is the beauty of research, we discovered that few European organizations use the term 'protection' and some of them find it to be quite controversial. There are several reasons why organizations object to using this term to qualify their activities. Two can be emphasized. The first one is that protection is a concept they associate with the State. As emphasized in modern political science since Thomas Hobbes, protection is understood as a regalian function, the core job of Leviathan States. It is especially true in Western Europe and has been reinforced after WWII with the rise of the welfare state. Here protection goes beyond basic political rights and encompasses economic and social support.

As a consequence, for some NGOs to use the term 'protection' is problematic. They do not want to pretend to replace the state. This is first because some small organizations interviewed feel that they do not have the means to protect. As one experienced UCP/A practitioner referring to their work on Lesvos said: "We don't protect, we accompany, and sometimes we can't even protect ourselves."[12] Still, more importantly, NGOs often see their work as a combination of presence and advocacy. For instance, the HR observers in Calais regularly complain to the IGPN (the French police supervision body) about the illegal violence in police expulsions. Although they believe it has little impact, they keep calling for enquiries, for the respect of procedures and legal requirements as a way to remind state institutions of their primary duty to citizens.[13] Hence, many civil society actors refrain from claiming the term "protection" for themselves to avoid confusion, provocation or a sense of competition with state-based institutions. In fact, the French generic translation for UCP/A is 'intervention civile de paix' which literally translates as 'civilian intervention for peace'.[14] Adopted in the early 2000's, it does not include the term "protection". In English, this may echo the generic term "nonviolent intervention" mentioned above which covers all forms of civil society interventions into violent conflicts. In English (and in German), Unarmed Civilian Protection or "Civilian Peacekeeping" are considered special forms of nonviolent intervention. NP switched the P from "peacekeeping" to "protection" when they learned that they were unable to advance the concept at the UN as long as it was described as "peacekeeping." The Department of Peace Keeping Operations literally owned the brand. They also found that by using the word "protection" they could position UCP/A in a much broader dialogue concerning the protection of civilians. As described in the Latin American workshop report[15], the Spanish-speaking organizations prefer "protective accompaniment". Indeed, we navigate a semantic minefield with preserved territories and strong genealogies.

There is however a second, deeper, set of reasons explaining the rejection of the word protection among some of the people that were interviewed. Some organizations and persons, often women's groups, object to the term on account of its entrenched verticality. They feel that protection is something done by some institutions or people to others. One protects a child, a victim, a refugee. These nouns can be questioned, because they have become labels of vulnerability and contribute to a (perceived) lack of agency, and powerlessness. For these actors, protecting indeed seems to run counter to empowering. One interviewee insisted: "I keep thinking why we do not use the term "protection". Protection would be about someone protecting others, so a person capable to protect protects the incapable ones."."[16]

It is important to note that UCP/A organizations (like those involved in Balkan Peace Team or currently the Federation for Social Defense in its work to promote UCP/A) that *do* emphasize the word protection stress the exact same points. They see 'protection', as a mutual process and wish to restore the word or show that there is another way to protect than the top-down, masculine, militarized interpretation that has become mainstream.

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[12] Runbir Serkepkani, Christian Peacemaker Teams, Lesvos (Greece), Interview 03/10/2020.

[13] Police Observatory Calais (France), Interview 28/10/2020.

[14] In France, the term goes back to Muller Jean-Marie, *Principes et Méthodes de l'Intervention civile de paix*, 1997, Paris

[15] https://nonviolentpeaceforce.org/images/Good_Practices/Documentation_Bogota_2020_Full_version_final.pdf

[16] Nenad Vukosavljevic, Center for non-violent action, Belgrade and Sarajevo (Serbia, Bosnia), Interview 07/10/2020.

In the Center for Nonviolent Action, the preferred term is 'violence prevention', and the work is challenging for the people who engage in it, for instance war veterans: "joining us exposes you to being accused of treason. It is an inconvenience; you are not going to gain anything except your own self-respect. People, when they come with us, their lives get harder. But in the long run, it proves them right."[17] Like Nenad Vukosavljevic , most interviewees were very clear indeed about emphasizing the dignity, and strength of the people they work with. Hence the need to find alternative words to protection. The emphasis can be placed for example on "safety" and/or "security" as common goods to achieve collectively.

These are important caveats and reflecting on the arguments around protection, we also realized the extent to which these objections were entrenched in the European history and national narratives. In Western Europe in particular, states remain largely seen as liberal benevolent structures; as institutions that fail yet can reform themselves and can progress. This may be seen differently in other continents, in other parts of Europe with stronger experiences of authoritarian political systems, in countries that have recently gone through war or occupation. Amongst the seminar participants, the positions varied.

A correlate to the State-benevolence assumption is that Europeans often connect protection with the Weberian idea of the State's 'monopoly of legitimate use of force'. They thus associate the ideas of civilian protection, or self-protection with aggressive vigilante groups or with a failed state context where citizens get hold of weapons in chaotic environments. Hence the importance of adding 'unarmed' to the terminology: unarmed civilian protection or peacekeeping. Hence there is a clear need to explore words and to pay attention to their multiple meanings.

The team took words seriously throughout the research process and its several stages. Especially as we tried to understand commonality and diversity amongst European civilian-based security initiatives, to create connections and synergy, we had to be both creative and cautious about concepts. Creative in the sense that we refused to be paralyzed by the assumed meaning of such or such a term or by disagreements between participants. We encouraged each other in being open intellectually and open to new meanings and practical options. We felt the need to explore all the options that words gave us, including a concept like 'civilian protection'. These concepts were useful at disturbing our assumptions, because they highlight paradoxes and contradictions that compel us to think further. At the same time, it was important to be cautious in our methods. Cautious in the sense that we needed to be reflective on words, especially during the person-to-person interaction times (interviews and the European seminar). It was essential to be able to question our own use of terms and to actively listen to that of others; to ask calmly: "what do you mean by 'protection'?" "What does it imply for you 'to defend'?" "What do you understand when you state that you are 'neutral'?". Indeed, it is a first "good practice" to pay extra attention to local and regional linguistic sensibilities.

This demanding work on postures and semantics has just begun and is on-going. As we build a community of practice, we have to simultaneously create a community of language. Not an artificial and arbitrary new speech, but a practice of listening, navigating the wealth of dimensions, and holding multiple meanings and contradictions together. Doing so may help to open new realities.

This report however will not fulfill these cautions completely. It will often use the term "UCP/A" for convenience, in spite of the reservations described here.

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[17] *Ibid.*

2. Before, In and After War

The three main armed conflicts where UCP/A-related activities were identified were Cyprus, the civil war in Northern Ireland and the various wars in what had been Yugoslavia until 1991. In addition, Chechnya and Georgia were two countries where a few civil society organizations became active although not comparable in size or impact to the first two.

2.1: Cyprus Resettlement Project (1972-75)[18]

Cyprus is one of the islands in the Mediterranean Sea that had been part of Turkey since the time of the Ottoman Empire, although the population is part Greek. In 1878 it became a British protectorate, later colony; in 1960 at its independence a power-sharing rule between Greeks and Turks was established. But conflicts between the two communities led to war, and many people were displaced. 1964 the United Nations sent one of its earliest military peacekeeping forces to keep the two sides apart, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) that is still on Cyprus today. In 1974, Greek nationalists came to power in a coup d'état with the support of the military junta that ruled Greece at that time. Unable to secure multilateral support against the coup, Turkey in response invaded the northern portion of the island. The resulting partition of Cyprus is still the status quo although the Greek part today is an independent state with the name Republic of Cyprus and member of the European Union.

As mentioned in the introduction, European peace organizations were among the first to advocate for nonviolent interventions, often called "peace armies", to prevent and stop wars, to be deployed by civil society or by the United Nations or its predecessor, the League of Nations. This predates World War II. [19] Some projects were never implemented, others, in particular activities of the World Peace Brigade[20] first took place outside Europe. Their first project in Europe was the Cyprus Resettlement Project1972-1975.

2.1.1 The project

The Cyprus Resettlement Project was founded by activists from different countries, among them former World Peace Brigade activists like Charles Walker and Shanti Sena members like Narayan Desai. The project described itself as a cooperation of five groups: Gandhians, Quakers from the UK and the USA (American Friends Service Committee), US civil rights activists and social scientists.

The Cyprus Resettlement Project was set up in the time before the Turkish invasion. Based on the principles of nonviolence and on working by consensus, its goals were to help to rebuild contact between the Greek and Turks, support the repatriation of refugees, and to help rebuild houses. Several fact-finding missions were organized between 1972 and 1973 and received support from the

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[18] Sources: Hare, A.Paul (2000); Walker, Charles (1981)

[19] See Weber, Thomas (2000): A history of nonviolent interposition and accompaniment', in: Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua and Thomas Weber, Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders. A Recurrent Vision, pp 15-41; Howard, Donna and Christine Schweitzer (1999): Chapter 2.2 Peace Teams and Civil Peace Services, Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility Study, a.a.O.

[20] The World Peace Brigade was set up in 1962, after Gandhi's death, by Shanti Sena activists including Jayaprakash Narayan, a close associate of Gandhi, Michael Scott from UK, noted for his work on African Liberation, and A.J.Muste, a veteran of nonviolent action from the US.

WPB sponsors included Julius Nyerere (then Prime Minister of Tanganika), and Kenneth Kaunda, who later became president of Zambia. From 1962-64 the WPB promoted nonviolence as part of African liberation struggles. The World Peace Brigade organized three projects: a Freedom March from what was then Tankanyika into Northern Rhodesia, to support Zambian independence and other activities regarding Zambia between 1962-64, A March from Delhi to Beijing in 1963 and monitoring of the cease-fire in Nagaland 1964-66.

The WPB collapsed mainly because of difficulties of communication -in those pre-fax, pre-email days- and funding problems. As Charles Walker commented at the founding meeting of PBI: 'The problem of the World Peace Brigade was: money, money, money … very few things in the world are made better by lack of money.' (Sources: Hare 2000 and https://www.peacebrigades.org/en/about-pbi/pbi-history/precedents-of-pbi)

UN peacekeepers who welcomed the initiative. Eventually the activists got permission from both the Turkish and Greek authorities to start the project. At the village level they gathered a certain amount of data on potential returnees and the status of houses. In November 1973, a first working team of 18 members, among them two Indians, arrived and stayed for three months, three or four volunteers each working in one of four villages. In April 1974, another team of five members took over.[21] The teams combined their protective presence with material aid: They repaired houses for returning refugees. They also organized a work camp with Turkish and Greek young people.

When the Turkish half of the island was occupied by Turkish troops in September 1974, the team members successfully protected threatened villagers. The project was formally ended in early 1975 when both the Turkish and the Greek side signaled that there was no further need.

The project had a budget of about 158,000 USD for one year. Its participants were trained in India. Five Cypriots were to be included in the team. Each team stayed for three months.

2.1.2 Summary

2.2.1 Good Practices

Charles Walker (1981:81) has emphasized several strengths which easily could be reformulated as good practices. One point (on home building and protective presence) was added here.

- The project was systematic in its formulation and development, based on explicit theory and documentation along the way.
- The project was openly and clearly nonviolent, made explicit in relevant ways at local, national and international levels.
- National groups contributed to the transnational project.
- Access was achieved through former UN officials.
- Home building and protective presence was achieved simultaneously.
- There was periodic evaluation by participants and others from stage to stage.
- There was sufficient funding.

2.2.2 Challenges

Hare (2000:125 pp) quotes two project members who named the following challenges:

- The time lag between work in the village and the political negotiations about resettlement created challenges.
- The lack of basic consensus over aims, approach and roles between the team members who came from four different countries, was aggravated by team members not arriving together. Nonviolence alone was not enough of a binding principle and was understood in different ways by different people. For example, they disagreed on how and to what degree to maintain contact with officials or power holders in general.
- Three months were not sufficient to achieve the task and to move into the field of community action.
- There was a lack of Greek or Turkish language speakers. (In one village they had a Turkish speaker, and the difference was very visible.)
- The lack of a common language in the teams was problematic.
- Different emphases, interests and skills of the team members led to a great deal of frustration of the team members.

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[21] The project had planned to set up mixed teams of Cypriots (from both sides) and international people. From the description in the sources available it remains unclear if they managed to do so.

2.2.3 Conclusions

Many elements of this project are reminiscent of later UCP/A initiatives as they exist today – the professional approach, seeking the support of authorities and international bodies, its transnational character involving people from the Global South, inclusion of local peace team members, evaluation, and training of participants, to name the most striking elements. Although the project had to be aborted after the changes in the situation on Cyprus, and although it was leaning much more on the reconstruction/peacebuilding side than on protection, it is certainly one of the more interesting early precedents of UCP/A or nonviolent intervention today.[22]

2.2 Northern Ireland

The civil war in Northern Ireland, often just called "the Troubles ", lasted from about 1968 to 1998. After the Irish War of Independence (1919–21), Ireland was divided – the South became an independent republic, the North remained part of the United Kingdom, a fact that its Catholic minority much resented. They identify with Ireland and repression of Irish symbols and language added to the grievances of the Catholics. The conflict is quite complex; to describe it simply as a divide between Protestants and Catholics leaves out that there are serious political differences within both denominations. (It would be a mistake to characterize the conflict as religious although it is often portrayed as such.) Therefore, the terms unionists (for those who prefer to be a part of the larger UK; mostly Protestants) and nationalists (who want a united Ireland, mostly Catholics, the more radical ones also termed Republicans) are more accurate. (McCartney 1999: 13) In 1968-69, demonstrations and counter-demonstrations of both sides quickly escalated into violence, and parts of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), dubbed the "Provisional IRA", became active in the North. Protestant ("Unionist") radicals also formed paramilitary units, among them the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA). The British military that first acted as peacekeepers was quickly seen fighting on the side of the Unionists. There were a number of armed groups and militias on both sides. Violence took the form of street rioting (often in connection to parades and marches), shootings and terrorist attacks that also targeted the British mainland.

In the course of the civil war, things happened that today would be called ethnic cleansing – many thousands of people were burnt out of their houses and forced to move to single-identity communities, or fled because they were intimidated. In some places like Derry/Londonderry, these communities protected themselves with walls, but even where there were no such physical barriers, the borders were all-present in the mind of the inhabitants. McCartney (1999: 47) observes that civil society had little influence on the political process, and that while there were groups and centers that worked on reconciliation, the predominant part of civil society was rather fueling the conflict than deescalating it. This only slowly changed in the 1990s. In 1994, there were ceasefire agreements with the paramilitaries. In the next one or two years, parades became the focus of most violence, which included bombing. In 1998 the civil war was ended with the Good Friday Agreement. The Agreement actually contains two agreements, one being a multi-party agreement by most of Northern Ireland's political parties (the Multi-Party Agreement); and the other an international agreement between the British and Irish governments (the British–Irish Agreement).

Between the beginning of the conflict and when the power sharing agreements were signed, over 3,500 people were killed, some 50,000 bereaved or injured and an estimated 35,000 were imprisoned and/or interned for politically motivated activities, [23] before the agreements included a power-sharing agreement. The Good Friday Agreement was confirmed by a referendum both in the Republic and in Northern Ireland and still defines the status quo. Since 1998, both conflict parties share power in the government of Northern Ireland. Violence almost completely stopped for a long

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[22] The question whether this project is still remembered on Cyprus, would require research which was not possible in the framework of this documentation.

[23] Kilmurray 2017:1

time, yet politics is stalled as the local parties struggle to maintain a stable government. Besides, since the course of the Brexit process, there are new anxieties. And in March 2021, there were nights when Protestant youth protested violently in the streets of Belfast against what they saw as a preferment of Sinn Fein reps when they were allowed to hold a funeral with many people in spite of Corona regulations, and some outbreaks of (mainly Protestant youth-led) violence.[24]

While there are hundreds of books and many more articles on the civil war in Ireland, including on community action which attempted to bridge the divided communities, engaged in peace education, worked with youth and with victims of violence (Kilmurray 2017, McCartney 1999), there is to the knowledge of the author very little that covers activities that could be counted as monitoring, protection or UCP/A. The outstanding exception is the 57-page report on monitoring of parades etc. by Dominic Bryan and Neil Jarman for Democratic Dialogue (1999) to which Rob Fairmichael pointed us, plus an article by John Watson in the INNATE newspaper from 1991. In the following part of this literature review, the report by Bryan and Jarman is quoted extensively. In addition, information from the interview with Rob Fairmichael and the fourth online workshop on "UCP/A in wars" has been used.

2.2.1 Early Efforts to Deescalate Violence

Early in the conflict, in 1970/71, there were relevant activities by different Peace Committees that developed at the local level. Mostly they were formed in Catholic communities, although some Protestant Churches were also involved. Their activities included unarmed peace patrols in the evenings, from 6:30pm to midnight, in order to diffuse tense situations. When they saw something, they tried to get the appropriate clergy, Catholic or Protestant, to intervene. There were probably also other, more spontaneous interventions from time to time. In the workshop, one incident from 1970 was mentioned where some Quakers intervened when the military started to beat up some youth.[25]

The peace committees decreased when the bombing became more frequent from 1972 onwards. In 1976, the group Women Together was founded by, among others, Mairead Maguire and Betty Williams after the death of Maguire's sister and her three children. The group organized large cross-community demonstrations against the civil war.[26]

Spontaneous interventions in violent situations may have continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s but only in the 1990s did more systematic activities of monitoring increase again.[27]

The following organizations have been involved in this early work to monitor protests and to stop violence:

- Central Citizens Defense Committee (CCDC), that represented the Catholic areas of Belfast in dealings "with the civil, police and military authorities and the media, engaged in social /welfare/civil liberties work, strove constantly to prevent sectarian trouble and violence clashes between sections of the Catholic population and the security forces, and often intervened in riot situations to restore peace." (Watson 1991:7)
- Peace and Reconciliation Group, Derry that was founded in 1976. Their focus was on monitoring parades, and to offer private feedback to particular groups involved in the local conflicts. They did not publish reports.
- Women Together/Independent Observer Network. This organization was founded in the early 1970s and understood itself as a cross-community, non-political group. They monitored protests in Ballymena and some other places, making themselves visible with colored tabards

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[24] Michael Hirst, ,What is behind the violence in Northern Ireland', https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-56664378 (14.4.2021)

[25] Source: Interview / workshop

[26] http://www.peacepeople.com/

[27] Source: interview/ workshop.

and identification badges. Bryan & Jarman (1999:39-40) report that through regular presence, they managed eventually to enter into some dialogue with the protesters, sometimes with more and sometimes with little positive effect.

2.2.2 Monitoring of Parades

Parades (marches) have played a role in the political life in Ireland for more than 200 years. Especially supporters of unity with UK held so-called Orange parades. When the civil war started, such parades became a focus for potential rioting.

> A number of groups from within civil society have attempted to contribute to a resolution of the parade disputes by observing and monitoring events and intervening where appropriate. Monitoring has become something of a growth industry and a diverse and varied one at that. The monitoring groups express a range of aims, ideals, practices and aspirations. Some have focused their attention on the role of the police and the potential for the abuse of human rights. Some groups maintain a neutral, independent and impartial stance; others have expressed support for one party; still others utilize monitors clearly identified with one party. Some monitors remain in the background at the event, quietly observing the flow of action and taking notes that will form the basis of a report; others see their role as mediators and are prepared to intervene to reduce the likelihood of trouble. Some monitors are highly visible; others do not stand out from the crowd. Some monitor in large groups; others work in pairs or sometimes alone. Some are local; others have travelled from as far afield as the USA. In this report we try to unravel the bewildering complexity of monitoring groups and the diversity of their approaches, aims and practices.… (Bryan & Jarman 1999:4-5)

The terminology with which these initiatives described themselves varied. Besides monitors or observers also the term "witness" was used. (Ibid, p. 6) Bryan and Jarman distinguish human rights organizations that monitor without ever intervening, "monitors-mediators" that combine monitoring with facilitation on the ground, and solidarity groups that monitor from a partisan position. Groups in the first category (Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) did not report on violence afterwards but hoped that the likelihood or level of violent confrontation would be reduced because of their presence. (Ibid:8)

Most monitors saw themselves as independent third parties, and made that clear during their work by wearing some kind of identification or by physically keeping distance to the events. The authors however emphasize that Independence is not the same as being neutral.

> All monitors … would consider themselves independent, in that there is some distance between them and the protagonists. This does not mean, however, that the monitor does not have sympathies with one group: rather, that they distance themselves from the activities on the day. Some groups, on the other hand, would see themselves as independent and neutral, in so far as they have no interest in whether a parade takes place or in the outcome of the event - only that if it takes place, it does so peacefully and without human rights being abused. (Ibid:10)

The third category they distinguish, solidarity groups, *were*

> present to observe what takes place often with a remit to record human rights abuses and, if appropriate, to intervene. They usually align themselves with one party. Many of the international monitors present at the parading disputes between 1997 and 1999 made it clear they were acting in solidarity with the residents' groups and described themselves as 'witnesses. They made their role clear to the RUC[28] beforehand and in some cases engaged with the parade organizers in an attempt to understand more fully what was taking place.

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[28] The Royal Ulster Constabulary (*RUC*) was the police force in *Northern Ireland* from 1922 to 2001.

> While these groups are clearly in general support of one party, they are usually proponents of non-violent protest and have clearly defined roles for themselves. (Ibid, p. 8)

There is little information regarding the recruitment of monitors. It seems they were mostly people from the local communities or church congregations concerned about the violence. Some organizations offered some training or at least briefings, in particular Mediation Northern Ireland (MNI), INNATES and the Parades Commission.[29]

<u>2.2.3 The different organizations involved in monitoring in the 1990s</u>

In the 1990s, there were several organizations doing monitoring / observing of Parades and other public events not only for documentation purposes but to try to maintain the peace by talking to one or different sides. "In most situations' interventionist monitoring involves persuading people to calm down, to move away or to move along. In other instances, it has involved clarifying facts to dispel rumors and thereby allay fears. Monitors do not have the capacity to threaten; they can only reason and suggest pragmatic responses to an unfolding situation", Bryan & Jarman conclude (1999:40). Mostly the intervention concerned the police and one civil party, but there were also a few other cases. They are all described in the booklet by Bryan & Jarman 1999, and summarized in section 10.6. These were

- Pat Finucane Centre, a "solidarity monitor" (Bryan & Jarman 1999: p 29).
- Mediation Northern Ireland that used individual monitors to get information about what was happening on the ground.[30] They also set up phone networks to connect activists from both sides.[31]
- INNATE (Irish Network for Non-violent Action Training and Education). Their approach was to try to 1. 'help everyone to be on their best behavior', 2. intervene if necessary and 3. give private feed-back reflections to the different parties involved.[32] They called their role "observer-mediator". They also produced a short report on monitoring in 1992 (*Observing: A Third Party Non-violent Response*") and organized a conference on monitoring in the Northern Ireland context in 1994.[33] One objective of that conference had been to win other organizations to engage in monitoring; according to Rob Fairmichael this objective was not fully achieved although he assessed that INNATE in 6 of 10 cases had some success in contributing to peaceful outcomes of situation, e.g. stopping an escalation between citizens and police.[34] However, in his eyes, they were not able to contribute to a solution of the issues, due to lack of resources, wrong timing, and the unwillingness from the conflict parties to engage in a solution.
- Dumcree Faith and Justice Group, a nonviolent Catholic group.[35]
- Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), a very influential civil society organization at that time, monitored primarily parades in the mid 1990s, issuing detailed reports that focused on the behavior of the police.[36]
- Peace Watch Ireland, a US-based group founded in 1994 to work in solidarity with Irish human-rights and social-justice organizations.
- The Table Campaign, an Irish organization founded in 1996, was based in Dublin.

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[29] Interview/ workshop.

[30] INNATE (n.d.), interview/workshop

[31] Interview / workshop

[32] Powerpoint by Rob Fairmichael at workshop.

[33] INNATE (n.d.). The INNATE website is at www.innatenonviolence.org

[34] Powerpoint presentation byRob Fairmichael at workshop

[35] Interview/ workshop

[36] INNATE (n.d.); http://www.caj.org.uk

- The Community Development Centre, North Belfast (CDC) based in an area with both Catholic and Protestant communities, sought to decrease tensions and to support 110 households that were displaced by the violence and intimidation.
- Meath Peace Group, another observer group.
- Coalition for Peace in Ireland /Information on Ireland Campaign were Canadian groups that have been monitoring parades disputes since 1996. Irish Parades Emergency Committee (IPEG) was a US-organization founded in New York, presumably by people with an Irish migration background.

2.2.4 Conclusions

The reports give a mixed picture as to whether the monitoring prevented violence or not. It certainly did in many cases, but not everywhere and every time. A list of good practices and challenges was developed from the descriptions of the work, and is found below under 2.6.

To quote two examples with different outcomes:

In one incident the presence of monitors from MNI contributed to the de-escalation of a situation when a verbal confrontation between a police officer and a Catholic man threatened to escalate to violence. Another police officer warned that there was someone watching and the police officer turned away.[37]

In another incident, observed by someone from CAJ, a woman in her front garden in a working-class area shouted abuse at the officers of the riot squad. One man broke ranks, ran after her and followed her into her house. The riot squad went into the house after him, wrecked it, and the monitor saw that someone was taken to the hospital with a head injury. The presence of observers had made no difference in this case.[38]

The behavior of the police towards the monitors depended on two things: the orders they had from HQ and how they perceived the monitors. If they saw them as partisan, they often refused any cooperation.[39] In violent situations where the parties were civilians (often youth), interventions seem to have been successful if they came from people who were generally respected – clergy and youth workers are two such categories mentioned in the descriptions of the individual organizations and incidents. Generally, monitoring often helped to encourage people to be on their best behavior.

Cross-community activities aiming at stopping violence became more frequent in the 1990s. One example given was the phone networks set up in Belfast. Earlier in the Troubles however, the report notes that such cross-community activities often were started only to fail after a short time.[40] In the 1990s, this approach seems to have been more successful.

As mentioned above, the various organizations had a wide variety of positions towards the conflict. Some tried to adopt a nonpartisan stance (INNATE, for example), some – including internationals, e.g., the (Catholic) Irish Americans coming to Northern Ireland or the Pat Finucane Centre – took the side of the Catholics.

Not all but many of the organizations that were founded during the Civil War are still active today, although working either on wider issues of reconciliation in Northern Ireland or on other international issues. It is hoped that in case tensions in Northern Ireland rise again due to Brexit and its aftermath, they will remember their experiences in the field of violence prevention made during the civil war.

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[37] Interview / workshop

[38] Interview/ workshop.

[39] Email communication by Rob Fairmichael to the author.

[40] Interview / workshop.

2.3 UCP/A During the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia

Today, there are seven independent countries in what had been the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia between 1945/46 and January 1992.[41] In 1990 all republics held their first multi-party elections. In Croatia and Slovenia those parties or coalitions won that stood for autonomy or secession from Yugoslavia, and referenda soon after confirmed the wish for independence from Belgrade. Conflict between different republics escalated to overt violence immediately after the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991. The government in Belgrade tried to prevent the secession of Slovenia by having the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) secure Slovenia's international borders. Thanks to successful mediation by the European Community (EC), a cease-fire was negotiated at Brioni on the 7th July.

But while the JNA eventually withdrew from Slovenia on 19 July, a few days later local fighting between Croats and Serbs in Croatia escalated. The JNA seemed initially to be trying to stop the violence. But it soon become clear they were fighting on the side of the Serbs living in Croatia. Those areas in Croatia where a considerable Serbian population lived were quickly brought under control of the JNA and local Serbian militias. An UN-brokered cease-fire was finally signed on 2 January 1992, and the UN sent peace-keeping forces (UNPROFOR) to Croatia to monitor the Serbian-controlled parts that proclaimed themselves in 1992 as the Serbian Republic of Krajina. (UNPROFOR later was extended to also work in Bosnia-Herzegovina.)

Unhappy and dissatisfied at the failure of the UN to take steps towards demilitarizing and re-integrating Krajina, in 1995 Croatia reoccupied two parts of the Serbian-controlled territories in eastern Croatia, with the exception of Eastern Slavonia which was, due to a UN-managed transitional administration, handed over peacefully to Croatia in 1998.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a country with three major groups, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats and Serbs, the referendum on independence demanded by the EC took place on 1st March 1992, and on 3rd March Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence, against the will of most of its Serb population. Two days later the war began. In the first phase of the war until end of August 1992, the Bosnian Serbs fighting against troops of the government in Sarajevo and Croat militias brought almost two thirds of the territory under their control. The war ended after months of shuttle mediation led by US envoy Holbrooke with the Dayton Agreement which was signed in December 1995.

The Dayton agreement placed Bosnia-Herzegovina under international administration secured by NATO-led peacekeeping forces, later by the EU force which is still present in the country. The Office of the High Representative is mandated to oversee the democratic reforms in the country although it no longer has the military strength at hand to enforce measures. Officially, Bosnia-Herzegovina is considered an independent state.

The international attention after 1995 soon turned to Kosovo where in 1997/1998 what had been a nonviolent resistance movement against the Serbian domination turned militant and the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) was founded. In 1998 the UCK increasingly became the real power factor. By mid-June it temporarily controlled large areas in central Kosovo, rapidly retreating in the face of a summer offensive by Belgrade's security forces. Under a massive threat by NATO to intervene, the fighting between the Serb forces and the UCK was suspended in autumn, and a large-scale civilian observer mission by the OSCE, the Kosovo Verification Mission, was sent to Kosovo. But in early 1999, violence was on the rise once again. Negotiations at Rambouillet failed to reach an agreement, and in March NATO attacked the Republic of Yugoslavia. The war ended in June with the capitulation of Belgrade. After the cease-fire the UN and NATO together with a larger number of other international organizations and institutions set up a protectorate with NATO as its peacekeeping arm (KFOR), and the UN as civil administrator (UNMIK). Today, Kosovo is like Bosnia-Herzegovina on the

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[41] This history of the conflicts is a summary of Schweitzer 2010, pp 59-73.

one hand considered an independent state (although not recognized by all UN members), but on the other hand is still controlled by international military and police forces.

These conflicts in the former Yugoslavia triggered a hitherto unseen response of civilian, nonviolent conflict interventions by international civil society actors not only from Western Europe but also North America and even Australia. Many of the instruments and approaches that today are part of the standard tool kit of nonviolent peacebuilding or conflict transformation date back to that time. Civil society actors played three different basic roles in that time: They complemented the work of state actors, they conducted projects to support victims of war and to build peace, and in some cases, they were able to control or correct actions by governments through advocacy or direct action. The development of instruments of civil conflict transformation received a massive boost through this engagement in the 1990s. Some of these projects had a clear element of UCP/A.

2.3.1 Balkan Peace Team (1993-2001 / 2012)

The volunteer project Balkan Peace Team (BPT) was founded in 1993 by European nonviolence and anti-war activists in response to invitations by NGOs and individuals from Croatia and Kosovo. The project has been documented rather well by Müller (2007) and Schweitzer & Clark (2002).

The Balkan Peace Team worked with small teams of two to five people each in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1994 and 2001. Originally, BPT started out with the goal to place 100 volunteers in Kosovo to prevent a war there. In the course of the development of the project in 1993, this idea quickly became reduced to a small-scale peace-team enterprise, and Croatia being more accessible than Serbia/Kosovo, BPT in the end started its work there.

2.3.1.1 Goals and objectives

The goals of BPT had been *inter alia* to seek to identify possibilities for dialogue between the different groups; to serve as a channel of independent and non-partisan information from the regions, to assist in the promotion of human rights for all, to act as international observer at the scene of incidents or potential flashpoints and to escort individuals or maintain a presence in threatening situations.

Protection and support of dialogue were the two foci of BPT. In Croatia protection was more important, whilst in Serbia and Kosovo the priority was the support of dialogue between civil society activists.

2.3.1.2 Principles

The principles of the Balkan Peace Team were "non-violence, independence, and non-partisanship, with a strong concern for human rights. The Balkan Peace Team is open for co-operation with anybody, regardless of nationality or religion, who is committed to peaceful conflict resolution". (Quote from an undated policy paper).

2.3.1.3 Field work

In Croatia between 1994 and 1999, BPT, operating under the name of Otvorene Oci (Open Eyes), deployed two teams of volunteers, one in Zagreb (or Karlovac for part of the time) and the other in Split. There were two main issues around which Otvorene Oci's peace-keeping activities revolved:

The first was the issue of illegal house evictions which was a focus of concern for a number of local human rights groups. In the first years after independence, the Croatian state (or local authorities) tried to evict tenants from flats that had belonged to the Yugoslav Peoples' Army. Victims were usually ethnic Serbs. Accompanying local human rights activists to evictions was one of the first protection-related activities Otvorene Oci undertook in 1994. When called to an eviction, BPT volunteers usually not only came themselves but also called upon other international agencies and

media to be present as well. In several cases the police aborted their attempts to evict the tenant when they found that internationals were present in the flat.

The second was monitoring the situation in the former Krajina (UN Protected Areas West and South) after the reoccupation by Croatia in 1995, and the accompaniment of local activists to the area. In Western Slavonia, BPT, together with volunteers from other international projects, entered the area within a few days of the reoccupation seeking to establish a continuous presence of observers. One volunteer spent two nights in the house of a local politician who was considered to be threatened.

In Kosovo, the BPT held an intermittent presence because it was difficult to get permission to open an office. Instead, BPT then operated mostly from Belgrade, visiting Kosovo regularly. The focus of the work was to bring together activists (students and others) from Pristina and Belgrade. The team served as shuttle mediators and accompanied activists on visits.

After the NATO war of 1999, BPT tried to stay in Kosovo and work there. It started running a youth center in a mixed town in an area where there was an ethnic mix but where ethnic tensions had not escalated to the point that work for reconciliation would be impossible. However, eventually the work in the Center was handed over to other NGOs when BPT dissolved for reasons described below.

2.3.1.4 Exit

Balkan Peace Team experienced three exits: First it withdrew in a somewhat planned manner from Zagreb in 1998 when an analysis done by the field team showed that there was no longer a need for that team. The withdrawal was discussed with the local partners who organized to compensate for BPT's exit. The next step, the closure of the second office of BPT in Split, was more chaotic and initiated by a break-down of the team. It was the Steering Committee of BPT that was hesitant to end the work because leaving Croatia was seen as creating an imbalance in the overall conflict web – BPT would be working in the future only on one side of the Serbian-Croatian divide which would mean that it made itself vulnerable to the accusation of one-sidedness.

This breakdown then was repeated three years later, in 2001, in Kosovo. There again it was the team that refused to continue working under unclear circumstances and suffering a lack of administrative support. Another contributing factor was that Kosovo was inundated with international projects after the NATO intervention. BPT had lost its exclusive angle, and the field workers were faced with staff from other organizations who did the same work but were paid for it while they were volunteers. Lack of funding, and the withdrawal of the first generation of the founders were some organizational reasons that added to the problems. [42]

2.3.1.5 The successor: Équipes de Paix des Balkans

One of the French members of BPT, the Mouvement pour une alternative nonviolente (MAN), continued work in Kosovo with a three-person team for some years under the name of "Équipes de Paix des Balkans". [43] Supported by Caritas, they worked in the divided town of Mitrovica where one half is Kosovo-Albanian, the other half Serbian-dominated. After some years, they founded a Mediation Centre in Mitrovica which existed at least until 2011.[44] In 2012, the French Balkan Peace Team ceased its activities.[45]

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[42] The story of these exits is described in detail in Müller 2007.

[43] http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-acteurs-163_es.html

[44] MCMfinalreport032011

[45] CRàBPTI.pdf

2.3.1.6 Clout and relationship to other actors

To assess BPT's strategy, two other points need to be mentioned. BPT was influenced by Peace Brigade International's theory of unarmed deterrence.[46]For that reason, in the beginning BPT member organizations expected to build up international influence and support. However, other than through its member organizations, very little was done in this respect, partly because of simple lack of resources.

When BPT was founded, it started to build up an alert network, but did not develop it very far. Only once was it used in Croatia, when protest letters regarding the house evictions were sent to Croatian authorities. The reason for neglect of the tool may have been more due to the work overload than a lack of opportunities to use it. There was at least one incident where the Croatian team made use of the alert network of a member organization: in 1996, on hearing of the arrest and beating of a conscientious objector, the team and a local activist succeeded in seeing the objector in prison and taking a photo of a military policeman threatening him. By the end of the day, War Resisters' International had sent out an email alert, followed the next day by Amnesty International – prompt action that very likely stopped further beatings of the person concerned. Overall, it can only be said that it is not clear how much the lack of international clout affected BPT's efficacy.

Regarding BPT's relationship to the international missions, especially UNPROFOR and the EC Monitors: Other than in the context of exchanging information or having to request permission to enter certain areas, BPT kept a conscious distance from them. This was partly due to the fact that BPT was an initiative of a coalition of pacifist groups that as a matter of principle did not wish any cooperation with armed actors or governments. But it was also due to BPT's practical experience in the field. The international state actors (UN, EC/EU etc) were not held in high esteem, and so not being identified with them gave BPT, in the eyes of its practitioners, a strategic advantage to the operation on the ground.

2.3.1.7 Recruitment and conditions of service

The field teams of BPT were rather small, usually three persons per office, and there were times when even this number could not be reached. At the beginning of BPT, the minimal stay of a field volunteer was six months. That was later extended to a year. Some volunteers, mainly those from Brethren Service, stayed for two years. From time-to-time short-term consultants, for example former volunteers, joined the teams for a period between six weeks and three months. In total, BPT had around 50 volunteers.

BPT covered volunteers' expenses for food, lodging and travel on BPT business. Additionally, BPT paid ca. 150€ pocket money per month. There was also a 150€ holiday payment. Volunteers serving with BPT for more than three months were entitled to reintegration help of 30€ for every month they worked with BPT. BPT supplied each volunteer with health insurance, third-party liability insurance, and accident / invalidity insurance.

BPT had no age limits. Volunteers had to be able to express themselves in English, and be willing to learn Croatian, Serbian or Albanian. They had to be mature, communicative, and to have past experience in demanding situations. High value was put on experience in another country, and conflict resolution or social movement experience, although none of these were "musts". Neither did they have to have computer literacy, or book-keeping skills, although the lack of these was sometimes felt a lot, because the teams were required to communicate by e-mail, write reports on computers, and do their own book-keeping.

The issue of social care for the volunteers who worked in highly stressful situations, witnessing much violence and human suffering, was recognized but answers were mostly sought through mechanisms in the teams themselves. CC members offered supporting talks on request but there was no formal provision for counselling or therapeutic treatment.

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[46] See Mahony, Liam and Eguren, Luis Enrique (1997)

2.3.1.8 Training

At the beginning, BPT followed PBI's example in combining trainings with an assessment. That meant that at the end of the trainings the participants were told if they would be accepted as volunteers of BPT or not. This process caused much dissatisfaction with the candidates, with the trainers and with the Coordinating Committee, and was abandoned in 1997 after a special meeting to evaluate and develop BPT's training procedures.

2.3.1.9 Funding

BPT's main funding sources were private donations (mainly from Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland), governments (Switzerland and UK), organizations like Diakonia Germany, a Christian Belgian trade union, and the Lutheran Church in Germany, foundations, (Heinrich Böll Foundation for example), and the fees of the member organizations. Its yearly budget in the year 2000 was about 300.000 €. Approximately one-third of the funds came from private donors, one-third from government sources and one-third from foundations or other organizations.

2.3.1.10 Conclusions

Balkan Peace Team was the only longer-term initiative in Europe with a mandate that included UCP/A although not exclusively. In Croatia, protective accompaniment played a large role while in Serbia-Kosovo the main focus lay on (re-)establishing links of communication between youth (students, activists) from Serbia and from Kosovo. There was accompaniment when such activists eventually met, but it was dialogue, not protection that lay at the core of BPT's work there.

Compared to other projects, BPT is fairly well s documented with its successes as well its failures and shortcomings. The latter were mostly due to lack of organizational capacity. Many of its learnings are still relevant today, in particular regarding the necessity of having sufficient backing for each person in the field.

In the workshop and interviews, the flexibility of BPT's mandate was positively remarked on.

2.3.2 Pakrac Volunteer Project (VPP)

Pakrac is a town in Western Slavonia, Croatia. During the war in 1991, it became divided. One part was under the control of Croatia, the other was part of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina. In 1993, the Antiwar Campaign Croatia started a volunteer project in Pakrac. It was under the umbrella of a wider, UN-run project, the "UNOV Pakrac Social Reconstruction Project (UNOV PSRP)", an ad hoc structure within the UN Office in Vienna. Between July 1993 and March 1997, Croatian and international volunteers worked in the project. The aims of the project were "initially to work in a town that was divided by a cease-fire line, and to begin the peace process through activities that would start to bring normalization to the area".[47] There have been volunteers from 36 countries. They did not get any financial support; on the contrary, participants had to contribute a fee of 150 German Marks (about 75 Euro).[48]

2.3.2.1 Activities

Nick Wilson (n.d.) summarizes the project:

> The VPP idea initially used international volunteers and ARK [Antiwar Campaign] activists for basic physical reconstruction and social assistance. International volunteers were recruited using systems already in place for work in refugee camps run by Suncokret, another NGO in

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[47] A Brief History of the Volunteer Project Pakrac (n.d.)

[48] Source: Workshop

the ARK network. None of the Croatian Anti-war Campaign activists involved had previous peacebuilding experience, and the Project's loose structure reflected this.

Originally planned as short-term experiment, VPP expanded beyond the summer of 1993 to fill social development and 'empowerment' roles with Pakracani, using Long Term Volunteers. By 1994 it had developed a concept of integrated grassroots peacebuilding which sought to combine physical reconstruction assistance ('hardware') and social assistance / social development / empowerment ('software'). In responses to the war in Croatia, as in many other contexts to that date, these naturally linked pre-requisites for constructing a future at the grassroots were rarely delivered by the same intervener, or even co-ordinated between different actors. Instead, they were artificially separated by specialist agencies. Operating at the grassroots in a distinct geographical area, VPP was able to experiment with reuniting these strands of the peacebuilding process.

The activities developed included, besides the physical reconstruction work, "social assistance to vulnerable groups through 'Community Visits'. These activities in turn created bases of trust and respect which were explicitly used for social development and 'empowerment' work in a Women's Club and Youth Club, Youth Development Programme, email and internet training, and miscellaneous educational, recreational activities." [49] Among the recreational activities, there were a photo and a puppet theatre project.[50]

The project was meant to work on both sides of Pakrac, but although all Western Slavonia was under nominal control of UN peacekeeping troops, the local authorities often prevented the volunteers from crossing to the Serbian side. The problem was partly solved through cooperation with a Serbian NGO, MOST, that sent (Serbian) volunteers to work on the Serbian side.

Wilson's list of challenges to the project includes funding (it had to do its own fundraising, mostly from British sources, since the UN was only paying for the physical reconstruction part), problems of internal organization which were probably due to lack of previous experience with such projects, and burnout of the long-term volunteers and staff.

2.3.2.2 Conclusions

The Volunteer Project is one of several projects that developed in the region to work on "social reconstruction". In the context that meant combining physical reconstruction of the heavily destroyed town with activities aiming at cooperation and eventual reconciliation. There was no explicit concept of protection involved although there were instances when volunteers assumed protective roles. For example, after the reoccupation of Western Slavonia in 1995, "VPP volunteers accompanied remaining Serbs and provided a bridgehead for INGO and LNGO responses".[51]

In the workshop, from the discussion of the Pakrac project, the following points were listed as good practices and challenges:

- Being there to listen to people was an important factor
- Meeting and cooperation with Serbian activists
- Learning from other conflict situation (Northern Ireland) was important
- It was not easy to work with the 'big agencies' like the UN.

2.3.3 Osijek Peace Teams

Osijek Peace Teams[52] was a project of the Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek, Croatia. This peace team project began with the support of the Swedish Life and Peace Institute, that

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[49] Wilson n.d.

[50] A Brief History of the Volunteer Project Pakrac (n.d.)

[51] Wilson n.d. Most Serbs had fled when Croatia reoccupied the territory.

[52] The description in this section is mostly a reprint from Schweitzer (2010, 203pp)

financed it, and Austrian Peace Services, that deployed international volunteers to work with the Croatian volunteers recruited through the Osijek Centre. The project officially began in 1998 with the end of the UNTAES mission in Eastern Slavonia (the international administration of that part of Croatia) which meant the withdrawal of many international support structures. But a pilot Listening Project had already begun in 1996 where people were interviewed about the peace efforts, the return of former neighbors and future co-habitation.

2.3.3.1 Activities

Teams were deployed to several small towns or villages, living in the local communities. In Dalje, for example, they helped to set up a youth club, organized a youth summer camp for youth from Croatia and Austria and supported a school partnership with an Austrian school. In Okucani, besides workshops with children and the formation of a youth group there were also workshops with women, a hiking club, activities to embellish the village, a series of therapeutic workshops for war veterans and five ecumenical services with Catholic, Orthodox and Adventist priests. Other activities included regular legal counselling, help with dealing with authorities, courses and seminars on diverse topics (from computer use to languages, and election monitoring to de-mining), help to reconstruct libraries or sports halls and special activities for the reintegration of returnees or disadvantaged ethnic groups like Roma.

The first (10-week) training for the Osijek Peace Teams took place in summer 1998. The work in the field started in 1999. Usually one international volunteer (from September 1999 mostly coming from Austrian Peace Services) was placed in a team with several local people.

As to the evaluation, initially local people had a hard time understanding the purpose of the project, expecting material humanitarian aid, and not seeing how seminars could help to improve their situation especially in view of the 'danger' in meeting people of the other nationality. However, as the project was better understood, it became more successful. An external evaluation showed the listening program, along with other activities, empowering those who had been implementing it as well as those being listened to, "in the way that it reduced their prejudices and fears of the other nationality, it raised the communication with the other nationality to a higher level, and it increased their motivation to participate in peace activities." (Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek 2001:107).

The summary of the evaluation published by Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek (2001b:116pp) lists a very large number of further general and specific achievements, as well as areas that need improvement, the latter mostly raising issues around management, project monitoring, training and preparedness of staff.

2.3.3.2 Conclusions

Osijek Peace Teams is a very interesting case of a locally-led volunteer project. That it was set up was probably influenced by experiences the local activists had on the one hand with Balkan Peace Team, and on the other with the social reconstruction project in Pakrac/ Western Slavonia that had been organized by UNDP and local NGOs together in 1993 (see 3.2.2). There were some lead people who were involved with several such projects, as well as close communication between them. Its character was that of a peacebuilding project and not focused on protection but on rebuilding severed human relations, but it certainly had an element of UCP/A in the area included.

2.3.4 Operazione Colomba in Kosovo (OC)

Operazione Colomba (English Operation Dove) was founded in 1992 "from the desire of some volunteers and conscientious objectors of the Comunità Papa Giovanni XXIII to concretely live nonviolence in war zones. Initially, it operated in the former Yugoslavia, where it helped reunite families divided by the various fronts, protect (unarmed) minorities, and create spaces for meeting,

dialogue and peaceful coexistence."[53] Currently, it is working in many countries of the world and has deployed over 2,000 volunteers in total.

In Kosovo, they worked between 1998 and 2010.

2.3.4.1 Principles

Some of the pillars of OC could be considered principles:

- Nonviolence to interrupt the cycle of violence triggered by armed conflict.
- Equiproximity or neutrality with respect to the parties.
- The principle of neutrality governs the relationship between the organization's peacekeepers and the actors in the conflict, but not the volunteers' behavior in the face of human rights violations committed by the warring parties. In fact, volunteers carry out monitoring operations to denounce abuses regardless of which side is responsible for the violence. (Zurlini-Panza 2010/22: 128)

2.3.4.2 Activities

OC started working in the area of the former Yugoslavia in 1992 with Italian Conscientious Objectors doing their alternative service abroad. In that time, the organization developed its approach and principles.

Central to its work is the direct sharing of the situations of danger, discomfort and difficulty that the victims of the conflict experience during the war in refugee camps, in threatened or besieged houses, in tents or in semi-destroyed structures. In this way, peacekeepers are able to connect with civilians exposed to the risks and trauma of violence. The principle of equiproximity means that OC applies the tool of direct sharing with all parties involved in the conflict. In this way, they seek to establish a relationship of trust with all the actors in the conflict in order to acquire the credibility necessary to establish a dialogue between them and eventually achieve reconciliation.

In Kosovo between 1998 and 2000, they had a project in the area of Suva Reka, in Rečane-Reçanë, one of the few mixed villages at that time. Its goals were to promote dialogue between the parties, support displaced persons and protect the population from violence. The action was developed in collaboration with UNHCR and OSCE. "The international permanent presence of OC served as a deterrent, protecting both the Albanian civilian population from the raids of the Serbian forces and the Serbian people from the incursions of Kosovo Liberation Army ", (Zurlini 2021).

According to Zurlini-Panza, their activities before the war of 1999 were:

- Work with children, in order to start common activities for the two ethnic groups;
- Unarmed accompaniment of the villagers in various parts of Kosovo, to ensure the safety of movement of both Serbs and Albanians
- Mediation
- Humanitarian activities consisting in the supply of medicines for both communities.

In general, the activities in Kosovo included[54]:

- monitoring and reporting human rights violations,
- civilian escorts,
- nonviolent interposition,
- networking with associations working for Human Rights protection.

These „were implemented by OC through two main approaches: "'direct sharing' and 'equiproximity'".

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[53] https://www.operazionecolomba.it/chi/chi-siamo.html

[54] Zurlini 2021

Direct Sharing' meant sharing the situations of danger, distress and precariousness in which the victims of war in Kosovo found themselves. OC's peacekeepers selflessly chose to live in the same conditions as civilians in Kosovo's war in order to create contacts with the parties and build a deep relationship of trust with them. The volunteers lived in damaged houses, in tents within refugee camps, in bombed urban areas and rural villages.

'Equi-proximity' implies that our volunteers apply the tool of 'direct sharing' with all the parties involved in the conflict. "Equi-proximity" also enables volunteers to carry out monitoring operations to denounce Human Rights violations committed, regardless of which party is responsible for them. In Kosovo, 'equi-proximity' meant that our peaceworkers shared their lives with Albanian and Serbian communities, speaking their languages, learning their history and culture (Zurlini 2021).

The beginning of NATO bombings interrupted the presence.[55] In April 1999 the team went to support a refugee camp in Albania and Macedonia to live next to the refugees.

In Kosovo 'equiproximity' also signified to stand by the side of the most targeted group depending on the warfare's phase. When the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces attacked the Albanian villages more and more seriously and systematically, and when NATO started to bomb Kosovo, OC escorted the Kosovar Albanian refugees from Kosovo to northern Albania and settled in a refugee camp with them. In those months, our peacekeepers openly explained that, at that moment, they would have supported the Kosovar Albanian population as the most targeted community in that warfare's phase, but they also told them that in the future they would have supported the Kosovar Serbian community" (Zurlini 2021).

After the war[56], the team returned to Kosovo and started two presences in the area of Pec-Peja and Mitrovica, in those areas where ethnic minorities were still present. They made a point in working with both communities, and became one of the first organizations that were able to work with the remaining Serbian minority. In 2003, they placed a team in the Serbian village of Goraždevac.

From c. 2004 on, their activities included, according to Zurlini (2021) and the discussion at the workshop:

- Workshops with people from both sides, sharing what they had lived through. The informal approach allowed the building of trust and dialogue with the local population and then succeeded in addressing the thorny issue of conflict. It was also with these participants that OC then offered accompaniment.
- Unarmed accompaniment: Together with OC volunteers, Serb participants would accompany Albanian people in Serb-dominated areas, and vice versa. Especially ethnic Serbs were very limited in their freedom of movement and were driven by OC in its neutral, unmarked private vehicles.
- In collaboration with Tavolo Trentino con il Kossovoche, which had similar interventions to OC, they developed ethnically distinct groups to analyze the conflict. Eventually these groups merged into one mixed group called Study Group, which directly addressed the issues of the war. The objective was to give a small group of people the opportunity to free themselves from the logic of ethnicity and to create small solutions to everyday problems.

Accompaniment of Serbians usually meant that they took people who, for example, had to go to a hospital in a private car, with two internationals sitting in front. Other than escorts by KFOR (the NATO peacekeepers), the people travelling remained anonymous and were not recognized by potential troublemakers from the Albanian side. At the same time, the volunteers also maintained

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[55] http://www.operazionecolomba.it/chi/storia-di-operazione-colomba.html. There is also a book on the project but it is no longer available: Dalla parte sbagliata. Operazione Colomba in Kosovo

[56] Zurlini 2021 writes that the team returned in 2003; in her earlier publication (Zurlini-Panza 2010/11) she said they returned already in June 2000.

contacts with Albanian communities, never hiding from either side that they also worked with the other.

> In this way, OC staff gained the credibility necessary to enable the construction of a dialogue and a future rapprochement between the parties. In fact, OC has created a long path of reconciliation for young people belonging to the ethnic communities in conflict. By telling and listening to the stories of suffering experienced during the war by the participants, they were able to re-humanize their "enemy" and question the propaganda that pushed them to fight against each other. Not only many of them apologize to each other, but they also jointly created concrete solutions to the negative consequences of the war. If, earlier, OC's volunteers made civilian escorts to guarantee the freedom of movement on the territory for Serbs and Albanians, at the end of the path the Albanian participants carried out civilian escorts for young Serbs to villages and towns with an Albanian majority and vice versa. All these activities supported the creation of a peaceful coexistence in Peja-Peć area. (Zurlini 2021)

2.3.4.3 Exit

The project was closed in 2010 when OC felt that the tensions had been reduced and they therefore were not needed anymore. They also were concerned they would create dependency if they stayed any longer.

2.3.4.4 Recruitment, training and conditions of service

OC works with a mix of (Italian-speaking) long-term volunteers (from 1 to 2 years) who are usually also the project coordinators and short-term volunteers (from 1 to 3 or up to 6 months). The volunteers are selected through trainings in Italy and abroad. People start as short-term volunteers before they can apply to become a long-term volunteer.

The volunteers receive pocket money and long-term volunteers have the right to vacations every three months.

OC runs four trainings a year for short term volunteers with 14-15 participants each, of which 10-12 actually go into the field, but it is more difficult to find long-term volunteers, they say.

The various phases of training include: the acquisition of skills in the field of nonviolence and reconciliation; the teaching of the principles that guide the nonviolent interventions of OC; knowledge of the projects in the field; simulations of situations of tension and conflict; group management in conflict situations; knowledge of the culture belonging to the society in which they intervene; the acquisition of skills related to the main activities of the projects.[57]

During and after service, the volunteers receive spiritual and other support.

2.3.4.5 Conclusions

Besides BPT, OC is probably the organization that most frequently provided protective accompaniment, though it was not their only role. Its nonpartisan approach allowed it to work with both sides in highly tense and divided communities. In the online workshop (in February 2021), the group identified central good practices including speaking Serbian and Albanian and sharing their lives with both (Serbian and Kosovo-Albanian) communities. These two elements allowed them to respond adequately when being challenged as "helping the enemy". Similar to some other projects, they found building a network with the many larger NGOs and international agencies a challenge because of lack of resources.

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[57] Sources: Website and interview

> Working in a Serbian village was a challenge for Italians since Italy had been part of NATO attack. "But in that situation, some aspects played a positive role in supporting our work: we spoke their language, we carried out unarmed civilian protection towards Serbian community during the war and, above all, from 2003 we selflessly stood by them in their daily needs and when violent episodes occurred, we never left them.
>
> We think OC's intervention in Kosovo had positive and effective impact but it was a small and isolated experience. With a massive presence of international civilians' groups - more widespread in different areas – practicing unarmed civilian protection, and if our activities had been part of an organic and broad plan, our action could have been transformative on a vast scale. (Zurlini 2021)

2.3.5 Beati I costruttori di pace

Beati I costruttori di pace ("Blessed are the peacemakers") is an Italian Catholic organization founded in 1985 by a Catholic priest named Don Albino Bizzotto, and working in many parts of the world. They often combine humanitarian aid with peace work. In late 1992 and in 1993 they organized two peace caravans to Bosnia Herzegovina that were meant to express solidarity with the victims of the war in Bosnia.[58] After these, they continued to experiment with inter-positioning:

- From late 1992 until 1995[59], they maintained a small permanent team in Sarajevo.
- During a peace demonstration somewhat later in 1993 a group of activists tried to cross symbolically a bridge between the Muslim and Serbian part of Sarajevo. The action went dramatically wrong, and one of the activists of Beati i costruttori di pace was killed by gun fire.[60]
- In September 1994, more than 100 people visited Sarajevo to express solidarity with the people who suffered from war, and to symbolically offer a form of anticipated accompaniment to the Pope (who they were demanding should also visit Sarajevo).
- In August 1995, 200 people wanted to repeat a visit but were stopped 15 km from Sarajevo.

2.3.6 Peaceworkers in Kosovo

In March 1998, the US-American nonviolent group Peaceworkers, an organization with a long history of direct nonviolent action whose head later also became a co-founder of Nonviolent Peaceforce, sent a delegation to Kosovo in solidarity with the Kosovar students of the University of Prishtina demonstrating for the reopening of the university and for political freedom. Five of the US-American activists were arrested and deported after a few days in jail. Their action falls under the category of peace-keeping insofar as it was quite explicitly based on methods of inter-positioning and international presence as understood by the initiator. Peaceworkers hoped that their international presence would help provide protection to the Albanian nonviolent protesters and help make peaceful change possible in Kosovo. The action also had an aspect of protest and advocacy since it called people to express protests to the Yugoslav and US president, and to send support messages to the students in Kosovo.

2.3.7 Organizations assuming protecting roles in certain situations

In the recent years and in the context of the discussion on human security, it has been more widely recognized that civilian protection may be a function of aid and development organizations operating in insecure environments, even though their mandate does not foresee this.[61] While the theoretical

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[58] See Schweitzer 2010.

[59] The author is not sure about the ending date of their presence.

[60] While the media immediately blamed a Serbian sniper, Beati i costruttori di pace rather assumes that the bullet that killed Gabriele Moreno Locatelli came from the Muslim side. See Cavagna 2007.

[61] This section is basically a reprint from Schweitzer 2010, with some additions made entering information from interviews and the workshop on war.

acknowledgment was mostly lacking in the earlier 1990s, in practice many organizations found themselves challenged with issues of direct protection.[62]

2.3.7.1 Overview

- International volunteers working in refugee camps in Croatia provided through their presence a certain protection, especially for Muslim refugees. The Muslim refugees were barely tolerated in Croatia, and the international presence (and the publicity due to their presence) prevented or mitigated police actions in the camps.
- Especially in the early years after the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, peace-building projects working there found themselves sometimes challenged by the possibility of interethnic violence, especially in the context of refugee and IDP return. While they usually tended to call in IFOR / SFOR for such cases - for example to escort people visiting graveyards - there were also situations where the presence of the civilian peace or development workers directly provided some protection. For example, one peace worker from the German Civil Peace Service in Banja Luka looked after an elderly widow who had returned to her pre-war apartment but was afraid of being attacked and evicted again.
- According to Lambach[63], in Kosovo after 1999, staff of the German Forum Civil Peace Service, although otherwise cooperating with KFOR, preferred to accompany Serbian returnees themselves in spite of security concerns. They feared that KFOR's presence would provoke extremist forces.
- Many local NGOs, especially the women, anti-war and human rights groups had international volunteers working with them. Sometimes these volunteers were deployed by a peace service organization, sometimes they just came on their own. As several activists from Croatia confirmed in personal talks and interviews conducted at the occasion of a War Resisters' International meeting in Ohrid in 2004, having these internationals around gave the local activists protection. They also helped with things like risk analysis so that people were better able to assess the situation.[64]
- Local activists accompanied other people when they needed to travel to remote places.[65]

2.3.7.2 Conclusions

These findings are of a very general nature – probably most NGOs working in volatile or conflict situations through their presence and activities assume a function of protection. In more recent years, this point has become much more elaborated than it had been in the 1990s, and protection of civilians has become an issue to be mainstreamed in humanitarian and peacebuilding work everywhere.[66]

2.3.8 Work in the Western Balkans Today

There are no civil society organizations today that focus on protection. Some other work that is being done is described in the chapter on communities below.

In the workshop and the interviews, it became clear that activists and ethnic minorities in the countries sometimes are threatened. This ranges from threatening phone calls or, nowadays, in the social media in Croatia, to attacks on Serbs in the street in Kosovo. Experienced activists give advice

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[62] See also: *Dubernet, Cécile (2017): The international containment of displaced persons*, Ashgate 2001, Republished by Routledge in 2017

[63] Lambach 2004:8

[64] Interview with Goran Bozicevic.

[65] Interview with Goran Bozicevic.

[66] For sources, see for example this website of UNHCR: https://www.refworld.org/civilians.html

and, it was said, would be able to offer training on security for human rights defenders if needed. The activists who have been around in the 1990s keep a memory of the options of accompaniment and how to increase safety and security.

Another issue having to do with protection is the refugees from Africa and Asia who got stuck somewhere in the Western Balkans. There are local initiatives working with them, but it seems more focused on humanitarian support, not engaging in the types of work described in the following chapter on refugees.

2.4 Chechnya

The North Caucasus, inhabited by a number of different people, among them the Chechens, has seen various conflicts in the time of the Russian and Ottoman empires. Today, Chechnya is an autonomous republic in the Russian Federation with about 1,5 million inhabitants. In the Soviet Union, it first was part of the Chechen–Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Chechens and the Ingush were accused of collaborating with them; in consequence, Stalin resettled about half a million of them in central Asia; a fate they shared with the Krim Tartars, among others. In 1957, those who had survived were allowed to return, but tensions soon led to violence between Russians and Chechens in the re-established Chechen–Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chechnya sought independence, and non-Chechens were driven from the area. In 1994, the Russian government under Yeltsin intervened militarily. The first Chechen war ended in 1996 with a peace accord. In 1999, the so-called second Chechen war (1999-2001) followed suit when Russian forces, responding to the invitation of neighboring Dagestan by Chechen-based Islamic forces, occupied Chechnya in 2000. Since then, low-level violence and terrorist attacks by Chechen radicals throughout Russia have continued.[67]

2.4.1 Chechnya Watch (1995-1996)

In 1995 and 1996,[68] a coalition of War Resisters' International, International Fellowship of Reconciliation and International Peace Bureau came together to plan a Chechnya Peace Observers project. [69] The feasibility report from 1995 recommended a presence of a few Russian-speaking foreigners but states: "It is unlikely that a team of international peace observers in Chechnya could actually deter or stop violence from occurring as such", because of the war situation. The project eventually materialized in the form of a "Chechnya Peace Watch" aiming at putting pressure on Russia to stop the war by mobilizing people outside of Russia to lobby politicians and to increase public awareness, particularly at the time of debates concerning the Russian re-entry to the Council of Europe and approval of IMF loans to Russia. There were several short-term delegations, and a project to support local Chechens monitoring the situation from neighboring Ingushetia together with the Russian organization Memorial. But besides some material aid nothing much came out of these attempts, mainly because the lines of communication between Grozny, Ingushetia, Moscow and the rest of the world were not good at the best of times. A project to support war orphaned children in Grozny, started and carried mainly by a Russian-based Quaker, founded a house in Grozny that existed for many years. Two British volunteers were kidnapped and spent over a year in

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[67] See Heller 2000

[68] This section is a slightly revised section of the NP Feasibility Study, Chapter 2.

[69] See: 'Chechnya Peace Observers. Feasibility Report. Tim Wallis, October 1995', minutes of WRI exec meetings in 1995 and 1996 reflecting the development. (Source: Christine Schweitzer); and personal communication from Tim Wallis (July 2,2001).

captivity. In Chechnya, foreigners have been - and still are - especially vulnerable because of hostage-taking by local guerrilla groups.[70]

2.4.2 Operazione Colomba in Chechnya

The above-presented OC tried in 2000-2001 to develop a project in Chechnya. They write on their webpage:

> Despite the considerable bureaucratic difficulties and risks, we managed to go to Ingushetia, a Republic bordering Chechnya, where most of the refugees (180,000) have poured into the camps and encampments. We also entered directly in Chechnya (Grozny and neighboring refugee camps) to check the desperate living conditions of the survivors: people had been abandoned at the mercy of violence without any kind of food and sanitation assistance. Due to the excessive risk situation for Westerners, we were unable to maintain a continuous presence for longer.[71]

2.4.3 Conclusions

It is difficult to assess the effectivity of these projects due to lack of written documentation. It is likely that work on the ground in Chechnya suffers from the same problem as the work described below for Turkey – lack of tolerance by the government, and problems to establish links and trust to all sides of the conflict.

2.5 NP in the South Caucasus

Nonviolent Peaceforce refers to this project as its "South Caucasus project" although in fact it only dealt – perhaps with the exception of an exploration to Armenia and Azerbaijan – with Georgia and the two separatist territories that had belonged to Georgia but declared their intention to secede, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In 1991 the former Soviet republic of Georgia became independent after the breakdown of the Soviet empire. One year later Abkhazia, a region that Georgia considers to be part of its territory, announced their intention to leave Georgia. A civil war ensued that led to the flight of most ethnic Georgians from the region. In 1994 the war was ended with a cease-fire agreement, and Russian peacekeepers were deployed to the region. A similar conflict exists between Georgia and South Ossetia. South Ossetia declared even before the independence of Georgia that it did not want to be part of Georgia. After a build-up of tensions between Georgia and Russia, Georgia at the beginning of August 2008 attacked South Ossetia. Russia responded with air strikes and troops that also invaded Georgia proper. The European Union mediated a Six-Point-Agreement which ended the short August 2008 war.

2.5.1 Goals and Objectives

The initial objectives were:
  (1) The consolidation of a region-wide constituency, capacity and knowledge base which will facilitate planning and acceptance of unarmed civilian peacekeeping support to support human security and conflict prevention in South Caucasus.

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[70] For example, the well-known humanitarian activist Fred Cuny and two of his Russian colleagues as well as an interpreter were disappeared and probably murdered in Chechnya in 1995. See
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cuny/bio/hero.html

[71] http://www.operazionecolomba.it/chi/storia-di-operazione-colomba.html

(2) The increase of safe options of communities affected by the boundary lines between Georgian TAT and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in addressing human security issues, for cross-boundary movements and for contributing to incident prevention mechanisms.

(3) The increase of conflict-affected communities' capacities to address human security and conflict prevention issues in a more sustainable way, as well as to get their contribution better taken into account in the higher levels of conflict transformation and resolution processes.[72]

These objectives were revised in 2013 to:

(1) Support local organizations in the creation of sustainable community-based protection mechanisms (Community Peace Initiative Teams-CPIT) to identify and cooperatively respond to community protection needs of the population in border areas of the Administrative Boundary Line between Georgia TAT and South Ossetia.

(2) Enhance the capacity of local partners in establishing local human rights monitoring, reporting, and verification and response structures in Abkhazia.

(3) Consolidate dialogue and network structures amongst civil society partners working on protection issues in the South Caucasus.[73]

2.5.2 Principles

The principles of NP as they are described on the webpage and have been listed in earlier reports of the Good Practice Workshops, are nonviolence, non-partisanship, primacy of local actors, and civilian-to-civilian action[74].

For this project, it seems that the principle of nonpartisanship was especially essential. The evaluation remarks that local authorities understood NP's nonpartisan character and therefore allowed them access to South Ossetia.

2.5.3 Field Work and Exit

NP started exploring the possibility of a project in the South Caucasus in 2010. The activities started in the second half of 2011, with five international and seven local staff beginning work in October 2011. The first step was a mapping of communities along the Georgian side of the Administrative Border Line (ABL) between Georgia and South Ossetia. NP had several local partners and worked with UN Women on at least one training project.

In May 2012 a new strategy was developed around the concept of the CPIT and the Advisory Council was set up. The main focus seems to have been a youth dialogue project as well as providing training to a cross section of community leaders, in clusters of rural, isolated villages whose land abuts or is on both sides of the ABL border between Georgia and South Ossetia. The training focused on both avoiding dangers and on effective responses when people were apprehended for being on the wrong side of the ABL and detained in South Ossetia. [75]

In order to work on both sides of the ABL between Georgia and South Ossetia, NP accessed people living in South Ossetia from the Russian side. There has been at least one training on UCP/A with a youth group from South Ossetia; the contact to them was established through a Georgian partner organization. Just before that, a similar training had taken place with Georgian youth, and the trainer took letters these youth wrote to their counterparts in South Ossetia with her to give to the South Ossetian youth. After that, the two youth groups met together for a new training in a third country

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[72] Source: the evaluation by Julian & Furnari 2013, p 23

[73] Ibid., pp. 24

[74] https://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/about/our-mission

[75] https://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/blog/south-caucasus-news/468-south-caucasus

(Turkey). The training was very successful and ended with the youth both having overcome prejudices about each other and hoping to help with making people in their communities safer. [76]

In another internal source[77] it is mentioned that in 2014 (?) NP was in the process of opening a human rights program in Abkhazia in partnership with a local organization. However, this seems to have never been implemented.

A challenge seems to have been gender roles. "Protection" was seen by the people NP trained as a male role, and at least in the youth training, the female participants found it difficult to envision a role as protector in their communities. Also, the NP team was predominantly male, with women mostly as local support staff which may have strengthened the perceived traditional role division. Black team members were a novelty for many of the rural people NP worked with but seem to have caused rather curiosity than rejection.

The South Caucasus project was closed soon after the evaluation which was conducted in 2013. A funding application for 2015 obviously failed.[78] It seems that lack of funding was the main reason for the closure, while there would have been chances to expand and strengthen the work on the ground.

2.5.4 Conclusions

According to the evaluation conducted in 2013 by Rachel Julian and Ellen Furnari, the visits and the mapping of the villages led to building a strong network of supportive organizations. The mapping of the villages gave NP a depth of understanding of the conflict and enabled them to select participants for the trainings who were committed and key community members. Some of those who participated in the Community Peace Initiative Teams trainings were afterwards working to influence new communities and networks. Setting up the field office close to the ABL made a difference to the feeling of safety of some local people and the level of confidence local people had to try to change the situation. And last not least, as a good practice it was noted in the evaluation it was helpful to start a new project with staff that had worked in other NP projects, a condition which was not met in the South Caucasus. Unlike the situation in some other countries NP has worked in, the political context made it impossible to address directly decision-makers or higher commanders on either side of the conflict. The work was much lower-key and focused on building contacts at the grassroots.

2.6 Summary on Work in the Context of War

This chapter looked at the activities of various projects and organizations during the civil war in Northern Ireland from the 1960s to the 1990s, and during the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In addition, there have been two attempts at UCP/A-related work in and around Chechnya – neither of which was able to really build up continuous work – and by Nonviolent Peaceforce in the South Caucasus in a post-war situation characterized by two frozen conflicts between Georgia and the two entities that have de facto split from Georgia.

Although the situation in Northern Ireland was one of civil war, and Northern Ireland therefore placed in this chapter (and in the workshop on "war"), the activities described there have probably more in common with what is described in chapter 5 on monitoring police than with the much wider approaches in the other contexts. Aside from some cross-community dialogue and setting up alert systems, most of the work took place around demonstrations, the so-called parades. Some civil society organizations just monitored them and wrote reports, others combined monitoring with direct intervention to prevent violence, and a third type spoke of witnessing events from a solidarity

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[76] Interview with R. Kabaki.

[77] A funding application to zivik for the year 2015.

[78] Personal knowledge of the rapporteur, there is no information available on the decision to close the project and how the exit was implemented.

/ partisan stance (usually Catholic). The monitoring definitely had some impact, judging from the reports, in regard to violence prevention although not always and everywhere.

In the other places, the activities described were multifold, and ranged from simply 'being with people' to physical reconstruction, social work, monitoring, reporting, influencing decision-makers, mediation, escorting (accompanying) and interpositioning.

There was also protection by local activists for the internationals in many cases. This was mentioned for BPT, Pakrac and the work of internationals in refugee camps. It is the same mutual relationship that has been observed in earlier workshops of the NP Good Practices series.

Another element that is worth noticing is that – with the exception of Northern Ireland – most projects had a very flexible mandate allowing them to engage in many different types of activities. Some engaged in physical reconstruction, many undertook social or educational activities with youth and other groups and many promoted dialogues through a variety of tools.

From the reports analyzed and the discussions in the workshops, the following good practices and challenges have been identified.

2.6.1 Good practices

For Northern Ireland, good practices found in the literature, interviews and workshop include:
- Combining monitoring and mediation
- Patience.
- Engage in early and sustained intervention.[79]
- Field unarmed peace patrols in the evenings in order to diffuse tense situations.
- Wear some kind of identification or physically keeping distance to make the nonpartisan role clear, being visible as a monitor and known to the actors on the ground.[80]
- Building relationships so as to be known and respected as a representative of an organization or because of the personal relationship with the parties to the dispute.[81]
- Use male role models.[82]
- Nonpartisanship as a principle.
- Monitoring requires police to know you. This leads to a relationship that allows monitors to move between the lines which gives both protection and leverage.
- Interpositioning is effective in some concrete situations.
- Cooperation with police and army to deescalate violence can be effective.
- Communities keeping open lines of communication (e.g. phone networks) across the interface/divide and to respond to rumors, the gathering of crowds and minor acts of violence.
- Combine monitoring of demonstrations with mediation on the ground.[83]
- Good reporting on what was observed and making these reports available for advocacy work regarding behavior of security forces for future events or a police reform or for complaints before international tribunals / courts, UN Bodies etc.

For the former Yugoslavia, the following good practices were mentioned either in the interviews, the literature or in the workshop:
- Send international volunteers to projects run by local NGOs.
- Partner with other organizations that have skills the UCP/A organization itself lack.

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[79] These three were listed in the Powerpoint presentation by Rob Fairmichael at the workshop.

[80] Workshop discussion

[81] Bryan & Jarman 1999:40-41

[82] Workshop discussion

[83] Northern Ireland

- A flexible mandate allows an organization to respond to different requests by the local partners.
- Nurture personal relationships.
- Horizontal decision-making within the projects is valued.
- Engage in physical work (reconstruction for example) because it builds unity and solidarity.
- Living and being together with local people is important.
- Be transparent about equiproximity to all sides.
- Create meeting points for people from all sides – this could also be a volunteer camp.
- Cooperate with activists "from the other side" of the conflict.
- Host dialogues between locals and international police.
- Build nonviolent life skills.
- Provide escorts to people at risk to move from one community to the next, or activists visiting fellow activists across the political divide.
- Monitoring and reporting are critical practices.
- Help communities to "re-humanize" the "enemy".
- Speak to the conflict sides confidentially in order to influence their behavior.
- Monitors need to check rumors.
- Be there just to listen to people affected by violence and war.
- Organize exchange and learning from other conflict places (for example Northern Ireland).
- It is good when international donors fund locally-run peace teams.

For South Caucasus, the following good practices can be extracted from the evaluation:
- Choose the right participants for trainings –people who are committed and have a solid base in their local community.
- Choose a strategic place for the field office.
- Use project staff for a new project that has experience in earlier projects elsewhere.[84]
- Do trainings with groups on both sides of the boundary lines first separately, and then bring them together to a third neutral place.

2.6.2 Challenges

For Northern Ireland, a number of challenges were identified including:
- There was little to achieve if there was no willingness of the parties to talk.
- Incompatible expectations and preconditions by the different actors created difficulties.
- Many events were outside the realm of where they could be influenced.
- A "professional" approach led to the suspicion that the interveners were making money through their activities.
- The lack of trust between the conflict parties created barriers.[85]
- As in other local monitoring projects elsewhere, a challenge for the monitors was to distinguish between their personal political inclinations and their role as "neutral" observers.[86]
- It was difficult to maintain cooperation with police (and/or army) when UCP/A practitioners were seen as being partisan to the protesters.
- Police may just have their orders and it is hard to influence them to disobey these orders.

For the former Yugoslavia, challenges listed were:
- Unrealistic expectations by practitioners and supporters regarding the potential impact.

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[84] Which did not happen in South Caucasus and was noted as missing.

[85] These six were listed in the Powerpoint presentation by Rob Fairmichael at the workshop

[86] Bryan & Jarman 1999:41

- Cooperation was hindered or impossible with large agencies like the UN due to different SOPs and understanding of the issues.
- Access to higher-level decision-makers was difficult or nonexistent.
- It was not possible to raise sufficient funds for longer-term projects; there was a lack of stable funding.
- It was hard to find enough volunteers willing to commit for a longer period (more than 2-3 months).
- Acceptance of non-white team members by the local residents was somewhat limited.

For the South Caucasus, the interview and the evaluation quoted above list the following challenges:
- There was little if any maintenance of contacts between participants in the projects without NP continuing to facilitate such contacts.
- NP was unable to build sufficient national and international links which would enable NP to ensure the security threats are addressed at a political level.
- Work in the separatist entities was very difficult and, it seems, limited to some visits.
- Access to and building relationship with Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia authorities and organizations was very limited.
- Gender: Protection was seen as a male prerogative.
- The impact was limited to a small number of people (according to the evaluation)
- Ethnic and 'racial' issues in the team needed to be addressed and given more attention.
- Language skills of international staff: It was very hard to find Russian-speaking staff; no international staff spoke Georgian. And Russian speaking staff was suspect in Georgia.

2.6.3 Suggestions collected

- Having many more volunteers/ staff doing this kind of work might create real impact.
- The international community often uses sticks when carrots would have been better. It would be important to try to explain that.

2.6.4 Conclusions

The cases of UCP/A in or after armed conflict vary in regard to the intensity of the violence and the actors. In some cases, conflict parties that were not on the ground played an important role in the unfolding of the conflict. The organizations discussed here were not able to influence these parties, at least not directly.

Most organizations shared the challenge that they were small and worked only in a few places or with few people. None of the projects was able to prevent or stop the violence in general although there have been many incidents that were defused and people protected from violence.

One function of the work in the war areas that was mentioned more than once was the psychological effect on those the UCP/A groups worked with: giving hope, helping people to think about the future, giving people a different perspective or simply 'give them something to do' was mentioned several times.

Other factors depended on the situation. For example, in some cases being visible (as a monitor or an international) was useful, in others it could help not to be visible (for example the accompaniment of OC in Kosovo; BPT had the same experience in some cases).

Regarding principles, the principles of nonviolence and of nonpartisanship stood out from the examples. Both were almost universally considered to have been essential for the success of the projects.

3. Working For the Rights and Security of Refugees

3.1 Against Racist Mob Violence in the 1990s

3.1.1 In Germany

After the break-down of the Warsaw Pact in 1989 and German reunification in 1990, both parts of Germany experienced a hitherto unknown outbreak of violence, which was directed primarily against asylum seekers and migrant workers. Of course, both in GDR and FRG there had been hostility against People of Color (PoC) and refugees before, but between 1991 and 1993 a political debate on restricting the asylum laws was accompanied by several larger-scale pogroms and murder attacks that cost the lives of several people. The violence began with a riot in Hoyerswerda (Saxonia, 1991) where a mob of up to 500 people assembled in front of a refugee shelter and a home for foreign contract workers. Under the cheers of neighbors young Neo-Nazis attacked the houses with stones and Molotov cocktails. The police arrived two hours after this started. One year later, something similar only with even more attackers and cheering by-standers (media counted up to 3,000) happened in Rostock-Lichtenhagen (Mecklenburg, 1992). Over four days, the office responsible for registering asylum-seekers and a home for contract workers were attacked and the home set on fire. The police withdrew and only the courageous self-defense of the inhabitants prevented casualties. These two pogroms were followed by assassination attempts in Mölln (Schleswig-Holstein, 1992) where two houses of people with Turkish background were set on fire, two children and a woman died and nine were very seriously wounded, and a similar arson attack in Solingen (North Rhine Westphalia, 1993) that killed five people. There were also some more attacks but these four towns stood and still stand in Germany for racist violence against foreigners and PoC. After 1993, pogroms like that stopped, but the right-wing scene reorganized. Some took to terrorism like the NSU ("National Socialist Underground") that committed, undetected and unsuspected by the authorities, murders of nine refugees and one police officer, 43 attempted murders, three bomb attacks (Nuremberg 1999, Cologne 2001 and 2004) and 15 robberies between 2000 and 2007.[87]

The spate of violence at the beginning of the 1990s caused many citizens, ashamed of the pictures of fellow-citizens cheering on arsonists, to seek ways to respond. Their goal: to intervene when shelters of asylum seekers or private homes of refugees or PoC were threatened. Groups that initiated such organizing were sometimes already existing initiatives of the peace and nonviolence movement, church groups and of course groups that worked against racism and for the support of asylum seekers. To the knowledge of the rapporteur, nobody has yet studied systematically or made a survey of all these initiatives, but there are many newsletter articles of such initiatives showing that the response was rather wide-spread.

A training handbook written in that time with the title "Nonviolent Neighborhood Help" (Beck, Müller and Painke 1994) gives an insight into the work of such initiatives, including examples from several cities. It refers to one type of the Neighborhood Watch approach. This is a form of self-organizing of neighbors created in the U.S. and the United Kingdom in the 1960's to prevent crime or to intervene if a crime happens. One of its sources were Quakers and the nonviolence trainer George Lakey in Pennsylvania. One of the German trainers, Uwe Painke, had visited the Quaker house and wrote his Ph.D. about the Neighborhood Safety concept and practice there.

What the handbook recommends and what was done by the initiatives was the following: People who took the initiative called neighbors together for a first meeting to discuss what to do. The handbook recommends door-to-door visits. Leaflets were handed out before the visits, to prepare people. Then those who were perceived as being threatened were contacted, asked what they

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[87] Their crimes were eventually discovered and the one surviving member of the group (the other two committed suicide) arrested in 2011. See ,Eine Chronologie zu den Verbrechen der NSU,'
https://www.welt.de/print/welt_kompakt/print_politik/article179197972/Eine-Chronologie-zu-den-Verbrechen-des-NSU.html

experienced and what form of support (if any) they wished. Typical elements of the protection where phone chains of neighbors who would call each other in case of an emergency, vigils or patrols in front of asylum shelters (especially on Saturday nights since most attacks happened that night), arrangement of acoustic signals like in the neighborhood watch systems (sirens, whistles etc.), and making contact with the police to ensure their cooperation. Some initiatives also tried to contact people who might become perpetrators, especially youth. Some initiatives approached nonviolence trainers to prepare for their activities, comparable to today's bystander trainings[88]. Such trainings usually lasted between one day and a week-end.

Many of these initiatives came together in 1992 to found an umbrella organization, the "Aktion Courage" (Action Courage) which still exists today and now focuses on work against racism in schools.

Similar activities may also have taken place in other countries but the rapporteur found no documentation about that.

When in 2015, a large number of refugees started to come to Europe, a first wave of sympathy and efforts to help the newly arrived in some countries was met with growing hostility and gains at national and regional elections by right-wing parties. Racist and anti-Semitic incidents, as well as threats against politicians and other people in the public sphere are on the rise again. People who support refugees may engage in spontaneous individual accompaniment, but so far there have been to the knowledge of the author no attempts to repeat the form of organizing neighborhoods as it was done in the early 1990s.

3.1.2 In France: Refugees and civil disobedience[89]

In France during the 1990s, various forms of mobilization developed in favor of refugees. Most of them were reactions to governmental measures seeking to restrict the rights of non-EU refugees. In the context of the rise of the political extreme right and the implementation of the Schengen Agreements, migrants, their children and especially refugees lost a whole range of rights. Asylum seekers were forbidden to work, criminalized by the justice system, more easily detained, expelled, and targeted for hate speeches.[90] In reaction, some undocumented refugees (many of whom had lived and worked for years in France) occupied churches. Some even launched hunger strikes to obtain papers. In 1997, about 100,000 persons demonstrated in Paris against a law compelling citizen to denounce undocumented refugees to the authorities.[91] Various collective actions against expulsions were set up, notably in the Paris Region and invited citizens to actively disobey. This entailed activists connecting to learn about an expulsion, going to the airport and informing other plane passengers of the presence of an expelled person, encouraging them to protest in the plane (refuse to sit down), thus blocking the take-off. Initially this often led to the expelled person being taken off the plane on the orders of the commander.

In terms of good practices related (if only from afar) to UCP, these initiatives were nonviolent, some with roots in anarchism (which has strong roots in France). This legacy is explained by the fact that the French state is particularly centralized and dominant in the life of its citizens, and much protest traditionally focuses on reacting to governmental policies, a feature that is still part of French political culture. Besides these forms of political contestations reclaimed space as part of their strategies. The occupation of public space (demonstrations, marches), of symbolic spaces (occupation of churches), of strategic locations (airport and airplanes) intended to make visible those persons so often invisible (in daily life and because of detention).

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[88] In German, the term "Zivilcourage trainings" is being used. "Zivilcourage" is hard to translate, it means courage normal citizens show when faced with challenges that may entail some violence, at least verbal violence.

[89] Written by Cécile Dubernet

[90] « 1972 – 2002 Les grandes étapes… », *Plein droit*, vol. 53-54, no. 2-3, 2002, pp. 27-36

[91] *Ibid.*

To our knowledge these movements did not connect to other migrant and refugee protection initiatives in Europe. These movements were not understood as UCP, or framed with the vocabulary of protection. They were inscribed more largely in movements of social protest which were called "les mouvements des 'sans'" 'the people without': without job, without accommodation, without papers.[92] Yet they were about protecting fellow human being seemingly caught in contexts that were structurally violent and criminalizing. There was little training but some spreading of information and guidelines for activists. The collective anti-expulsions for instance produced guidelines in 2000 to structure the ways in which activists could organize resistance to expulsion at airports.[93]

The French government knows how to negotiate, play on time, divert, or repress such initiatives. For instance, it rapidly took strong measures to criminalize the passengers in planes and airports who used their presence to try and prevent expulsions. In 1998, some protesting passengers were heavily condemned, including to jail terms, for their act of protest. The migrant/refugee movements were not clearly structured or clearly led and seem to have dissolved in time. The Collective anti-expulsion Paris Ile de France dissolved in 2005. Overall, despite some regularization programs set up in the late 1990s, the situation remained dire. A migrant march from Marseille to Paris was initiated in 2002 to prevent the issue from being forgotten.

Spontaneous support refugees and civil disobedience regularly resurfaces in France as civil disobedience is part of a culture of political resistance.[94] However, few organizations have been set up to help and structure, connect, finance, expand such initiative/impetus, as well as to train activists in non-violence. Hence effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability remain problematic issues. And, with the numerous provocations of state agents, protest movements often turn violent.

3.1.3 Conclusions

The protection of asylum seekers and refugees that was organized at the beginning of the 1990s in Germany and France, although under politically quite different parameters, definitely has to be rated as a case of spontaneous UCP/A. In Germany, the activists combined protective presence with building contacts to the police so that they would intervene if needed, and in some cases also with people who were potential perpetrators. This kind of work was not intended to be long-term; initiatives either turned to other work or probably dissolved in some cases. However, the memory of these efforts is still there, and probably could be revived if some activists took the initiative. In France, the means of protection were more based in social protests.

One very experienced trainer who did trainings in the 1990s for CSOs in the field of responding to racist mob violence said that he was not aware of any work of this type nowadays, in UK nor in Germany. In Germany, since 2015 people who supported refugees have been threatened and a few even murdered, but they usually go to the police and ask for protection from them. One person, a middle-level politician, made headlines because he applied for permission to arm himself which was denied.[95]

A follow-up to this kind of trainings however has been a project in Germany called LOVE Storm, that gives training to people to defend themselves and others against hatred in the internet.[96]

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[92] Mouchard, Daniel (2002) « Les mobilisations des « sans » dans la France contemporaine : l'émergence d'un radicalisme auto-limité » ? ,Revue Française de Science Politique » 2002/4 Vol. 52, 425-447. URL : https://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-de-science-politique-2002-4-page-425.htm

[93] The guidelines can still be found online on an archive page with a warning that by 2005, they were no longer up-to-date. URL/ http://pajol.eu.org/rubrique6.html#xd_co_f=YjZmNzY3ZWUtZTllOS00MjdkLTg0MWEtOTc2MzJhMDRjMWEw~

[94] Lendaro, Annalisa. « Désobéir en faveur des migrants. Répertoires d'action à la frontière franco-italienne », *Journal des anthropologues*, vol. 152-153, no. 1-2, 2018, pp. 171-192.

[95] Interview with Detlef Beck.

[96] www.love-storm.de , a project of the Federation for Social Defence.

3.2 Current Initiatives of the 2020s

For the workshop on UCP/A in Europe, several activists from French organizations that work with and for refugees were interviewed and invited to the workshop. That does not mean that there are not many organizations in other countries supporting refugees, but with the exception of Christian Peacemaker Teams in Greece and the fledgling project of the BSV in Germany we were not able to identify organizations or groups that currently engage in monitoring or protective accompaniment. There are thousands of groups working with refugees, engaging in activities ranging from language classes to accompaniment to authorities, help with visa applications, finding a job etc. There were certainly groups that accompanied them with the intention to provide some protection in 2015 and perhaps 2016 when the large numbers of refugees started to come to Europe, but people we contacted all told us that this kind of activity had stopped in the meantime.

A special case which we considered were the different boats run by NGOs[97] in the Mediterranean Sea to save refugees seeking to cross the Sea in small boats. Together, they have been saving the lives of thousands of refugees by picking them up and transporting them to Italy, Malta or Spain in spite of furious resistance by these countries that forced the boats to often stay for many days in the open sea, confiscated the boats or persecuted the captains and the NGOs running them. However, we considered them too special a case to include them.[98]

Another example we did not look at more closely but considered interesting was work with former refugees who were forcibly returned back home to their country of origin. We heard of an initiative in Sierra Leone that helped to set up a self-aid network of such refugees, helping them in the difficult process of reintegrating into their country after the "shame" of not having made it in Europe.

3.2.1 In France

Several authorities and security forces are involved in dealing with refugees. There are the police under command from the local administration (prefecture-town hall), and the federal gendarmerie which is part of the military. The policies regarding how to deal with refugees are made by the Ministry of Interior. The ministry acts locally via its 'Prefets' the departmental representant of the central government. Yet, the local mayors and their attitude towards the refugee issues play an important role in how refugees are treated in a particular place. They are often the key players in the decision on whether refugees can stay in a place or not.

3.2.1.1 Human Rights Observers in Calais and Grande-Synthe

Human Rights Observers (HRO)[99] is a project of the "Auberge des Migrants" ("Shelter of Migrants"). HRO is financed half by Auberge des Migrants and half by "Help Refugees". It was founded in 2017, after the dismantling of a refugee settlement called the "Jungle" in Calais. They mostly work in Calais and Grande-Synthe (which is close by), and also have people at the French-Italian border. In Calais and Grande-Synthe there are large refugee settlements or camps that have not been legalized by the French state, and therefore are constantly harassed and often dissolved by the security forces. At the border, the issue is people who have been forcibly sent back to Italy, based on the assumption that this is where they came from.

HRO describe themselves as an organization for observation, data collection and analysis of the state of human rights of exiled people in Calais and Dunkirk.

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[97] Sea Watch (https://sea-watch.org/), Sea Eye (https://sea-eye.org/), Mediterranea Saving Humans APS (https://mediterraneanrescue.org/en/), Proactiva Open Arms (https://www.openarms.es/es) and some that stopped in the meanwhile, like a shop by Médecins sans frontiére and the German „Jugend rettet".

[98] See Carola Rackete with Anne Weiss (2019): *Handeln statt Hoffen: Aufruf an die letzte Generation.* Droemer Knaur, München and the websites of the various organizations, for example sea-watch.org. See also https://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/hilfe-weltweit/fluechtlingsschutz/seenotrettung

[99] The name is English in original, it is not a translation from French.

> The HRO team is inter-associative, and was created at the request of certain exile communities in Calais who wanted volunteers to be present in the field at night and during expulsions because of the many reports of violence. Its functioning is similar to the cop watching method: it consists in being present as much as possible during police controls and expulsions and in documenting police operations.
>
> Every day, HRO teams are on the ground to document and monitor all human rights violations against these populations. Today, we are also developing a communication and advocacy project through social networks, reports, NGO cooperation, court cases and interaction with public authorities.[100]

The organization was initiated by people from UK and continues to maintain close links to the other side of the Channel. There are three coordinators and about five volunteers, many of them from UK, plus some people who are sent by other organizations. Communication takes place in English and French.

HRO has developed a method of low-key reaching out to refugees in the camp[101]: They just visit, walk around, present themselves to them, distribute leaflets with their phone number and tell people to call them in an emergency. Through such visits, they seek to build trust with the refugees which is a challenge, also because the turn-over in the illegal camps is very high and people are constantly on the move.

There are evictions or other police actions against refugees in Calais almost every night. The HRO has an alert system and tries to send 2-3 volunteers by car to the camp before the police arrive, in order to be able to talk to the police before their action starts. When the police arrive, they usually create a perimeter around the camp. The observers are not allowed inside the perimeter, and the police seek to prevent the observers from watching what is happening. The monitors take notes and if possible, film the police although the police always forbid that. They also try to talk to the police but the police usually refuse to respond, and there seem to be different opinions within the organization whether to talk to the police at all. The concern is that the refugees might suspect that they take the side of the police.

The police react to observers who are not French with disregard and tell them they should look after the human rights in their own country. The HRO is clear that their presence is not able to protect the refugees although at the outset of the activities this may have been the idea. In relationship to the police, they try to maintain a neutral role.

In one case, the HRO received information about an evacuation early enough to alert the refugees so that they could leave before the police arrived.

They share the observations they make with the administration and with other NGOs, for example Amnesty International, the Fondation Abbé Pierre or Romeurope.

Often, they just serve as transmitters of the voices of the refugees, for example submitting letters and statements they wrote to the French authorities or media. In one case, that led to an investigation of police behavior.

They have also tried in some cases to open a dialogue with the local French population which sometimes has been very aggressive towards the refugees.

Currently the HRO volunteers do not wear identifiable vests although the organization has them and earlier used them. The concern is not to be confused with civil servants from the municipality, it seems. They also have and use badges for identification. The teams are often mixed gender, and it is considered important to have at least one male volunteer present in particular for communication with the refugees who are very often young men.

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[100] http://www.laubergedesmigrants.fr/fr/lassociation/collectif-hro/hro-qui-sommes-nous/

[101] The French term they use is to "maraude", walking around. It is nowadays mostly used by homeless people to describe their movements.

Aside from the monitoring, the HRO also sometimes does accompaniment, for example when refugees want to file a complaint with the authorities, or to return to the camp for their property (which often has been confiscated or destroyed however).

The volunteers have to complete four training units before they start working:

- A general "field" training, given by an association of the network coordinated by people with experience in humanitarian field work.
- A general "safe guarding" training, given by an association of the network.
- HRO field training, given by the HRO coordination team to explain the work of HRO, the process of evictions and what is expected of observers.
- A legal training, "rights in front of the police", given by the HRO team's lawyer, to all volunteers who request it, not only to HRO teams.[102]

Regarding positive impact, the HRO members interviewed thought that they might have had some influence on the police procedures in general, and, for example, the need for translators for the refugees. They have not observed an obvious impact on the situation during the evacuations, however.

3.4.1.2 La Cimade

The Cimade is an old organization founded in the 1930's by people from the Protestant churches. Today, its network comprises 90 local groups all over France. The work is financed by some associations.

They describe their objectives as follows:

> Cimade shows active solidarity with oppressed and exploited people. It defends the dignity and the rights of refugees, whatever their origins, their political opinions or their convictions. It fights against all forms of discrimination and, in particular, against xenophobia and racism.[103]

They do not use the term "protection" to describe their work. They see protection as a task of the State; their role is to encourage the State to perform its duty vis-à-vis the refugees. La Cimade supports local organizations in their work by providing legal advice and networking with other organizations. They also advise refugees in the various shelters on their rights, and they observe evictions together with other local organizations. In their monitoring, they mostly work with volunteers who are organized in teams of two people. The observers write reports and communicate via WhatsApp. They do not take pictures or film police actions because they feel that this may escalate a situation. They also do not do "cop watching" but explain their presence as making sure that the correct procedures are observed. They do not wear a uniform but have an inter-organizational letter explaining that they have informed the local authorities about their work which they show the police.

When people are expelled to the other side of the border (Italy, Spain), they try to contact the refugees and interview them.

La Cimade's approach to support other local associations also means that they have not formulated abstract principles but believe in the independence of each of the partner organizations.

They think that their presence may have a dissuasive influence on the police but have never analyzed this question. A big success was that they managed to facilitate the return of minors who were illegally deported to Italy for a hearing in a French court.

Sexism and racisms are two factors they observe in the police but also find from time to time in the associations they work with.

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[102] Source: interview.

[103] https://www.lacimade.org/nous-connaitre/organization/

3.2.2 Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) in Greece

Christian Peacemaker Teams[104] is an international organization that was founded in the mid-1980s by members of historic peace churches (Church of the Brethren, Mennonite, and Friends/Quakers) in the U.S. They define their mission as "building partnerships to transform violence and oppression":

> CPT places teams at the invitation of local peacemaking communities that are confronting situations of lethal conflict. These teams support and amplify the voices of local peacemakers who risk injury and death by waging nonviolent direct action to confront systems of violence and oppression.

CPT work includes:

- Accompanying our partners as they work nonviolently to defend their rights and communities.
- Advocacy: amplifying the stories and voices of those experiencing violent oppression.
- Human rights observation and reporting.
- Solidarity networking: partnering with individuals and organizations to work toward change.

> CPT understands violence to be rooted in systemic structures of oppression. We are committed to undoing oppressions, starting within our own lives and in the practices of our organization.[105]

Currently they have volunteers from many countries, including members of other religions, and work in several countries and regions – the Middle East (Palestine and Iraqi Kurdistan), Colombia, Turtle Island (N. America) and Greece.

"Aegean Migrant Solidarity" is the title of the project they are running in Mytilene on the Greek island Lesvos since 2014.

CPT speaks of "accompaniment" of people, and does not use the term "protection".

They work together with a local partner named "Lesvos Solidarity" which developed out of a loose network.[106] The initial project ran for three months in 2014 and 2015. Since 2016 the project has been expanded, and now runs year-round under the auspices of CPT Europe. They began their work in one camp before the large numbers of refugees started to arrive in 2015. They accompanied refugees who had, supported by the Greek solidarity group, taken over a former children's summer camp area – a settlement which was considered illegal by the Greek authorities and threatened constantly with evacuation. CPT mounted a presence in the camp. In early 2021, the camp was closed by the authorities.

Another activity of CPT is to accompany people who have been arrested and accused of smuggling people to Europe. They maintain contact with them in jail and often accompany them to court.

One year, there were 35 refugees randomly arrested because they had peacefully protested against a crackdown of the Greek government at Moria. CPT cooperated with other groups on that, and most who had been arrested were freed. After a fire in Moria in 2020 that destroyed the camp, they supported the six minors who are accused of having set fire to the camp.

Other activities include practical help like distributing water, accompanying people who go to the hospital, police stations, helping people who get lost, or helping a group (for example a LGBTQI-group) to write a statement in English. There were also monitoring of demonstrations and providing trainings in

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[104] www.cpt.org

[105] https://www.cpt.org/about

[106] https://lesvossolidarity.org/en/

Alternatives to Violence [107], intentionally mixing different groups of refugees (African and Middle East) as well as including Greeks.

A central matter of concern for them is to make sure that the voices of the refugees are being heard, be it by authorities or by the multitude of other international NGOs. Some of these INGOs are experienced as acting in a rather patronizing way from time to time.

One matter of concern is the relationship between the locals and the refugees. There has been solidarity from the side of the locals, but also aggression and protests by right-wing groups. CPT tries to differentiate here and criticizes other international groups who tend to see the locals across the board as hostile. They point out that it is also a policy of the Greek government which fears solidarity between its citizens and the refugees, to divide both groups. They found, for example, solidarity from the side of local businessmen who employed refugees and then helped them to get papers. One of them, a Greek baker, even went on hunger strike in protest when the authorities refused to legalize his employees. During Covid-19, there were also hotels that hosted refugees and restaurants that fed them.

CPT thinks that they have a certain positive impact on the situation because they have been on the island for such a long time. Other groups[108] have volunteers who come and go, they stay. CPT sometimes also intervenes with these groups, especially if they tend to speak for the refugees, and seeks to make sure that the refugees have a voice themselves. Another asset of being there for a long time is the institutional memory that CPT keeps. On one occasion they were able to use their documentation in a trial proving that an accusation against some people about something that had happened two years ago was false. In the workshop it was emphasized that short-term projects in general do not work.

CPT's recruitment takes place in several steps which has been described in earlier workshops of the UCP/A Good Practice series. On Lesvos they work with a mixture of local and international staff. Most internationals have been Europeans, but they have also had a few people from other continents. In 2020, CPT had three staff and an intern on Lesvos – the project coordinator was not on the island but is keeping contact with them. Team members are also expected to do some outreach work after their return home, speaking about their experiences so as to educate people about the situation.

The team members do not wear uniforms, but through their constant presence are known to the authorities. They also speak with the police when monitoring demonstrations or other situations where police are present but do not seek them out because of their principle not to have contact with armed actors, considering the police to be one of them.

The principles of CPT have been described in earlier workshops as well. In short: CPT sees itself as partisan and in solidarity with those who are oppressed. Nonviolence is essential for them, as is following the lead of the refugees rather than speaking for them.

3.2.3 Adaptation of NP trainings by Federation for Social Defence in Germany

The German "Federation for Social Defense" (BSV) has among its board and staff three people who have worked for Nonviolent Peaceforce, served on its board or accompanied NP's work since its founding in 2001. The BSV was also one of the German organizations involved in trainings for civil society groups that wanted to protect refugee homes in the early 1990s (see above). Fed from both sources, the BSV conceptualized a training concept for refugees adapting NP's community security trainings to the situation of refugees in Germany. The content of the workshops was meant to guide the participants with an analysis of dangerous situations and threats and to develop specific non-violent options for action on site for the given situations. Together with those affected, as well as

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[107] This is a training concept developed by Quakers originally for prison inmates but since then also used in other contexts. Today, there is a world-wide community of practitioners of AVP trainings.

[108] Before Covid, there were 60-80 NGOs on Lesvos seeking to support the refugees.

voluntary and full-time supporters, the various potential dangers and threats were to be analyzed and non-violent options for action are developed.

The goal of the work of BSV is to use the NP approach to create a space for refugees as well as other people confronted with violence in the structures of the German society. The idea is that people who experience violence, racism, sexism etc., share experiences and then together discuss how to deal with that kind of violence. In societies dominated by Whites, PoC experience racism all the time. This may occasionally lead to physical violence instigated by those perpetrating the racism, or by those experiencing it when they have not developed creative and nonviolent responses.

An initial pilot in a refugee shelter for women in 2019 provided a training for women. After having won the support and approval of the administration of the shelter and the social workers of the town, the BSV applied for and received funds for a part-time staff and project funding for three years. The project "Strong against Discrimination and Violence" started in March 2020, just when the Corona epidemic hit. There have been two or three face-to-face workshops in the short period when such events were allowed. But mostly the project had to depart from its original intentions and carry out online workshops on topics like daily racism, intersectionality between racism and discrimination of women etc. Therefore, little so far can be said about any impact or lessons learned. It is hoped that perhaps in 2022, the last year of the project grant, the original plans of such workshops can be taken up again.

3.3 Summary including the Workshop, Interviews and Literature Review

Refugees are threatened often both by right-wing extremist groups and by security forces. The projects included in the Good Practice Workshop included examples of both. Unfortunately, we were not able to include the participation of refugees themselves which was partly due to the restricted online format and the impossibility of translation to multiple languages. In the evaluation of the workshop, it became clear that this was a deficit which should have been overcome. So the perspective of those with whom the groups present at the workshop work, was not directly included.

There are many organizations seeking to support refugees in a way that also leads – or may lead – to their protection from physical harm. They vary widely in their approaches, policies, visions and understanding of the State as a counterpart which makes it difficult to generalize. A few things however could be observed:

Most organizations said that they try to contact the authorities and influence them although that is not always easy, and there are disagreements within and between the refugee support groups regarding this issue. In particular, work with the police is controversial (see also chapter 5 below). At the French-Italian border, one organization did some awareness training with local police, for example, regarding the rights of unaccompanied minors which was very positive. Others only speak to the police in certain situations but do not try to build a relationship with them. Others reject any such contact.

There seems to be a growing sensitivity regarding issues of racism, and in particular an awareness of not acting or speaking FOR the refugees but supporting them in making their own voice heard. One example that came up several times in the workshop was to make use of refugees who have been trained as "cultural interpreters" to facilitate dialogue between refugees and the authorities. The example given came from Germany, but it seems that there are similar approaches in other countries as well. Advocacy in a wider sense of fighting for the rights of refugees is an important part of the work of many organizations.

Another important issue raised by several participants in the workshop was the importance of networking between organizations, including organizations which may not be "natural allies". Networking can make use of different strengths and inclinations of the various organizations. When and where they collaborate, they are able to achieve a considerable added value to the overall support of the refugees – for example if one organization focuses on monitoring, another may use its

reports for advocacy work with the authorities and media, a third one may look at influencing or even training police in human rights issues.

3.3.1 Good practices

- Long-term presence and projects are critical.
- Don't rush with activism. Build trust before you push.
- Focus on realistic, concrete goals.
- Discuss and plan together with those affected by violence what strategy to use, leave the decision what kind of support they wish to those affected.
- Do not only look at violent behavior but also at structural violence.
- Build trust by just visiting, walking around or setting up a focal point (mobile café for example) and meeting people in a camp or in a neighborhood
- Avoid a patronizing attitude and just help those affected to make their voice heard instead of speaking for them.
- There is more impact when several organizations work together when seeking contact to the authorities.
- Great impact can be achieved through coalitions between refugees and non-refugees.
- Access networks you do not usually work with.
- Engage with the public because that may increase support.
- Balance protocols and creative dialogue.
- Involve local entrepreneurs who give work to refugees.
- Precise observation is important.
- Maintain long-term documentation that can serve as institutional memory.
- Engage the neighborhood; involve the local population in refugee issues and seek its support.
- Bring people together and open space for dialogue. Round tables may be one such approach.
- Counter attempts to criminalize refugees.
- Involve police in planning responses to attacks by right-wing mobs.
- Offer training for local police.
- Set up alarm networks by phone.
- Serve as transmitters of the voices of the refugees vis-à-vis authorities or media but do not speak for them.
- Offer legal advice to refugees.
- Work with refugees who were deported back home: Support social cohesion and conflict resolution among them.[109]
- Use cultural interpreters when properly trained to translate and mediate with authorities because they understand the background of the refugees better.

3.3.2 Challenges

- Fast turn-over of refugees in illegal camps stifles relationship-building and coordination.
- There is danger of building dependencies when working with groups of vulnerable people.
- There is often high turn-over of volunteers in the projects.
- Support self-organizations of refugees if you do not agree with their approach and methods.
- It can be difficult to know how to communicate about migrant/refugee issues to the wider public, especially if right-wing orientation is strong.
- Cooperation between NGOs is not always easy because of different approaches and values.
- It may not be possible to speak with a common voice to the authorities because of disagreement between the NGOs.

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[109] This was listed in the workshop on communities.

- Sometimes there are different understandings of rights (of refugees) among the supporting groups.
- There are in-group tensions between deported refugees.
- It is not easy to translate different cultural understandings.
- There is a risk of leaking information to the authorities when using go-betweens who translate between refugees and authorities.
- Authorities are suspicious about solidarity with refugees.
- It is often unclear how to deal constructively with authorities and police.
- People are set up against each other.
- Separation is a deliberate strategy, as is restriction of movement of refugees by the state.
- Donors sometimes set strange conditions when they provide support. (One example was money to build toilets for kids only.)
- It may not be clear how to decide who do we build trust with, and how?
- There is so much brutalization, stigmatizing and criminalization of refugees.[110]
- Contacting the police and talking with them may lead to losing trust with refugees.
- In some places there is hostility toward international volunteers from the police.
- Confusion with social services or other local admin staff that the refugees reject having contact with.
- Photographing and filming police actions: On the one hand organizations may want to do it for documentation purposes; on the other hand, it may be misused by the security forces or rejected by the refugees themselves. In France, it is currently illegal to do such filming.
- Financing of projects is short term (3 years maximum); the work needs to take place long-term.

3.3.3 Suggestions collected

- Use creative activism (for ex. use of street arts) to strengthen messaging.
- Reimagine (vision) a more open society.
- Try to figure out how to build relationships with extremist (right-wing) groups.
- Reflect on privilege and racism.

3.3.4 Conclusions

The work with refugees that can be considered under the umbrella term of "Unarmed Civilian Protection" is perhaps wider and less clearly defined as in other areas of work looked at under the lens of UCP/A. Direct protection was the objective of the described initiatives of the early 1990s, and plays a role in the work of the Human Rights Observers, some of whom insist on absolute impartiality. For others, the focus is much more on solidarity and witnessing and standing with the refugees against those who try to harass or evict them. One participant said you can only build relationship when you can say, 'we struggle together'.

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[110] From the workshop on communities.

4. Monitoring and Protecting Against Violence by Police and Other State Agencies

The situations of monitoring and protecting against violence by police and other state agencies examined in the literature review, interviews and the workshop vary quite a lot. Additionally, there is a lot of overlap with activities described in other chapters, such as working with refugees or the monitoring done in Northern Ireland during the civil war. It is also important to keep in mind that the operating procedures used by police and other non-military security forces are quite different from country to country, and in addition such procedures change over time. In some democratic countries, a clear tendency to heavier armament and more 'robust' policing has been observed which adds to the complexity of the issue, as has the police violence against PoC which is not only an issue in the U.S. but also in most European countries.

There is also a difference between situations where the problem is individual aggressive police people who overstep the rules versus situations where the authorities deploying the police expect them to be 'robust' or violent. The latter is not only the case in countries like Belarus (see below) but also in the case of some demonstrations or other situations in democratic countries – be it the eviction of refugees from 'illegal' camps in France or protests against the G20 summit in Germany in 2017.

4.1 Sheffield Police Watch (1984)

This initiative[111] was about monitoring police during a workers' strike in Sheffield, UK, the National Union of Mineworkers strike in 1984. The problem was that police interference escalated during the strike, seeking to control picketing miners.

The project was set up by the local Trades Council and Unemployment Center – semi-official bodies in Sheffield. They maintained an independent stance towards all parties to the dispute. The project lasted for at least six months – the exact length is not clear. There were about 45 volunteer monitors who organized themselves into three groups. Bryan and Jarman (1999) write that there seems to have been no preparatory training for them. Each group was based at a different miners' advice center and sent out small teams of 2-3 monitors every day. They watched the police and reported on their behavior. It seems there was no intention to intervene or mediate, although their presence might have had an influence on how the police acted. They also appeared as witnesses in court cases against miners. Some police respected their work, some did not.

> In his review of the work of Sheffield Policewatch, John Field felt that while the group did have some impact on the ground this was always limited. He acknowledged that the group 'lacked any wider capacity to influence events' and while its reports were used by the media and thereby helped influence local public opinion, there were 'no effective mechanisms., whereby local opinions can affect the autonomy of the police institution'. Nevertheless, he considered it important that the group was able to provide independent witnesses to acts of violence and a structure of support for the victims of police abuses. …
>
> The status of monitors as independent and impartial seems to have derived from the fact that they were dissimilar to the two main protagonist groups. The monitors were predominantly female and middle-class - in contrast to the working-class, male miners and police officers with whom they mingled. It is also interesting to note the variety of reactions from the different police forces with whom the group came into contact. In some cases, the police were helpful, whereas in other situations the monitors were treated like the picketing miners. The quality of the working relationship with the police can have a

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[111] Information on this initiative was found in the booklet by Bryan & Jarman (1999) quoted so extensively above on Northern Ireland. For the Sheffield Police Watch, they relied on a report by John Field which was not accessible for this review.

considerable bearing on the ability of monitors to work on the ground. (Bryan/Jarman 1999:16-17)

4.1.1 Conclusion

This police watch project seems to have been a spontaneous response to excessive police violence against the miners, conducted by people without any previous experience or links to the nonviolence movement. The monitors seem to have made a difference in some cases.

4.2 Gorleben International Peace Team (GIPT) (1997, 2001)

Gorleben is a rural place in Northern Germany of almost symbolic value for its decade-long nonviolent resistance against a subterranean nuclear waste deposit. In 1997 Kurve Wustrow, a nonviolence training center based in the region, organized an ad-hoc international peace team to monitor the upcoming two-week long phase of nonviolent protests. Its goals were to monitor the police activities to report on human rights violations, and to spread these reports world-wide using the international participants as vehicle. [112]

The Kurve recruited participants from the USA (3), Ecuador (2), Nigeria (1) and Macedonia (1), and prepared them in a five-day training. The team watched the demonstrations side by side with a German human rights organization that regularly monitors the demonstrations in Gorleben, and reported on what they saw. They did not succeed in getting a special status with the authorities, and although they marked themselves with a button as international observers, were treated as fellow protesters rather than as independent monitors.

In the evaluation report of the project written by the team itself, there is a very frank list of problems and shortcomings of this project, together with recommendations about how to improve if there was another GIPT. The list starts with short-term recruitment, lack of experience and sufficient training, lack of a common language and enough German language skills in the team and ends with problems of co-ordination and equipment.

A second such monitoring by the Gorleben International Peace Team of a nuclear waste transport took place in 2001, this time with participants from Sri Lanka, Cameroon, France and Germany. Its goals were to increase the attention of international media regarding the nonviolent protests and to increase the awareness among human rights organizations of the dangers of the civil use of nuclear power. The Kurve Wustrow also wanted to turn around the predominant practice of "North goes South" by using international volunteers to influence conflicts in Germany.

Its principles were:

1. Basic right to life: The highest priority was to be given to the right to life and an intact environment.

2. Nonviolence, including the principles of tolerance, love, respect, decision-making by consensus and respect of differences.

3. International character: The GIP teams were to be international, with different geographical, cultural, economic and political world views included. This, they said, would allow

- different perspectives on the work
- learn about different cultures and respect differences
- objectivity of the observations
- to see the discussion in an international context.

The main task of the team was to monitor the human rights situation in the area (the "Wendland") shortly before, during and after the nuclear waste transports between the 26th and 29th of March 2001, and to report about it. The focus of the reports was to be escalation and de-escalation. The

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[112] This part on 1997 is a reprint from the NP Feasibility study.

mandate also included talks with protesters and police and monitoring how the media reported about the protests. Their final report – which documented numerous cases of police violence – was published as a 50-page booklet.

4.2.1 Conclusions

The initiative had the name "peace team", but its mandate was not direct protection, but to monitor the human rights situation and to contribute to the struggle against nuclear power. It is however a rare and therefore interesting case of "South comes North" (although in the team of 2001, the majority of the team members came from France and Germany while in the first there had been three from the Global South).

4.3 Committee for Basic Rights and Democracy in Germany

The Committee for Basic Rights and Democracy was founded in 1980.

> It sees itself as part of the extra-parliamentary opposition and as a co-organizer of civic protest. Statements, press releases, conferences, essays and brochures, planning and organizing actions, observing demonstrations, but also concrete help for prisoners and the "Action Holidays from War" are among the diverse forms of intervention. The Basic Rights Committee is financed exclusively by donations and membership fees.[113]

One of its activities, which is no longer happening due to a generation change in staff and board, was the observation of demonstrations.[114]

They understand themselves as a nonviolent organization which stands for democracy and human rights. In the monitoring of demonstrations, they maintained strict neutrality regarding the issue of the protest.

They started with monitoring protests just after the founding with observing a protest at a nuclear power site (Brokdorf). The report at that time refuted the distorted media portrayals of a violent demonstration.[115] A series of further observations followed. After an interruption, the Committee took up the monitoring again when there were large numbers of protesters against the transports of nuclear waste to a storage site in Northern Germany (Gorleben) in 1995, 1996 and 1997 as well as in the early 2000s. They also monitored a meeting of punks in Hannover at the beginning of August 1996, the so-called Chaos Days, and a protest of fascists and the counter-protest against them. The last monitoring took place at the G 20 summit in Hamburg in 2018. They consider such monitoring as "practical, democratizing constitutional protection".

Before the protests, the Committee researched and evaluated the different publications about the protests from the perspective of the organizers, media and authorities.

At the demonstrations, teams of monitors tried to cover as much of the demonstration as possible. Their main tasks were to watch and to document the actions of both sides, police and protesters. They were not to involve themselves in what was happening. The Committee considered this kind of independence to be essential for the credibility of a monitoring report. In Gorleben, they had teams of 15-20 people on the ground. They wore identification badges (like press people) but no uniforms.

Before the protests, they sought contact with the police and local administration. The experiences vary: In Gorleben in the 1990s it was easier and the police were open for talks, in Hamburg in 2017 in

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[113] https://www.grundrechtekomitee.de/ueber-uns

[114] This generation gap is a rather general experience in European activism, in particular between those who experienced the European divide before 1989 and those who were born after.

[115] http://www.grundrechte-report.de/1998/inhalt/details/back/inhalt-1998/article/demonstrationsbeobachtungen-eine-exemplarische-aktionsform-der-buergerrechtsbewegung-1/

preparation of the G20 summit in 2018, there was a meeting with the Senator for Interior[116] but the Committee did not see any readiness for dialogue.

They also observed an increasing militarization and armament of police in the last 20 years.

The Committee did not work on request from the protesters but their board and staff decided which protests to observe. Sometimes they cooperated with other groups but that was sometimes not easy due to different objectives of the various groups. In 2018 at the G20 summit, they cooperated with observers deployed by the OSCE which also monitored the protests; a cooperation considered very fruitful.

In a report from 1998 they explain the procedure of report writing and principles:

> The observers write their reports as soon as possible after the end of the demonstration – based on notes and sketches made on the spot –, which collected and summarized then allow a picture of the entire course of events. This report is supplemented and contrasted with the press statements of the police and the pronouncements of politicians. Media coverage is also collected and critically evaluated.

> After an initial summary report in a press release shortly after the demonstration, detailed reports are compiled on the basis of the information collected and published in a brochure. The yardstick for our evaluation is Article 8 of the Constitution[117], broadly understood in democratic terms.

> The reports so far have met with widespread interest, from those who participated in the demonstrations, but also from many others. Summaries have sometimes been reproduced in the media. Recently, more and more police chiefs and police authorities have become interested in the reports.

> The demonstration observation is in principle "neutral" to the content of the demonstration. However, it takes sides with the fundamental right to freedom of demonstration. In a representative democracy, the freedom of expression and the freedom of citizens to assemble are a fundamental right and corrective to the narrow-mindedly developing, detached decision-making power of the representatives.[118]

The Committee estimates that in total they might have had 30 monitors who worked as volunteers with them; sometimes staff (they have a 2–3-person office) joined them. They always worked in teams of at least two persons. New people were deployed together with more experienced ones; sometimes people were prepared in a seminar, and all had an informative talk with the staff responsible. Age-wise the monitors were varied; there might have been slightly more women than men. At the last monitoring in 2017, there were several monitors who had previous experience in other organizations, for example Peace Brigades International.

As to impact, they think that they did not influence the behavior of the protesters but might have sometimes had influence on the police to follow the rules. In some cases, the reports written afterwards influenced the public debate on what happened during the protests. The monitors did not have an aim to protect protesters. In one case, the protesters protected them when the police charged the demonstration, by helping them to escape.

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[116] Hamburg is one State in the German Federation; the Senator is what in other States would be the Minister of Interior.

[117] Right to demonstrate.

[118] http://www.grundrechte-report.de/1998/inhalt/details/back/inhalt-1998/article/demonstrationsbeobachtungen-eine-exemplarische-aktionsform-der-buergerrechtsbewegung-1/

4.3.1 Conclusions

The demonstration monitoring by the Committee for Basic Rights is comparable to that of some groups in Northern Ireland insofar as the main focus was on report writing and through the reports and public debate seeking to influence how police act and thereby protecting civic rights.

4.4 Parisian Observatory of Civil Liberties

The Parisian Observatory of Civil Liberties[119] is an independent collective created in 2019 at the initiative of the League of Human Rights (Federation of Paris) and the Syndicate of Lawyers of France (Paris) which also finances its work.

> Its objectives are to document police practices and procedures, particularly judicial ones, and to inform those affected by these practices of their rights.
> Observers are present at the places where these practices are carried out and collect testimonies. Reports and analysis will be made public in order to raise awareness among citizens, justice actors and public authorities, fuel the public interest debate on freedoms and provide a collective response to these abuses. [120]

Their Charter from July 2019 states:

> For several years, the implementation of security laws has fueled a climate of tension between the police and the population, on the pretext of maintaining public order.
>
> In the streets, neighborhoods, police stations, relations between the police and the population are deteriorating.
>
> The instrumentalization of the police and gendarmerie forces by the Government results, in fact, in obstructing the expression of protest in the public space, in particular through the use of weapons of war (…), first in working-class neighborhoods, against young people in particular, then during demonstrations, resulting in trauma, serious injuries, or even mutilations.
>
> This is evidenced by the many reactions from national … to international bodies, as well as the serious concerns expressed publicly by the medical services, which have had to treat in recent months an unprecedented number of people victims of serious injuries. Yet, as the UN Special Rapporteur denounced, the French Government persists in denying the reality.
>
> Faced with the scale and gravity of this situation, and following local initiatives (Toulouse, Nantes, Quimper, Montpellier, Perpignan and Gironde, etc.), the Paris Federation of the League of Human Rights has decided, in partnership with the Paris section of the French Lawyers' Union, to set up an Observatory of Public Freedoms.
>
> The Parisian Observatory has set itself the objectives of documenting police practices, the abusive use of procedures, particularly judicial ones, and of informing those affected by these practices of their rights.
>
> Observers are present at the places where these practices are carried out and collect testimonies. Reports and analysis will be made public in order to raise awareness among citizens, justice actors and public authorities, fuel the public interest debate on freedoms and provide a collective response to these abuses.[121]

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[119] https://site.ldh-france.org/paris/observatoires-pratiques-policieres-de-ldh/

[120] https://site.ldh-france.org/paris/observatoires-pratiques-policieres-de-ldh/

[121] https://site.ldh-france.org/paris/2019/07/12/charte-de-lobservatoire-parisien-libertes-publiques/

The organization focuses exclusively on Paris and its suburbs. It maintains strict neutrality regarding the protest issues when observing demonstrations. Besides neutrality, its two other principles are confidentiality (of what is reported and in particular also of photos taken) and security (of the monitors). In the interview they said they consider themselves a nonviolent organization.

They would like to have a recognized status as observers which would allow them to be present even if, for example, a demonstration is being dissolved by the police. However, they consider their work to be "political" in the sense that they stand for the freedom to demonstrate, free expression, for human and civil rights.

The monitors are all volunteers. Many have a legal background (lawyers, law students) but there are people from other professions and background as well. They enlist through an internet platform registering for particular dates; three people form a team. They consider three monitors a good practice because it allows a division of tasks – watching out for security, note taking and taking pictures. They estimate that a volunteer needs to be prepared to do monitoring for eight hours, plus several hours of report writing. Volunteers who have never done any monitoring may attend a one-day training in recognizing different security forces and their weapons, how to behave, how to observe and how to document, but mostly the training happens "on the job" with a new person working together with more experienced volunteers. Gender-wise, the Observatory considers sending mixed teams a good practice. The basic information is also made available in writing. After the events, team members are debriefed regarding what happened as well as to deal emotionally with what had been observed.

The teams work in consensus and the rule is that the teams follow, without discussion, the decisions made by the person most afraid.

The Observatory has monitored 47 events since its inception through November 2020. The decision which demonstrations or events to observe are made by a small team.

They are recognizable through their clothing: For security reasons, the volunteers wear vests and a snow helmet with logo and stickers "League for Human Rights", the Logo of the Observatory and the word "Observation" on it. They are also equipped with goggles and gas masks.

In their monitoring, they make contacts to other NGOs supporting refugees (if the event is about refugees) and with street paramedics. The monitors present themselves to the police, although this at least once ended with having parts of their equipment being confiscated. Several times, police tried to forbid filming or to confiscate the pictures they took. They often manage to avoid this by negotiating with the police, and by presenting a document showing that the material was owned by the Human Rights League.

Another activity is to distribute small leaflets that inform about the rights of demonstrators and rights when being detained or arrested.

The Observatory thinks that their presence sometimes has helped to prevent violence though in other cases the police just followed the orders received. Also, being recognized as human rights observers has not always helped to protect the monitors themselves: in some cases, it made them targets for the police.

The reports they write they publish (including social media) and also use for international advocacy, including wit the UN. They also publish special studies for example on the techniques the police use to encircle protesters.

4.4.1 Conclusions

Compared to the other groups described above, two elements jump out: The rather heavy protective equipment, and the wish to have a formal status as observers with the police. This may be a consequence of the fact that the French armed forces are known to be very heavy handed on demonstrators. Other than that, it seems that the experiences, good practices and challenges are very much comparable to other forms of European police monitoring.

4.5 Nash Dom in Belarus

Belarus has been an independent country since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the attempted coup in Moscow in November that year. In 1994, Alexander Lukashenko was elected president, an office that he still holds. The political situation in Belarus is characterized by a formally democratic but de facto very autocratic system; election results have always been questioned by international observers (not only the last ones in 2020), and civil society as well as political opposition[122] have faced repression – arrests, mistreatment in custody, sexual harassment, and other sanctions that especially target women by taking away their children, etc. After the Presidential elections in 2020, the situation escalated and mass protests took place every week, leading to thousands of arrests and an increase of torture and rape by the security forces. Many people have fled the country since, seeking asylum especially in Lithuania and in Ukraine.[123]

Nash Dom (Our House) is a Belarusian civil society organization founded c.2002, and registered abroad in the Czech Republic and Lithuania due to political repression in Belarus. It is organized in a network structure that extends all over Belarus and links and coordinates more than 19 volunteer groups in 18 Belarussian cities. Its head, Olga Karatch, a former City Deputy, had to leave the country after having been arrested and threatened in 2011 and now mostly works from Vilnius.

Nash Dom defines its mission as "the transformation of the society in a nonviolent way towards one with a strong civil society, increased citizens' activism on the level of local communities and more transparent and accountable public authorities, civil servants and deputies".[124]

Their values and goals are nonviolence, fighting for sustainable development and democratic change, respect for human rights and promoting women's rights.[125]

In this work Nash Dom underlines the importance of communication and interaction with local administration bodies, seeing the authorities as one of the responsible stakeholders in the work of Nash Dom.

Nash Dom is known for its concrete local actions in the field of local community development and improvement of local infrastructure (lighting, repairs and beautification in neighborhoods, etc.) that also include: pressuring local Councils to publish their budgets and to listen to the citizens they are responsible for; running local campaigns; providing legal consulting; supporting citizens to file court procedures and to write letters of complaints; collecting signatures and defending citizens and activists in case of repression through legal advice. In the last couple of years before summer 2020, their focus was on the imprisonment of youth and of women activists whose children were taken away from them by the State. Since the Presidential elections in 2020, the activists inside Belarus have tried to keep up their activities. The leader of Nash Dom, Olga Karatch, almost daily publishes YouTube videos on different issues, from Lukashenko's Coronavirus policy to calls to keep protests nonviolent. These videos are watched by more than 100,000 people[126].

Among Nash Dom's campaigns was one titled "Protective Umbrella Belarus" which ran between 2011 and 2013. It focused on police and aimed at pressuring police to behave correctly and respect human rights in their work. It also mobilized activists to stand for their rights, advised them on their rights and established emergency procedures in the case of arrests.[127] In order to influence security forces to refrain from abuse, they created a database into which they entered 1,300 police stations,

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[122] In Belarus like generally in most of Eastern Europe, "political" means party politics and seeking to gain power through elections.

[123] See for example OSCE Rport on the Novemeber 2019 parliamentary elections, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/4/447583.pdf; or a more recent OSCE statement on the harassment of HR defenders published in February 2021: https://www.osce.org/odihr/478669

[124] From a funding application from 2017 (internal document).

[125] Source: interview.

[126] https://www.youtube.com/user/NashDomTV

[127] Final report of the project to donors from 2012 (internal document)

including all information they could collect about them, and Nash Dom sent its information materials to the police. They also wrote a small picture book with the title "My father is a police man. What does he do at work?" where they addressed mistreatment by police. Their website "Officials info" started to collect information on civil servants.[128] It contains 120,000 names of individual civil servants and what was observed regarding their behavior in their job. Citizens were invited to vote for the best and the worst civil servant. The campaign was quite successful. For many years, the numbers of people tortured and sexually harassed while in custody went down and some police were even charged and found guilty of torture. Activists from Nash Dom found that they were much safer than activists from other organizations – obviously the security forces feared the repercussions of arresting them.

Currently, Nash Dom tries to support people who are under threat of arrest by having produced online information with standard templates for complaints etc. in the form of a wiki. They also try to provide lawyers and offer psychological help for people who have been tortured. Their observation is that if lawyers show up at the police station, people may not be mistreated. In Belarus, all lawyers are state lawyers, there are no private ones. Still, they also face a risk of being arrested themselves when defending activists. For some cases, Nash Dom is also using its international network and asks members to write letters etc.

Nash Dom works with a wide range of volunteers. The generic term they use for them is "rights protectors". They have come to the organization through different channels and join a local group. For security reasons, Nash Dom does not maintain a central list; only the local coordinator knows everyone in their group. Volunteers are offered trainings, for example in safe communications, how to work with victims of violence, or general introduction into issues of civil society. Due to Covid-19, much happens through Zoom.

4.5.1 Conclusions

Nash Dom's approach to protection of its own activists and of other people is in some ways quite singular. It is based on a naming and shaming strategy directed at individual law enforcement officers, seeking to influence their behavior. They take away their anonymity and make sure that their family, friends and neighbors are informed – through the database or in some cases probably also through leaflets displayed publicly – that they beat, harassed or raped people. This seems to have been quite effective in the Belarusian context.

In the workshop, a few people raised concerns about this approach and wondered if this blaming and shaming meets the criteria of strict nonviolence. However, Nash Dom points out that it does not publish any private information on the officers (like family status etc.) but only information regarding their work.

4.6 Summary including the Workshop, Interviews and Literature Review

Very generally speaking, monitoring and documenting the actions of police has been a very standard effort to try to put a check on police violence, rights violations and outright mistreatment of people under arrest.

Monitoring of police is taking place in various contexts. In the workshop, the examples came from Northern Ireland (see 3.1), the work on and with refugees, monitoring police during demonstrations not related to civil war and done by groups specializing in this, and the singular approach taken by the "rights protectors" in Belarus.

The activities differ also in regard to the direct intervention vs. pure observing. Especially in Northern Ireland, as described above, some organizations did intervene from time to time, others excluded

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[128] https://chinovniki.info/ The website is still running and maintained with new information.

that. Still another difference was the purpose of the reports that are written. While in most cases they are used for publicity and advocacy purposes, there were also organizations that preferred a confidential approach, seeking to change the behavior of perpetrators through dialogue in a non-public setting.

Some concerns were raised in the workshop regarding taking pictures and filming. While on the one hand this yields proof to be used later in law cases or in publicity work, on the other hand it might endanger activists if the police confiscate the material and use it for their purposes., Also, people observed that trying to film or taking pictures may increase tensions in a situation rather than de-escalating it.

Another field of activity – which was considered to be controversial – is offering training to police. As in North America: Some civil society organizations do give such trainings, others rule it out because they reject any cooperation with armed and/or with government forces, or even wish to abolish police altogether.

4.6.1 Good practices

- Be neutral in regard to the issues demonstrators are raising, promoting. Assume an impartial / neutral[129] attitude when monitoring protests.
- Support grassroots documentation by refugees: Give refugees access to mobile phones so that they can themselves document what is happening.
- Always work at least in pairs. If the situation is very tense, send monitoring teams of at least three people, with one person focusing on the security and safety of the monitors.
- When filming or taking pictures of protesters, ask for their permission even if the data protection law allows such filming / taking pictures. (Please however notice that some organizations do not consider visual recording a good practice at all.)
- Photograph and film only police, not the protesters, so that there is no evidence against them that the police could use for court trials.
- Photographing/ filming may pacify a situation because police know there is evidence produced.[130]
- Make use of photos and films in court.
- When publishing photos/films, make sure that faces cannot be recognized.
- Bearing witness is powerful even without video.
- Provide and implement training / awareness of safe ways to communicate electronically, for example using Telegram or Signal, Jitsy as a platform, encryption of data, using phones without personal data on them etc.
- Acknowledge that police are not a uniform anonymous body but that police forces consist of individuals with different attitudes. There are many examples of individual police people who disagree with what their colleagues do and who try to protect vulnerable people even if their colleagues do not do so.
- The quality of the working relationship with the police can have a considerable bearing on the ability of monitors to work on the ground.
- Engage with individual commanders.
- Humanizing does not negate accountability.
- Strengthen/empower communities and activists to know how to talk to /deal with police and know how to respond in cases of persecution and arrest.
- Inform police that they have the right to disobey obviously illegal orders.[131]

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[129] Different groups use different terms when describing their approach.

[130] This is suspected to be one reason behind a new law project in France forbidding the filming of police; In May 2021 however, the French Constitutional Court (the highest court in France) sanctioned the project (especially on the filming issue) and the government now has to work this and other articles anew. Tensions around this issue remain high between HR defenders and authorities because police forces are being targeted for violent aggressions and murders.

- Public shaming of individual perpetrators has proven to be an effective tactic.
- Train police – even on nonviolence.
- Make yourself visible/recognizable as monitors.
- Use clothing or ID cards so as to be recognized as monitors.
- Deploy gender-wise mixed teams to counter the machismo of the police.
- Work in consensus during the observation and base the team's behavior on the person willing /being able to take the least risk.

4.6.2 Challenges

- That there is no special status for monitors at demonstrations that protects them is a challenge.
- Using photography and filming – it may also increase vulnerability or escalate situations.
- Using cameras may weaken relationships with police.
- Photographs and films may endanger the protesters if they fall into the hands of the police.
- Confiscation of pictures and films and mobile phones by the police, and then the data being used against the protesters.
- There is a risk police or protestors will see monitors as partial or provocateurs. .
- New laws challenging UCP/A work.
- Police making up their own rules.
- Police sometimes protect violent groups.
- While monitoring alone can have some impact, its ability to deter violent behavior is limited.
- Transforming police is hard and a structural problem.
- It is hard to defend the civic right to demonstrate when you very strongly disagree with the protesters (fascists, Corona deniers etc.)
- Cooperation with other demonstration monitors due to differences in approach and goals can be difficult.
- Due to small numbers, it is very hard to observe everything that happens at a demonstration.
- The GIPT faced challenges that included short-term recruitment, lack of experience and sufficient training, lack of a common language and enough German language skills in the team. There were also problems with co-ordination and equipment.
- Understanding and using safe electronic communication.

4.6.3 Suggestions collected

- Learn more from the global South.
- Understand the whole process of data security and improve digital hygiene.
- Understand impact of new laws.
- Increase access to mobile phone use and video for poor people who cannot afford it.
- Have a legal status as observers at demonstrations.

4.6.4 Conclusions

One basic strategic decision for each organization identified in the workshop was whether to focus on accountability of the state and its law enforcement agencies, or to focus on working with

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[131] In France, there is an organization specialized on this. The produced the following booklet:
https://tousmigrants.weebly.com/uploads/7/3/4/6/73468541/-livret-au_nom_de_la_loi.pdf

communities. There are some organizations that try to do both but many have decided in favor of one or the other. Among those groups we talked with and invited to the workshop, there are few who have put protection in the middle of their efforts. Nash Dom in Belarus is the most explicit in intending their work to provide protection. Others, including some of those who focus on working with communities, may not necessarily speak of "protection" but rather of standing in solidarity with those who are repressed and suffer police violence. Some police observation groups frame their work in legal terms, focusing on the defense of human rights. When they mention "protection", they mean first the protection of legal standards and provisions rather than people per se. When they talk about "violation", it often is violation of the law. This focus is based on the assumption that if the law is protected and implemented, then people are safe.

5. Working with Tensions in Communities to Prevent or Reduce Violence

The project interviewed or otherwise collected information on a number of civil society organizations that are dealing with conflicts in communities. We interviewed representatives, and some also participated in the workshop. Most of them however do not really engage in what could be considered UCP/A:

- The Center for Nonviolent Action (CNA) in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina[132] has offices in Belgrade and Sarajevo, and in addition also works in North Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo. They give trainings in nonviolence and work with war veterans on projects of 'dealing with the past', marking unmarked sites of war atrocities in Bosnia. While people from the different ethnic groups doing this marking together provides a certain protection for those who are a minority in each place visited, this protection is a side-effect and not emphasized as a goal or tactic by the CNA.

- The Institute for Constructive Conflict Resolution and Mediation e.V. (IKM) (Germany)[133] is running various programs of conflict transformation in Hamburg. Their activities include setting up peer mediation in schools, mediation trainings, establishment of Round Tables, training of street workers, and interreligious dialogue between Muslims, Jews and Christians etc. The mediation work and the round tables they established in urban neighborhoods in Hamburg deescalate conflicts which otherwise easily might lead to violence, especially among groups of young people who feel excluded from the majority society. However, like the CNA, they emphasize that they do not do direct protection as UCP/A is described. The IKM has also trained street workers for some hot spots but the challenge of that model is that the authorities – as well as local citizens – tend to see them as deputy sheriffs who should intervene if there is any trouble with youth, a loud party, drug use etc.

- Médiations Nomades (MN) in France [134] was founded by Yazid Kherfi. He is an educator who came to this work after having gone through a career similar to that of the youth he is nowadays working with. This included prison and a threat to be expelled from France which was prevented at the last moment by some French supporters. Besides his work at MN, he is also a consultant for people in prisons, teaches at the University of Nanterre and wrote two books on his work.[135]
  The work of MN consists in going every night to different hotspots – ghetto areas where mostly PoC live and which are ripe with violence and crime. They go with a truck, put out a table, play music and offer tea and juice to whoever comes, especially young (male) people who are walking the streets at night.[136] Through this Kherfi hopes to establish a dialogue with the expectation that this will make it possible to defuse certain tensions. Sometimes police people join and although the youth at first say that they do not talk to police, they often have engaged conversations. There is little contact to young women.
  The main principle of MN is nonviolence, their motto being "The word is stronger than violence", on the truck the terms "nonviolence", "fraternity" and "respect" are written. Personal encounters, listening and empathy are essential for them. MN does not use the term 'protection' nor is there anything in their work that could be considered to be UCP/A.

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[133] Institut für konstruktive Konfliktaustragung und Mediation e.V., https://www.ikm-hamburg.de/

[134] http://www.mediationnomade.fr/

5.1 Operazione Colomba in Albania[137]

In Northern Albania, the phenomenon of blood feuds – an honor code which was once found in all the Mediterranean area- has continued to survive. Offenses against one person are seen as an offense against the whole family, and the male relatives (today sometimes also the female ones) are expected to take revenge by killing a member of the other family if they don't want to lose their honor. Since this leads to new revenge, some feuds last decades if not longer. The result is that many people live in fear; some hardly dare to leave their houses. While the Code of Honor also permits reconciliation – something which happened in large ceremonies in neighboring Kosovo in the 1990s – such reconciliation between families is rarely considered an option here. During communist times after World War 2, practicing blood feuds was forbidden and prosecuted, but after the overthrow of the regime of Enver Hoxha, and due to a lack of a functioning new legal infrastructure, blood feuds were on the increase again. For a long time, the post-communist governments denied that there was a problem with blood feuds. A report made by OC in 2012 and subsequent advocacy work which led to pressure by international organizations, started to change that perception among the Albanian government and wider civil society. Until 2017, there were campaigns and demonstrations against the blood feud every year.

Operazione Colomba has been introduced already above under 3.2.4 for their work in Kosovo. In Albania, they ran a project between 2010 and 2019. Its inception had been contacts which their mother organization, the Associazione Comunità Papa Giovanni XXIII, had with families who were victims of the blood vendetta in Albania.

The team maintained a permanent presence in the Shkodra area and visited the Tropoja area every month. It was financed through donations and its mother organization. However, finding funds remained a challenge because OC did not build anything tangible (schools, hospitals) or distribute goods. There are very few calls for funding that UCP/A organizations like OC can apply to.

The objectives of the project were:

- Fight against the 'phenomenon of blood vengeance' to overcome it and achieve national reconciliation
- Contribute to the spread of a culture of human rights and nonviolence in the context of marginalization and exclusion induced by the practice of "blood revenge", allowing a gradual increase in the instruments of promotion, protection and safe-keeping of the rights of the victims of this phenomenon;
- Starting reconciliation processes, through paths of truth and forgiveness;
- Contributing to the creation of actions in concert with local civil society that promote the overcoming of the phenomenon through the implementation of reconciliation mechanisms;
- Push the institutions to take charge of the "blood vengeance phenomenon" and equip themselves with tools to overcome it.[138]

The Italian teams, consisting mostly of younger people, lived in the village and shared their daily life with people, as they had done previously in Kosovo. At first, they concentrated in their work on the women and youth because they found them more accessible. They found that their presence encouraged positive social behavior. By living and working with people they gave them a space to share their emotions and to consider alternatives to revenge killings.

Their main activities included[139]:

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[137] http://www.operazionecolomba.it/dove-siamo/albania/albania-progetto.html

[138] http://www.operazionecolomba.it/dove-siamo/albania/albania-progetto.html

[139] Quoted from http://www.operazionecolomba.it/dove-siamo/albania/albania-progetto.html and https://www.operazionecolomba.it/njepopullkundergjakmarrje/chiusura-presenza-di-operazione-colomba-in-albania, with additions from the interview and workshop.

- Finding pathways to overcome anger and grief for members of families who are victims of the phenomenon, particularly women and adolescents. When OC closed its project, it found this had been very successful and families had started to overcome the wish for revenge killings, although there also have been cases in their work when people were not ready to give up their intention to take revenge.
- Developing mediation paths between families in conflict with the aim of reconciliation between the parties. As foreigners, they could not offer mediation themselves or hold reconciliation workshops as they had done in Kosovo, but they could work in the background to help such mediation come about, because they had access to the different families.
- Awareness-raising campaigns and non-violent actions aimed at ensuring the application of the laws governing blood vengeance issues and at creating a national reconciliation process involving all social actors and promoting the use of restorative justice. Among other things, OC brought representatives of local political institutions to the areas of blood feuds so that they could see the situation with their own eyes.
- Monthly events in the areas most affected by the phenomenon to spread a nonviolent culture based on respect for human rights;
- Round tables and public meetings to involve associations and Albanian civil society with a view to formulating proposals to solve the problem. At an annual summer camp, OC tried to bring youth from different geographical and socio-economic backgrounds together. Workshops for example on media or video addressed youth while women's circles allowed the women some space of their own while the OC volunteers looked after their children.
- Dissemination of the testimonies of those who have chosen reconciliation instead of revenge;
- Nonviolent accompaniment to guarantee greater freedom of movement and to allow access to basic services for those who risked suffering revenge attacks. Such accompaniment was offered to men as well as women and children and included support of people in prisons. Accompaniment was also offered for trips to cultural, religious or leisure venues. This encouraged people to break the isolation in which they had lived.
- Networking with other associations working on revenge in the field to ensure that victims of the phenomenon have access to educational and recreational opportunities. These included national (political, civil society, religious, etc.) and international institutions (e.g., the UN special rapporteur, the EU, OSCE, UNDP etc.
- Monitoring and collecting data on the numerical and geographical distribution of the phenomenon to develop an increasingly detailed and updated knowledge of the problem;
- Publicizing the non-violent interventions carried out.[140]

The project was closed in 2019 when OC found that they had achieved most of their objectives and people were breaking out of their isolation and pursuing alternatives to blood feuds to addressing wrongs. They announced that in future, missionaries of the Pope John XXIII Community would continue to monitor the situation, and that the Association Trentino con i Balcani would conduct meetings and workshops.

5.2 Summary including the Workshop, Interviews and Literature Review

Conflict issues in communities in Europe are manifold. Perhaps those most ripe with the potential for violence are those caused through economic and social exclusion, political extremist activism, and activism by extremist groups defining themselves by religion, and ethnically defined divides.

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[140] http://www.operazionecolomba.it/dove-siamo/albania/albania-progetto.html

There are possibly hundreds of initiatives and organizations in all European countries that work on these and other conflicts in communities. The examples we interviewed and invited to the workshop are only a few which stand for many others. [141] The overwhelming majority of them are local organizations working in their own country, often in their own town/region, and most of them talk of conflict prevention or transformation, dialogue etc. Operazione Colomba was the only international organization we could identify, and they are the exception that confirms the rule that this kind of conflict transformation work in Europe is done by locals, not internationals. OC was also the only organization whose work had an explicit element of UCP/A in the form of protective accompaniment of people they worked with in Albania.

5.5.1 Good practices

- Initiate low-key intervention and networking with local institutions.
- Transparency in the work is very important.
- It is essential to be on the ground and listening to all sides.
- Support and/or create space for different groups to come together to deescalate conflicts.
- Start work to bring together people with different or hostile backgrounds by finding a minimum common ground. Provoke "impossible" meetings (meetings that are considered impossible because they take place between hostile individuals or groups).
- Bring children from different sides of a divide together for a work camp or an activity, and thereby indirectly also address their parents.
- Work with trainer teams that are mixed in many ways: gender, ethnic/national background, religion, pacifists and former soldiers, etc.
- Network with other institutions, including religious organizations and local administration.
- Confidential dialogue behind closed doors may lead to breakthroughs regarding relationships between groups.
- Stand by people and never give up on them, with patience. This also means standing by people physically, to live with them, and presupposes learning the language, the background, history, which gestures are respectful etc.
- Spread the message: do advocacy at many different levels of society, including in the diaspora. Advocate for application of laws to generate pressure by international organizations on governments to change their behavior.
- Publicize nonviolent interventions.
- Protect the privacy of the victims/people.
- Provide unarmed accompaniment (civil escorts): this is important to guarantee the freedom of movement of the accompanied but also to build trusting relationships with these families and to break isolation.
- Initiate a restorative justice path inside and between concerned families (concerned by blood feud).
- Open people's mind to nonviolent alternatives.
- Be present when and where the people are.
- Open up public space in the evenings to engage with youth.
- Address and meet informally and without publicity with the heads of different (ethnic, religious) groups in order to discuss controversial issues of common interest.
- If working in a foreign country, learn the local language even if you are a short-term volunteer.
- Bring different generations together so that they can learn from each other.
- Before going to a new place, contact all authorities, including police.

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[141] See for example https://www.mitarbeit.de/publikationen/shop/konfliktbearbeitung_in_der_nachbarschaft/ for some examples. Unfortunately, so far the vast majority of the literature on conflict transformation only covers work in the Global South, not in Europe.

- Offer Alternatives to Violence Project trainings.
- Organize community dialogue in crisis situations.
- Develop solidarity events focused on people who need help.
- Talk to people who really know the context.
- Listening and empathy are essential activities.
- Raise awareness of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms.
- Deliberately move to difficult communities and live there as a neighbor as a central practice in an intervention.
- Counter hate-speech online.
- Mobilize leaders of community groups to de-escalate violence and the threat of violence.
- Support families in reconciliation processes.
- Create personal space for women by providing child care.
- Support inside mediators who have a lot of influence and shield them against exploitation that tries to force them to offer their services for free while other mediators are being paid.

5.5.2 Challenges

- Working relationships with authorities depends on the persons holding the respective office and their willingness to act; if there are new people, the work has to start again from zero.
- There are challenges to find the right way to solve problems: every context is different, and good practices in one cannot necessarily be transferred to another (at least not all of them).
- There are numerous challenges to financing the work. Even when working with volunteers which reduces costs, there are very few calls for funding that small UCP/A organizations can apply to.
- Seeking individual strategies is more frequent than solidarity and struggling together.
- Social norms (for example, the way to dress) can be barriers which need to be taken into account.
- In-group tensions (for example between different Muslim communities) fuel right-wing narratives.
- Violence by 2nd and 3rd generation refugees against newly arrived refugees is a problem.
- Tensions and racism among different refugee groups (e.g., African vs Middle East) are a challenge.
- It is sometimes difficult to know how to involve groups of men when volunteers are mostly women.
- Street workers in hotspots being considered to be deputy sheriffs by population and police creates problems.
- Finding long-term volunteers is difficult.

5.5.3 Suggestions collected

In the workshop the following suggestions were noted. They do not refer particularly to the topic of this chapter:

- There is an urgent need for recognition of the field of UCP/A. Talking about peacekeeping etc. should not automatically mean armed peacekeeping.
- Funding calls for UCP/A work.
- Support inside mediators and pay them, give them mediation training that is recognized.
- Decolonize UCP/A organizations.
- Do your own internal work on yourself, as a helper.

5.5.4 Conclusions

The relationship of this work to what NP calls Unarmed Civilian Protection/Accompaniment in a narrow sense is weak. With the mentioned exception of OC, protection rarely plays a role in the work of those committed to dealing with conflicts in communities from a conflict transformation point of departure. The approach here is to prevent violence by solving/dealing with conflicts. The same kind of conflict transformation work can be found in the Global South – thousands of local and international NGOs as well as governmental organizations are working on it.[142] However, when choosing UCP/A and the organizations identifying with this approach as a point of departure, one will find that they also engage in similar work in addition to protective presence, accompaniment etc., as has been described in the other Good Practice Workshops. For that reason, the good practices and challenges identified in the workshop and the interviews are also of relevance for UCP7/A.

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[142] The literature on that can be found in the thousands – just Google-search "conflict transformation" – the total number of hits is 365.000.000, many of which are publications.

6. Governmental Civilian Peacekeeping

There were two larger-scale civilian governmental peace-keeping missions in the area of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.[143]

6.1 European Monitoring Mission in Croatia (ECMM / EUMM)

The first was the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM, later EUMM, from 1991-2007).[144] The monitors were mainly recruited from civil servants (diplomats) and the military (usually seconded professional soldiers). Besides the (then 12) EC countries Canada, Sweden and some Eastern European countries also participated. The head of the mission automatically came from the country which had the EC (EU) presidency, and changed every six months (as did most of the monitors, few of whom had contracts for longer than six months.) The EUMM in the Western Balkans formally came to an end on 31 December 2007. During its final years it only maintained a presence in Montenegro and Albania. At inception in July 1991 the ECMM was sent to Slovenia and Croatia with a typical peacekeeping mandate, though without weapons, namely to help establish the ceasefire by:

- Lifting the blockade of the units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and facilities;
- Facilitating the unconditional return of JNA units to their barracks;
- Clearing roads;
- Effecting the return of all facilities and equipment to JNA;
- Monitoring the deactivation of territorial defense units and their return to quarters;
- Monitoring the suspension of the implementation of declarations of independence for the agreed period of three months in 1991;
- If and when required, monitoring the release and return of prisoners detained in connection with hostilities since 25 June 1991 in cooperation with ICRC.

With the deployment of UNPROFOR in 1992, the mandate of ECMM changed. It concentrated then on those thematic and geographic areas which did not fall under the UNPROFOR mandate, gathering information on ceasefire violations, military movements, the local civil situation and the status of implementation of the Vance Peace Plan of 1991 (the plan that had led to the deployment of UNPROFOR I). They maintained a presence on the ground, "stationed within the community they are responsible for and their members are living (at risk) under the same conditions as the surrounding civilian population" (Landry 1999:4). They also accompanied international negotiator teams, brokered local cease-fires, helped with the exchange of prisoners of war, escorted humanitarian aid (without arms), reported on human rights violations, etc.

At the end of 1992 EC monitors were also sent (on request by these states) to Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Macedonia. The intention of these deployments was to prevent 'spill-over', and to monitor the security situation. After 1996 they started working in Kosovo, and in November 1999 deployed observers to FR Yugoslavia to monitor the political and security developments, and facilitate contacts between the parties (Mauro 2002:303). In March 2001, EUMM also became active in North West Macedonia. They also got involved in small-scale humanitarian aid, for example delivering letters across border-lines, locating missing people etc. At that time, it consisted of approximately 100 monitors seconded by EU member states as well as by Norway and Slovakia.

6.1.1 Conclusions

The ECMM in the former Yugoslavia was the first such mission the EC (later EU) deployed. In Croatia the ECMM ran into many problems. It faced logistical dilemmas and suffered from poor

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[143] Although their civilian character however was limited since they operated in a heavily militarised environment. The Kosovo Verification Mission was protected by a NATO Extraction Force based in nearby Macedonia.

[144] This section is partly a reprint from Schweitzer 2010.

communication and confusion over objectives and priorities. The Serbs saw the monitors as spies for Croatia, while in Croatia they were considered highly ineffective and usually referred to by the nick-name 'ice-cream men' because of their white uniforms. Nevertheless, they may have achieved more on the ground than they were credited with at the time, preventing small incidents from leading to major confrontations through their interventions.

6.2 Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)

Under the threat of a NATO intervention in Kosovo in autumn 1998, the Yugoslav government under Milosevic agreed at the end of October 1998 to the deployment of a 'Kosovo Verification Mission' (KVM) under the umbrella of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[145] An unarmed OSCE mission was acceptable to both sides, although the Kosovo-Albanian leadership would have preferred an armed peacekeeping force. Deployment began in November 1998, but not having the personnel (or equipment) ready, the Mission only reached around 75% of the agreed number of 2,000 staff before it was withdrawn on 20 March 20 1999 after the collapse of the Rambouillet negotiations. The members of the mission were unarmed, but there was the NATO Extraction Force, deployed in Macedonia in December 1998 to protect the staff of the Kosovo Verification Mission.

The KVM's mandate was to establish a permanent presence throughout Kosovo, monitor the ceasefire agreed to between OSCE and FR Yugoslavia in October 1998 and to report cease-fire violations, conduct border monitoring, and facilitate the return of refugees along with ICRC and UNHCR. It was also anticipated that they would supervise elections in Kosovo. The Verifiers established permanent outposts in crisis areas, visited places where fighting was reported, monitored several court trials, conducted weapons verification inspections, accompanied Serbian police and Serbian investigators to places controlled by the UCK, and sought to intervene actively if they came across violent incidents.

The KVM had lots of problems to recruit sufficient staff – it never reached the full numbers before it had to withdraw. The personnel were mixed – some states only sent (former) soldiers and civil servants, others (like France) opened the ranks to people from civil society who were experienced in Kosovo. On each team, there was at least one military person which Dufour (2007) assesses as necessary due to the tasks – like assessing exchanges of fire and the like. They received some preparation before leaving to the field but no special training in de-escalation techniques or dialogue support.

6.2.1 Conclusions

The evaluation of KVM is rather contested. On the one hand, it undoubtedly managed to reduce violence by talking to both sides and convincing them to contain localized outbreaks of violence. In addition, their mere presence played a role in restraining violence. Specifically, at the beginning of the mission the cease-fire was respected. Both the Serbs and the more moderate commanders of the UCK were willing to stop fighting, which gave a chance for stabilization of the situation. Refugees and displaced persons returned in greater numbers as the fighting calmed down. According to one source, even in January-February 1999 when the situation became tense again, the arrival of KVM personnel on the scene usually had a de-escalating effect.[146]

On the other hand, the Verifiers could not contain the violence. There were attacks on police and civilians all the time to varying degrees, and increasingly also on the Verifiers themselves. The agreement to deploy KVM was also flawed because it was an agreement between the USA and FR Yugoslavia, with the UCK not being a party to it, and not feeling bound by it. The cease-fire was also

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[145] This section is partly a reprint from Schweitzer 2010.

[146] See Schweitzer 2010.

used by the UCK to move back into its strongholds as soon as the Yugoslavs withdrew, probably in preparation for a new offensive in spring 1999. [147]

The rapporteur's evaluation would be that under the circumstances KVM was deployed - with one party of the conflict explicitly hoping to bring about the military intervention already threatened against the other party - the KVM was surprisingly successful in the field regarding prevention of violence.

6.3 European Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM)

Since the Peace Agreement of 2008 (see chapter 3.4), the EU has maintained an "unarmed civilian monitoring mission" in Georgia which also has some elements of UCP/A, similar to its earlier work in the Balkans mentioned above. The mission describes itself as follows:

> Our priorities are:
>
> - to ensure that there is no return to hostilities;
> - to facilitate the resumption of a safe and normal life for the local communities living on both sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABL) with Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
> - to build confidence among the conflict parties;
> - to inform EU policy in Georgia and the wider region.
>
> Ever since our deployment we have been patrolling day and night, particularly in the areas adjacent to the ABLs with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We have around 200 monitors from various EU Member States working on the ground. Our Headquarters are in Tbilisi and we have Field Offices in Gori, Mtskheta and Zugdidi.[148]

A lot of their activities seem to consist of meeting with politicians at different levels. There is an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) to discuss security- related issues, including detentions and the situation at the boundaries to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that meets from time to time; in July 2020 there was the first meeting of the IPRM in one year. One element is a conflict prevention hotline that saw 1,400 activations in one year (2017).[149] The hotline is meant to help communication across the boundary lines between the parties, and help *inter alia* facilitate the release of detainees, the safety of agricultural works near the Administrative Boundary Lines and early notification of particular activities, such as military exercises.

Monitors patrol the boundary lines regularly. During these patrols, they meet with community members and leaders to discuss the situation. In 2017, they conducted more than 4,800 such patrols.

Their leaflet says:

> Whenever an incident occurs, or other security related issue happens, we facilitate information exchange to clarify the situation, and avoid any creation or escalation of tensions.

All these are clearly functions and activities that would belong to the broader field of UCP/A.

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[147] Some opponents of NATO intervention have voiced the suspicion that the KVM was no more than a smoke screen to prepare the NATO campaign and spy out military targets for NATO. The facts in the sources and secondary literature, however, all tend to indicate that NATO was already prepared and willing to attack, not wishing a second protracted war like in Bosnia, but that it did not have a primary overriding interest in starting this war as soon as a pretext offered itself.

[148] https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm. They add: "Our mandate is valid throughout all of Georgia. However, the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have so far denied us access to the territories under their control."

[149] See the sources quoted under 10.3.5

Although they emphasize that they do not finance projects and do not provide aid, there is a Confidence Building Facility which finances projects – ten in 2017 with €150,000 - "contributing to civil society dialogue and exchange across the Administrative Boundary Lines", their 2017 report states. "Among the projects launched were an internet radio station in the Abkhaz language for unbiased fact-based news, a training series for internally displaced women in civil engagement with a view to enhancing their participation in peace building processes, and a workshop for young leaders from Abkhazia and Tbilisi-administrated Territory on how to overcome environmental challenges through cooperation across the Administrative Boundary Line."[150]

6.3.1 Conclusions

The EUMM in Georgia seems to be a respected and effective tool of preserving the unstable cease-fire in that country.[151] Staff recruitment processes by now have been established by the EU and most of its member organizations, so it does not seem to suffer from the shortcomings of the earlier EUMM in the former Yugoslavia. A more in-depth study of its work might be interesting. As they describe, their presence and facilitation lead to the decrease of tensions, and thereby indirectly to protection of people though protection of civilians is not part of their mandate.

6.4 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM)

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) maintains many missions of different character. One of them, the mission to Ukraine, similarly to the KVM described above, has components that could be considered as UCP/A, although probably to a lesser extent.

The violent conflict in Ukraine started when the new Ukrainian government that was formed after the civil resistance "Maidan" movement, which lasted from 2013 until the beginning of 2014, announced its intention to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union. Eastern and south-eastern regions of Ukraine did not wish to follow what they saw as an Anti-Russian move. The region of Crimea, after a referendum whose credibility is in doubt, chose to join Russia or – depending on the political standpoint – was annexed by Russia. In two other regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, fighting between Russian-supported militias and the Ukrainian military broke out. In spite of a ceasefire agreement (the Minsk Agreement) concluded in 2015, the fighting has never fully stopped.

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) was deployed on 21 March 2014, following a request to the OSCE by Ukraine's government and a consensus decision by all 57 OSCE participating States. The Mission currently (April 2021) consists of more than 700[152] unarmed civilian monitors from 44 OSCE member states; and local staff from Ukraine who work as language assistants, administrative assistants and advisers.

The SMM is an unarmed, civilian mission, in theory present on the ground 24/7 in all regions of Ukraine. Practically however, its movements are restricted and access to those areas that announced their split from Ukraine is difficult. Its main tasks are to observe and report in an impartial and objective way on the situation in Ukraine; and to facilitate dialogue among all parties to the crisis. It gathers information about the security situation and reports on it, especially on specific incidents on the ground. The Mission monitors talk to various community groups -authorities at all levels, civil society, ethnic and religious groups and local communities. At first glance, the monitoring and reporting of ceasefire violations are the core of the SMM, and most daily reports contain incidents

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[150] Annual report 2017

[151] There had been until 2009 also a UN Monitoring mission but it had to be ended because Russia vetoed its extension in the UN Security Council.

[152] 712, 575 male and 137 female, according to Status Report from 5 April, 2021

and document that OSCE members were once more prevented from crossing boundary lines. However, in the daily reports there are some indications that the mission at times also gets involved in actively intervening in situations: "The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure", as an example from a daily report.

6.4.1 Conclusions

To what degree protection is part of the work of the SMM is less clear than in the case of EUMM in Georgia. When browsing through the daily reports, they mostly seem to focus on establishing facts regarding breaches of the unstable cease-fire, keeping track of civilians being allowed or not allowed to cross the boundary lines, and complaining about being denied access. From time to time, there are indications that they got involved in other activities which may fall under UCP/A as well. It may be interesting to follow up on their work through a more in-depth research or interview as well.

6.4 Recruitment, training, conditions of service in governmental missions

The current situation in 2021 is very different from it was in the 1990s when most of the missions described here took place. Then and today, it is the individual governments that supply staff to such missions. For the KVM, that meant, for example, that France included people from civil society who had a good knowledge of Kosovo, while Germany only recruited civil servants and a few academics. At that time, there was no special training for such civilian missions, only some preparation that focused on legal and security issues and gave some background on the situation on the ground. The teams were mixed internationally, again as they are today, but it was possible that their level of preparation was quite different. Today, in most European countries as well as at the level of the EU, recruitment of civilian staff for international missions is much more formalized, and some countries have even established their own training facilities (like the Center for International Peace Missions, ZIF, in Germany, for example).

The staff receives their normal salary plus an extra supplement for international service and quite good per diems. What was missing were provisions for cases when someone was seriously hurt and in consequence not able to return to her/his work. In Germany, this changed only a couple of years ago after a couple of incidents in North Africa, the state now takes full responsibility for such cases.[153]

6.5 Summary

As already argued in the NP Feasibility Study, there are purely civilian governmental missions that can be subsumed under UCP/A.[154] There are, of course, certain differences, and here is a tentative reflection of what these differences might be:

- They are being sent under an agreement between governments – the sending governments or an international organization (UN, OSCE, and EU) on the one hand and the hosting government on the other. There are no such civilian missions that have been sent against the will of the country of deployment, unlike some armed military interventions sent by the United Nations under Chapter VII, though consistent with the practice of what has been called "classical" or "traditional" military peacekeeping.[155]

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[153] The rapporteur is not sure if that is the same for personnel seconded from other countries.

[154] The author is aware that this is a controversial view and some people, especially in Nonviolent Peaceforce, are not in agreement, wishing to reserve the concept of UCP/A to NGOs only.

[155] See for example Bellamy & Williams 2015.

- This is in contrast with INGO projects that are usually based on an invitation from a local organization, or UCP/A carried out by a local organization itself. The government may or may not want the INGO to be present.
- Their staff is highly dominated by seconded civil servants and military although there may be people from a nongovernmental background involved as well.
- In spite of the described problems with staff recruitment, the infrastructure backing the staff of these missions is much bigger and able to cover all needs than is usually the case with NGOs.
- Their SOPs usually limit what they do much more than it is the case with NGOs, because any change needs approval through an often rather complex bureaucratic structure. The local civil society may or may not welcome the observers. In Croatia in the early 1990s, the EUMM observers were objects of derogatory jokes.[156] Moreover, civil society itself was rather in line with the nationalist sentiments of their governments and there were only a few small groups advocating for nonviolence.
- Direct protection has never been the core of the mandate, although some of the missions have a broader focus on violence prevention.[157]
- In some cases, protection may have been more an outcome of other activities like monitoring and assessing breaches of ceasefires. This may not be so dissimilar to the ceasefire monitoring by NGOs.
- NGOs usually claim that they are independent of their governments and of national agendas (if in fact they always are, could be discussed); governmental missions are ruled by the governments that send them.

There is no reason why this instrument of international organization could not be expanded and replicated in other situations as well. So far, this instrument only seems to have been used when deployment of military forces was excluded for one reason or the other, but rarely as a first option.

6.5.1 Good practices

- A mandate wide enough to allow flexibility and direct protection.
- Using NGO representatives in the missions, not only civil servants.
- The deployment needs to be supported by all parties to the conflict.
- Train civilian monitors in UCP/A techniques.

6.5.2 Challenges

- Monitors lack experience and training in nonviolent methods.
- Use of missions for wider political objectives from the side of the deploying countries.
- Perception of the missions as not being impartial or pursuing national interests of third countries.
- Unrealistic expectation of civilian monitors in a violent context.
- High turn-over rate to due limited length of deployment.
- Limited mandate and inflexible SOPs prevent effective intervention even when people on the ground think it would be possible.

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[156] Own knowledge of the author.

[157] However, it seems unclear if for UCP/A NGOs protection is in all cases really the objective and core of their activities. So perhaps this difference is not as big as it seems at first glance.

6.5.3 Suggestions

These suggestions were not collected at the workshop for from the literature or interviews, but are being put forward by the rapporteur:

- Enhance cooperation between such missions and civil society UCP/A organizations when both are present in a country to strengthen the mandate of both.
- Add direct protection by nonviolent means to the mandate of such missions (instead of looking towards armed peacekeepers to provide such protection).
- Increase the number of people with a NGO background an experience in UCP/A in such missions.
- Conduct joint trainings for NGOs and governmental missions in UCP/A.

6.5.4 Conclusions

These missions for the most part seem to have been deployed when military missions had to be ruled out for political reasons. This is very clear in the case of the KVM and the SMM. It may be suspected that the States agreeing on them saw them more as a substitute for military peacekeeping than as a proven tool in its own right; sometimes international military was expected to protect the civilian monitors[158]. The usual philosophy of protection of civilians, when asking government representatives, is that only the military can protect civilians. Therefore, the military is needed for keeping both the local population and the international civilian experts that are deployed safe. The reality that civilians can also provide protection, while being obvious on the ground, has not made it into the mandates of these international missions (yet).

However, they could play an important role in protection of civilians if their mandates allow them to do so. In Europe, many NGOs committed to peace and nonviolence advocate for civilian peacekeeping missions by UN, OSCE or EU.[159]

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[158] So in the case of KVM by NATO troops in Macedonia, and for the ECMM in Croatia by UNPROFOR:

[159] The Green faction of the European Parliament in the 1990s pursued a proposal for a Civilian Peace Corps deployed by the EU. The initiative came from the late South Tyrolian politician Andreas Langer and was continued by Ernest Gülcher: https://www.alexanderlanger.org/en/284/1365. There have been some attempts to revive the proposal but it seems that it got stuck in some subcommittees of the EC (you use both EU and EC in this sentence, is it just one?). The European Solidarity Corps that was launched in 2016 is more a voluntary learning service for young people, comparable to the U.S. Peace Corps but not sent to conflict areas as the original proposal by Langer had envisioned. (See https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/5h0i9l/eu_gets_its_own_version_of_the_peace_corps/

In Germany there is the initiative "Rethinking Security (Sicherheit neu denken) which advocates for "just policing" instead of international military, and also sees civilian peacekeeping as an option for some cases. www.sicherheitneudenken.de)

From the francophone world, there is the initiative "Promote a European security and peace policy", initiated by the Institut de recherche sur la Résolution Non-violente des Conflits and Agir pour la paix. Its appeal is supported by 27 European organizations and is called „Action to finance and send civilian peace intervention missions by the European Union as part of its security and peace policy", **https://**www.irnc.org/IRNC/Actualites/IRNC/2689.

7. Summary and Conclusions

7.1 Outlining the Framework of UCP/A in Europe

The conflict issues the European organizations responded to in this Good Practice project dealt with:

- Wars (mostly civil wars)
- Violence and rights' violations against minorities, refugees and People of Color.
- Dealing with police violence (an issue that overlapped largely with the first two categories).
- Tensions and conflicts in communities, and
- Organized crime. (This last category was only looked at in the literature review.)

In the sample, there are both activities undertaken by international organizations and activities by local people, with the second constituting the large majority. There were also some mixed organizations with both national and international staff and volunteers.

There seem to have been at least two sources that motivated civil society actors to engage in UCP/A or UCP/A-comparable activities in Europe. One is the tradition of nonviolence going back to Gandhi and other nonviolent protagonists of 100 years ago or more. Most of the peace teams and peace marches described here would fall under that category, as well as some of the organizations working with refugees or in communities. The principles they adhered to were, when formulated, similar to those listed in the good practice workshops, including nonviolence, working on invitation, nonpartisanship and independence.

A second type of activities seems to have developed without reference to that tradition, simply based on the urgent need people have felt to 'do something' against an evil (e.g., violence, injustice, discrimination) they observed. They then developed their own approaches and strategies.

7.1.1 How much Unarmed Civilian Protection has there been in Europe?

Perhaps more strongly than in the other regional workshops, in the European Good Practice process the question arose where to draw boundaries between what NP calls UCP/A, and other kinds of activities.

There are some organizations that undertook activities that are usually counted as central for UCP/A, like protective accompaniment and presence. Most of them were active in situations of civil war or dealing with refugee issues – Cyprus Resettlement Project, BPT and many others in the Balkans of the early 1990s, CPT in Greece, OC in Kosovo and Albania. But they do not concentrate that "purely" on protection as the core of their mandate as some organizations, for example in Latin America, do. Many of them combined protective accompaniment and presence with dialogue promotion, activities that could be rated as social work (for example running a youth center) and physical reconstruction, protection being only one angle and often not the predominant one. They have moved further away from the centrality of protection.

The groups currently working with refugees see their work more as acts of solidarity and witnessing, and most of them reject the term "protection" to describe their work. The reasons seem to differ: Some may have experienced that they are not able to effectively protect refugees from police, and therefore speak rather of witnessing. Others point out that protection is a function and task the State has to take care of, and that their role is to monitor whether and how the State fulfills its obligations in this regard.

Monitoring of protests and of police behavior sometimes had an element of intervention to prevent or stop violence but more often it was about gathering information to be put into reports afterwards, and using these reports either to open dialogue with the different parties, or to use them for public relations work or in legal proceedings.

The same observation can be made for the governmental missions described in section (6) that monitor ceasefires or boundary lines in civil war contexts but whose mandate is about reporting, not direct intervention or protection of civilians.

Work in communities, the last category we identified, focuses largely on prevention and bringing parties in conflict together. Whether such work with actors on the ground who may be victims or perpetrators of such violence, could or should be called Unarmed Civilian Protection, is doubtful. Of course, people are protected if there is no violence or violence is quickly stopped. But there may be no accompaniment, protective presence, monitoring or any focus on keeping individuals or communities from harm.

A special case is the protection work by Nash Dom in Belarus both in context (civilian movement against a dictatorship) and methods (blaming and shaming of civil servants). Another special case is dealing with organized crime in Italy where people tend to rely on (in the end, violence-based) protection by the police and putting public pressure on the criminal networks through mass protests.

7.1.2 Principles

There have been no big surprises regarding the observations on principles that have been made in other workshops. Many organizations, although not all explicitly, consider nonviolence as a principle – not only those standing in the tradition of peace teams or peace services, but also some others that developed independently. Occasionally it was mentioned that different interpretations of what nonviolence meant in practice became an issue, as in the early Cyprus project of the World Peace Brigade.

Impartiality and nonpartisanship are a principle many groups adhere to as well, again with some exceptions where activists saw their engagement as a contribution in solidarity to victims – here in this case mostly to refugees. Operazione Colomba coined a special term for their approach, equiproximity. In other contexts, organizations outside Europe have talked of "allpartisanship" when describing a similar approach, of being close to all sides, rather than proclaiming neutrality and keeping a strict distance from all sides.

A slightly different picture emerges in regard to the principle of primacy of local actors, probably due to the fact that the majority of the organizations we looked at are local actors themselves. While most organizations professed the need for close cooperation on the ground, and giving a voice to the victims, perhaps only half of them became active on request by other local actors, or formulated being guided by local actors as an explicit principle. Many decided to involve themselves and then built cooperation and networks on the ground. Independence was rarely listed as a principle, with the exception of BPT, although many organizations emphasized in their publications and/or the interviews and workshop the need of independence from political actors, certain funders and government structures.

As to the other principles discussed in the earlier workshops, none of them were mentioned in this European Good Practice project although this may be due to the different process. For example, the principle of "do no harm" had been proposed by NP in the earlier workshops and then people discussed it and most agreed that it of course was essential.

7.1.3 Basic Strategies of Protection

The basic strategies applied are not so different from those already described in earlier regional workshops, perhaps with the exception of Nash Dom's activities in Belarus. Relationship-building plays a much larger role than deterrence[160] in the sense that pbi and others have defined deterrence as a function of accompaniment by volunteers who can activate a shield. The exception are the wars in the former Yugoslavia, perhaps Cyprus, and Belarus where deterrence has been achieved locally,

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[160] See Mahony & Eguren 1997

by threatening individual perpetrators with public shaming. In some other cases it seems that deterrence has not or only sometimes worked even when it was tried – that seems to be the case when dealing with police-refugee confrontations as well as monitoring of demonstrations from Northern Ireland to current cases. In these cases, police are not deterred from violence and unwarranted arrests, but the presence of witnesses, or even video of their actions, makes later legal action regarding human rights violations possible.

This observation may hypothetically be explained by the fact that in Europe there is no perceived power gap between monitors and actors as there is in Latin America or many countries of Asia. "White privilege" and post-colonial international structures that give internationals a special status and role which allows them to protect local activists are mostly absent in Europe. There has been no project in the sample with only Asian or African UCP/A practitioners, without Europeans or North Americans in the team, and from the observations organizations made that tried mixed teams (Gorleben for example) it is doubtful if such teams would find the same respect as for example North Americans find in Latin America. More likely, they would be the first to be arrested and deported.

A last element important to emphasize is that several projects have a larger goal of changing the way state institutions work, for example how police act or what regulations and policies governments develop in regard of dealing with refugees. Often their monitoring on the ground has the function of providing the information for this kind of advocacy or protest work. This is not, for the most part, internationals trying to change a foreign state, but local people trying to impact their own state institutions.

7.1.4 The Role of Gender and Racism in Accompaniment

Gender awareness seems to play a larger role in many of the described projects than issues of racism and overcoming colonial structures. Some projects reported that only recently have they made efforts to diversify their teams, including more PoC and Non-Christians in their work. As to gender, most paid attention to work with mixed teams, some do trainings on gender issues, and many experienced challenges resulting from working in rather patriarchal settings.

7.2 Tactics of Protection

The tactics of protection, as it is called in the earlier reports of the Good Practice series, or simply activities included:

- Protective accompaniment, for example of people of one ethnic background when going to a territory controlled by another group (BPT, CPT, OC in Kosovo) and of human rights defenders when dealing with police (BPT).
- Monitoring of demonstrations played an important role during the Troubles in Northern Ireland as well as in the work of civil rights organizations currently. It is sometimes combined with direct intervention, but more often, as mentioned above, it focuses more on collecting information for reports. Refugee support organizations monitor police actions against refugee camps.
- Report writing, and then using reports for confidential meetings with actors, for public advocacy or in the context of legal proceedings against perpetrators, is an important activity in the field of police monitoring.
- Presence in certain locations: CPT is present in one or several refugee camps on Lesvos, OC maintained presence in the villages where it worked with the local population, sharing their daily life.
- Patrolling is a tactic mostly found in this sample in the case of the governmental missions, although there was also some patrolling early in the Northern Ireland conflict.

- Visiting (in camps for example), meeting and talking to people to introduce oneself, to assess the situation and needs, and to build trust for later activities is a frequent activity.
- Interpositioning was the idea of the short-term peace caravans in Bosnia-Hercegovina[161] in the former Yugoslavia, none of them achieving any lasting impact. It also took place in some violent situations at demonstrations in Northern Ireland.
- Helping to facilitate the return of IDPs and refugees played a role in both Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia.
- Setting up phone networks for early warning was a tactic used in different contexts, for example in Northern Ireland and in Germany in the 1990s.
- Peace caravans / marches have been tried several times during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. They had an element of interpositioning although mostly they aimed at expressing solidarity with the victims of war.
- Dialogue between hostile groups has been pursued by several organizations, especially in the former Yugoslavia.
- Bridging of individuals and local groups to local authorities, and/or other international or national actors, has played a role in particular in the Balkans.
- Mediation is an activity that plays a role in some of the conflict prevention and transformation work in communities, for example in Germany and Albania.
- Establishing round tables for dialogue has also been done mostly in the conflict prevention and transformation work.
- Establish meeting points, for example in hotspots in communities, where people can come together for exchange and enjoy a safe place, has also been done.
- Training for empowerment or enhancing special skills is found in many projects, with local actors as well as in some cases with police.
- A very special method is Nash Dom's establishment of a database of civil servants and publishing human rights violations committed by individual members of the security services.
- Combining different types of work is a common approach for local/national organizations. Since in the European context most organizations fall into that category, it is not surprising that such combinations were common. A combination of dialogue, protection and physical reconstruction and humanitarian aid was an approved and successful approach in some European cases, such as Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia.
- Advocacy for the needs of refugees, different SOPs of police, and a change of migration laws, inter alia, is an important part of the work of many of the organizations looked at. Such advocacy is often done in cooperation with allies that may concentrate solely on such work.
- Organizing public events on relevant issues is an activity that some organizations undertook.
- Founding and running youth centers or youth activities with the intention of using them as a vehicle of bringing hostile groups together is another activity that was reported.
- Plan and help with the physical reconstruction of destroyed houses was an important activity both in Cyprus and Pakrac.

7. 3 Managing UCP/A Projects

7.3.1 Volunteers and Staff

With the exception of the organizations working on conflict transformation in communities and NP in Georgia, most groups and initiatives were/are mostly or exclusively working with volunteers; some

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[161] They were mentioned above in connection to Beati i costruttori di pace; besides the two caravans they organized, there have been a one or two more. See Schweitzer 2010.

have (had) a paid coordinator. In case of the international projects, the length of stay of the volunteers varied a lot, from 1-2 years to a few weeks.

The NGO type teams are either purely local or mix local and internationals, with only two longer-term exceptions, projects that excluded nationals: BPT and OC. The governmental missions recruit staff among the member states of the organization deploying the mission, while in some cases also employing local staff.

A number of the organizations have organized /are organizing preparatory trainings for their volunteers. The length of these trainings seems to vary from a couple of hours to several days or longer.

7.3.2 Cooperation Between Different Actors

In the cases of (civil) war settings, the relationship to the international governmental interveners, especially the military peace-keepers, is ambivalent. The KVM was protected by a NATO force placed in the neighborhood. In Cyprus there was a close cooperation with the UN Forces. In the Balkans, many activists were partly motivated by demonstrating an alternative to military intervention and kept a clear distance and maintained cooperation at a minimal level, which they also justified by finding better acceptance on the ground (BPT). Others – human rights, humanitarian and also peace service organizations –generally displayed a higher degree of cooperation with the military forces (for example seeking out the military peace-keepers as first option for protection), but again there was one case in the sample where this was not done because the group in question felt that accompaniment by the military increased instead of lowered the risk.

Building a relationship to civilian security forces, police, has proven to be controversial. As in North America, the attitudes towards police and engaging police vary a lot, from a total refusal to have anything to do with them through informal contact on the ground to formal contact with the police commanding structure and offering trainings on human rights etc. to police.

7.3.3 Exit Strategies

Exiting the field was a challenge for most projects; in this regard the experience in Europe does not differ from that of projects on other continents. Some projects broke down for lack of support or staff (BPT in Kosovo) or by governmental decision (KVM), others lost their welcome (Cyprus), yet other projects just dwindled away over the years, and a few were closed when the organization felt that it had achieved its goals (OC). Others are still continuing many years later, though their focus may have changed.

7.3.4 Widening Accompaniment in the Region

BPT began with the idea to deploy larger numbers of volunteers to Kosovo and quickly found that this was impossible. A representative of OC wrote that "with a massive presence of international civilians' groups - more widespread in different areas – practicing unarmed civilian protection, and if our activities had been part of an organic and broad plan, our action could have been transformative on a vast scale"[162]. The Kosovo Verification Mission was planned for 2,000 verifiers – a number it never reached. The sense that larger numbers would make a difference was said perhaps more explicitly in Europe than it has been said in the earlier workshops where "larger scale" was often related to covering more countries rather than being with larger numbers in one place. This is certainly a question that will need further discussion in the last phase of the Good Practice project.

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[162] Zurlini 2021

7.4 Questions and Recommendations

The literature review, interviews and online meetings on UCP/A in Europe concluded this phase of the Good Practice project undertaken by Nonviolent Peaceforce. What has yet to follow, is a divided international conference- the first part online towards the end of 2021, the second part hopefully face-to face in June 2022. This report is not the place to draw final conclusions from the workshop series. However, a few issues and questions are highlighted for further discussion at these conferences and in the wider field of those who were involved in the project:

- One main issue that came up is that the presence of international teams is dependent on the good-will of the countries they are working/volunteering in. With the growing post-democratic and authoritarian regimes with strong right-wing and racist overtones, there is a serious question as to whether the space for UCP shrinking, not only for international actors but for national as well (France, Belarus). Here in Europe several conflicts and places were marked where UCP/A was contemplated but could not take place – will that number grow? Are there strategies to overcome this?
- A second question was mentioned in the section above: Could larger numbers of UCP/A practitioners make a difference and change the conflict parameters at large?
- It is important to revisit the question of "pure UCP" in the light of the positive experiences made in Europe in combining protection with social work and physical reconstruction. This question has been raised before in earlier workshops but has yet to be answered. One suggestion made by Huibert Oldenhuis who commented on the draft of this report was to distinguish three types of UCP:
  a) Pure/orthodox**:** Organizations that have a strict focus on provision of strategic physical presence to protect, roughly meaning protective accompaniment, protective presence, interpositioning and patrols. But even these orgs will do additional things such as advocacy that they would argue is part of the protection process or strengthens that. Perhaps early PBI work would fit this.
  b) Integral/fusion: UCP complemented with other activities that further enhance a protective environment or interrupt cycles of violence, like conflict mitigation or medical accompaniments, gender-based violence (GBV) awareness, dialogue and capacity building. Often a protective aspect is fused into non protective activities such as supporting a mediation process etc. One could also fit reconstruction work by CPT or Ecumenical Accompaniment Project in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) or OC here sometimes as it may not be completely separate from their protective presence.
  c) Multiple hats/UCP on the side of other activities.
- How does the definition of UCP/A relate to conflict transformation and prevention, where are boundaries distinguishing UCP/A from peacebuilding in general? Is trying to distinguish such a boundary helpful?

8. Documentation

8.1 Good Practices

<u>Before and during war</u>

Cyprus
- The project was systematic in its formulation and development, based on explicit theory and documentation along the way.
- The project was openly and clearly nonviolent, made explicit in relevant ways at local, national and international levels.
- National groups contributed to the transnational project.
- Access was achieved through former UN officials.
- Home building and protective presence was achieved simultaneously.
- There was periodic evaluation by participants and others from stage to stage.
- There was sufficient funding.

Northern Ireland
- Combining monitoring and mediation.
- Patience.
- Engage in early and sustained intervention.[163]
- Field unarmed peace patrols in the evenings in order to diffuse tense situations.
- Wear some kind of identification or physically keeping distance to make the nonpartisan role clear, being visible as a monitor and known to the actors on the ground.[164]
- Building relationships so as to be known and respected as a representative of an organization or because of the personal relationship with the parties to the dispute.[165]
- Use male role models.[166]
- Nonpartisanship as a principle.
- Monitoring requires police to know you. This leads to a relationship that allows monitors to move between the lines which gives both protection and leverage.
- Interpositioning is effective in some concrete situations.
- Cooperation with police and army to deescalate violence can be effective.
- Communities keeping open lines of communication (e.g., phone networks) across the interface/divide and to respond to rumors, the gathering of crowds and minor acts of violence.
- Combine monitoring of demonstrations with mediation on the ground.[167]
- Good reporting on what was observed and making these reports available for advocacy work regarding behavior of security forces for future events or a police reform or for complaints before international tribunals / courts, UN Bodies etc.

<u>Former Yugoslavia</u>
- Send international volunteers to projects run by local NGOs.
- Partner with other organizations that have skills the UCP/A organization itself lack.
- A flexible mandate allows an organization to respond to different requests by the local partners.

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[163] These three were listed in the Powerpoint presentation by Rob Fairmichael at the workshop.

[164] Workshop discussion

[165] Bryan & Jarman 1999:40-41

[166] Workshop discussion

[167] Northern Ireland

- Nurture personal relationships.
- Horizontal decision-making within the projects is valued.
- Engage in physical work (reconstruction for example) because it builds unity and solidarity.
- Living and being together with local people is important.
- Be transparent about equiproximity to all sides.
- Create meeting points for people from all sides – this could also be a volunteer camp.
- Cooperate with activists "from the other side" of the conflict.
- Host dialogues between locals and international police.
- Build nonviolent life skills.
- Provide escorts to people at risk to move from one community to the next, or activists visiting fellow activists across the political divide.
- Monitoring and reporting are critical practices.
- Help communities to "re-humanize" the "enemy".
- Speak to the conflict sides confidentially in order to influence their behavior.
- Monitors need to check rumors.
- Be there just to listen to people affected by violence and war.
- Organize exchange and learning from other conflict places (for example Northern Ireland).
- It is good when international donors fund locally-run peace teams.

South Caucasus
- Choose the right participants for trainings –people who are committed and have a solid base in their local community.
- Choose a strategic place for the field office.
- Use project staff for a new project that has experience in earlier projects elsewhere.[168]
- Do trainings with groups on both sides of the boundary lines first separately, and then bring them together to a third neutral place.

<u>Working For the Rights and Security of Refugees</u>
- Long-term presence and projects are critical.
- Don't rush with activism. Build trust before you push.
- Focus on realistic, concrete goals.
- Discuss and plan together with those affected by violence what strategy to use, leave the decision what kind of support they wish to those affected.
- Do not only look at violent behavior but also at structural violence.
- Build trust by just visiting, walking around or setting up a focal point (mobile café for example) and meeting people in a camp or in a neighborhood
- Avoid a patronizing attitude and just help those affected to make their voice heard instead of speaking for them.
- There is more impact when several organizations work together when seeking contact to the authorities.
- Great impact can be achieved through coalitions between refugees and non-refugees.
- Access networks you do not usually work with.
- Engage with the public because that may increase support.
- Balance protocols and creative dialogue.
- Involve local entrepreneurs who give work to refugees.
- Precise observation is important.
- Maintain long-term documentation that can serve as institutional memory.
- Engage the neighborhood; involve the local population in refugee issues and seek its support.

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[168] Which did not happen in South Caucasus and was noted as missing.

- Bring people together and open space for dialogue. Round tables may be one such approach.
- Counter attempts to criminalize refugees.
- Involve police in planning responses to attacks by right-wing mobs.
- Offer training for local police.
- Set up alarm networks by phone.
- Serve as transmitters of the voices of the refugees vis-à-vis authorities or media but do not speak for them.
- Offer legal advice to refugees.
- Work with refugees who were deported back home: Support social cohesion and conflict resolution among them.
- Use cultural interpreters when properly trained to translate and mediate with authorities because they understand the background of the refugees better.

Monitoring and Protecting Against Violence by Police and Other State Agencies

- Be neutral in regard to the issues demonstrators are raising, promoting. Assume an impartial / neutral[169] attitude when monitoring protests.
- Support grassroots documentation by refugees: Give refugees access to mobile phones so that they can themselves document what is happening.
- Always work at least in pairs. If the situation is very tense, send monitoring teams of at least three people, with one person focusing on the security and safety of the monitors.
- When filming or taking pictures of protesters, ask for their permission even if the data protection law allows such filming / taking pictures. (Please however notice that some organizations do not consider visual recording a good practice at all.)
- Photograph and film only police, not the protesters, so that there is no evidence against them that the police could use for court trials.
- Photographing/ filming may pacify a situation because police know there is evidence produced.[170]
- Make use of photos and films in court.
- When publishing photos/films, make sure that faces cannot be recognized.
- Bearing witness is powerful even without video.
- Provide and implement training / awareness of safe ways to communicate electronically, for example using Telegram or Signal, Jitsy as a platform, encryption of data, using phones without personal data on them etc.
- Acknowledge that police are not a uniform anonymous body but that police forces consist of individuals with different attitudes. There are many examples of individual police people who disagree with what their colleagues do and who try to protect vulnerable people even if their colleagues do not do so.
- The quality of the working relationship with the police can have a considerable bearing on the ability of monitors to work on the ground.
- Engage with individual commanders.
- Humanizing does not negate accountability.
- Strengthen/empower communities and activists to know how to talk to /deal with police and know how to respond in cases of persecution and arrest.
- Inform police that they have the right to disobey obviously illegal orders.[171]

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[169] Different groups use different terms when describing their approach.

[170] This is suspected to be one reason behind a new law project in France forbidding the filming of police; In May 2021 however, the French Constitutional Court (the highest court in France) sanctioned the project (especially on the filming issue) and the government now has to work this and other articles anew. Tensions around this issue remain high between HR defenders and authorities because police forces are being targeted for violent aggressions and murders.

[171] In France, there is an organization specialized on this. The produced the following booklet: https://tousmigrants.weebly.com/uploads/7/3/4/6/73468541/-livret-au_nom_de_la_loi.pdf

- Public shaming of individual perpetrators has proven to be an effective tactic.
- Train police – even on nonviolence.
- Make yourself visible/recognizable as monitors.
- Use clothing or ID cards so as to be recognized as monitors.
- Deploy gender-wise mixed teams to counter the machismo of the police.
- Work in consensus during the observation and base the team's behavior on the person willing /being able to take the least risk.

Working with Tensions in Communities to Prevent or Reduce Violence

- Initiate low-key intervention and networking with local institutions.
- Transparency in the work is very important.
- It is essential to be on the ground and listening to all sides.
- Support and/or create space for different groups to come together to deescalate conflicts.
- Start work to bring together people with different or hostile backgrounds by finding a minimum common ground. Provoke "impossible" meetings (meetings that are considered impossible because they take place between hostile individuals or groups).
- Bring children from different sides of a divide together for a work camp or an activity, and thereby indirectly also address their parents.
- Work with trainer teams that are mixed in many ways: gender, ethnic/national background, religion, pacifists and former soldiers, etc.
- Network with other institutions, including religious organizations and local administration.
- Confidential dialogue behind closed doors may lead to breakthroughs regarding relationships between groups.
- Stand by people and never give up on them, with patience. This also means standing by people physically, to live with them, and presupposes learning the language, the background, history, which gestures are respectful etc.
- Spread the message: do advocacy at many different levels of society, including in the diaspora. Advocate for application of laws to generate pressure by international organizations on governments to change their behavior.
- Publicize nonviolent interventions.
- Protect the privacy of the victims/people.
- Provide unarmed accompaniment (civil escorts): this is important to guarantee the freedom of movement of the accompanied but also to build trusting relationships with these families and to break isolation.
- Initiate a restorative justice path inside and between concerned families (concerned by blood feud).
- Open people's mind to nonviolent alternatives.
- Be present when and where the people are.
- Open up public space in the evenings to engage with youth.
- Address and meet informally and without publicity with the heads of different (ethnic, religious) groups in order to discuss controversial issues of common interest.
- If working in a foreign country, learn the local language even if you are a short-term volunteer.
- Bring different generations together so that they can learn from each other.
- Before going to a new place, contact all authorities, including police.
- Offer Alternatives to Violence Project trainings.
- Organize community dialogue in crisis situations.
- Develop solidarity events focused on people who need help.
- Talk to people who really know the context.
- Listening and empathy are essential activities.
- Raise awareness of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms.

- Deliberately move to difficult communities and live there as a neighbor as a central practice in an intervention.
- Counter hate-speech online.
- Mobilize leaders of community groups to de-escalate violence and the threat of violence.
- Support families in reconciliation processes.
- Create personal space for women by providing child care.
- Support inside mediators who have a lot of influence and shield them against exploitation that tries to force them to offer their services for free while other mediators are being paid.

Governmental Civilian Peacekeeping

- A mandate wide enough to allow flexibility and direct protection.
- Using NGO representatives in the missions, not only civil servants.
- The deployment needs to be supported by all parties to the conflict.
- Train civilian monitors in UCP/A techniques.

8.2 Challenges

<u>Before and during war</u>

Cyprus
- The time lag between work in the village and the political negotiations about resettlement created challenges.
- The lack of basic consensus over aims, approach and roles between the team members who came from four different countries, was aggravated by team members not arriving together. Nonviolence alone was not enough of a binding principle and was understood in different ways by different people. For example, they disagreed on how and to what degree to maintain contact with officials or power holders in general.
- Three months were not sufficient to achieve the task and to move into the field of community action.
- There was a lack of Greek or Turkish language speakers. (In one village they had a Turkish speaker, and the difference was very visible.)
- The lack of a common language in the teams was problematic.
- Different emphases, interests and skills of the team members led to a great deal of frustration of the team members.

Northern Ireland
- There was little to achieve if there was no willingness of the parties to talk.
- Incompatible expectations and preconditions by the different actors created difficulties.
- Many events were outside the realm of where they could be influenced.
- A "professional" approach led to the suspicion that the interveners were making money through their activities.
- The lack of trust between the conflict parties created barriers.[172]
- As in other local monitoring projects elsewhere, a challenge for the monitors was to distinguish between their personal political inclinations and their role as "neutral" observers.[173]
- It was difficult to maintain cooperation with police (and/or army) when UCP/A practitioners were seen as being partisan to the protesters.
- Police may just have their orders and it is hard to influence them to disobey these orders.

Former Yugoslavia
- Unrealistic expectations by practitioners and supporters regarding the potential impact.
- Cooperation was hindered or impossible with large agencies like the UN due to different SOPs and understanding of the issues.
- Access to higher-level decision-makers was difficult or nonexistent.
- It was not possible to raise sufficient funds for longer-term projects; there was a lack of stable funding.
- It was hard to find enough volunteers willing to commit for a longer period (more than 2-3 months).
- Acceptance of non-white team members by the local residents was somewhat limited.

South Caucasus
- There was little if any maintenance of contacts between participants in the projects without NP continuing to facilitate such contacts.

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[172] These six were listed in the Powerpoint presentation by Rob Fairmichael at the workshop
[173] Bryan & Jarman 1999:41

- NP was unable to build sufficient national and international links which would enable NP to ensure the security threats are addressed at a political level.
- Work in the separatist entities was very difficult and, it seems, limited to some visits.
- Access to and building relationship with Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia authorities and organizations was very limited.
- Gender: Protection was seen as a male prerogative.
- The impact was limited to a small number of people (according to the evaluation)
- Ethnic and 'racial' issues in the team needed to be addressed and given more attention.
- Language skills of international staff: It was very hard to find Russian-speaking staff; no international staff spoke Georgian. And Russian speaking staff was suspect in Georgia.

Working For the Rights and Security of Refugees

- Fast turn-over of refugees in illegal camps stifles relationship-building and coordination.
- There is danger of building dependencies when working with groups of vulnerable people.
- There is often high turn-over of volunteers in the projects.
- Support self-organizations of refugees if you do not agree with their approach and methods.
- It can be difficult to know how to communicate about migrant/refugee issues to the wider public, especially if right-wing orientation is strong.
- Cooperation between NGOs is not always easy because of different approaches and values.
- It may not be possible to speak with a common voice to the authorities because of disagreement between the NGOs.
- Sometimes there are different understandings of rights (of refugees) among the supporting groups.
- There are in-group tensions between deported refugees.
- It is not easy to translate different cultural understandings.
- There is a risk of leaking information to the authorities when using go-betweens who translate between refugees and authorities.
- Authorities are suspicious about solidarity with refugees.
- It is often unclear how to deal constructively with authorities and police.
- People are set up against each other.
- Separation is a deliberate strategy, as is restriction of movement of refugees by the state.
- Donors sometimes set strange conditions when they provide support. (One example was money to build toilets for kids only.)
- It may not be clear how to decide who do we build trust with, and how?
- There is so much brutalization, stigmatizing and criminalization of refugees.[174]
- Contacting the police and talking with them may lead to losing trust with refugees.
- In some places there is hostility toward international volunteers from the police.
- Confusion with social services or other local admin staff that the refugees reject having contact with.
- Photographing and filming police actions: On the one hand organizations may want to do it for documentation purposes; on the other hand, it may be misused by the security forces or rejected by the refugees themselves. In France, it is currently illegal to do such filming.
- Financing of projects is short term (3 years maximum); the work needs to take place long-term.

Monitoring and Protecting Against Violence by Police and Other State Agencies

- That there is no special status for monitors at demonstrations that protects them is a challenge.

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[174] From the workshop on communities.

- Using photography and filming – it may also increase vulnerability or escalate situations.
- Using cameras may weaken relationships with police.
- Photographs and films may endanger the protesters if they fall into the hands of the police.
- Confiscation of pictures and films and mobile phones by the police, and then the data being used against the protesters.
- There is a risk police or protestors will see monitors as partial or provocateurs.
- New laws challenging UCP/A work.
- Police making up their own rules.
- Police sometimes protect violent groups.
- While monitoring alone can have some impact, its ability to deter violent behavior is limited.
- Transforming police is hard and a structural problem.
- It is hard to defend the civic right to demonstrate when you very strongly disagree with the protesters (fascists, Corona deniers etc.)
- Cooperation with other demonstration monitors due to differences in approach and goals can be difficult.
- Due to small numbers, it is very hard to observe everything that happens at a demonstration.
- The GIPT faced challenges that included short-term recruitment, lack of experience and sufficient training, lack of a common language and enough German language skills in the team. There were also problems with co-ordination and equipment.
- Understanding and using safe electronic communication.

Working with Tensions in Communities to Prevent or Reduce Violence
- Working relationships with authorities depends on the persons holding the respective office and their willingness to act; if there are new people, the work has to start again from zero.
- There are challenges to find the right way to solve problems: every context is different, and good practices in one cannot necessarily be transferred to another (at least not all of them).
- There are numerous challenges to financing the work. Even when working with volunteers which reduces costs, there are very few calls for funding that small UCP/A organizations can apply to.
- Seeking individual strategies is more frequent than solidarity and struggling together.
- Social norms (for example, the way to dress) can be barriers which need to be taken into account.
- In-group tensions (for example between different Muslim communities) fuel right-wing narratives.
- Violence by 2nd and 3rd generation refugees against newly arrived refugees is a problem.
- Tensions and racism among different refugee groups (e.g., African vs Middle East) are a challenge.
- It is sometimes difficult to know how to involve groups of men when volunteers are mostly women.
- Street workers in hotspots being considered to be deputy sheriffs by population and police creates problems.
- Finding long-term volunteers is difficult.

Governmental Civilian Peacekeeping
- Monitors lack experience and training in nonviolent methods.
- Use of missions for wider political objectives from the side of the deploying countries.
- Perception of the missions as not being impartial or pursuing national interests of third countries.

- Unrealistic expectation of civilian monitors in a violent context.
- High turn-over rate to due limited length of deployment.
- Limited mandate and inflexible SOPs prevent effective intervention even when people on the ground think it would be possible.

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8.4 List of interviews

1. Center for Nonviolence (Serbia), Nenad Vukosavljevic, interviewed by Cécile Dubernet
2. Christian Peacemaker Teams (Greece), Rûnbîr Serkepkanî, interviewed by Ellen Furnari
3. Fairaend (Germany), Detlef Beck, interviewed by Christine Schweitzer
4. Human Rights Observers (France), several participants, interviewed by Cécile Dubernet
5. INNATE (Northern Ireland), Rob Fairmichael, interviewed by Christine Schweitzer
6. Institut für konstruktive Konfliktaustragung und Mediation (Germany), Katty Nöllenburg, interviewed by Christine Schweitzer
7. Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie (Germany), Elke Steven, interviewed by Christine Schweitzer
8. La Cimade (France), Agnes Lerolle, interviewed by Cécile Dubernet
9. Médiations Nomades (France), Yazid Kerfi, interviewed by Cécile Dubernet
10. Nash Dom: Olga Karatch (Belarus), interviewed by Christine Schweitzer
11. Nonviolent Peaceforce, RosemaryKabaki, interviewed by Ellen Furnari
12. Observatoire parisien des libertés publiques, several participants, interviewed by Cécile Dubernet
13. Operazione Colomba: Sara Ianovitz and Giulia Zurlini (Italy), interviewed by Berit Bliesemann de Guevara
14. Pakrac Volunteer Project: Goran Božičević (Croatia), interviewed by Christine Schweitzer
15. Réseau contre la traite (France), Geneviève Colas, interviewed by Cécile Dubernet

All interviews took place between September and December 2020.

8.5 Attendees of Workshop

Name	Organization
Agnes Lerolle	La Cimade, CAFI
Ann Patterson	Northern Ireland
Béatrice Cosentino	Comité ICP
Berit Bliesemann de Guevara	NP
Bertrand Cauly	Observatoire parisien des libertés publiques
Cécile Dubernet	NP, Institut Catholique de Paris
Chloé Smid-Nielson	HRO (Calais)
Christine Schweitzer	NP, BSV
de vinci	?
Elke Steven	Grundrechtekomitee
Ellen Furnari	NP
François Marchand	Comité ICP
Giovanni Scotto	University of Firenze
Giulia Zurlini	Operazione Colomba
Goran Božičević	trainer, diff. Croatian org.
Hortense	Observatoire parisien des libertés publiques
Huibert Oldenhuis	NP
Isabella	HRO (Calais)
Isabella Ranieri	University of Firenze
Jan Passion	NP
Jeanne Delarocque	?
Jeanne Tabulation	Observatoire parisien des libertés publiques
Katty Nöllenburg	IKM
Kerstin Blidi	NP

Laure	HRO (Calais)
Marie Simon	IRNCF
Marion Girard	NP
Mayeul Kaufmann	University of Grenoble
Mel Duncan	NP
Nathalie Tehiot	Observatoire parisien des libertés publiques
Olga Karatch	Nash Dom
Orianne	HRO (Calais)
Outi Arajärvi	BSV
Pete Hämmerle	IFOR Austria
Rachel Julian	NP
Rob Fairmichael	INNATE
Rûnbîr Serkepkanî	CPT Greece
Sara Ianovitz	Operazione Colomba
Simonetta Pittaluga	NP
Tejan Lamboi	BSV
Tiffany Easthom	NP

Some participated only in one, some in several, some in all online meetings.

Due to the online format of the workshops, there have been a few participants whose identity is not clear.