
UNARMED CIVILIAN PROTECTION

STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN
CAPACITIES TO PROTECT
CIVILIANS AGAINST VIOLENCE



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A joint project of:



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PREFACE

I welcome this new UNITAR manual, entitled *Unarmed Civilian Protection: Strengthening Civilian Capacities to Protect Civilians*, developed in cooperation with Nonviolent Peaceforce. I do so for four reasons.

First, it builds upon the newly accepted recognition that civil society organizations play an increasingly important protection role in situations where civilians face serious physical risks. As the previous UN Secretary-General has pointed out, United Nations peacekeeping missions are not the only protection actor on the ground and there are many conflicts worldwide in which the UN has no peacekeeping presence. This sentiment was affirmed in UNGA Resolution on *Follow-up to the Declaration of Programme of Action on the Culture of Peace, A/69/L.34*. This UNITAR publication aims to strengthen the capacities and competencies of international and local civil society actors, especially in areas of latent or overt violent conflict, to better protect vulnerable civilians and deter further escalation of violence.

Second, the June 2015 UN High-Level Panel on Peace Operations Report to the UN Secretary-General asserts that unarmed strategies must be at the forefront of UN efforts to protect civilians. The panel also recognizes the positive contributions of unarmed civilian protection actors and recommends that political and military missions should work more closely with local communities and national and international non-governmental organizations in building a protective environment for civilians. This UNITAR manual aims to professionalize this protection work without resort to arms or reliance on military force.

Third, as the international community has committed itself to several new, challenging Sustainable Development Goals to cover the period until 2030, it is increasingly clear that these goals can only be achieved in a violence-free environment in which the physical safety and security of civilians are guaranteed. That is why Goal 16 speaks of the need to promote peaceful and inclusive societies. This UNITAR manual will make a contribution to help local partners strengthen local peace infrastructures and capacities, and thus reduce the risks of an early relapse into violence after a ceasefire or peace pact has been agreed.

Fourth, the unmet need for direct physical protection of civilians against armed violence has never been greater than it is today. The past years have been excruciating for civilians caught up in violent conflict. The number of people having to flee because of war and persecution accelerated since 2014. The UN High Commissioner on Refugees is reporting that more than 60 million individuals have been forcibly displaced worldwide. This is the largest number since UNHCR began keeping records.

The international community has long searched for better ways to guarantee the centrality of civilian protection, but has not had sufficient tools or guidelines to implement. This manual is a small but vital step in offering practical guidance and skills.

It will require involvement of many more actors, including civil society. No one can do it all alone! Without a renewed and practical commitment to this concept, the humanitarian system will not move forward.

UNITAR is pleased to present this manual at this opportune moment in time.

Nikhil Seth
United Nations Assistant Secretary-General
Executive Director
UNITAR

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PBI Photo / Volunteer Accompanying the Inter-Church Justice and Peace Commission (CIJP) in the Curbaradó River Basin, Colombia / September 2011

ACRONYMS

CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
CPC	Civil Protection Component (Philippines)
CPR	Communities of Popular Resistance (Guatemala)
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EU	European Union
EWER	Early Warning/Early Response
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMT	International Monitoring Team (Philippines)
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRL	International Refugee Law
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JIU	Joint Integrated Unit (South Sudan)
LGBT	Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transsexual
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MONUC	United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
NCOORD	National Coordinating Office on Refugees and Displaced
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PBI	Peace Brigades International
R2P	Responsibility to Protect

SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UCP	Unarmed Civilian Protection
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNEF	UN Emergency Force
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WES	Western Equatoria State
WFP	World Food Programme
WFP	Witness for Peace

INTRODUCTION

Unarmed strategies must be at the forefront of UN efforts to protect civilians. Humanitarian organizations play essential roles in protecting civilians.

High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 16 June 2015

[W]e heard a few messages again and again. First, the journey from war to sustainable peace is not possible in the absence of stronger civilian capacity. Without this capacity, there may be breaks in the fighting but resilient institutions will not take root and the risk of relapse into violence will remain.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Chair to the Senior Advisory Group to the UN Secretary General on Civilian Capacities in the Aftermath of Conflict, March 2011

More than 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by repeated violence (World Bank, 2011). In absolute terms, the unmet need for direct physical protection of civilians against imminent violence has never been greater than it is today. In these contexts, civilians are faced with a wide variety of abuses and human rights violations, including killings, torture, sexual abuse, and forced displacement. In many situations children are abducted or recruited into armed forces; women trafficked for sexual exploitation; and human rights defenders¹ imprisoned or killed. Even humanitarian aid workers, delivering aid to survivors of war, are not free from intentional (or targeted) attacks. Recognizing the overwhelming need, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon insists that 'human protection is a defining purpose of the United Nations in the twenty-first century' (Ban, K. 2012).

¹ Human rights defenders act to promote or protect human rights, including civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Particular issues of concern in areas of violent conflict are executions, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, discrimination, forced evictions and access to health care. Human rights defenders investigate and report on human rights violations and abuse. They also accompany survivors of human rights violations, take action to end impunity, support better governance, contribute to the implementation of human rights treaties, and provide human rights education.

Since 1999 UN peace operations have assisted states recovering from war to protect civilians. However, there are many situations of war and violent conflict, where UN peace operations cannot be deployed and where government actors are not willing or able to provide protection to (all) civilians. The international community has struggled, in theory and in practice, with the question of its responsibility to protect civilians within the territory of sovereign states. In addition, the scale and complexity of protection challenges in the Balkans, Rwanda, Darfur, Libya, and Syria have demonstrated that threats to civilians are complex and dynamic: no single international actor is capable of mitigating them without significant support from other institutions (O'Callaghan and Pantuliano, 2007).

The international community has begun to recognize that humanitarian organizations and civil society groups have played and are playing a long-established and often critical role in seeking to address large unmet protection needs. A small number of these organizations and groups focuses specifically on providing direct physical protection to civilians – an area of work that conventionally has been covered by the military and police, and of course by UN peacekeepers² wherever peace operations are deployed. These organizations and groups practice what is described in this manual as Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP).³ UCP is the practice of civilians protecting other civilians in situations of violent conflict, imminent violence, and following crises. It involves international civilians protecting local civilians, local civilians protecting each other, and even local civilians protecting international or non-local civilians. The practice of UCP is nonviolent and nonpartisan. Protection is provided on invitation from local actors. It supports local actors as they work to address the roots and consequences of violent conflict. This practice is grounded in international law, in the principle of civilian immunity in war, and in the protection afforded by international conventions (these sources of are elaborated in Module 2).

More specifically, UCP is a strategic mix of key nonviolent engagement methods, principles, values, and skills. Specially trained civilians, in close coordination with local actors, apply UCP to prevent violence, provide direct physical protection to civilians under threat, and strengthen local peace infrastructures. Practitioners of Unarmed Civilian Protection engage with affected individuals and communities at the grassroots level for extended periods of time. They provide, for example, protective presence for civilians who are about to flee their homes. This physical presence, close to where threatened and vulnerable people live, may be provided twenty-four hours seven days a week for several weeks or even months. UCP practitioners can also employ a range of other methods, such as monitoring ceasefires, accompaniment, rumour control, and capacity development⁴ for civilian protection. UCP is applicable at various stages of a conflict; during early stages to prevent violence, during crisis situations to stop violence or de-escalate tensions, and at later stages to help sustain peace agreements and create a safer space for peacebuilding efforts.

² Many other humanitarian organizations and civil society groups focus on different areas of protection, for example by providing basic necessities to survivors of violence or advocating for the protection of social and cultural rights.

³ Scholars and practitioners have used other terms for this practice, including Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping, Proactive Presence, Proactive Engagement, and Protective Accompaniment.

⁴ Capacity is the ability of individuals, institutions, and broader systems to perform their functions effectively, efficiently and achieve their development objectives in a sustainable way. Capacity development is a long process whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time.

It is estimated that “between 1500 BCE and 1860 CE there were in the known world an average of thirteen years of war to every year of peace”. In that whole period of well over 3000 years “more than 8000 peace treaties were concluded—each one of them meant to remain in force forever. On average they only lasted two years!” (Stevens, 1989). One obvious conclusion is that peace treaties don’t guarantee peace—because they often don’t resolve conflicts nor do they address the underlying causes: ‘post-war’ is not the same as ‘post-conflict’. At best, peace treaties provide a brief interlude without violent action, to give the conflict parties a chance to get down to the tough task of peacebuilding, to address the deeper reasons for the war, and to get the peace right (Carriere, 2011).

UCP practitioners operate in a variety of conflict situations,⁵ including places where UN or other regional and international organizations are currently not present. The entry of UCP teams into these places can be easier than the entry of armed or more formal protection actors as they do not require an internationally agreed mandate. UCP supports peace infrastructures at the sub-national and grassroots level which is where ceasefires often unravel, leading to the spread of violence and relapse into war. These peace infrastructures include Early Warning/Early Response systems, weapon free zones, and women protection teams. UCP attributes a special role to women as peacemakers and plays a role in accompanying bottom-up peacemaking efforts. In the process, UCP strengthens peace infrastructures at lower levels and connect them with actors at higher levels.

UCP practitioners also operate alongside and collaborate with UN peacekeepers (military, police and civilians) and humanitarian organizations, with job descriptions that in part overlap and in part differ. In places where UN peacekeepers operate, UCP practitioners may have complementary roles, for example in strengthening community-based protection capacities. Furthermore, they could play a role in accompanying or supporting mediation processes (e.g., by UN Department of Political Affairs or the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) through ongoing engagement with conflict parties at the local level. In this context, UCP practitioners may play an important role in identifying and addressing protection needs of particularly targeted groups, such as human rights defenders. Moreover, while communities in affected areas may rely on armed protection against large-scale attacks, they may find it easier to approach UCP team members (who live in their midst) to meet their needs for individual protection.

The question could be asked: How would unarmed civilians be able to prevent violence and protect civilians? Experts point out that in situations of violent conflict all parties have multiple sensitivities, vulnerabilities and points of leverage, and international ‘proactive presence’ tacitly activates those sensitivities (Mahony, 2006). A conflict party naturally wants to look better than its opponents. Moreover, most conflict parties have several good reasons to pay attention to third parties, especially outsiders: first, because their personal or political reputation is at stake; second, because they want to avoid repercussions including blame, retribution or sanctions; and finally, because of individual moral concerns. Therefore, ‘unarmed’ does not

⁵ The World Development Report 2011 recognizes multiple forms of violence: (1) local intergroup conflict; (2) “conventional” political conflict (contests for state power or for autonomy or independence); (3) widespread gang-related violence; (4) organized crime or trafficking with accompanying violence; and (5) local conflicts with transnational ideological connections (Chapter 1, Table 1.1). This course will focus on the first two forms of violence and also the fifth, forms for which UCP offers approaches that have proven effective.

mean 'without influence' or 'defenseless' (Carriere, 2011).

At best UCP applies the 'soft power' of encouragement. UCP practitioners may try to encourage potential perpetrators to meet their needs without the use of violence. This is a practice that is rooted in a long tradition of active nonviolence. Though conflicting parties may not be persuaded to refrain from battle altogether, they may be willing to reduce its impact on civilians. They may, for example, be persuaded not to attack schools and hospitals or to agree on a temporary ceasefire that allows for the evacuation of disabled civilians. Such concessions are often the result of a long process of building relationships and trust with all parties. The nonviolent approach to protection and keeping the peace also supports the transition from a culture of violence to a culture of peace and nonviolence. It shows affected communities that it is often (but not always) possible to reduce violence without the use of weapons or reliance on armed force. Moreover, it enables these communities to participate actively in the process of peace and security and to shape their own destiny. As a significant number of UCP practitioners are women, they encourage active participation of local women in this process.

A key objective of UCP is strengthening the capacities of civilians to protect other civilians. As stated by Jean-Marie Guéhenno in the opening quote of this introduction, strong civilian capacities are considered to be essential in the transition from war to sustainable peace. Guéhenno goes on to say that even countries devastated by conflict possess some of the needed capacities for peace, but that international actors often focus on what they themselves can provide, rather than listening to the real needs and capacities of those whom they serve. These observations lie at the heart of UCP.

UCP uses a bottom-up approach to protection and keeping peace. It starts by listening to the protection needs of civilians and identifying local capacities for peace. It then works to protect and nurture these existing capacities, strengthening them in areas where local actors require assistance. Above all it aims to strengthen local civilian capacities to protect civilians from violence, so that local actors can take ownership of UCP. The capacity development process is not limited to stand-alone training courses. It is illustrated and supported by the visible day-to-day practice of UCP practitioners in the area. This allows local actors to assess the applicability of UCP in their own context. More importantly, it allows them to be involved in day-to-day practice and hone their skills until they feel confident to initiate their own UCP efforts.

Overall goal

This publication aims to make a contribution to the common objectives of protecting civilians and keeping peace. More specifically, it offers an introduction to the foundations and practices of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP), its principles, sources of guidance, methods and required skills. Although the idea of UCP has been around for almost a century, it is only in its more recent manifestation that it has begun to receive serious attention in UN and donor circles as well as from the leadership of organizations and governments operating in settings of violent conflicts.

Target audience

The primary audience for the manual consists of staff of aid agencies and civil society organizations working in conflict situations (at different levels and in different capacities) and interested in strengthening their capacities to protect the people they serve as well as their own staff. The secondary audience is constituted by individuals or groups interested to take part in UCP activities in the field. And finally, the manual addresses a broader audience including university students, journalists, and civilian, military, and police personnel working in conflict and postconflict environments (as part of a UN or non-UN operation) interested in gaining an appreciation of UCP principles, practices, methods, and required competencies. Moreover, some modules may be of interest to staff of donor agencies, and of governments facing violent conflict.

Content and learning objectives

This manual forms the basis of an online course with the same title. As such, it accompanies the online course and serves as a resource for further study and practice. The manual can also be of use to online facilitators and face-to-face trainers. It contains summaries of key messages, bibliographies, and some appendices, including a glossary of terms.

At the end of the manual, readers will be able to:

- Recall the key UCP definitions, principles and sources of guidance
- Illustrate UCP methods and required skills
- Summarize key steps to go through in preparation for entering a community
- Outline key actions to undertake while living in and exiting a community

The manual is composed of five modules.

1

MODULE 1 INTRODUCTION TO UNARMED CIVILIAN PROTECTION

The module introduces the concept of Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) by presenting some of its fundamental principles and rationale, defining relevant terms, and by placing it within the history of nonviolence and peacekeeping – two traditions from which it is born. The module concludes by presenting some of the main actors who practice or support UCP and related activities.

2

MODULE 2 UNARMED CIVILIAN PROTECTION: OBJECTIVES, PRINCIPLES AND SOURCES OF GUIDANCE

The module dives into the core of Unarmed Civilian Protection by exploring its key objectives, principles, and sources of guidance. By expanding on these, you will acquire a deeper understanding of UCP, how it functions, its use of encouragement and deterrence, and how it is placed within the greater frame of humanitarian intervention.

3

MODULE 3 UNARMED CIVILIAN PROTECTION: KEY METHODS

The module introduces and describes UCP methods and related competencies. It then discusses how, when and where these methods and skills are used. Practical case studies illustrate different strategic applications of methods in a conflict context.

4

MODULE 4 UNARMED CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN PRACTICE: KEY COMPETENCIES NEEDED WHEN ENTERING THE COMMUNITY

The module describes the first steps UCP agencies take in preparing to enter and when entering the community. It begins with a description of the core competencies of UCP practitioners, that guide the recruitment, training, and deployment process. It then moves into the issue of conflict analysis, which supports UCP teams in understanding conflict dynamics, and lays the foundation for strategic planning. The section on conflict analysis is followed by a description of different types and stages of conflict.

5

MODULE 5 UNARMED CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN PRACTICE: LIVING IN AND EXITING THE COMMUNITY

After describing the final components of the UCP programming cycle, the module presents a case study from South Sudan that brings the learning from all five modules together. This case study is used to show how the different components of the UCP programming cycle described in Modules 4 and 5 and the UCP methods described in Module 3, can be applied in a particular situation of violent conflict. The module concludes with a number of key dilemmas that UCP practitioners may experience throughout the UCP programming cycle.

Icon Legend



Assignment



Summary of key
messages



Case study



Recommended
reading



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Carriere, R. (2011). 'Another Peacekeeping' is Possible. *Kosmos: Creating the New Civilization for the Common Good*, (The Changing Nature of Human Security). Retrieved from <http://www.kosmosjournal.org/articles/another-peacekeeping-is-possible>

Ki-moon, B. (2012). *R2P, the Next Decade*. Keynote Address to Stanley Foundation Conference on the Responsibility to Protect. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/speeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1433#.UiuHXxZGwdJ

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1

MODULE 1
INTRODUCTION TO
UNARMED CIVILIAN
PROTECTION

OVERVIEW AND LEARNING OBJECTIVES

United Nations peacekeeping missions are not the only protection actor on the ground. Moreover, they are not always deployed in contexts where civilians face serious risks. United Nations and other humanitarian organizations, including ICRC and various non-governmental organizations, play a long-established and critical role in seeking to enhance the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including in places that do not have peacekeeping presence.

Ban Ki-moon, Former United Nations Secretary-General, UN Security Council, 2012, paragraph 52

The UN, in collaboration with Member States, should:

- *Promote women's empowerment and non-violent means of protection, and taking into account the whole range of women's protection issues and the interventions to address them - including women's leadership and women's empowerment - in mission planning, implementation, and reporting, as well as in policy discussions on the protection of civilians in the context of peace operations.*
- *Scale up their support to unarmed civilian protection (UCP) in conflict-affected countries, including working alongside peace operations.*

The Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, p. 157 Preventing Conflict, Securing Justice, Transforming the Peace, October 13, 2015

The nature of war has changed dramatically over the past century. Increasingly, civilians are targeted. As a consequence, the protection needs of civilians have increased and expanded. Multi-dimensional peace operations¹ have responded to this need by including the Protection

¹ These combine military, civil administration (including election and human rights monitoring and police support) and humanitarian expertise, together with political negotiations, and mediation.

of Civilians (PoC) in their mandates, while many humanitarian organizations have built protection (in the broadest sense of that word) into their assistance programmes. However, there are many situations of war and violent conflict where peace operations are *not* deployed, and where government actors are *not* willing or able to provide protection to all civilians. Though humanitarian organizations may be operating in these areas and offering supplies and services, they rarely provide direct physical protection to threatened civilians, since that is generally considered the role of the police or military. However, increasingly civilians are organized to contribute in this task of direct physical protection.

Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) has been developed to address several of these concerns. Specially trained and organized civilians apply UCP in situations of violent conflict, imminent violence and post-crisis situations. Instead of arms they use a mix of nonviolent strategies to prevent violence, protect threatened civilians, and enhance the capacities of local peace mechanisms and actors to respond at multiple levels to situations of violent conflict. While implementing organizations use different methods, depending on the organizational approach and context, the concept and practice of UCP is demonstrably effective (Beckman, 2013; Cure Violence, n.d.; Gunduz and Torralba, 2014; Mahony et al., 1997; PBI, 2009; Schweitzer, 2012). It might, however, be the least understood and least recognized among the different roles, strategies, and capacities civil society organizations can bring to peace processes. Still, it reflects a profound shift that is taking place in the global discourse on international response to conflict: from a concern for solely national security to national and human security, from the defence of states to the protection of civilians, and from the implementation of violent defence to the reduction of violence (Schweizer et al., 2010, p.17). In short, civilians protecting civilians!

The module introduces the concept of Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) by presenting some of its fundamental principles and rationale, defining relevant terms, and by placing it within the history of nonviolence and peacekeeping – two traditions it is born from. The module concludes by presenting some of the main actors who practice or support UCP and related activities.

At the end of the module, readers will be able to:

- Define UCP and related terms
- Describe the place of UCP within the traditions and practices of nonviolence and peacekeeping
- Describe potential actors in UCP

1.1

INTRODUCTION TO UCP

1.1.1 Understanding the need for the protection of civilians and reducing violence

UCP seeks to reduce violence and provide direct physical protection in situations of imminent and active violence, and in post-crisis situations. Understanding this need is a prerequisite for understanding the purpose of UCP. Warfare is one of humankind's most destructive activities. In the 19th century, it was widely accepted that the military of a civilized country fought the armed forces of the enemy— not enemy civilians. The battle of Gettysburg, 1863, in the US Civil War is widely believed to be the bloodiest battle ever in the Western Hemisphere. Fifty-one thousand combatants were killed compared to one civilian. Civilian immunity was a central principle in the military practice of major European powers and was embedded in international conventions (Primoratz, 2010, pp 1-2).

However, the nature of violent conflict has changed dramatically during the past century. Modern weapons, especially small arms, have been one key factor in a radical increase in civilian deaths during wars and violent conflicts. Also, the shift from inter-state to intra-state wars, during the late 20th century has brought violence directly into many local communities. In contemporary wars, the outdoor café, the inter-village bus, and the weekend marketplace have become battlegrounds (Anderson, 1999, pp 11-12). Though there remains debate about the precise statistics, it is widely assumed that the casualty rate of civilians, in comparison to that of combatants, has increased significantly since the beginning of the 20th century (Rupesinghe, 1998). In many internal conflicts involving government armed forces and rebel groups, civilians are trapped between the two factions, and are sometimes specifically targeted or used as human shields. Even humanitarian aid workers, delivering assistance to survivors of war, are not free from attacks, whether intentional or unintentional.

The dramatic increase in forced displacement in 2013 and the fact that the average amount of time people worldwide are living in displacement is now a staggering 17

years, all suggest that something is going terribly wrong in how we are responding and dealing with this issue...

Jan Egeland, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council, UNHCR, 2014

Though violent conflicts affect entire civilian populations, it is the women, children, disabled, stateless, and displaced people who tend to be most vulnerable.² Discrimination and violence also takes place against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender people on the basis of their sexual orientation and gender identify, though their numbers are much smaller. The UN High Commission for Refugees reported a global figure of 45.2 million forcibly displaced people at the end of 2012, the highest level in almost 20 years (UNHCR n.d.). The access to basic services for Internally Displaced People (IDPs) is often difficult and IDPs are easy targets for exploitation and abuse. Women and children face heightened risk in the form of rape, sexual humiliation, and other types of violence. Many children are separated from their families during emergencies. Sometimes they are deliberately abducted and forced into roles of combatants, spies, messengers, or sex slaves. Both during and after conflicts, women and children are particularly exposed to the dangers of landmines and unexploded ordnance.³

People living in violence-affected countries struggle to address the root causes of conflicts, to promote reconciliation and to reach development goals. There are clear and proven linkages between lethal violence and failure to meet specific Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For instance, the majority of MDG goals in fragile, conflict-affected states were not met, and even where progress was made, it was often reversed when countries relapsed into conflict, as projected (World Bank, 2013; United Nations, 2013). It is estimated that more than 50 percent of the total population in extreme poverty resides in places affected by conflict and chronic violence (United Nations, no date, n.d.). At the same time, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for 2015 did little to reach the world's most vulnerable since they were "silent on the devastating effects of conflict and violence on development" (United Nations, 2013).

But there is now at least a new acknowledgement of these 'devastating effects'. The UN's 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda includes references to peace. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can be summarized to deal with five 'P's: People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnerships. And with regard to Peace, it explicitly states that: 'We are determined to foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies which are free from fear and violence. There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development.' It is a beginning, but everything will depend on how these high-sounding phrases will be translated into practical action on the ground. What is needed, first and foremost, is a quantum increase in the resources available for violence reduction and prevention, and a sharp focus on the protection of civilians.

'Protection' is a broad concept and means different things to different people. The protection needs of civilians are diverse and not only related to armed conflict. They may also arise in the following situations (Slim and Bonwick, 2005):

² Though categorizing vulnerable populations allows for a more focused response in providing protection, the categories should not be treated as absolute. There often are significant differences in the levels of vulnerability within each category.

³ Retrieved at <http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/demining/>

- Post-conflict situations, in which the lack of effective rule of law fosters violations and abuses;
- Natural disasters, in which natural hazards combined with poverty and social vulnerability put people at extreme risk;
- Famine, where drought, discrimination, political mismanagement and/or deliberate starvation cause severe risks;
- Protracted social conflicts, in which discrimination, violence, exploitation, and impoverishment are constant risks (Slim & Bonwick, 2005).

While all the protection needs of civilians in all these situations deserve to be met, the focus of this course is on the practice of UCP to offer direct physical protection to threatened civilians in situations of violent political conflict.⁴



Recommended reading

Ferris, E. (2011). *The Politics of Protection: the Limits of Humanitarian Action*, Chapter 10. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

1.1.2 Key characteristics of UCP

What is UCP?

UCP is the practice of deploying unarmed civilians before, during, and after violent conflict, to prevent or reduce violence, provide direct physical protection to other civilians, and strengthen or build local peace infrastructures. The purpose of UCP is to create a safer environment, or a 'safer space', for civilians to address their own needs, solve their own conflicts, and protect vulnerable individuals and populations in their midst. This 'safer space' is created through a strategic mix of key nonviolent engagement methods, principles, values, and skills. Organizations implement UCP differently and may not use all of the methods listed below in Figure 1, or may include other methods not listed. Additionally scholars and practitioners have used different terms to describe the theory and practice of UCP, including Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping, Proactive Presence, and Protective Accompaniment. For the purpose of this course, the term Unarmed Civilian Protection will be used. Though there may be subtle

⁴ The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research defines a political conflict as a positional difference regarding values relevant to a society – the conflict items – between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions or the international order, or that hold out the prospect of doing so (Heidelberg Institute, 2014). It includes conflict over territory, secession, decolonization, autonomy, system/ideology, national power, regional predominance, international power and resources.

differences between the theories that lie behind these terms, the respective practices are basically very similar.

The four main **methods** of UCP are proactive engagement, monitoring, relationship building, and capacity development. Each of these methods has a number of **applications**, for example: protective presence, protective accompaniment, and interpositioning; ceasefire monitoring, rumour control, and Early Warning/Early Response (EWER); confidence building and multi-track dialogue; training and supporting local UCP infrastructures. Frequently, UCP methodologies and applications are used in a dynamic interaction, reinforcing and complementing each other. They are also selected on a case-by-case basis, depending on the specific needs of the identified population, the type of conflict and context, as well as the mandate and capacity of the implementing organization. As such, UCP may emphasize various methodologies and applications differently in different situations, as well as in different phases of a particular conflict.

It is the application of these methods, through the use of **key principles** (e.g., nonviolence, nonpartisanship) as well as **key sources of guidance** (e.g., International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law) and **key skills** that characterizes UCP (Figure 1, UCP Bubble Chart). Unarmed Civilian Protection practitioners are always unarmed, operating as a nonpartisan 'third-party presence'. UCP methodology has been pioneered by organizations such as Peace Brigades International, Witness for Peace, Meta Peace Team, and Nonviolent Peaceforce.

PBI makes us brave, which is very important for our job. Sometimes we have to go to dangerous places, and the existence of PBI makes us more secure in this sort of travel. PBI really helps us to make a space so we can travel and do our job in defending people without fear."

Afridal, Director of LBH Banda Aceh, a legal aid institute, about protective accompaniment provided by Peace Brigades International (PBI)




Figure 1: The UCP Bubble Chart

UCP is a strategic mix of key nonviolent engagement methods, principles, values, and competencies. Where they all overlap, they constitute the core of UCP. From the perspective of organizations practicing 'UCP', however, there is a spectrum or range of possibilities. UCP as an umbrella concept brings together the practices of a number of different organizations that apply key UCP characteristics in one form or another. These organizations may use some, not necessarily all, of the methods and principles that are presented here. They also may use different terms to describe these methods and principles.

The different organizational applications of UCP methods combine selective elements of UN peace operations and humanitarian efforts. They can be characterized as responsive, remedial or environment-building actions (see Figure 2) (Caverzasio, 2001). However, a key distinguishing feature of UCP is its focus on responsive action.




Figure 2: Levels of Action Against Abuse - The ICRC Egg Model

The different applications of UCP methods can be characterized as responsive, remedial and environment-building actions (Source: Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2002) *Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action, Programmes and Practices Gathered from the Field*, page 115.)

Responsive action is undertaken in connection with an emerging or established pattern of violence. It is aimed at preventing the recurrence of violence, putting a stop to it, and/or alleviating its immediate effects. Examples include:

- Providing visible protective presence and accompaniment for vulnerable civilians. UCP practitioners may, for example, accompany threatened human rights defenders when they travel to document abuses or violations. They may also be visibly present in the homes and workplaces of threatened civilians or monitor public gatherings to prevent the excessive use of force;
- Establishing safe spaces, weapon-free zones, and peace zones or temporarily relocating civilians under severe threat to 'safe houses' until the threat is diffused;
- Bringing together conflicting parties in safe and neutral spaces and/or enhancing the capacities of mediators to mediate disputes by accompanying the process with presence and engagement;
- Providing rumour control and the monitoring of ceasefires to de-escalate tensions and enhance advancement of peace processes to final peace agreements;
- Supporting international norms and encouraging the commitment of aggressing parties not to attack civilians, women, children, the disabled, hospitals, health centres, schools, religious places and/or foreigners.

Remedial action is aimed at supporting people in restoring their dignity and ensuring adequate living conditions subsequent to a pattern of violence. It usually involves access to rehabilitation, restitution, compensation, and repair. Remedial activities are longer-term and aim to assist people living with the effects of a particular pattern of abuse. Examples of

remedial action in the context of UCP include:

- Facilitating access to justice and other services for survivors of violence (accompaniment of survivors to hospitals or to state duty bearers to report abuse);
- Facilitating access to international actors such as UN Special Rapporteurs;
- Disseminating information and referring survivors of violence to service providers to ensure appropriate and timely assistance;
- Tracing and reunifying separated, unaccompanied, and abducted children with their families or primary caretakers.

Environment-building action refers to a more structural process aimed at creating and/or consolidating an environment conducive to full respect for the rights of individuals and groups. Examples include:

- Establishing community security meetings or working groups with communities to raise awareness, share information about security or create protection strategies;
- Strengthening or establishing women protection teams and building their capacity;
- Strengthening or supporting the functioning of community-based ceasefire monitoring mechanisms and Early Warning/Early Response (EWER) systems;
- Supporting state duty bearers⁵ and advocating for additional protection mechanisms (police posts, courts etc.) where necessary;
- Establishing interactive dialogue frameworks in partnership with local actors to connect grass roots peacebuilding structures to higher-level peace processes.

By and large, these actions are part and parcel of UN peace operations, where they are employed. But as the opening quote of Ban Ki-Moon makes clear: UN peacekeeping missions (or peace operations as they are called nowadays) are not always deployed in the many conflict places where civilians face serious risks.

How does UCP work?

Armed actors on both sides confirm that the presence of a third party 'watching over them', including NP [Nonviolent Peaceforce], has served to temper their behaviour.

Gunduz and Torralba, 2014, p. 12

The question could be asked: How would unarmed civilians be able to reduce violence and protect civilians? Rather than relying on the threat of armed force, UCP practitioners use physical presence and visibility, networks of relations, community acceptance, positive engagement, and in some cases conveying the cost of negative consequences, to achieve their objectives. Modeling nonviolence in a high-intensity conflict provides a window for local actors to see an alternative way of responding to conflict, not to mention the physiological pull

⁵ By ratifying a UN human rights treaty or convention, the state (as principal duty bearer) automatically assumes the role of guaranteeing these rights (of the right holders), namely the obligations to respect, protect and fulfill people's rights. Non-state duty bearers (aka moral duty bearers) include parents, teachers, principals, administrators, NGOs etc.

toward such nonviolent behaviour.⁶ Social norms guide much of behavior, and many people prefer to cooperate as long as others are doing their share (World Development Report, 2015).

Temporary interventions can have large and lasting positive effects on a community by shifting a pattern of social interactions from one suboptimal self-reinforcing arrangement (or “equilibrium”) to another arrangement that better promotes well-being and becomes self-sustaining.

World Development Report, 2015

UCP is much more proactive than presence and observation. The effectiveness of UCP methods comes primarily from coordinating and communicating, engaging with key, armed actors, and building multi-layered relationships. Effective coordination and communication with relevant actors and stakeholders at various levels of society open up channels of communication. It also enhances the capacities of local peace infrastructures to respond to incidences of violence and ensure the protection of civilians. Moreover, it increases the acceptance of UCP personnel by all actors and directly improves the security levels of UCP teams in the field.

In situations of violent conflict all parties have multiple sensitivities, vulnerabilities, and points of leverage, and international ‘proactive presence’ tacitly activates those sensitivities (Mahony, 2006). A conflict party usually wants to look better than its opponents. Moreover, most conflict parties have several good reasons to pay attention to third parties, especially outsiders: first, because their personal or political reputation is at stake; second, because they want to avoid repercussions including blame, retribution, or sanctions; and finally, because of individual moral concerns. Therefore, ‘unarmed’ does not mean ‘without influence’ or ‘defenceless’. (Carriere, 2011)

Negative consequences to potential perpetrators include damage to international status, implied threat of referral to the International Criminal Court, and loss of international aid, political support, tourism, etc. In most contexts of violent conflict, human rights abuses and violations rarely happen when external actors (for example, foreign nationals) are present to witness the crimes.⁷ Outsiders play a vital role in providing impartial protection and expressing solidarity. In a subtle but important way a third party changes the dynamic of any conflict on a psychological level. Such witnesses greatly increase the likelihood that potential perpetrators will face negative consequences for their actions.

Though pressure or **discouragement** may be needed in certain circumstances, the ‘soft power’ of **encouragement** is UCP’s preferred strategy.⁸ UCP practitioners will try to encourage potential perpetrators to meet their needs without the use of violence. This is a practice that is rooted in a long tradition of active nonviolence. Though UCP teams may not be successful in persuading

⁶ Scientific research on mirror neurons demonstrates the physiological power of modeling (Metta Center, n.d.). Please see some examples of this in the case studies that follow.

⁷ There are exceptions. In some war locations in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, the presence of foreigners has increased the security risk of local actors.

⁸ When pressure is applied, most often it is applied indirectly through other parties, such as embassies or human rights advocacy organizations that may not have a field presence in the country (at least not at senior management level).

conflict parties to refrain from battle altogether, combatants may be willing to reduce their impact on civilians. They may, for example, be persuaded not to attack schools and hospitals, or to agree on a temporary ceasefire that allows for the evacuation of sick and elderly civilians. Such concessions are often the result of a long process of developing relationships and trust with all parties. The nonviolent approach to protection and keeping peace also supports the transition from a culture of violence to a culture of peace and nonviolence. It shows affected communities that it is possible, more often than is generally assumed, to reduce violence without the use of weapons or reliance on armed force. Moreover, it enables these communities to participate actively in the process of peace and security and to shape their own destiny.

In my experience, engaging even the worst abusers in this manner may yield unexpected results: you give a fellow the choice between solving the issue quietly, among ourselves, based on a gentleman's agreement or putting him on the line by raising the case with his superiors. Not only may you solve the issue, but you may create a bond of confidence with the fellow, an ally who does not perceive you as an enemy, and who may be useful to solve future cases.

ICRC protection officer (Mahony, 2006, p.50)



Box 1 - Case study: UCP teams and UN peacekeepers collaborate in Jonglei, South Sudan [<https://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/download.php?id=37>]

When community members in southern Jonglei State in South Sudan approached Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP), a UCP organization active in the region, with concerns that certain areas had become unsafe, NP facilitated dialogue between the community and UN peacekeepers in order to address protection issues. This dialogue included a community security meeting with only women, who were given an opportunity for the first time to express their security concerns and protection needs directly to UN peacekeepers.

As a response to security concerns expressed by the community, Nonviolent Peaceforce worked together with UN peacekeepers on the ground, UNPOL, and the national police service to set up a system where they would jointly patrol certain areas. UNPOL, the UN peacekeepers, and Nonviolent Peaceforce's team took turns throughout the day, morning, afternoon, and evening, to make patrols in the area where there had been violence. An emergency phone tree was also established and distributed among the key actors in the area.

There was one place in Kandako, at a water access point, where women experienced sexual violence by ill-disciplined soldiers. Women reported eighteen to twenty cases of rape per month. They said they were unsafe when getting water. This was not an issue that was immediately publicly expressed due to the sensitive nature of the topic. NP talked with the UN peacekeepers, explaining the situation to them. The peacekeepers responded by saying that they would collect their own water at that particular borehole. They would go there as another way to boost their presence. Over a six to eight week period of doing these patrols, the number of reported rapes per month dropped from eighteen to zero. NP received feedback from the soldiers who would say, "We know that you're here, and we know why you're here." The soldiers were a bit frustrated, but they moved on, and they've been leaving the women alone.

As an NP staff member recalls, "Patrolling in Kandako was one of the most effective things we did. It not only made civilians feel safer, I believe it actually made them safer as well. We started patrolling in March 2012 one week after a civilian was killed in the area. In the eight months that we were patrolling no civilians were shot. Two days after NP's forced evacuation from Pibor County in October 2012 three people got shot. One of them died"

SOURCE: Nonviolent Peaceforce South Sudan (2013)



Assignment

View:

- Lazaro, F. (2012.) *On Mindanao, Protecting Civilians in a Combat Zone with Eyes and Notepad*, PBS Newshour, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec12/mindanao_12-25.html
- Deterring violence in emergencies, Jonglei, South Sudan⁹ <https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6xXWyhAU8biM1VnNjJxc0lZU0k/edit>

Read:

- Wallis, T. (2010). Civilian Peacekeeping. *Oxford Encyclopedia of Peace* <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/civilian-peacekeeping-entry-oxford-encyclopedia-peaceoup-2009>
- Shah, K. (2013). *Diary of a Peacekeeper*. Page 5 of this document: <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/images/news/newsletters/2013/fn2013winter.pdf>
- Schweitzer, C. (ed.) (2010). *Civilian Peacekeeping: A Barely Tapped Resource*. Belm-Vehrte, Germany: Sozio Publishing. http://nonviolentpeaceforce.org/images/news/CP_A_Barely_Tapped_Resource.pdf

⁹ This video presentation provides background information on the case study presented in Box 1.

1.2

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Unarmed

Unarmed means not equipped with or carrying weapons (Oxford, n.d.). In the context of UCP this means that organizations or agencies implementing UCP will not be equipped with or use weapons to protect themselves or their beneficiaries. It sends a clear message to all parties that they are not taking part in the conflict and pose no physical threat to anyone. UCP personnel are less of a target than those who carry weapons and they may gain access to areas where armed peacekeepers are not welcome.

Whereas the reliance on armed force is avoided by all organizations and agencies that implement UCP, their approach towards local actors who carry or use weapons varies. These variations depend on the local context, the nature of the conflict and the mandate of the organization. Many UCP agencies will not provide protection services to individuals and groups that are equipped with weapons. In some cases UCP agencies do not provide any services at all to armed actors, including capacity development for security forces. However, grey areas remain, especially for rural areas. Here, the distinction between an armed and unarmed actor can be hard to make. Traditional weapons (e.g., machetes, spears) play a prominent role in daily life (for cutting grass, fishing, etc.). Moreover, people may appear unarmed but could secretly be part of an armed militia group, for example.

Civilian

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines civilians as those persons who are not combatants (members of military/paramilitary forces) or members of organized armed groups of a party to a conflict. The ICRC also excludes civilians who are part of 'levée en masse' (mass uprising) within the definition. A combatant, on the other hand, is defined as a person who takes an active part in hostilities, who can kill, and who, in turn, is regarded as a lawful military target. He or she can be a member of the armed forces (other than medical personnel and religious ministers), or of an armed organized group. Under international humanitarian law, armed forces are subject to an internal disciplinary system, which must enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict.

UCP is carried out by civilians for civilians. At its core and from the outset, it is a partnership between UCP teams and local civil society—even though other partnerships may develop with local government, security sector, and humanitarian organizations over time. This partnership

includes the invitation from local civil society organizations (mostly from NGOs) for UCP organizations to establish a physical presence in their country and in specific communities within that country. The civilian-to-civilian partnership derives from global solidarity among civilians, some of whom have experienced similar violence elsewhere. Moreover, it de-emphasizes the role of armed conflict parties as the sole actors involved in providing protection and managing security. Finally, it encourages civil society leaders and organizations to increase their role as peacemakers, peacekeepers and peacebuilders.

Though the definition of a civilian may appear to be clear, it sometimes creates confusion for UCP implementers at the field level. In areas of protracted conflict a disproportionately large segment of society has been or still is affiliated in one way or another with armed forces. They may not be bearing arms, but aid armed forces or groups. For example, members of local civil society organizations may be employed by the armed forces because NGO work does not allow them to make an adequate living; or a church minister in one small village may be employed in a neighbouring village as a police inspector. (For more information on civilian immunity, see Module 2).

Protection

Protection is defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC, 1999) as a concept that encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law.¹⁰ Protection involves creating an environment conducive to respect for human beings, preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse, and restoring dignified conditions of life through reparation, restitution, and rehabilitation. This is a very broad definition that can be applied to nearly every effort that aims to make an improvement in people's access to their rights in any situation. It allows for a holistic approach to protection that includes the access to medical care, freedom of movement, and the recognition of dignity. It has also made humanitarian and development actors more aware of the potential threats and opportunities their interventions pose to the safety and security of affected populations in situations of war and violent conflict as well as natural disasters and famine.

Though protection mainstreaming has broadened the discourse about the safety and security of civilians in high-risk situations, it has also created a false impression about the amount of attention and resources dedicated to protection as ordinary people understand the term: physical safety and security.¹¹ In order to understand protection within the context of UCP it is useful to distinguish four different areas of protection. These areas are visualized in the multi-layered onion model, shown in Figure 3.

¹⁰ The definition was originally adopted by a 1999 Workshop of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Protection.

¹¹ Recent studies into peacebuilding projects also mention the lack of attention to and the need for direct protection. Comparing 13 case studies on the role of civil society in peacebuilding, Thania Paffenholz mentions this as one of her most striking findings: 'while protection was always highly relevant during armed conflict and war, it was performed only to a far lower degree.' (Paffenholz, 2009, p.6).




Figure 3: The Protection Onion

This multi-layered onion model, created by Paul D. Williams (Williams, 2010, p.22), is an adaptation of the ICRC's egg model, depicted in Figure 2. It shows four layers of protection. UCP practitioners, like the military, the police, and UN peacekeepers, mainly operate in the red coloured area of physical protection from imminent violence.

The first and broadest area of protection relates to long-term environment building work that creates the **enabling conditions** necessary for the enjoyment of human rights. Setting policies and acceding to international conventions form part of the work. It does not target specific moments of abuse. It aims to build structures and capacities to change attitudes in society, which will make abuse less likely to occur in the future.

The second area of protection relates more directly to the **enjoyment of human rights**. Here the focus is to protect, promote and fulfill human rights. It aims to raise awareness about injustice or abuse and to reform or remove damaging structures that make abuse more likely. Examples include the promotion of equal rights for women and men, access to justice by minority groups, and good governance practices. Many human rights advocacy groups as well as rights-based development agencies that contribute to protection, operate in this area. Unlike the outer layer, this work is in reaction to abuses and the threats of abuse.

The third area of protection relates to the **provision of basic necessities**. Elizabeth Ferris has called this "humanitarian protection" or "access to lifesaving assistance" (Ferris, 2011, loc.3804). It is a more immediate response to a particular situation of violence or crisis and relates to the incorporation of protection into humanitarian relief. As Ferris points out, humanitarian protection is usually not about preventing people from getting hurt, but responding to people who are already hurt (i.e. remedial action). It includes for example the timely delivery of medical assistance to protect survivors of violence from further harm or the provision of life-saving information to populations affected by natural disasters. Most humanitarian agencies that contribute to protection operate in this area.

The fourth area of protection relates to **physical protection from imminent violence**, or physical safety and security. It is based on a minimalist definition of protection as “defending or guarding from imminent danger or injury”. Physical protection includes direct interventions to prevent people from getting hurt, and to remove or reduce threats. Traditionally, this is the domain of the military and the police. Currently, unarmed civilians are increasingly involved in this area of protection, both within UN peace operations and within civil society groups. This reflects the recognition of the unmet need for the protection of civilians. UCP practitioners can operate in all four areas of protection, but their main focus lies with providing physical protection from imminent violence.¹²

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping as defined by the UN is action undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers (United Nations, n.d., p.97). Peacekeepers are defined as ‘military, police and civilian personnel, who work to deliver security, political and early peace building support’ (United Nations n.d.). Though some NGOs that apply UCP also use the term peacekeeping,¹³ they view this as action undertaken to prevent or reduce violence, provide direct protection to civilians, and stabilize the environment to make serious peace processes possible (Carriere, 2011). Furthermore, UCP organizations do not portray their efforts as ‘delivering security’. They prefer to describe their activities as collaborative action undertaken by UCP personnel and local actors to increase the safety and security of vulnerable populations and individuals.

The role of peacekeeping and keeping peace can be understood better when it is contrasted with peacemaking and peacebuilding. Johan Galtung, one of the pioneers of peace research, suggests that all conflicts have three major components (Galtung, 2000). First, there are the *Attitudes (A)* of the conflicting parties. These attitudes tend to become more and more hostile towards each other as the conflict escalates. In order to reach some sort of settlement of the conflict, the parties must first change their attitudes and perceptions of each other. This, broadly speaking, Galtung defined as the process of *peacemaking*. Second, attitudes in conflict situations are very much affected by the *Behaviour (B)* of the belligerents. Escalating degrees of violence make it more and more difficult to see the mutual benefit of ending a conflict. Therefore it is essential to find ways of tackling the violence itself in order to de-escalate the situation and to enable the peacemaking process to develop. Galtung defines this as the task of *peacekeeping*. Third, there is the matter, or matters, over which the conflict is being waged, or the *Causes (C)* of the conflict. Tackling the actual causes of the conflict is what Galtung defines as *peacebuilding* (Wallis and Junge, 2001, p.3).

¹² The role of UCP practitioners in providing basic necessities is minimal. They don't provide material aid, but they may provide life-saving assistance by, for example, accompanying or transporting survivors of violence to hospitals in rural areas.

¹³ The broader interpretation of the word “peacekeeping” as used by some NGOs is referred to in this course as “keeping peace”.




Figure 4: The ABC Conflict Triangle

Conflicts generally pass through well-recognized stages, including the very early stages of *latent conflict*, which may simmer for years, before yielding to a *confrontation* stage. This is the stage during which attitudes harden and options are closed, until the confrontation turns into a crisis stage of actual hostilities. The crisis will sooner or later lead to an *outcome*, a stage in which levels of tension, confrontation, and violence decrease. Finally, there is at least one *post-crisis stage*, often a precursor to the next conflict and the cycle starting all over again. Peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding are usually positioned in specific stages of the conflict. Peacemaking is most often launched after a crisis. Peacekeeping follows peacemaking and is sustained until the situation is stable enough for peacebuilding, which is usually carried out during the post-crisis stage. Though knowledge of the different stages (and of the corresponding interventions) allow UCP practitioners to better understand the roles they can play in these stages, the reality of peace and war is often more complex. Many conflicts relapse into the crisis stage more than once before stabilizing into a post-crisis stage.

The world has been more successful at peacemaking than peacebuilding. According to Uppsala University, in the period between 1975 and 2011, only 125 peace agreements out of 216 were followed by the termination of violence for at least five years (Högbladh, n.d., p.51). Former parties in the conflict often underestimate the complexity of addressing the underlying causes of conflict, and resume arms before the peacebuilding process can be completed. Sustained peacekeeping efforts can reduce the chance of a premature return to hostilities. Peacekeeping is one key link between peacemaking and peacebuilding. Without effective peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and development efforts risk failure almost as soon as they have begun. Though effective in many cases, peacekeeping has not always been able to maintain sufficient safety and stability long enough for local actors to address the underlying causes of violence.

As UCP aims to tackle violence in order to de-escalate situations, it is essentially a peacekeeping intervention. Unlike UN peacekeeping, which is generally applied after an official peace agreement has been reached, UCP may be applied in all stages of a conflict. It can be launched before a crisis occurs to prevent violence. It can also be sustained when peacebuilding efforts are well underway to ensure that the cycle of violence does not start all

over again. This does not mean that UCP practitioners are directly involved in peacemaking or peacebuilding. They may accompany peacemaking processes and provide a safer space for local actors to make and build peace. They may also facilitate the contribution of people at the grassroots to Track-One¹⁴ peacemaking activities. Throughout this process UCP practitioners serve to underline the centrality of the protection of civilians. More information about the stages of conflict, and the application of UCP in various stages, will be provided in Module 4.

Nonviolence

Nonviolence in its most basic form can be defined as the use of peaceful means, not military or physical force, to bring about political or social change.¹⁵ As an ethical philosophy, nonviolence upholds the view that moral behaviour excludes the use of violence; as a political philosophy it maintains that violence is self-perpetuating and can never provide a means to a lasting peaceful end. As a principle, it supports the pacifist position that war and killing are never justified. As a practice, pacifists and non-pacifists have used nonviolence to achieve social change and express resistance to oppression (Peace Pledge Union n.d.). It is this framework of philosophy, principle, and especially practice that distinguishes 'nonviolence' from 'unarmed'. Unarmed only explains that a person or group is not equipped with or carrying weapons. Nonviolence assumes that people take active roles, making choices and commitments and building on their experience.

The degree to which principle, philosophy, and practice are applied, greatly differ among practitioners of nonviolence. Some practitioners regard the principle and philosophy as ideal, but not always applicable, or may even reject them altogether. They practice nonviolence as they believe it to be the most effective or least costly strategy for social or political change in a particular situation. They may also use nonviolence for the lack of better alternatives because a military or other violent option is not available or viable. There are also those practitioners who adhere to the principle and philosophy of nonviolence under any circumstances. For these practitioners nonviolence is a moral stand and a way of life. UCP does not choose between these two positions. The fact that nonviolence is a key principle of UCP simply means that it is part of the mandate of UCP agencies and that UCP team members strictly adhere to nonviolence under all circumstances during their employment. It does not imply that individual UCP practitioners view nonviolence as a way of life or a moral stand. Nonviolence will be further explored in Section 4 of this module.

Proactive engagement

Proactive engagement refers first of all to the need of being proactive for the sake of providing protection. This engagement involves building relationships with relevant actors and other stakeholders from grassroots to higher levels. It also involves opening up and maintaining credible channels of communications among relevant actors. Relationships and communication channels with conflicting parties on all sides may, for example, be used to

¹⁴ Track-One refers to official government diplomacy whereby communication and interaction is between governments. Track-Two Diplomacy is the unofficial interaction and intervention of non-state actors. The term Track-Two was coined and developed by the US diplomat Joseph Montville.

¹⁵ Force in this sentence is used in the sense of physical force, or the force of weapons.

call a temporary ceasefire or humanitarian corridor to evacuate vulnerable populations or individuals. Moreover, proactive engagement involves enhancing the capacities of key actors to ensure protection of civilians. More information on proactive engagement will be provided in Module 3.

Some UCP practitioners describe the method of proactive engagement as 'proactive presence'. Both terms are created to distinguish the method described in the previous paragraph from the presence of international observers or monitors in situations of violent conflict, who do not purposefully augment the potentially protective impact of their presence, with other intentional actions focused on increasing their influence to protect civilians and deter violence. Many observers, monitors and humanitarian aid staff do make conscious efforts to have protective impact, even when it is not part of the mandate. For those that do not, or cannot, their presence may aid protection, but the cases tend to be isolated. Moreover, there are many situations in the past where a presence of foreign nationals has had no effect at all. Failure to act could even be taken as acceptance of abuses. Just as it is impossible to fight a famine simply by setting up food warehouses, so it cannot be assumed that, simply by being there, an international presence provides protection.

What is needed... is not passive presence for its own sake, but well informed and carefully analysed strategies and tactics that use the presence of each [UCP practitioner] to influence all the actors around them.

Liam Mahony, 2006

Monitoring

Monitoring is essentially the practice of observing compliance to a standard. The precise meaning of monitoring varies among organizations. However definitions share the common elements of continuous measurement and comparison to a previously established plan, situation, or set of targets. Its purpose is to help all the people involved to make appropriate and timely decisions that will improve the quality of the work, to ensure accountability, and to encourage implementation according to plan (Kelley et al, 2004, p.1).

Within the context of UCP, monitoring refers first of all to observing compliance with ceasefires agreements. This activity may be officially mandated or more informally performed. Secondly, it refers to observing the security situation for the purpose of rumour control. Thirdly, it refers to observing the security situation for the purpose of Early Warning/Early Response (EWER). The observation of political events (e.g., demonstrations, elections), legal proceedings (e.g., trials, tribunals), or social processes (e.g., holidays, celebrations, parades) in situations of violent conflict, is often referred to as monitoring as well. These activities are then a mixture between monitoring and proactive engagement. The monitoring of a trial may be intended to observe compliance to the law as well as to provide protection to lawyers, witnesses, or the accused through physical presence and visibility. More information on monitoring will be provided in Module 3.

Relationship building

Building relations with local and international key actors at the grassroots, middle-range and top levels of society (including, for example, UN Special Rapporteurs) is an important component of UCP. It is used to prevent or reduce violence, create community acceptance, control rumours, communicate needs, dissuade potential perpetrators, connect communities with duty bearers, and influence decision makers. A crucial element for the effectiveness of UCP comes from establishing and improving relationships with actors who have the power to influence potential perpetrators of violence or parties in conflict. These actors include government representatives, armed actors (state and non-state), and local religious and community leaders. While establishing such relationships inherently provides some protection, these influential persons can be specifically called upon if and when threats do occur. They may be able to use their influence to dissuade potential perpetrators from actualizing their threat.

Capacity development

Capacity development refers to the strengthening of knowledge, skills and abilities of individuals or groups. In the context of UCP, capacity is built in order to increase knowledge about and effectiveness of local mechanisms and protocols for violence prevention and protection. Capacity development is most often provided through training for civil society organizations and government actors. Capacity development at the grassroots level is most effective when it is tailor-made, context-specific, and participatory. More information on capacity development will be provided in Module 4.

1.3

THE SPECTRUM OF UCP

The diagram presented in Figure 1 (UCP Bubble Chart) shows where several key principles, key methods, and key sources of guidance overlap and intersect. Where they all come together, they constitute the core of UCP. The diagram also shows a number of key skills that support effective practice of the key methods. The Bubble Chart helps to make clear that different organizations may use different combinations and permutations of the UCP characteristics. ‘UCP organizations’, therefore, come in a great variety. They could be portrayed as fitting somewhere in a spectrum (or range) of possibilities. Therefore, UCP is an umbrella term that brings together the practices of a number of different organizations, such as Peace Brigades International, Witness for Peace, Nonviolent Peaceforce and many others, that apply combinations of UCP characteristics in some way or another. These organizations may use some, but not all of the methods and principles that are presented in the UCP Bubble Chart. Besides, they may use different terms to describe these methods and principles. The different components of the diagram will be explored in more detail in Module 2 (Key Principles and Sources of Guidance) and Module 3 (Key Methods and Skills).

The spectrum of UCP can be placed within a wider field of unarmed efforts for the protection of civilians (see Figure 2, Section 1.2). As stated before, a whole host of actors are involved in addressing the protection needs of civilians (see definition of ‘protection’ in Section 2). Many of these actors are themselves unarmed civilians who provide protection with methods, principles, sources of guidance, and skills that are similar to the key components of the UCP spectrum. The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, is a well-known unarmed, nonpartisan, civilian actor that engages parties in situations of violent conflict to prevent violence. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like the African Union (AU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also organize unarmed missions with civilians. UN peace operations (managed by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO) include police and other civilians whose work concerns protection. Whether these organizations would be placed at the heart, the edges, or outside of the UCP spectrum is to some extent arbitrary.

Adding to this complexity is the fact that UCP organizations rarely, if ever, apply the identified principles, methods, and sources of guidance all together in the exact same format. Instead, they are used in a strategic mix selected on a case-by-case basis, specific to focused populations and conflict and appropriate to context. Therefore, UCP will look different in different situations and at different phases of the conflict. An overly rigid definition of UCP ignores the necessary flexibility of this practice and could stifle its creativity. Examples and

case studies will be used throughout the course modules to illustrate the variety of situations and responses.

If a classification were to be made, however, the UCP spectrum could be distinguished from the wider field of unarmed protection efforts by (1) its emphasis on providing direct physical protection to imperiled populations, and (2) enhancing the capacities of both local people and local peace mechanisms to respond, at multiple levels, to situations of violent conflict. This distinction would include all organizations or missions proactively deploying unarmed civilians to provide direct physical protection as their only or main purpose. But it would exclude humanitarian and development organizations that respond to crises by providing essential, often lifesaving, assistance; theirs is not a 'proactive presence' intended to prevent or protect against imminent violence. It would also exclude diplomacy and negotiation efforts aimed at restoring peace and the usual mechanisms of protection at the governmental level.

Each of these responses to conflict is essential in their own way. Understanding the specific functions and roles of each allows for effective coordination of efforts to provide security for people threatened by violence. Our interest here is to highlight the important role that UCP plays among the various layers of protection (see Figure 3 above).

Accepting these different but complementary protection functions, some of the efforts of the OHCHR in Nepal, could be regarded as UCP (see Module 3). A similar case could be made for the unarmed EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia that has, for example, contributed to improving the security situation through visible presence and daily patrolling in high-risk areas, reporting of incidents, and confidence building (EUMM, n.d.). UN Volunteers, too, have found themselves in situations where they performed UCP (Weiss and Minear, 1996). As previously mentioned, although the presence of international field staff (whether election monitors, human rights monitors, or humanitarian aid staff) may in itself have some protective impact, UCP implies consciously and intentionally using presence to protect other civilians. The ICRC is a special case: it has legally defined rights, of long standing, to be active in zones of war.¹⁶ As a hybrid IGO-INGO it is specifically mandated to ensure compliance with the Geneva Conventions and related humanitarian laws, with a focus on the protection of prisoners of war and political prisoners, but also on other victims of armed conflicts to whom it provides humanitarian relief assistance (Carriere, 2011). ICRC also sets authoritative standards for protection actors constituting the minimum obligations that apply to any humanitarian or human rights organization (including UCP organizations) engaged in protection work in armed conflict and other situations of violence (ICRC 2013).

While definitions and models have their limitations, they help to clarify the niche that UCP fills. UCP operates primarily within the innermost circle of the protection onion, unlike most other humanitarian efforts. Traditionally, this is the domain of the military and the police. Currently, unarmed civilians are increasingly involved in this area of protection, both within UN peace operations and within civil society groups. This reflects the growing recognition of the unmet need for the protection of civilians (Paffenholz, 2009). UCP practitioners can operate in all four circles of the Protection Onion (Figure 3), but their main focus lies with providing physical protection from imminent violence.

¹⁶ The ICRC also has financial security, with significant funding from governments.

In no way does this differentiation imply a value judgement about the relative effectiveness or contribution of organizations that operate in other layers of the protection field. In fact, we all share the terrain, having different peace mandates, fulfilling complementary roles in protecting civilians, deterring violence and developing local peace infrastructures.

1.4


UCP, NONVIOLENCE AND PEACEKEEPING

The decision to go to Bougainville unarmed caused some angst in the Australian Defence Force at the time, but it was the right one. At least two occasions I encountered may have gone differently if we had been armed. Perhaps more fundamentally, the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) experience reaffirmed for me that the role of peacekeepers is to not only stand between the warring sides to prevent more suffering but also to encourage the coming together of divided people.

Andrew Rice, Australian Department of Defence, 1999 (Schweitzer, 2010, p.7)

UCP is rooted in two main practices: one practice is that of nonviolence, and the other practice is that of peacekeeping.¹⁷ This section provides a brief overview of both, and describes how UCP is a composite of key features of nonviolence and peacekeeping.

1.4.1 Nonviolence



View:

- Dr. Michael Nagler, *Basics of Nonviolence*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBDeesTDEKk> (Michael Nagler 2013b)

UCP is built on a legacy of the use of nonviolent methods in movements for civil and political rights. Examples can be found from all over the world. They include nonviolent struggles against colonialism and dictatorships, campaigns for women's rights, and the development of peace armies (i.e., organized units of unarmed men and women who place themselves between conflicting parties to prevent violence). The examination of such examples shows

¹⁷ Recognizing there are significant differences in size, scope and process with UN peacekeeping.

the variety of strategies, methods and applications, and the adaptability of active nonviolence. Only recently has serious attention been paid to the task of documenting and classifying early nonviolent methods (Pt'chang Nonviolent Community Safety Group Inc. 2005, p.19).

Associating nonviolent struggle with pacifism, passivity, weakness, sometimes with religious beliefs or isolated street protests has contributed to misconceptions about this phenomenon. However, recent studies on nonviolent campaigns against repressive regimes indicate that nonviolent campaigns are actually, by and large, more effective than campaigns resorting to armed force. Analysing 323 campaigns from 1900 to 2006, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan found that major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53% of the time (with a 20% failure rate), compared with 26% success for violent resistance campaigns (with a 60% failure rate).¹⁸ Their research also shows an **increasing** success rate of nonviolent campaigns from 1940 to 2006, ranging from less than 40% success in the period from 1940 to 1949 to almost 70% in the period from 2000 to 2006. Campaigns using armed force, on the other hand, show a gradual decrease in success, ranging from over 40% to over 10% of success in the same periods (Chenoweth et al, 2011).

To place UCP in its proper context, it is important to understand the usual classification of nonviolent action:

- **To disrupt the status quo.** Nonviolent actions are used as a way to change social, political or economic conditions (e.g., Gandhi's campaign for Indian independence, the US Civil Rights Movement). Nonviolence is most frequently associated with these types of campaigns and activities.
- **To protect the status quo.** Nonviolent tactics are used for civilian-based defense of a country against invasions and aggressors or to protect local customs and social structures from aggressors within a country. As Professor Gene Sharp, a scholar of non-violent struggle, suggests: "Their weaponry consists of a vast variety of forms of psychological, economic, social, and political resistance and counter-attack. The trained population and the society's institutions would be prepared to deny the attackers their objectives and to make consolidation of political control impossible." (Sharp, 1985) Such techniques were employed in East Germany and Poland during the Cold War.
- **To protect civilians and prevent violence.** Nonviolent methods are applied by civilians for the direct physical protection of civilians from the threat of violence. UCP clearly fits into this category.

In Module 2, where the key principles of UCP will be described, more information will be provided on the characteristics of nonviolence and how it is applied within the framework of UCP.

¹⁸ The balance refers to partial success.



Assignment

View:

- George Lakey. (2013). *Taxonomy of Nonviolent Action*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnnBCKRa3rM&list=PL3fe0eIWTeHOnbYF1N1e0g8ZZBHdb2HM3>
- Michael Nagler. (2013). *Peace Teams*. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=deXGQyK6xak> (Martin Nagler, 2013a)

1.4.2 Peacekeeping

Over the last 50 years of peacekeeping, when it has been successful, it has not been the tanks or the machine guns that have kept the peace. In fact these have been rarely used. It's been the blue helmets themselves that kept the peace, or rather, what they represent. Soldiers on UN peacekeeping missions represent the UN; they represent the international community; they represent world public opinion. That's what gives them the authority ... to actually keep the parties from fighting each other, to keep the environment safe for civilians, and to create the conditions for peacemaking and peacebuilding activities.

Tim Wallis, Former Executive Director of Nonviolent Peaceforce (Schweitzer, 2010 p.29)



Assignment

Listen to:

- *Lester Pearson's Suez Solution*, <http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/lester-pearsons-suez-solution>

UCP also builds on the practice of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping was 'invented' during the 1956 Suez Crisis by Lester B. Pearson, then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. Working with UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, Pearson crafted the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). UNEF was a lightly armed international military force that occupied an inter-positional buffer zone between the belligerent parties, with their consent. The purpose of UNEF, and of the other peacekeeping missions that were deployed during the Cold War, was to stabilize international conflicts. By this method, time and space were provided for

politicians and diplomats to work out a long-term durable solution. Eighteen such missions were deployed before 1990.¹⁹

The beginning of modern peacekeeping operations coincides with the end of the Cold War in 1989–90. A new type of violent conflict came to characterize the international scene. These wars were mostly intra-national (as opposed to inter-national) and often involved *several* belligerent factions. Conflicts involved regular military forces, militias, insurgents, heavily armed organized criminals, brigand bands, local warlords, and petty criminals. Civilian elements of the population frequently became the target or object of military operations conducted by one or more of the fighting forces.

While the Charter of the United Nations specifically prohibits Member States from interfering in the internal affairs of other states, the vicious internal wars and genocides of the 1990s (e.g., Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia) have led to a broader interpretation of what this means. The Security Council has authorized intervention, under the provisions of Chapter VII, whenever an internal situation presented a sufficient threat to international peace, security, and stability. These modern peacekeeping operations are dramatically different from the majority of the earlier operations that preceded them during the Cold War period (Morrison et al, 1999, p.1572).

Alan Doss, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) observed that the resolution authorizing the first multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission in the Congo in 1960 (MONUC) was three paragraphs long. He goes on to say that “MONUC[’s] ... last mandate resolution had something like forty-nine operational paragraphs covering, at the top, protection of civilians, first priority, but then added everything else that followed including monitoring illegal smuggling of minerals, arms, you name it. Once we have recognized that we need a comprehensive approach, we knew we needed more civilians” (Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2012)

One important difference is the incorporation of the protection of civilians into the mandate of peacekeeping operations.²⁰ The notion of protection of civilians first appeared in the UN Secretary-General’s Report on the Situation of Africa of 13 April 1998 (S/1998/318 or A/52/871) (UN Security Council 1998). In this report Kofi Annan referred to the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict as a ‘humanitarian imperative’²¹ Since then, the notion of protection of civilians has become more and more central to the mandate of peacekeeping operations. The first mission provided with explicit protection language in the mandate ‘to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’, was authorized in 1999.²² By 2012, the

¹⁹ Note that the very first ‘peacekeeping’ type of operation conducted by the UN (before the term ‘peacekeeping’ was coined), which was in Palestine in 1948, was unarmed. UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) consisted of unarmed military observers, essentially a military operation but without weapons (Schweitzer 2010, p.27).

²⁰ Though the protection of civilians only became part of the mandate of UN peace operations in 1999, it was long practiced by others, such as the ICRC and the UNHCR.

²¹ The following year the United National General Assembly approved the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, often called the ‘UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders’ (UN General Assembly, 1999). This was a full century after the Conventions of The Hague of 1899 (and then again 1907) on the protection of civilians in war were ratified and became international law.

²² This refers to the UN Peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

majority of nearly 100,000 uniformed UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide were operating under such a mandate.

Two noteworthy developments regarding the protection of civilians in the context of peacekeeping operations are the publication of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines in 2008 (United Nations n.d.), and the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. The 2008 Guidelines aimed to address the intentional targeting of civilian populations during armed conflicts. It also called for the mainstreaming of the protection of civilians into the planning and conduct of peacekeeping. Finally, it clarified that missions may have to use force to ensure effective protection. The R2P doctrine states that each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from four types of crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (2005 United Nations World Summit (A/RES/60/1, para. 138-140). It was unanimously adopted in 2005 by the United Nations World Summit of Heads of States and Governments and confirmed a year later by the UN Security Council.

Though the protection of civilians has become central to UN peacekeeping operations, there is a lack of consensus on what it means. An independent study, commissioned in 2008 by the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on the implementation of protection mandates in peacekeeping operations concluded: 'Strikingly, despite ten years of statements by the [Security] Council, adoption of three iterations of the Aide Mémoire and a number of mission specific and thematic resolutions, no Council document offers an operational definition of what protection of civilians means for peacekeeping operations...' (Holt et al, 2009, p.57). Even when definitions seem clear, specific clauses regarding civilian protection such as 'within its areas of deployment', 'within its capabilities' 'without prejudice to the responsibility of the host country' leave ample room for interpretation (Holt et al, 2008, pp.14-16).

These shortcomings are now progressively being addressed (Breakey et al, 2012). DPKO has issued the Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in Peace Operations (UNDPKO, 2010), which further articulates and clarifies the meaning of protection of civilians in peace operations. In addition, a framework of implementation has been drafted that acts as a key reference for the development of protection strategies (UNDPKO, n.d.).

1.4.3 UCP: connecting peacekeeping with nonviolence

Military peacekeeping has been one response and has produced limited positive results in certain situations, but its cost, effectiveness, timeliness and efficiency for the protection of civilians has come under scrutiny. The world is witnessing the limits of meeting violence with only armed, military means - and this is happening right at the time when the world of civilians needs much more, not less human protection: direct physical human protection should be an imperative. When confronted with the imminent threat of violence to civilians - or worse, the actual mass violence against

civilians - the world should have more options to choose from... And, in any case, armed peacekeepers may not always be the best answer.

Libran Cabactulan, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations (Cabactulan, 2012)

The international community has recognized the limits of protecting civilians and keeping peace with military means only. UN peacekeeping operations have also responded to the diversity of contexts and protection needs, transforming themselves into multi-dimensional peace operations. Recognizing the need for 'soft power', they have given more prominence to their civilian components. At the same time, the UN has also chosen to deploy a more robust form of intervention by the military component of peace operations, its first offensive combat force in the form of a specialized 'intervention brigade' in the Democratic Republic of Congo.²³ In renewing the mandate for the mission in South Sudan, the Security Council in May of 2014 unanimously authorized the mission to use "all necessary means" to protect civilians (S/Res/2155).

The prevention of deadly conflict is, over the long term, too hard—intellectually, technically and politically—to be the responsibility of any single institution or government, no matter how powerful. Strengths must be pooled, burdens shared, and labour divided among actors.

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997

Operating without a military component altogether, UCP has adopted some of the characteristics and methods from the practice of nonviolence (e.g., characteristics such as winning over instead of containing a perpetrator of violence, and methods such as proactive engagement or building relationships with perpetrators). At the same time, UCP has adopted characteristics and methods from the practice of peacekeeping (e.g., stabilization of conflicts, creation of space and time to allow for peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the protection of civilians and the promotion of universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms). In short, UCP is a composite of key features of nonviolence and peacekeeping.

Every time non-violence has been used correctly it has been a brilliant success – and almost every time, barely anyone notices. Until the media catch on, it's up to the public to get informed about unarmed civilian peacekeeping. For if we know of no alternative, we may continue to flounder in the old dilemma of violence or inaction.

Nagler and Po, 2010

However, UCP is not the sum of nonviolence and peacekeeping. It is something new, leaving behind certain characteristics and methods of the traditions from which it originates. It has left behind the aspect of civil disobedience or (illegally) challenging unjust regimes. It has become very careful when it comes to frightening or threatening aggressors to change their violent behaviour, preferring dissuasion instead of shaming. It has also changed its unarmed

²³ On 28 March 2013 the UN Security Council authorized its first offensive combat force in the form of a specialized 'intervention brigade' that is part of MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

resistance towards repressive regimes into unarmed resistance against human rights violations and abuse. At the same time UCP has maintained a commitment to nonviolent social change and adopted a strictly unarmed approach to protecting civilians and reducing violence. See Figure 5 (below).




Figure 5: UCP as a Composit of Key Features of Peacekeeping and Nonviolence

Though UCP in its current form, and as a composit of key characteristics of peacekeeping and nonviolence, is a recent phenomenon, the concept of UCP is much older. Christine Schweitzer (Schweitzer, 2010, p.9) has identified a number of terms (and small-scale practices) that have been used in recent history to describe similar concepts²⁴:

- **Peace Army** (Shanti Sena in Hindi), a concept originating with Mahatma Gandhi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the 1930s;
- **International Peace Army** (proposed by Maude Royden in 1931 for civilians to interpose between the Japanese and Chinese);
- **Nonviolent intervention across borders** (Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber, 2000);
- **Third-party nonviolent intervention** (this term is often used in the US-American nonviolence movement, but it is unclear who coined it);
- **Peace force** (used early by the British MP Henry Osborne in a suggestion to send an unarmed force to patrol the demilitarized zone between Egypt and Israel in 1956);
- **Interpositional peace force** (Weber, 1993);
- **World Police Force** (term probably used first by the British MP Richard Acland in 1958);
- **Cascos Blancos** (created by Argentine government in 1994 for volunteers to prevent and reduce risk in disasters);
- **White Berets** (a term developed in advocacy work, relating to the proposal of unarmed UN forces)
- **Peace teams**, a term becoming fashionable in the 1980s and 1990s, with a number of organizations referring to themselves and the type of work they were doing as 'peace teams' (e.g., Christian Peacemaker Teams, Balkan Peace Team and others).

Regardless of the various terms that have been used to describe the concept of UCP over time, there has been a recurring interest in the option of employing unarmed missions for the purpose of providing protection and keeping peace. As a peacekeeping strategy, UCP

²⁴ Schweitzer notes that Charles Walker has already used the term 'civilian peacekeeping' in 1981. Moreover she identifies four sources of UCP: 1) peace armies, 2) various proposals by individuals and organizations to establish a standing unarmed peacekeeping force, 3) different volunteer services that have developed since World War I seeking to contribute to reconciliation through voluntary work, and 4) military peacekeeping.

has proven itself to be effective in many situations and can work in conjunction with other strategies. Whatever mix of strategies is used, the key is to be able to set up mechanisms for consultation and dialogue that are collaborative and not competitive. Lasting protection strategies need to bring in many actors, and need to address national as well as local issues, because no conflict has only national dimensions.

Unarmed civilian protection is not a perfect instrument. It is not a panacea. It is not always the right tool, and it should sometimes be avoided. It is, however, a tool that in some circumstances is the right one, the appropriate one, the most effective one. It is a tool that can sometimes be productively deployed on its own, sometimes alongside other instruments, for example within the context of a more conventional peacekeeping operation. Let's make sure we have the systems in place to use it when we need it.

Chris Coleman, Director of the Civilian Capacity Project, United Nations (Coleman, 2012)



Assignment

View:

- Michael Nagler, *Peace Teams*, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=deXGQyK6xak> (Martin Nagler 2013a)

1.5

UCP ACTORS

This section describes the main actors involved in UCP implementation. It starts by providing an overview of the most prominent organizations practicing UCP. It then lists the type of individuals and populations that benefit from UCP. And finally it describes some features of local partners and organizations that have invited UCP teams to provide their services.

1.5.1 Unarmed Civilian Protection practitioners

UCP practitioners are specially trained. They are women and men from all over the world, recruited from backgrounds that are relevant to UCP. They include women and men from the areas of violent conflict wherever appropriate, bringing their in-depth knowledge about the context and conflict and their ability to speak local languages. They all undergo intensive training and work together to implement protection programming. They often live together. UCP is a full-time job that requires readiness twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. A large number of the UCP practitioners live in the communities that are affected by violence and are able to respond in the middle of the night. They may be paid or they may be volunteers.

Many organizations currently use UCP in one form or another. Though their methodologies, mandates and principles differ, all of them use strategic physical presence as a core method for stopping or deterring violence. It is important to note that these organizations may not all describe their methods as 'UCP'.

Well-known UCP organizations include:

Peace Brigades International [<http://www.peacebrigades.org/>]

Peace Brigades International (PBI) is a volunteer-based international NGO that makes its decisions by consensus and has been promoting nonviolence and protecting human rights since 1981. It has sent 'unarmed bodyguards' to 'make space for peace' in Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, and Nepal, among other places. It is particularly known for its work on protective accompaniment of threatened human rights defenders.

Nonviolent Peaceforce [<http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/>]

Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) is an international NGO that promotes protection of civilians through proactive engagement with parties in conflict and by facilitating dialogue. Founded in 2002, NP has worked in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, South Sudan, Myanmar, and the South Caucasus. Their UCP team members are paid professionals who come from throughout the world. NP was formally involved in monitoring the ceasefire in Mindanao between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), beginning in 2009. Current explorations (2016) include Southern Thailand, Northern Iraq, Burundi, Uganda, Greece (refugees), Syria, and Standing Rock.

Witness for Peace [<http://www.witnessforpeace.org/>]

Witness for Peace (WFP) is a politically independent, grassroots organization of people committed to nonviolence and led by faith and conscience. WFP was founded in the US in 1983. It supports peace, justice and sustainable economies in the Americas by changing US policies and corporate practices that contribute to poverty and oppression in Latin America and the Caribbean. Currently, WFP has a permanent presence in Nicaragua, Mexico, and Colombia as well as a visible presence in Cuba, Honduras, Bolivia, and Venezuela.

Christian Peacemaker Teams [<http://www.cpt.org/>]

Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) is an international NGO established in 1988 to support teams of peace workers in conflict areas around the world. It provides nonviolent direct action, human rights documentation, and nonviolence training. CPT sums up its work as '...committed to reducing violence by getting in the way'. CPT has a full-time corps of over 30 peacemakers who currently work in Colombia, Iraq, the West Bank, The United States-Mexico border, and Kenora, Ontario, Canada.

FOR Peace Presence: USA [<https://peacepresence.org/>]

FOR Peace Presence provides physical safety, political visibility & solidarity by accompanying communities & organizations that embrace active nonviolence to defend life, land, and dignity in Colombia

Guatemala Accompaniment Project of the Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala [<http://www.nisgua.org/>]

The Guatemala Accompaniment Project participates in the struggle to ensure the respect of human rights by placing volunteers side-by-side with individuals, communities and organizations working on sensitive issues ranging from precedent-setting legal cases to indigenous rights and environmental justice. In communities, courtrooms and public activities, the network's presence in Guatemala has created the space for Guatemalans to organize in defense of their own rights by enabling activists to advance their work more publically and

effectively than they could without accompaniment.

Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel [<http://www.eappi.org/>]

The Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), a project of the World Council of Churches, launched in 2002, brings internationals to the West Bank to experience life under occupation. Ecumenical Accompaniers (EAs) provide protective presence to vulnerable communities, monitor and report human rights abuses and support Palestinians and Israelis in working together for peace. When they return home, EAs campaign for a just and peaceful resolution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict through an end to the occupation, respect for international law and implementation of UN resolutions.

Cure Violence [<http://cureviolence.org/>]

The Cure Violence (formerly known as Ceasefire) model is a public health approach to violence prevention that understands violence as a learned behaviour that can be prevented using disease control methods. The model aims to prevent violence through three main approaches: i) interrupt transmission; ii) identify and change the thinking of highest-potential transmitters; and iii) change group norms. Starting in the US city of Chicago in 1995 and expanding to other US urban areas, Cure Violence now has projects in Puerto Rico, Honduras, Trinidad, South Africa, Kenya and Iraq.

Other relevant organizations that operate within the spectrum of UCP include:

International Committee of the Red Cross [<http://www.icrc.org/eng/>]

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organization. Its exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the Geneva Conventions and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It directs and coordinates the international activities conducted by the Movement in armed conflicts and other situations of violence.

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [<http://www.ohchr.org/>]

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) represents the world's commitment to universal ideals of human dignity. They have a unique mandate from the international community to promote and protect all human rights. Over the years the OHCHR has increased its presence in the field to enhance its effectiveness of promoting and protecting human rights.

There are many other organizations that are involved in providing protection to civilians, though most of them are not providing direct physical protection.



Assignment

Visit websites of the 10 UCP actors listed above.

1.5.2 Populations served

UCP is conducted in areas of protracted conflict, where civilians are continually threatened by violence. UCP focuses specifically (though not exclusively) on isolated areas with little international presence, and on areas where protection service mechanisms are nonexistent or malfunctioning. It serves populations in vertical conflicts (between the state and civilians) as well as horizontal conflicts (among civilians). More information about the types of conflict and the appropriateness of UCP to operate in these conflicts will be provided in Module 4.

Within a target area, UCP serves vulnerable individuals and groups as well as local actors who serve and protect these people. Individuals and groups include:

- women
- people at risk for physical and sexual violence.
- children (especially separated, unaccompanied and abducted children as well as child soldiers)
- the elderly
- lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and trans-gender (LGBT) people
- physically or mentally challenged people
- displaced people (internally displaced persons, refugees and returnees)
- stateless people
- human rights defenders and civil society organizations working for social change
- government officers with a responsibility to protect civilians
- journalists reporting on conflict, war, and human rights violations
- voters in contentious elections.

1.5.3 Inviting civilians and organizations

UCP is provided upon invitation or request. The original request to establish a presence in a country may come, for example, from a well-known civil society group or from a government department (e.g., a national commission for human rights). Following a rigorous feasibility

appraisal of the proposed project, and after approval by the UCP organization's board of directors, a presence in the country may be established. But before establishing a field office in a specific community (and ultimately establishing activities with specific target groups), more invitations need to be secured from sub-national entities. At lower levels, the invitation may come from local governments, traditional chiefs or community-based organizations. These invitations or requests are also carefully analysed to determine if UCP can be undertaken usefully and responsibly (i.e., without putting staff members or local people at undue risk).

Some organizations only provide UCP upon formal invitation, while others also provide UCP upon informal invitation or a clear expression of interest and acceptance. Either way, some form of invitation is considered important for a number of reasons. First, it would be disrespectful to establish a UCP presence in a community that has no interest in such a thing. Second, the needs and participation of a community form the foundations for UCP's tailor-made strategies and methods. Third, the security of unarmed peacekeepers depends on the acceptance of the host government and host community. As UCP practitioners do not bear arms, they need to ensure that they are not mistakenly perceived by anyone as a threat. In order to do this, they do not interfere in internal affairs, they are transparent, and they build relationships of trust and acceptance by all parties, including armed actors.

Logical as this process of invitation may sound in theory, at the field level it poses certain challenges. Before a request for a UCP presence can be made, UCP organizations themselves are often proactive, engaging with local actors to assess needs and interests. It is important that the concept of UCP be adequately explained and understood in the community. People in isolated and disempowered communities may welcome any type of agency, with the hope of gaining some benefit, but without understanding the nature of their own participation. On the other hand, misunderstandings about the need and nature or potential of UCP could lead a community to conclude that they do not need unarmed protection even when it could benefit them. Therefore, UCP organizations need to be proactive and ask the right questions to find out whether unarmed protection is wanted and needed, and if their presence would be helpful.

1.5.4 Local partners

The primacy of local actors and nonpartisanship are key principles of UCP. This means that UCP practitioners do not take sides nor advocate for particular solutions to conflicts. Instead they observe, create safe spaces, encourage, connect, and facilitate; and they strengthen the capacity of local partners who are directly involved in peacemaking or human rights work.²⁵

Local actors are most often organized civil society groups or NGOs, though they can also be government departments (e.g., a national commission on human rights). Many local civil

²⁵ Participants at a 2001 workshop on Practical Protection, organized by the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University and the American Red Cross, concluded that 'establishing strategic partnerships is among the most effective means by which NGOs can broaden their protection roles in the field, gain access to target populations and increase the resources available for more explicit protection activities...' (Ferris, 2011, loc.1479).

society groups and human rights defenders in situations of violent conflict are keen to associate themselves with an unarmed international third party, especially one that is independent from any particular government. Not only does it give them easier access to international networks, but it also helps them boost their own nonpartisanship or at least the perception thereof. At times they fear that protection with weapons will draw more fire to them, instead of shielding them from violence. Others feel that unarmed protection can help to distance themselves from (armed) state protection actors, whom they may perceive as the main perpetrators of violence.²⁶

Local partners are often the first to trust UCP organizations and therefore play an important role in solidifying trust and acceptance within the wider community. Though local partners do not have to adopt all the principles of UCP, agreement on key values and principles needs to be established. Thorough assessment and background checks are made by UCP personnel to ensure that local partners are not linked to armed groups, carry arms, or exercise violence through other means. This might compromise the security of the UCP teams or other partners and beneficiaries. Other challenges include the possibility that local partners may become targets after association with UCP organizations. Module 4 will explore the question of how to meet these challenges.

Though local partners are of key importance for UCP, there are places (e.g., South Sudan) where organized civil society is weak or almost non-existent. There may not be any organized local partners in the area and communities may desire and expect UCP organizations to show leadership. In such a case UCP focuses directly on communities. As a consequence the leading role of UCP practitioners increases, posing various challenges to the mandate and principles of the organization, especially non-partisanship and primacy of local actors. UCP teams are challenged to find a balance between being non-responsive to the felt needs of communities on the one hand, and overtly directing local processes on the other. This challenge will be explored in more detail together with other challenges and dilemmas in Module 5.

Circumstances may be even more complicated where the roles between civilians and combatants are blurred: soldiers on extended leave work for NGOs; the government liaison for international organizations may be based in the military barracks; and the village chief may return to his former post in the police force after the next election. Key methods in facing these challenges are the inclusion of a wide range of actors in programming, the consistent use of transparency, on-going trust building and capacity development.

²⁶ The choice made by local partners to associate themselves with unarmed protection can help UCP organizations to explain and justify their presence to suspicious police or military actors, who may consider protection to be their responsibility.



Summary of key messages

- The nature of war has changed dramatically over the past century. Increasingly, civilians are targeted. The protection needs of civilians have increased and diversified. UCP offers a civilian-to-civilian protection approach that embraces the principle of the primacy of local actors and nonviolence.
- UCP is to be seen as complementary to conventional peacekeeping, the work of the ICRC and other organizations whose work includes efforts to protect civilians to one degree or another. UCP practitioners operate in a variety of conflict situations to offer civilian-to-civilian protection, including situations where no peacekeepers are deployed.
- Instead of using the threat of armed force, UCP practitioners employ a mix of key nonviolent methods, principles, values, and skills. Specially trained and organized civilians apply UCP in order to prevent violence and provide direct physical protection of civilians under threat.
- Key UCP methods are: proactive engagement, monitoring, relationship building and capacity development. Key principles of UCP are: nonviolence, non-partisanship, independence, primacy of local actors, civilian-to-civilian relationships, and civilian immunity in violent conflict.
- Though UCP has roots in the tradition of nonviolent action as well as in the tradition of peacekeeping, it is not the sum of both traditions but rather a composite or mixture of various components from each, leaving behind nonviolent resistance and armed protection. From this composite (or synthesis), UCP has emerged into something new and distinct.
- The main UCP actors are (1) UCP personnel, (2) the populations served (e.g., displaced people, women, children, human rights defenders), (3) the civilians and organizations that invite a UCP presence, and (4) local partners.
- UCP is an additional approach to peacekeeping. It is not a perfect instrument. It is not a panacea. But it is a tool that in some circumstances is the right one, the appropriate one, the most effective one. It is a tool that can sometimes be productively deployed on its own, and sometimes alongside other instruments, such as a conventional peacekeeping operation.



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ZONA HUMANITARIA

NUEVA ESPERANZA
EN DIOS

TERRITORIO EXCLUSIVO
DE LA POBLACION CIVIL
CAVIDA



2

MODULE 2
UNARMED CIVILIAN
PROTECTION:
OBJECTIVES, PRINCIPLES
AND SOURCES OF
GUIDANCE

OVERVIEW AND LEARNING OBJECTIVES

People try nonviolence for a week, and when 'it does not work', they go back to violence which hasn't worked for centuries.

Theodore Roszak

UCP activities are governed by several key objectives, principles, and sources of guidance. Together these form a frame of reference for UCP theory and practice. Although the objectives, principles, and sources of guidance as elaborated in this module are common ground among most UCP actors, the language that is chosen to describe them, as well as their application, may differ. Differences depend on the conflict, context, and the mandate of the implementing agency.

The module dives into the core of Unarmed Civilian Protection by exploring its key objectives, principles, and sources of guidance. By expanding on these, you will acquire a deeper understanding of UCP, how it functions, its use of encouragement and deterrence, and how it is placed within the greater frame of humanitarian intervention.

At the end of the module, readers will be able to:

- Describe the key objectives of UCP
- Describe the key principles of UCP
- Identify the relevant sources of guidance for a given UCP programme

2.1

KEY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF UCP

Three key objectives govern UCP activities:

1. To prevent or reduce direct violence and its many consequences
2. To increase the safety and security of civilians threatened by violence
3. To strengthen local peace infrastructures

These three UCP objectives are mutually reinforcing. For example, if violence is prevented, civilians may feel safer, and this in turn will help to increase their confidence that violence can be prevented in the future. As a result, they may increase their peacemaking or peacebuilding efforts. Similar reasoning applies when the second and third objectives are taken as starting points.

This section explores the three key UCP objectives. Attention will then be given to encouragement and deterrence, which are two strategies that UCP practitioners use to achieve the three objectives.

2.1.1 Objectives

Objective 1. Preventing or reducing direct violence and its consequences

First and foremost, UCP focuses on preventing direct violence. Unchecked, violence against civilians often leads to internal displacement, refugees, food insecurity, ill health, etc., as well as death and the destruction of homes and infrastructure. In order to prevent violence, UCP relies heavily on networks of relationships, trust, and acceptance by all parties in a conflict. Once tensions have escalated into violence, it becomes increasingly difficult to provide space for negotiation, dialogue, and listening. Thus UCP focuses more on, and is perhaps more effective at, prevention than stopping direct violence once it is underway. Most UCP methods are preventive. Multi-track dialogue, rumour control, monitoring of ceasefires are all predominantly used to de-escalate tensions and prevent violence.

NP is seen to be able to influence the actions of GPH (Government of the Philippines)

and MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) armed actors, including the capability to cause armed actions to cease and desist through direct access. This is recounted in community narratives of firefights and incursions that are soon quelled after information is forwarded by community monitors to their NP counterparts. Accounts cite mere minutes as the time elapsed between the reporting of the incident solely to NP, and the pull-out of armed actors or the cessation of armed action in a locality.

Gunduz and Torralba, 2014. Evaluation of Nonviolent Peaceforce's Project with the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team in Mindanao.

There are many situations where efforts to prevent violence are not sufficient, particularly in large-scale conflicts where patterns of violence are already established. In these circumstances, UCP practitioners work to interrupt violence that has already broken out. UCP team members of Nonviolent Peaceforce, for example, provided shuttle diplomacy between the leadership of government forces and non-state armed actors in Mindanao in 2008, at the height of a crisis. This shuttle diplomacy was carried out to secure the commitments of the two parties for dialogue. It also served to establish confidence-building measures in order to facilitate a ceasefire or at least on-going negotiations. Other methods that UCP practitioners use to stop violence in a time of crisis are interpositioning, proactive presence, and protective accompaniment for local peacemakers, human rights defenders and journalists. These methods will be explored in more detail in Module 3.

Though UCP practitioners may be able to stop violence in certain circumstances, these are exceptional cases. Most often the best result they can aim for is to reduce the intensity or impact of violence. They may achieve this, for example, by establishing early warning mechanisms or facilitating the commitment of aggressing parties not to attack vulnerable groups or places like hospitals and schools. Reducing the impact of violence is an important objective that is often neglected, especially by affected communities in situations of protracted conflict. They may have suffered from violence for a long period of time and consequently feel unable to change the situation. Overwhelmed by the magnitude of the conflict, they ignore the small steps they can take to reduce the number of casualties. Reducing the impact of violence, even on a small scale, often builds confidence and gives people a sense of control over their situation.

UCP strategies for preventing or reducing violence are applicable at times other than imminent or full-blown crisis. Conflicts usually build up over a long period of time. At the same time most peace agreements are followed by recurring cycles of violence that threaten the peace process for years. Therefore, UCP teams apply both short-term as well as long-term violence prevention and reduction strategies. The application of UCP methods in different stages of a conflict will be explored in more detail in Module 4.

The capacity of UCP to prevent or stop violence has its limits, though these limits will vary from situation to situation, and needs to be grounded in humility. A handful of UCP practitioners will, in most cases, not be able to prevent or stop a large-scale outbreak of violence. At the same time, this capacity should also not be underestimated. Rarely is preventive action given the attention and resources it deserves. In her book *The Politics of Protection* Elizabeth Ferris states: "Even if the ICRC had had 10,000 staff in Rwanda, it is unlikely that ICRC could have stopped the widespread killing" (Ferris, 2011 loc.3733). True as this may be, it obscures

the fact that smaller nonviolent efforts *can* stop violence. For example, former UN official Mukesh Kapila describes how a handful of ‘diminutive’ nuns of the Missionaries of Charity (Mother Theresa’s order) saved hundreds of Tutsi children. When the Hutu soldiers came for the children, the head sister told them, “You cannot come in-this is a sacred place of God.” The soldiers turned and went away (Kapila 2013, loc.2279). It also doesn’t seem to take fully into account the possible impact of long-term preventive action. The international community, skilled in the art of emergency relief, usually reacts only after extraordinary events have taken place. UN peace operations as well as UCP projects are most often assigned to the emergency relief trajectory and are subsequently criticized for being too little and too late.¹

Objective 2. Increasing the safety and security of civilians threatened by violence

While UCP’s first objective is to prevent or reduce violence, at the field level this is often not achieved. Deeply rooted conflict and on-going cycles of violence are not easily stopped or prevented. Therefore UCP’s second objective is to increase the safety and security of civilians threatened by violence. Safety can be defined as being free from danger, risk, or injury; and security, as the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger. Safety is a more complex word that implies an inner certainty that all is well. In a sense, *security* is external, while *safety* is internal (Maddox, n.d).

Increasing the safety and security of civilians is based on reasoning similar to that of reducing the impact of violence. It starts by acknowledging that the situation is too complex to control entirely, but that there are always ways to reduce vulnerability. Though increasing safety and security is usually regarded as a defensive strategy, in the context of UCP, this usually means taking a step forward towards the source of the threat, instead of backwards to hide from it. The first strategy is to attempt positive engagement with potential perpetrators. When this does not lead to the desired result, safety is sought in networks of support and influence across many sectors of society. Relationships with influential people may be used to dissuade a potential perpetrator. Traditional security measures, such as high walls and barbed wire are also used. More information on the practical aspects of security will be provided in Module 5, and more information on engagement with perpetrators will be provided in Section 2.1 of this module.

Though its main aim is to increase the physical security of civilians against direct violence, UCP also works to increase the human security of civilians, which refers to the right of all people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. For example, in some situations disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities may be excluded from specific services or resources that they need to meet basic needs. As a response, UCP practitioners can advocate for or facilitate access to such services by engaging with appropriate state duty bearers and international aid donors.

UCP and human security mutually reinforce each other. UCP, with its focus on the individual and collective protection of civilians against direct physical violence, makes an immediate and practical contribution to human security, and has the potential to do so on a much wider

¹ In the history of UN peacekeeping operations there seems to be only one example of a preventive deployment; the UN Preventive Development Force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

scale. UCP's approach to security as *security with* instead of *security from* is a recognition of the indivisibility of human development, rights, and safety.

Objective 3. Strengthening local peace infrastructures

Communities' self-protection measures are the first line of defence from civil conflict (Ferris 2011, loc.936). Most communities in situations of violent conflict already have some self-protection and conflict-resolution strategies or mechanisms that existed before UCP organizations established a presence in the area. On-going violence, destruction of infrastructure, and displacement may have overwhelmed or broken down local peace infrastructures, but they can often be revitalized or strengthened relatively easily. UNDP defines infrastructures for peace as "mechanisms, resources, and skills through which conflicts can be resolved and peace sustained within a society" (UNDP n.d.). Strengthening local peace infrastructures is the most obvious place for UCP practitioners to start their protection work. It is also the most promising strategy to achieve the other two UCP objectives (preventing or reducing violence and increasing safety and security).

Strengthening local peace infrastructures also increases local ownership of UCP efforts as these efforts can be increasingly carried out in collaboration with the appropriate local actors. This will further increase the capacity and confidence of local actors and reduce dependency on external support. Moreover, increased local ownership of UCP efforts tends to increase the relevance of these efforts, because local actors usually know best which methods suit the conflict and context. To ensure sustainability, local peace infrastructures must be strengthened. International UCP personnel will not be present forever. Their presence is highly dependent on uncertain factors like funding, and the goodwill of the government to grant visas, etc. Moving ownership to local actors ensures that when international organizations leave, UCP efforts continue.

2.1.2 Strategies: encouragement and deterrence

The two strategies of encouragement and deterrence play an important role, not only in achieving the above-mentioned three key UCP objectives, but also in connecting the objectives to UCP methods. The two strategies also link the UCP principles, sources of guidance, methods, values, and skills to the key objectives. These methods will be further defined in Module 3.

Encouragement relates to positive engagement with all actors. **Deterrence** relates to the use of negative pressure to discourage certain behaviours. Both encouragement and deterrence are used to influence relevant actors in order to prevent violence, increase safety and security, and strengthen local peace infrastructures. Encouragement is the preferred strategy. Deterrence is used as a latter resort, when encouragement is not effective.

Encouragement

Repeated incidents of violence, a culture of war, and a climate of fear can lead in many situations to discouragement and loss of morale. Civil society leaders and communities in isolated conflict areas often need support and encouragement more than protection. Encouragement therefore plays a key role in effective UCP. UCP practitioners can boost morale as well as providing new ideas and additional protection tools. This can support local peace infrastructures in generating renewed efforts for peace and security.

Encouragement is also increasingly used in the relationships with state duty bearers, replacing the use of pressure wherever possible. These are the people who have a formal responsibility to protect, and in most cases they respond better to positive engagement than to pressure. In the absence of functioning state structures, they often feel unsupported or unable to make a difference. UCP teams can support and encourage them in carrying out their responsibilities to protect civilians. When state actors, who are the principal duty bearers, increase their protection role, they limit the space for potential perpetrators to act with impunity. This may in turn encourage civilians to increase their efforts for peace and social change, knowing that they will be protected by the state (even though government officials do not always see their role as offering state protection).

Finally, encouragement is also increasingly used in the relationships with perpetrators of violations and abuse, whether they are state or non-state actors. Encouragement may take different forms: rational argument, moral appeal, positive role modelling, increased cooperation, improved human understanding, and adoption of non-offensive policy. In most situations there are identifiable needs and fears behind acts of violence. Separating the acts of violence from the person or institution committing these acts, UCP practitioners encourage open communication between local peace actors and perpetrators in the hope they can be persuaded to change their behaviour. Ideally, this engagement reminds the perpetrators of their humanity, and, in turn, they choose not to commit acts of violence. It may also reinforce their natural human inhibition against inflicting harm on fellow humans. Though this reasoning may seem idealistic, it is often too quickly assumed that perpetrators are not willing to engage or change their behaviour. Fear of working directly with perpetrators plays an important role in this frequent lack of engagement.

Deterrence

When encouragement is insufficient, deterrence is applied. In the context of UCP, deterrence means confronting aggressors with sufficient negative consequences to influence them *not* to commit human rights violations or abuse. UCP methods are effective in deterring violence against civilians because they counteract impunity by ensuring that crimes cannot happen in secret. Most aggressors prefer to carry out their abuse in private, without witnesses, to avoid legal, political, and social repercussions. The visible presence and engagement of external persons (such as internationals or nationals from other parts of the country) who would witness these abuses or human rights violations makes would-be perpetrators more reluctant to engage in violent acts. The presence of witnesses greatly increases the chances, or at least the perception, that the potential perpetrators will face negative consequences for their actions. Similarly, potential perpetrators may be unwilling to harm internationals who are

in the way of intended harm to civilians.

Examples of negative consequences are:

- **The loss of ‘moral high ground’.** Human rights violations or abuse may receive attention in international reports or media, damaging the reputation of perpetrators;
- **The loss of legitimacy among the local support base.** Supporters or the electorate at the local level do not want to be associated with leaders that are known to have committed violations or abuse;
- **The loss of status within the community, family, social, or religious organizations;**
- **The loss of contracts, aid, debt relief, or tourism.** This could be the result of bad publicity;
- **The loss of opportunities or likelihood to realize future political ambitions.** Potential donors may be reluctant to support candidates with a record of violations or abuse;
- **The sanctions or military intervention;**
- **The legal actions.** Perpetrators could be prosecuted by a national court, tried in war tribunals or taken to the International Criminal Court.

The effect of UCP’s encouragement and deterrence strategies is the creation of safer space, as shown in Figure 1, below.




Figure 1: Increasing Safe Space for Civilians

This figure is adapted from the work of Liam Mahony (Mahony, 2006, p.17). Safe space refers to the level in which civilians are protected from harm. Unsafe space refers to the level in which civilians are susceptible to potential harm. The effect of the proactive presence and engagement of UCP personnel in a situation of violent conflict is that the space for perpetrators to act with impunity (the unsafe space for civilians) becomes smaller. Perpetrators fear negative consequences of their actions and become more circumspect. As a result, the space, or opportunities for civilians to act with decreased fear of imminent violence (safer space) becomes larger. Note that in most situations of violent conflict there are no clearly distinct spaces where civilians are completely safe.



Box 1 - Case study: UCPs deter violence in Colombia

Mario Calixto was the President of the Human Rights Committee of Sabana de Torres, a small town in central Colombia. He was under heavy threats by local paramilitary forces, due to his denouncements of acts committed by these paramilitary groups.

On the evening of 23 December 1997, two armed men came to Mario's house, and intimidated and threatened him while 'asking' him to go with them: this method is widely used in Colombia to kill human rights defenders. Mario was in the presence of two expatriate observers from Peace Brigades International (PBI) at the time. In fact, he had been receiving protective accompaniment by PBI on a regular basis for several weeks. The observers from PBI intervened and asked the gunmen to leave, which the gunmen finally did, visibly puzzled by the consequences of acting before expatriate witnesses. After this incident Mario and his family were forced to move to another part of the country, but they were willing to continue with their human rights work from the new location.

This incident was not an everyday case but highlights the significant work undertaken by the 36 expatriate observers deployed by PBI in the midst of the protracted armed conflict in Colombia. It is also a good example of the interface between policies/strategy (the evident presence of PBI observers – the only expatriates in a small town and in regular contact with NGOs, civilian authorities and security forces) and perceptions/reactions (the puzzled reaction of the armed men, dissuaded from acting, afraid of the potential consequences of their action in the presence of two expatriates). This incident demonstrates the unique blend of policies and perceptions that frequently characterizes the practical fieldwork of protecting human rights defenders.

Excerpted from: Luis Enrique Eguren, *Field protection for human rights defenders: accompaniment by international observers, a case study*, Peace Brigades International, January 2002



Assignment

View:

- David Grossman, (2012). *On The Act of Killing* <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EaD7Dgv306Y>

There is not always a clear distinction between the two strategies of encouragement and deterrence. Often they are used simultaneously according to the specifics and dynamics of conflict and context. Similarly, it is not always clear whether influencing behaviour is the result of deterrence or encouragement. Effective deterrence usually reinforces the encouragement of civilians. As deterrence reduces the space for potential perpetrators to carry out their threats, the safe space for civilians to operate is increased. This often encourages civilians to further increase their safety and security by using UCP methods. It may also encourage civil society leaders and state duty bearers to resume or increase their efforts towards political and social reform. Assuming it leads to structural change, reform may eventually deter human rights abuses in a more sustainable manner.

Box 2: Examples on how UCP methods² intersect with encouragement and deterrence

	Encouragement	Deterrence
Proactive engagement	Threatened civilians realize there are ways to prevent or reduce abuse. They may feel encouraged to speak out about abuse, confront perpetrators and establish or reinvigorate their own protection activities. Potential perpetrators realize that their needs can be met without the use of violence.	Protective accompaniment and presence block or interrupt a pattern of abuse, or make it more difficult for abusers to threaten or abuse civilians.
Monitoring	Civilians clearly see the presence of and timely response to incidents by UCP monitors in the area and see that their own people (local UCP staff or partners) are actively involved.	Fearing that the international protectors could invoke negative consequences, perpetrators are reluctant to commit violence in the presence of a clearly identified protection monitors.
Relationship building	Survivors of violence feel encouraged by the stronger networks of relationships, and the opportunities this gives them to report abuse, connect with relevant service providers, and access services. State actors are reinforced in their responsibility to protect. Non-state actors are encouraged to enhance their international image.	Perpetrators are reluctant to commit violence because UCP teams have a relationship with their superiors and other high-level actors on which they depend.

² Methods will be further elaborated in Module 3.

Capacity development	Local actors feel inspired and empowered to improve their own security and that of others by applying new methods.	Local actors feel increasingly able to confront patterns of abuse and raise their profile, diminishing the space in which perpetrators can act with impunity.
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Recommended reading

- Mahony, L. and Eguren, E. (1997). *Unarmed Bodyguards: International Accompaniment for the Protection of Human Rights*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Mahony, L. (2006). *Protective Presence: Field strategies for civilian protection*. Geneva, Switzerland: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/Proactive-Presence.pdf

2.2

KEY PRINCIPLES OF UCP

UCP methods and activities are governed by the application of a specific set of principles. There are six such principles: nonviolence, nonpartisanship, primacy of local actors, independence, civilian leadership, and civilian immunity in war. This section describes each of these six UCP principles. It also clarifies how UCP practitioners apply the principles to achieve the three key objectives.




Figure 2: Key Principles of Unarmed Civilian Protection

2.2.1 Nonviolence

Nonviolence is a powerful and just weapon... which cuts without wounding and ennobles the man who wields it. It is a sword that heals.

Martin Luther King (1964)

In Module 1, nonviolence was explained as the use of peaceful means to bring about social and political change. Module 1 also showed that there is a long worldwide tradition of nonviolence and that nonviolent struggle has been more effective in bringing about social and

political change than violent struggle. Finally, UCP was presented as a composite of selected key features of nonviolence and peacekeeping. It includes and discards some aspects of both traditions from which it originates.

Not relying on the use of armed or physical force, UCP practitioners need alternative means to prevent violence and protect civilians. Without such means, UCP would not be able to achieve much. It finds alternative means in nonviolence. Some peaceful means to bring about social and political change, such as negotiation, are so widely used, even by militaries that they are hardly thought of as 'nonviolent'. Unlike militaries, however, UCP practitioners cannot pick and choose between force and nonviolence. If they were to use force, even momentarily, they would change the rules of the game and lose, or at least weaken, their ability to protect themselves and others because that ability depends on the levels of acceptance and trust they have built with all conflict parties. At the same time, understanding these rules, and the worldview in which they are grounded, allows UCP practitioners to make optimal use of the methods and tactics that are available to them.



View:

- Michael Nagler. (2013). *Degrees of Nonviolence*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6tSjsDTAjlw>

Characteristics of nonviolence - Strategy, Principles, Participants, Tactics

This section provides an overview of some characteristics of nonviolence that are relevant for UCP. It clarifies the approach to protection and security on which UCP theory and practice are built. The identified characteristics will be explored in comparison to some of the characteristics of violent struggle. This comparison is relevant as UCP applies a nonviolent approach within a context of violent conflict and a culture of war. *The goal of nonviolent struggle in general is to win over the enemy as an ally.*

This goal of nonviolent struggle is relevant to UCP as it clearly shows that nonviolence goes beyond a mere refusal to carry arms. Nonviolence requires a completely different mindset that is the opposite of seeking containment, punishment, and/or defeat. This is not a choice based on principles of right and wrong, it is a strategic choice. UCP practitioners aim first and foremost to prevent violence and protect threatened civilians. Winning over a perpetrator of violence or abuse as an ally is perhaps the most sustainable way of preventing violence and increasing the safety and security of threatened civilians. Transforming a relationship of opposition to one of cooperation has many potential benefits beyond the immediate goal of security, but while this would be an ideal outcome, it is often not possible. The fact that UCP practitioners do use pressure as a latter resort is a clear indication that winning over a potential perpetrator as an ally is indeed a strategic choice. If violence can only be prevented

through the use of pressure, they will not hesitate to do so, but always without weapons or resort to armed force.

Strategy: *Whereas the strategy of violent struggle is to inflict suffering to force the opponent to accede, the strategy of nonviolent struggle is to change the mind of the opponent, who then changes behaviour.*

The goal described above (“to win over the enemy as an ally”) is very closely related to a primary strategy of nonviolence. Too often dismissed without being attempted, the strategy of changing the opponent’s mind is based on the belief that both victim and perpetrator share a common humanity. It does not depend on the assumption that people are inherently ‘good’. In fact, it recognizes the potential for both ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in all people, including the extremes of altruism and cruelty. This strategy primarily appeals to the humanity of the aggressor; it seeks to destroy enmity, not the enemy. It is relevant as UCP practitioners seek to build relationships of trust and acceptance with all actors, especially with perpetrators and other actors who are difficult to reach. The greater their ability to acknowledge the intrinsic humanity of these actors, the more likely UCP practitioners will gain trust and acceptance from these actors. This trust and acceptance may then provide them with the necessary leverage to protect civilians in times of need.

There is no way to peace. Peace is the way.

A.J. Muste

Principle: *Whereas in violent struggle the ends justify the means, in nonviolent struggle there is no contradiction between the means and ends.*

When UCP is effective in preventing violence, it can have a powerful impact. It demonstrates that a nonviolent approach to conflict and violence is more than just an ideal. It challenges the assertion that violence may be needed to bring peace. Gandhi often said that means and ends were two sides of the same coin, meaning that they could not be separated from one another. Nonviolence presents opportunities to interrupt or even break the cycle of violence. It is an invitation to all actors to actively support the shift from a culture of war to a culture of peace. This message is most effective when individual UCP practitioners demonstrate the values of nonviolence at all times, including when off duty. They typically live within communities, where their attitudes and behaviour are closely observed. Even the perception of ‘violent’ attitudes or behaviour can have a negative impact on the work of UCP.

Participants: *Whereas violent struggle demands participants who are willing and able to injure and kill other humans, nonviolent actions inherently require a much broader and diverse base of participation.*

UCP also requires a broad and diverse base, and actively promotes the involvement of local actors as peacemakers, peacekeepers, and peacebuilders, regardless of gender, age, or physical abilities. UCP teams not only include national or local staff, they also strengthen the capacity of local peace infrastructures. Furthermore they create platforms for vulnerable groups to express their needs and concerns, and connect peacemakers at the grassroots level with relevant actors at the middle-range and top level. Though UCP personnel are trained

professionals, they show local actors that nonviolent action is available to everyone. Contrary to popular perception, they do not have to be pacifists or saints nor have a particular degree or intellectual background to practice nonviolence.

Tactics: *Whereas secrecy and force are commonly used to limit options for response in violent struggles, transparency, trust, and acceptance are commonly used to open opportunities for response in nonviolent struggles.*

In order to build trust and acceptance, UCP practitioners ensure that their actions are most often transparent to, and are perceived as such by, all relevant actors.³ In a similar fashion, UCP activities need to be clear and announced. Even the perception of secrecy needs to be avoided so that UCP teams do not appear to pose a threat to anyone. In case pressure is applied to confront potential perpetrators with the consequences of their actions, UCP practitioners work to illuminate options for possible positive responses, if at all possible.⁴ Moreover, they need not be reluctant to remove the pressure when a positive response is forthcoming. Understanding the logic of violence and promoting the search for alternatives are important components of nonviolent action.



Recommended reading

- Chenoweth, E and Stephan, M. (2011). *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. Chapter 1. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

2.2.2 Nonpartisanship

What is nonpartisanship?

Being nonpartisan means not choosing or taking sides in a conflict. Nonpartisanship does not mean indifference or passivity; nor is it the same as neutrality. Neutrality means not taking sides and not helping or supporting any party in a conflict. Nonpartisan actors proactively engage in a conflict. They may work against injustice and the violations of human rights, or for personal dignity and individual freedom, as means for establishing an enduring peace. Nonpartisanship is not about pro- or anti-government. To be nonpartisan is to say, 'We will be at your side in the face of injustice and suffering, but we will not take sides against those you

³ There are occasional cases when the safety of a civilian requires secrecy, for example, in helping someone under threat to go to a safe location.

⁴ Ensuring that options are available is not always under the control of UCP personnel, for example, in the case where consequences of a perpetrator's actions include arrest by the International Criminal Court.

define as enemies' (Mahony and Eguren, (1997) p.236). Or, as Jean Hoefliger, the ICRC head of delegation in Lebanon said in 1977:

The ICRC is not neutral, the ICRC is not impartial. We are partial, absolutely partial, we are always taking the same side, we are taking the side of the victims and we will always do so, because they are in need.

Hoefliger, J. (2009). *Humanity in War*, p.112. Geneva, Switzerland: ICRC

How does nonpartisanship relate to UCP?

UCP practitioners are nonpartisan. Committed to the dignity, security and wellbeing of all, and struggling against violence, they do not adopt partisan interests or take the side of any party. This approach allows them to build relationships with all parties, wherever possible, and gain their trust and acceptance. UCP practitioners are not considered to be neutral, as they openly and clearly support and promote human rights, security for all, and the peaceful transformation of conflicts. Most international humanitarian organizations are either nonpartisan or neutral. This enables them to prioritize humanitarian rather than political considerations and gives them (on most occasions) a sort of 'diplomatic immunity'. They are allowed access to 'war theaters' from which they would be prohibited were they perceived as 'working for' one side or another in a conflict.

In practice, being nonpartisan implies that UCP practitioners:

- Deal with all parties, whenever possible, with an open mind;
- Report as objectively as possible;
- Refrain from judgmental responses, despite possible emotional identification with the oppressed or with a victim;
- Voice concerns to those responsible without being accusatory;
- Do not become involved in the work of the groups or individuals they assist or protect;⁵
- Share the tools of protection and conflict resolution they have at their disposal, without intervening or imposing their own opinions.

Not all organizations that apply UCP define themselves as 'nonpartisan' and among those who do, nonpartisanship is interpreted and applied differently from one organization or project to another. The ICRC defines itself as 'neutral', even though they are proactively engaged in a conflict and do help and support parties in conflict to some extent. Peace Brigades International (PBI) and Nonviolent Peaceforce both define themselves as nonpartisan, but apply the principle in different ways. Christian Peacemaker Teams, on the other hand, do not define themselves as nonpartisan. Expressing the principle of 'getting in the way' and

⁵ The level of noninvolvement is an issue of debate and interpretation among UCP implementing organizations. Some projects, for example, insist on only conducting 'workshops' instead of 'training' to emphasize the role of UCP personnel as catalysts or facilitators of dialogue and learning between local actors rather than as trainers who transfer external knowledge, ideas, and skills to local actors. Other projects are more flexible, but most of them make sure they don't impose their own ideas onto local actors or tell them what to do. Such essential details are often dealt with in the basic agreements or terms of reference between the UCP organization and the conflict parties that have invited it.

drawing on the traditions of civil disobedience, they figuratively and literally 'get in the way' of oppression, injustice, and violations of human rights. See Figure 2, below, for a spectrum of nonpartisanship within UCP.




Figure 3: The Spectrum of Nonpartisanship within UCP

(Source: Schweitzer, 2010 p.13): Not all organizations that apply UCP define themselves as nonpartisan. Though it is difficult to draw clear lines between a nonpartisan and partisan approach to UCP, those who stand in solidarity with vulnerable populations and individuals and the issues they fight for are generally not considered to be nonpartisan.

Challenges of nonpartisanship

Nonpartisanship is perhaps the most challenging principle of UCP, especially at the field level. Many UCP practitioners are personally committed to justice and human rights. In the face of overt injustice, when no action is taken to address the injustice, they find it challenging to refrain from taking a stand.

Challenges to adhering to nonpartisanship include:

- Dealing with all parties with an open mind, and with open eyes and ears (internal conflicts might be hidden);
- To put aside one's biases and prejudices as best as possible when reporting;

- Voicing concerns to those responsible for abuse without being accusatory. This is where the difference between nonpartisan and neutrality may become problematic;
- Recognizing the humanity in all people, even those who have committed atrocities;
- Separating acts of violence from the people who commit those acts or the institutions to which they belong. In the beginning, when they are still new in the area, this may be easier for UCP team members, but after witnessing on-going acts of violence from a specific group or institution, it becomes much more difficult;
- Maintaining transparency (key stakeholders must know what UCP teams are doing—suspicion means increased security risks), while at the same time maintaining the confidentiality and trust of vulnerable individuals and groups, who may suffer abuse from the same key stakeholders (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2013);
- Maintaining relationships and acceptance from key stakeholders (especially national governments, non-state actors) that tolerate or propagate violence and abuse, while adhering to mandate and principles (protecting human rights), which challenge these stakeholders. Operating with a lower profile (behind the scenes, but not secret) is an option, but it can lead to a perception of legitimizing violence and abuse;
- Responding to pressure from international groups to name and shame.

Some of these challenges will be explored in more detail in Module 5.

2.2.3 Primacy of local actors

I made a conclusion after my three missions. We can't solve the problems in these countries by being there. We are not the only answer, there is so much more answer to solving that problem, and that is the people themselves. But we can give them some peace and stability, so they can develop it themselves, that is the only way.

Former peacekeeper quoted in Furnari, 2014 p.167.

What is the primacy of local actors?

The phrase 'primacy of local actors' refers to the principle that local actors have the right and responsibility to determine their own futures, govern their own country or community, and solve their own problems. In the context of violent conflict this means that third parties can support, protect, and/or collaborate with local actors, while recognizing that the local actors remain the drivers of peace processes, development, and socio-political change. The principle of the primacy of local actors is grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21/3: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government" as well as in the UN peacekeeping guidelines (2008).

Though 'local actor' can be defined as an inhabitant of a particular area or neighbourhood, it is not always clear who is considered a local actor and who is not. In situations of violent conflict it is not uncommon for people to spend extensive periods of time in refugee camps, IDP camps or among diaspora groups before returning to their place of origin. International

organizations may count IDPs among local actors, but their host communities may view them as outsiders. Even when there is consensus about who is a local actor and who is not, the issue of primacy remains difficult as different groups of local actors may have opposing views about 'the will of the people'.

How does the primacy of local actors relate to UCP?

Firstly, recognizing the primacy of local actors means that UCP personnel respect the rights of local partners, state duty bearers, vulnerable groups, and other actors to make their own decisions. Secondly, this means that UCP teams adhere to the laws, rules, and regulations of the national government and refrain from protests, boycotts, civil disobedience, or other forms of nonviolent non-cooperation. At the same time, UCP practitioners may provide protection to local actors engaging in nonviolent action. Thirdly, the primacy of local actors means that civilians of a community experiencing violent conflict are regarded as the decision makers on matters in their community. This includes the decision to invite unarmed civilian peacekeepers to live and work in their neighbourhoods, as well as the decision to receive protection or capacity-development services.

Adhering to the primacy of local actors is not only a matter of respect; it is also a matter of strategy. The effectiveness of UCP, as well as the security of its peacekeepers and beneficiaries, depends on acceptance and trust by all parties. Moreover, UCP assumes that local people best understand their own conditions, contexts, and potential solutions. If, on the other hand, primacy would lie with UCP teams, they would be held responsible for important decisions and solutions affecting the community. Acceptance by all parties would become increasingly difficult and nonpartisanship impossible. Furthermore, it is essential to capacity building that all local actors recognize and assert their own agency in creating the context for security.

An important consideration in recognizing the primacy of local actors is to avoid negative impacts of UCP. Most negative impacts of third-party intervention in situations of conflict are caused by failure to recognize the primacy of local actors. Ignorance, arrogance, lack of capacity and ability, or the urgency to respond to an emergency situation are all factors that may play a role in generating negative impacts (see Box 3).



Box 3 - Case study: Negative impacts that UCP aims to avoid by maintaining the primacy of local actors

- Increasing threat to civilians: Agencies' actions or 'aura of expertise' may cause a false sense of security leading people to take risks they would not otherwise take; agencies may put people in dangerous situations; participation in an agency programme or affiliation makes people become targets; agencies may not explicitly analyse and discuss with local partners the differences in risk each faces in a particular context.
- Worsening divisions between conflicting groups: Agencies may underestimate the depth of divisions and not be prepared to deal with problems, or may not have the skills or experience to manage a tension-filled situation; or may claim to be playing a neutral role but openly become advocates for one side.
- Reinforcing structural or overt violence: Agencies may accept partisan conditions placed by the more powerful side in a conflict, or influential outside states, in order to conduct a programme; agencies may tolerate or fail to challenge behaviour that affirms the perceptions of superiority and inferiority of people in conflict.
- Diverting human and material resources from local initiatives and mechanisms: Agencies may come in with preset ideas and models, and not listen to what local people want or need; agencies may focus too much on 'talking about the past conflict' rather than on actions that can be taken to change the situation; foreign agencies may hire local activists, pulling their energies away from promising local initiatives.
- Increasing cynicism: Agencies may create unrealistic expectations within communities; agencies may not be transparent about their activities with communities so that rumours and suspicions can promote cynicism.
- Disempowering local people: Agencies may teach people things they already know, conveying the message that expatriates know best; agencies may give the impression that they are 'taking care of the situation'; agencies may implement programmes in a way that fosters dependency on outside 'experts' and at times undermines local expertise and organizations; foreign agencies may work exclusively with the NGO sector and avoid engagement with government structures, fostering resentment and competition; agencies from the outside may not know when to leave.

Excerpted from: *Confronting War. Critical Lessons For Peace Practitioners*, Mary B. Anderson, Lara Olson with Kristin Doughty, The Collaborative for Development Action Inc, Cambridge MA, 2003, p. 21-26 11



View:

- Anderson, M. B. (Ed.) *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - Or War*. http://www.medicalpeacework.org/fileadmin/user_upload/videos/Mary_B_Anderson.wmv

2.2.4 Independence

UCP organizations are independent from any interest group, political party, ideology, and, in most cases, religion.⁶ Their strategies and programmes are not an extension of the policy of governments, private companies, political parties or religious groups. This allows them to focus their attention and resources on the protection needs of vulnerable groups wherever they are located, whatever they stand for. Being independent also reinforces the principle of nonpartisanship. In order to strengthen the perception of independence, most UCP agencies make a conscious effort to obtain funding from multiple sources. They may decide not to accept funds from parties to the conflict or from beneficiaries of the conflict or the project. Some UCP organizations apply other social responsibility screens to their donors such as not accepting money from weapons manufacturers. Most also rely on substantial contributions from individuals. In the interests of transparency and trust building, it is important that the source of funds is disclosed to local actors. The perceived independence of UCP agencies can be a contributing factor in the decision of conflict parties to invite them for roles such as official ceasefire monitors of a peace process.

2.2.5 Civilian-led

“Civilian-led” interventions refer to the partnership between UCP organizations and local actors.⁷ This partnership includes the invitation from local actors for UCP organizations to establish a legal, physical presence in their country, and in specific communities within that country. It is a deliberate attempt to move away from armed groups as the sole actors involved in providing protection and managing security. It is also a way to build the confidence of civil society to increase its role as peacemakers, peacekeepers, and peacebuilders.

⁶ Some are affiliated with a specific religion (e.g., Christian Peacemaker Teams) from which they derive their humanitarian philosophy or funding, but their aim is universal civilian protection, not to proselytise.

⁷ While UCP organizations are civilian led, some military operations do adapt UCP methodology e.g. the Australian army in Bougainville.

Though the principle may be clear in theory, it sometimes creates confusion for UCP agencies at the field level. In areas of protracted conflict, a disproportionately large segment of society has been, or still is, affiliated with armed forces. They may not be bearing arms, but still aid armed forces or groups. This makes it hard to distinguish who is a civilian and who is not. Civilians are often compelled to align themselves with one side or another for their own safety. The presence of UCP teams opens a space for civilians to assume a more non-aligned position. As partners of an unarmed, nonpartisan, independent, and civilian protection agency, civil society organizations can send a clear message that they are not affiliated with either side in the conflict.

2.2.6 Civilian immunity in war

Civilian immunity is to be understood as "an almost absolute principle that spells out one of the central and most stringent requirements of justice as it applies to war, and recognizes an almost absolute right of the vast majority of civilians—namely, all those who cannot be considered 'currently engaged in the business of war'—not to be targets of deadly violence. This right and principle trumps other moral considerations with which they may come into conflict, with one exception: that of a (narrowly understood) moral disaster"⁸

Primoratz 2010, pp.39-40

This principle had earlier been developed during the 19th century when the idea of limited war, including specifically the immunity of 'innocent' civilians (non-combatants), was regarded as a civilizational achievement (the humanizing restraint on warfare) and codified in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (ibid. p.2). It was taken for granted that the military of a civilized country fought the armed forces of the enemy, and not enemy civilians. But with the start of the First World War, and throughout the remainder of the 20th century, the idea of civilian immunity in war was largely forgotten or ignored. Only with the UN Secretary-General's 1999 report on the protection of civilians, and subsequent UN Security Council resolution mandating UN peacekeeping missions with the task of protecting civilians, did the international community return to this idea and refocus on the topic of civilian immunity—exactly one hundred years after the first Hague Convention.

The concept of civilian immunity in war is central to UCP as it aims to protect civilians who are not currently engaged in the business of war from being targets of deadly violence. Due to the shift from inter-state to intra-state wars, which has brought violence directly into communities, the protection needs of such civilians have increased significantly.

⁸ The exception referred to may occur when the only way to avert a large moral disaster (for example, facing the sure prospect of genocide like the Nazi death camps or the Rwandan ethnic cleansing) is to act in breach of the principle of civilian immunity and attack enemy civilians. But this exceptional justification may become a slippery slope.



Recommended reading

- Primoratz, I. (ed.) (2010). *Civilian Immunity in War*. Introduction and Chapter 1. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

2.3

KEY SOURCES OF GUIDANCE FOR UCP

UCP relies on international laws and conventions as key sources of guidance for monitoring compliance to human rights standards and for prioritizing protection needs. UCP organizations also work to raise awareness of these laws and conventions wherever their teams are active. Furthermore, they support and encourage state duty bearers and decision makers to fulfil their obligations and facilitate access to justice for civilians. These sources guide UCP practitioners whether or not the country where they are working is a signatory.



Figure 4: Key Sources of Guidance for Unarmed Civilian Protection



Recommended reading

- Ferris, E. (2011). *The Politics of Protection: the Limits of Humanitarian Action*. Chapter 1 and 2. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

2.3.1 International Humanitarian Law

UCP organizations use International Humanitarian Law as the internationally accepted standard for the protection of civilians. They monitor adherence to this set of laws and identify instances where these laws have been breached. The laws also help them in prioritizing protection needs.

What is International Humanitarian Law?

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) aims to protect human life and dignity within the context of armed conflict. IHL emerged in the 19th century to protect soldiers who were no longer active participants in combat. Over the past 150 years or so, IHL has expanded its original focus on protecting prisoners of war and wounded soldiers into a broad range of activities designed to protect civilians who are affected by, but are not direct participants in conflicts (Ferris loc.135). IHL establishes the responsibilities of armed actors and restricts the use of certain methods and means of warfare. It also strikes a balance between military necessity and the principle of humanity (the protection of persons affected by armed conflict). All parties to conflict—including government forces, rebels, and other armed groups—are bound by IHL. The International Committee of the Red Cross is the guardian of IHL.

Most of IHL is contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (International Committee of the Red Cross 1949) and the Additional Protocols of 1977 (International Committee of the Red Cross 1977a; International Committee of the Red Cross 1977b) relating to the protection of victims of armed conflicts. Many parts of IHL have now acquired the status of customary law. Customary law is a set of general rules by which all states are bound independent of the ratification of the actual treaties or conventions (UNITAR advanced course, protection of civilians in peace operations, Module 2: International legal dimension of the protection of civilians, p.2). Serious violations of IHL are called war crimes. War crimes may be committed by a country's regular armed forces, such as its army, navy, or air force. They may also be committed by irregular armed forces, such as guerrillas and insurgents.

IHL applies both to international as well as non-international armed conflicts. Non-international armed conflicts involve either regular armed forces fighting groups of armed dissidents, or armed groups fighting each other. IHL does not cover internal tensions or disturbances such as isolated acts of violence. IHL applies only once a conflict has begun, and then equally to all sides, regardless of which side started the fighting. IHL applies at all times, during peace and during armed conflicts.

How is International Humanitarian Law relevant to UCP?

IHL helps provide justification for the response of UCP teams in the field when they recognize actions that are considered a breach of IHL. It is a reference point for UCP personnel as

they communicate with armed actors and state officials about the need for civilian protection. Raising awareness about IHL is an important part of the work of UCP practitioners. Soldiers and combatants are often not fully aware of these laws, especially at the grassroots level. Workshops and dialogue about IHL can encourage participants to implement these laws or act as a reminder to all parties of their commitments and responsibilities.



View:

- *International Humanitarian Law: A Universal Code*, International Committee of the Red Cross, (International Committee of the Red Cross n.d.) <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/audiovisuals/video/00981-humanitarian-law-universal-code-video-2009.htm>

2.3.2 International Refugee Law

As with IHL, UCP organizations use International Refugee Law (IRL) to identify internationally accepted standards for the protection of civilians. They monitor the adherence to this set of laws and identify instances where these laws have been breached. The laws also help UCP practitioners in prioritizing protection needs.

What is International Refugee Law?

International Refugee Law (IRL) is a set of rules that aims to protect: i) persons seeking asylum from persecution; and, ii) those recognized as refugees under relevant legal instruments. It was developed in the middle of the 20th century to protect people who had left their countries because of fear of persecution and whose governments were unable or unwilling to protect them. Still later, the growing recognition that people who were displaced from their communities but remained within their countries also needed protection led to the development of international norms for protecting internally displaced people (Ferris 2011 loc.139, 184). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the custodian of IRL.

IRL's legal framework provides a distinct set of guarantees for these specific groups of persons. The main sources of IRL are treaty law, notably the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Optional Protocol. In particular, the 1951 Convention consolidates previous international instruments relating to refugees and establishes the legal definition of refugees and minimum standards for their treatment (UNITAR advanced course, protection of civilians in peace operations, Module 2: International legal dimension of the protection of civilians, pp. 5-6).

How is International Refugee Law relevant to UCP?

Understanding IRL can help UCP practitioners in prioritizing protection needs and in providing protection to civilians. UCP personnel may observe, for example, that refugees in a certain place are forcefully returned to a country where they risk persecution. As this is prohibited under IRL (article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention), they may engage with government officials and decision makers in an effort to stop the forced return or, alternatively, accompany the return of refugees to augment their safety. If this effort is not successful, UCP organizations can quietly use international networks to advocate for diplomatic pressure towards the government that is in breach of the 1951 Convention. At the same time, they can engage with the refugee community to understand their needs and explore different response strategies, or to connect refugee leaders with representatives from the diplomatic community to further strengthen the advocacy efforts.⁹

Further discussion concerning refugees and other displaced people in situations of violent conflict will be provided in Module 4.

2.3.3 International Human Rights Law

UCP practitioners use International Human Rights Law (IHRL) as the foundation for protection strategies and are expected to understand how the implementation of their tasks intersects with human rights.

What is International Human Rights Law?

After World War II, as part of a new world order, IHRL was developed to limit abuses by governments. It is made up of an accumulated body of international instruments including treaties, declarations, and standards that aim to establish the basic rights of all people. It includes the right to be treated equally, to life, liberty, and the security of person, and to freedom of movement as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948. The UN Human Rights Council oversees the implementation of human rights legal instruments.

IHRL applies in peacetime and in situations of armed conflict. It assumes that human rights are inherent to the human being and are inalienable. IHRL imposes a three-fold obligation upon states: to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights. The obligation to respect means that states must refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The

⁹ UCP practitioners primarily deal with IDPs, who are not subject to International Refugee Law. Nevertheless, they can use the standards of IRL as a reference for the protection of IDPs. Moreover, actions described in this paragraph, such as engaging with the refugee community and connecting leaders to the diplomatic community, equally apply to IDPs.

obligation to protect requires states to protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses. The obligation to fulfil means that states must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights.

Some treaties permit governments to derogate from, or partially and temporarily suspend, particular rights in situations of public emergency threatening the life of the nation. However, there are certain rights that can never be suspended—not even in war. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that the following rights may never be derogated: right to life; prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prohibition of slavery; prohibition of imprisonment because of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation; prohibition of retroactive application of criminal law; right to recognition as a person before law; freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. In addition, certain provisions of IHRL constitute customary law—i.e. they bind all states, regardless of whether they have explicitly consented to it (UNITAR advanced course, protection of civilians in peace operations, Module 2: International legal dimension of the protection of civilians, pp. 3-4).

Over 100 countries have national human rights institutions with mandates that may include monitoring domestic human rights and acting on complaints or petitions from citizens. These institutions can be institutionally weak, and rarely have they taken the lead in considering the human rights implications of violent conflict (Ferris 2011). Yet, local human rights defenders and other individuals and groups might choose to access these bodies and may require protection.

How is International Human Rights Law relevant to UCP?

UCP agencies often use International Human Rights Law (IHRL) to guide their priorities in terms of protection. In some cases, UCP personnel monitor compliance with IHRL to identify civilians whose rights, as stipulated by IHRL, have been violated (by state actors) or abused (by non-state actors). Secondly, they support and encourage state duty bearers and decision makers to fulfil their obligation in protecting the human rights of civilians. Thirdly, they facilitate access to justice for civilian survivors of violence. When appropriate, UCP teams raise awareness among civilians and state actors about human rights, especially the rights of vulnerable populations, such as women, children, disabled and displaced people.

Individual UCP team members are expected to understand how the implementation of their tasks intersects with human rights. They need to be able to recognize human rights violations or abuse and be prepared to respond appropriately within the limits of their mandate and their competence. Moreover, UCP personnel are also bound to act in accordance with international human rights law, and should ensure that they do not become perpetrators of human rights abuses.

Although IHRL plays an important role in UCP, it is essential to ensure that UCP team members do not create a perception that they are investigating incidents for the purpose of public reporting. While documenting and publicizing human rights violations is very important work, it is often not possible for the organizations who carry out UCP work in conflicts to fill this role. Public blaming and shaming can quickly result in relationships being destroyed and perceptions that UCP teams are biased against

certain conflict parties. In some contexts, even the phrase “human rights” can offend some sensitive actors, some of whom may claim that human rights are a western concept which does not apply in their country. The consequences of such perceptions can be detrimental- UCP team members risk losing access to communities, or even more severe consequences such as deportation or imprisonment. Providing protection for local human rights defenders is a common strand of UCP work- but the distinction between providing space for local actors to carry out human rights work, and UCP teams carrying out such work themselves is an essential one.

2.3.4 Women, peace and security

As long as women are not full and equal participants in governance, as long as we are considered the weaker sex, we will be vulnerable to abuses of unimaginable brutality. But, as long as we continue to resolve differences and conflicts with weapons, battalions, mercenary armies, and brutal force, we will continue to suffer the horrors of war which include rape.

Cora Weiss, President of Hague Appeal for Peace, one of the drafters of UNSC 1325. (2011)

International laws on women, peace, and security relate to UCP in a way similar to IHL and IRL. UCP uses UN resolutions and international conventions related to women as internationally accepted standards for the protection of the rights of women, as well as their participation at all levels of peace processes.

What are the legal frameworks relating to women, peace and security?

Key legal frameworks relating to women, peace, and security include United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, and 2122 (UNSCR 1325, 1820 and 2122). UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (2000) marks the first time the UN Security Council addressed the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women. It also recognized the importance of their equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security. This Resolution has been greeted as a milestone due to its recognition of and commitment to address women’s experiences of armed conflict.

UNSCR 1325:

- Condemns the increased targeting of girls and women during armed conflict and the negative impact of armed conflict on girls and women;
- Recognizes the need for better data, institutional arrangements, and training focused on meeting women’s special protection needs and fulfilling their human rights;
- Reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response, and in post-conflict reconstruction;

- Calls on all conflict parties to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict;
- Urges all actors to increase the participation of women in and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts;
- Specifies that gender-based violence should be prosecuted; it should be excluded from amnesty during peace negotiations and during post-conflict negotiations on constitutional and legal reforms.

Resolution 1820 (2008) links sexual violence as a tactic of war with the maintenance of international peace and security. It also demands a comprehensive report from the UN Secretary General on implementation and strategies for improving information flow to the Security Council; and adoption of concrete protection and prevention measures to end sexual violence.

Resolution 2122 (2013) puts in place a roadmap for 'a more systematic approach to the implementation of commitments on women, peace and security'. It includes concrete measures on the development and deployment of technical expertise for peacekeeping missions and UN mediation teams supporting peace talks. It also calls for improved access to information and analysis on the impact of conflict on women and women's participation in conflict resolution in reports and briefings to the Security Council. Finally, the resolution strengthens commitments to consult, as well as include, women in peace talks.

Another important document, though not specifically focused on women in situation of armed conflict, is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 1992). Adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979, it is often referred to as an international bill of rights for women.

UN resolutions related to Women, Peace, and Security apply at all times. They require the inclusion of women in preventing, managing, and resolving conflict. UNSCR 1325, for example, recognizes women as major contributors to peace and security.

How are these international laws relevant to UCP?

UCP uses UN resolutions and other international agreements on women, peace, and security, such as resolution 1325, 1820, and 2122, as internationally accepted standards for the protection of the rights of women, as well as for their participation at all levels of peace processes. This has particular importance to UCP because women (just as refugees) are among the most vulnerable in times of armed conflict and post-conflict. Women face heightened risk of rape, sexual humiliation, prostitution, early marriage, and other forms of gender-based violence and domination. These abuses are often downplayed as an unfortunate but inevitable side effect of war.

Addressing the protection needs of women in situations of violent conflict requires a specific set of skills and tactics. It requires a great deal of trust building, deep listening skills, and confidentiality. UCP practitioners, living among vulnerable communities and dealing with

individual protection needs, are often in a good position to address these needs. More information about women in situations of violent conflict will be provided in Module 4.

The international laws on women, peace, and security are also relevant to UCP as they promote the participation of women. They direct UCP interventions to pay particular attention to supporting women leaders in community processes to address conflicts. They also encourage UCP organizations to include women in equal numbers and status as UCP personnel and to promote and support their leadership throughout the operation. In places where UCP teams play an official role in ceasefire monitoring, they may help to establish mechanisms and structures to implement protocols such as UNSCR 1325. And UCP practitioners may support women's direct participation in multi-track diplomacy situations encouraging women, especially from the grassroots, to bring their experiences directly to Track 1 negotiations.

While the UN Security Council and Secretariat focus much attention on women's participation, the make-up of UN peacekeeping missions will continue to be dependent on troop-contributing countries where women's involvement in the military is low. UCP, on the other hand, can draw from the general population, attracting women from many different areas of expertise.

[W]omen are in a marginalized position and often are not part of relevant human rights discussions. Female PBI volunteers can be an example for women working for human rights. The role of male PBI volunteers is no less crucial, as they can be role models as men who respect women as equal counterparts by meeting with local women eye to eye, listening to them and treating them as subjects rather than as objects, as is common in Papua. This kind of approach by males can be an important experience for both women and men in the local context and can open the window for alternative interactions between genders.

PBI volunteer, Indonesia (IFOR-WWP, 2010, p. 85)



Assignment

Read:

- IFOR-WPP. (2010). *Engendering Peace: Incorporating a Gender Perspective in Civilian Peace Teams*. http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/NGO/reconpb_engenderedpeaec_iforwpp_2010.pdf

View:

- UNITAR. (2010). *Women, Peace and Security: From Resolution to Action* www.youtube.com/watch?v=kITqQcWmOxE

2.3.5 Children and armed conflict

International laws on children and armed conflict relate to UCP in a similar way as those on women, peace, and security. UCP uses UN resolutions and international conventions related to children and armed conflict as internationally accepted standards for the protection of children.

What are the legal frameworks relating to children and armed conflict?

In 1998 the UN General Assembly proclaimed the period 2001-2010 as the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (resolution 53/25). Resolution 53/25 recognizes the enormous harm and suffering caused to children by different forms of violence at every level of society throughout the world. The resolution also promotes the fostering of a culture of peace and nonviolence. The resolution invites member states to take the necessary steps to ensure that the practice of peace and nonviolence is taught at all levels in their respective societies. It also invites non-governmental organizations and other groups to support actively the implementation of the Decade for the benefit of every child of the world. The implementation of resolution 53/25 includes enabling people at all levels to develop skills of dialogue, negotiation, consensus-building, and peaceful resolution of differences. Even though the Decade has passed, implementation under the original resolution is annually reviewed and recorded. The establishment of a culture of peace and nonviolence is the ultimate goal of peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping.

Other UCP sources of guidance regarding children are the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), especially articles 34-38; related Optional Protocols, e.g., on child soldiers and on the sale of children; and UN Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005). The latter includes six types of grave child right violations: killing and maiming; recruitment of children in armed forces or groups (CAAFG); rape and sexual violence; abduction; and denial of humanitarian access.

The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict issued a Guidance Note on SCR 1998, The Protection of Schools and Hospitals highlighting the impact of attacks on schools and hospitals on children and calling for greater action to ensure that hospital and schools have no part in warfare.

How are these international laws relevant to UCP?

By dint of their vulnerability, children in general are in need of, and entitled to, special protection. But children living in armed conflict should be able to count on protection services on a priority basis. UCP is well placed to provide some of those services to children at the grassroots level, especially direct physical protection and reunification with families. UCP strategies specifically aim to identify grave child right violations and address the protection needs of children that are subjected to these violations. UCP practitioners provide protective presence to schools and hospitals. They also work with local civil society organizations in support of

states, encouraging them to take the necessary steps to ensure that peace and nonviolence practices are utilized to settle conflicts for the benefit of all, but especially children. UCP practitioners sometimes also help disseminate and teach those practices. More information about children in situations of violent conflict will be provided in Module 4.

2.3.6 Seville Statement on Violence

A fundamental premise of UCP work is that violence is not inherent in the human condition. The Seville Statement on Violence confirms this premise and suggests that peace and nonviolence can be learned.

What is the Seville Statement?

The UNESCO study resulting in the Seville Statement on Violence (UNESCO 1986) consulted biologists and social scientists on the question if humans have a biological tendency toward violent behaviour. More specifically they asked: 'Does modern biology and social science know of any biological factors, including those concerned with the biology of violent behavior of individuals, that constitute an insurmountable or serious obstacle to the goal of world peace based upon the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and including an ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament through the United Nations?'

Drafted and signed by 20 scientists from around the world, the statement concludes that it is scientifically *incorrect* to say that:

1. Humankind has inherited a tendency from our animal ancestors to make war
2. War or any other violent behavior is genetically programmed into our human nature
3. In the course of human evolution there has been a selection for aggressive behaviour more than for other kinds of behaviour
4. Humans have a 'violent brain'
5. War is caused by 'instinct' or any single motivation

The statement concludes as follows: 'Just as "wars begin in the minds of men," peace also begins in our minds. The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us' (UNESCO 1986).

How is the Seville Statement relevant to UCP?

The Seville Statement on Violence shows that the UN operates under the belief that violence is not inherent in the human condition, and therefore, peace is possible. It further indicates

that this conclusion is supported by scientific research.¹⁰ This validates the nonviolent approach of UCP and strengthens its role as a catalyst for change in situations of violent conflict. As the quote from Theodore Roszak at the beginning of this module suggests, while skepticism exists about the effectiveness of nonviolence, the concept has been given very little opportunity to prove itself. Though violence may not be inherent in the human condition, violence has frequently been selected as an approach to resolving conflict. UCP provides a viable alternative approach to building security without use of coercion or violence.

2.3.6 UN Charter (Chapter 1, article 2: 3 and 4; Chapter 6, article 33)

The Preamble of the UN Charter states that one reason for the establishment of the UN is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”

Articles 2, 3, and 4 of Chapter 1 and article 33 of Chapter 6 of the UN Charter are key source of guidance for UCP because they lie at the foundation of UCP theory and practice; they promote the use of peaceful means to settle disputes. UCP also reinforces these articles, showing Member States that the peaceful means articulated by the UN Charter can also be applied by unarmed civilians in providing protection to other civilians.

What is the UN Charter?

Chapter 1 of the UN Charter states the purpose of the United Nations, and article 2 describes key principles:

3: All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

¹⁰ As with many complex topics associated with psychology and human evolution, the study of violence is a vigorously contested field. There is no absolute consensus on whether or not humans have inherent tendencies to violence, and new studies are continually adding evidence to the discussion. While it is true that war and violent conflict is apparent as far back as we can investigate in human history, it is not correct to conclude that it is necessarily a part of the human condition. As Gandhi wrote, “If the story of the universe had commenced with wars, not a man would have been found alive today. ... The fact that there are so many men still alive in the world shows that it is based not the force of arms but on the force of truth or love.” (Gandhi, M, (1997). *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings*, ed. by Anthony J. Parel, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 6 of the UN Charter deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes:

Article 33: The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

How is the Charter relevant to UCP?

UCP in and of itself helps to create a context in which disputes can be resolved in a nonviolent fashion. UCP is a relatively new instrument, organized by civil society, that may be used to support peacemaking and peacebuilding without resorting to the use of armed force and without infringement on the sovereignty of the state. Its purpose is to enable all parties to the conflict to seek peace by peaceful means. In so doing UCP helps to protect vulnerable civilians under threat and to develop local peace infrastructures. UCP can also be seen as a form of intercultural co-operation to help deter violence and to keep the window of opportunity open for all parties to the conflict to address the deeper roots of the conflict.

International UCP teams from around the world support state duty bearers as well as civil society groups in situations of armed conflict to encourage respect for human rights. This includes socio-economic rights, cultural rights, and access to humanitarian aid. Finally, UCP contributes to dispute resolution by creating a safe space for local parties to meet and build their protection capacity. Furthermore, UCP practitioners strengthen local peace infrastructures, provide confidence building, and engage in multi-track dialogues with armed and non-armed actors.

While it is a challenge to bring about a peace agreement, it is an even bigger challenge to implement. When cattle keepers and farmers in Yiol West and Mvolo clashed with each other in the beginning of 2011, it took Nonviolent Peaceforce 110 separate interventions over the course of 8 months before peace agreements were successfully implemented by the affected communities and 76,000 IDPs returned.

Tiffany Easthom, Executive Director, Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2014



Summary of key messages

- UCP aims to stop violence and destructive conflict by preventing and reducing the impact of violence; increasing the safety and security (including human security) of civilians threatened by violence; and strengthening local peace infrastructures.
- Encouragement and deterrence are two strategies that play important interactive roles in connecting the methods, principles, sources of guidance, and skills to the key objectives.
- UCP practitioners apply specific characteristics of nonviolence to achieve key objectives. Characteristics include winning over perpetrators of violence as allies by generating a change of mind; widening the options for response and participation; correlating means and ends; and substituting force with trust, acceptance, and transparency.
- Most UCP organizations do not adopt partisan interests or take sides. To be nonpartisan is to say, 'We will be at your side in the face of injustice and suffering, but we will not take sides against those you define as enemies'. This allows UCP practitioners to build relationships with all parties, to gain their trust and acceptance, and to achieve (on most occasions) a sort of 'diplomatic immunity'.
- UCP organizations recognize the primacy of local actors. They adhere to national laws, refrain from nonviolent noncooperation, and regard local actors at the field level as decision makers in their own communities. This includes the decisions to invite UCP teams to their community for protection and other services.
- UCP practitioners are independent from any special-interest group, political party, ideology, and, in most cases, religion. This allows them to focus their attention and resources on the protection needs of all vulnerable civilians, whoever and wherever they are.
- UCP practitioners use sources of key guidance to monitor compliance and to prioritize protection needs. They also use them to raise awareness about internationally accepted standards. Furthermore, they support and encourage government officials, military and decision makers to fulfil their obligations and facilitate access to justice for civilians.



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NP Photo / National Protection Officer Carrell Cataya Magno giving an Orientation on Human Rights in Lamud, Mindanao, Philippines / December 2013

Human Rights

- ⊗ inalienable fundamental rights
- ⊗ inherently entitled as human
- ⊗ universal (applicable everywhere)
- ⊗ egalitarian (same for everyone)
- ⊗ natural rights or as legal rights
- ⊗ rights to life, dignity and self-development
- ⊗ makes man/woman human (who)
- ⊗ foundation of freedom, justice
- ⊗ minimum standards how both individuals and institution treat each other
- ⊗ empower people to take action

3

MODULE 3 UNARMED CIVILIAN PROTECTION: KEY METHODS

OVERVIEW AND LEARNING OBJECTIVES

What is needed is not first and foremost a global bureaucracy to mitigate human suffering and manage social change. The future demands instead a more creative, extensive, and inclusive network of relationships and resources geared towards facilitating and enabling the efforts of people and societies themselves to shape their own futures.

T. Weiss and L. Minear, reflecting on the experience of individual UN Volunteers involved in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (Weiss et al., 1996).

UCP employs four main methods: proactive engagement, monitoring, relationship building, and capacity development. Each of these methods has a number of different applications, such as protective accompaniment (proactive engagement), rumour control (monitoring), multi-track dialogue (relationship building), and training (capacity development). These are all shown in Figure 1 and explained in the text that follows. UCP methods and their applications are applied to prevent or reduce violence and its consequences; increase the safety and security of civilians threatened by violence; and strengthen local peace infrastructures. The use of these methods in and of themselves will not contribute to these objectives without the use of appropriate skills (see Module 4). Active listening and negotiating are two of the basic skills that are required to prevent violence and protect civilians effectively. Though these are skills used by many actors, their application by UCP practitioners in situations of immediate threat can make the difference between life and death.




Figure 1: UCP Methods and Applications

At their core, UCP methods and skills are focused on creating productive relationships with actors across different levels of society (grassroots, middle-range, and top level), as well as across dividing lines of conflict. These relationships may at times rely on calculated pressure, but building and maintaining cooperative relationships is more effective over time.

The module introduces and describes UCP methods and related skills. It then discusses how, when and where these methods and skills are used. Practical case studies illustrate different strategic applications of methods in a conflict context.

At the end of the module, readers will be able to:

- Explain the four basic methods of UCP
- Apply these methods to a given UCP scenario

3.1

PROACTIVE ENGAGEMENT

Proactive engagement is the defining method of UCP. It asserts that while the physical presence of UCP practitioners can be helpful in providing protection, real security usually comes through engaging proactively with all stakeholders, including those who target civilians. Though the term “proactive engagement” is frequently used to describe UCP methodology in general, in this course – and in this section in particular - it is used as a distinct UCP method. As such, it has three different, but closely related, applications: protective presence, protective accompaniment and interpositioning. This section describes these three applications.



Recommended reading

- Schirch, L. (2006). *Civilian Peacekeeping: Preventing Violence and Making Space for Democracy*. Uppsala, Sweden: Life and Peace Institute.

3.1.1 Protective presence

What is protective presence?

There are two basic types or levels of protective presence. The first type refers to the long-term presence of international humanitarian actors in an area of violent conflict. Although many humanitarian agencies are present in such contexts and may provide some protective effect, this is not UCP. Studies show that protection by mere presence, while important, has its limits. In reviewing field-based protection in Darfur, Sorcha O’Callaghan and Sara Pantuliano found that it can even create a false sense of security within communities that feel that the international community has made a commitment to protect them (as referenced in Ferris loc.1518). Conscious attention to maximizing the protective presence of UCP teams in a community, and addressing the potential negative impacts, can, however, provide meaningful protection. Thus the second type of protective presence refers to a specific method by which

UCP personnel are strategically placed in locations where civilians face imminent threats. This type of presence is usually provided for a shorter period of time, from a few hours up to a few months, and represents more accurately the concept of proactive engagement.

There are always people on the street corners spying on us to watch our movements. When they see that internationals are entering our offices, this helps us tremendously.

Farfan, A.E. (n.d.) Families of the Disappeared. Guatemala: Peace Brigades International

Protective presence is perhaps the most basic application of UCP methods. Although in some cases it is used on its own, it is frequently used alongside other methods. When, for example, monitoring or capacity development is applied in a situation of violent conflict, the physical presence of UCP personnel during monitoring or capacity development activities can be used strategically to increase the feeling of safety among direct beneficiaries or civilians nearby.

How does protective presence work?¹

In times of relative peace, most perpetrators carry out acts of violence in private to avoid legal and social repercussions. However, in many situations of protracted conflict, legal systems have broken down and acts of violence have become an everyday occurrence, committed in broad daylight. International encouragement or pressure at the policymaker level to stop violence is important, but is often insufficient. Systemic abuses are the product of collaboration between actors at many levels, all of which need to be influenced. Words spoken at the UN Security Council are unlikely, therefore, to effect change in a conflict zone until they are translated into direct action on the ground by missions, peacekeepers, diplomats, embassies, donor agencies, and others. External encouragement or pressure reaching a state or armed group has to go down the chain of command (Mahony, 2006).

Unfortunately, the transmission of top-level international encouragement or pressure is highly uncertain. States and armed groups can ignore encouragement and have developed nimble countermeasures to side-step pressure. Decision makers deflect and undermine pressure, using propaganda to destroy the legitimacy of accusing organizations. They may also isolate and stigmatize targeted civilian groups, or shift attention to the actions of their enemies. Decision makers, to avoid overt denials, often develop buffer mechanisms to absorb and co-opt international pressure. For example, state agencies are created specifically to deal with international concerns and they may employ lobbyists and public relations firms. This ploy allows the state to claim that it is taking all possible measures to protect people. Non-state armed groups also create such buffers: their political wings absorb international pressure, while their abusing military and intelligence wings remain offstage (ibid. p.14).

States and armed groups can also create smokescreens to evade responsibility for abuses, even while admitting that they occur. A common and devastatingly effective smokescreen is the use of paramilitary or death-squad operations. These are often either secretly under

¹ This section draws on the work of Liam Mahony, see Proactive Presence: Field Strategies for Civilian Protection.

military control, or allowed to act with impunity when their agendas are convenient to the state. In other cases, explanations such as 'lack of discipline' or 'loose cannons' distance the high-level decision makers from the abuses. Banditry and 'accidents' also commonly camouflage political attacks. Smokescreens give both the abusing party and its international allies a level of plausible deniability when faced with accusations. In the face of such countermeasures, international response strategies need to be complemented by more targeted and effective protective action (ibid. p.15).

The presence of international observers—particularly if they are trained UCP practitioners—strengthens the international response to stop attacks on civilians in three important ways.

1. **Targeting the entire chain of command:** International presence projects the visible concern of the international community to the entire chain of command of abuser groups. UCP personnel (whether national or international staff) interact with all ranks of the military and civilian hierarchy, national and local, ensuring an awareness of international consequences for abuse of civilians. No other international effort can match the effectiveness of having trained observers present in the field, providing direct international visibility of ground-level perpetrators and building relationships locally and regionally. These relationships provide opportunities to build cooperative interactions, so that protection does not rely solely on coercion or pressure. This is particularly relevant because the chain of command is never a unified entity. Building close relationships with amenable individuals within abuser groups allows UCP teams to generate the necessary level of support to maintain their presence. Moreover, UCP personnel can encourage these supportive individuals to reform the group's organizational structure and reduce violence.
2. **Revealing responsibilities:** Monitoring and verification at different levels of society can help reveal relationships of responsibility among armed actors—for instance, between a state and paramilitaries. This increases accountability and, to some extent, combats countermeasures such as smokescreens.
3. **Strengthening international commitment:** When an act of violence occurs despite international presence, the international community is likely to react more quickly than if there had been no such presence. Embassies and home governments usually will engage more forcefully in protection when their own citizens are present in a mission and at risk. This increases pressure on top-level decision makers to take action (ibid. p.16). This does not automatically result in increased protection, but it greatly increases international attention to a situation.




Figure 2: Targeting the Entire Chain of Command. Source: Mahony (2006) p.15

Protective presence in practice

Protective presence is employed in different forms, depending on the nature of the conflict, the context, and the mandate of the organization that provides the presence. UCP practitioners around the world provide protective presence in refugee sites, at offices and homes of human rights defenders, at schools, hospitals and marketplaces, for workshop venues, in weapon-free zones, and in peace communities. Protective presence is also provided alongside the monitoring of demonstrations, trials or tribunals, celebrations, and parades.

UCP providers are currently exploring the UNICEF concept of 'children as a zone of peace' as a way of framing a protection objective focusing on the protection of children, with protective presence at locations such as schools.

There are two primary variations of protective presence: first, static protective presence is used when there is one specific area where civilians are under threat, and it is possible for UCP team members to position themselves in a location where they are visible throughout that area. Patrolling is used when the area where civilians are under threat is too large or laid out in such a way that UCP team members cannot be visible throughout the location from one location. However, the layout is still important: if they cannot quickly move throughout the area and be highly visible, patrolling will be less effective.

In some cases protective presence is provided to individuals (e.g., human rights lawyers, journalists), and in other cases to large groups (e.g., refugees or communities under threat). In high-risk situations the presence of UCP personnel can be sustained twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, with UCP team members working in shifts. In low-risk situations UCP presence does not need to be continuous. UCP teams typically range from two to twelve members, depending on the context.

Though UCP agencies do not all operate in the same way, there are many similarities in

the ways they provide protective presence. Conscious visibility is one commonly shared tactic. Most UCP agencies use clearly identifiable uniforms, cars, flags and other markers to strengthen their visibility and increase their security.² Uniforms are especially important for local staff members, who could easily be mistaken for bystanders without their distinctive uniform.

If we surprise armed actors in the field we have not done our job.

Tiffany Easthom, Executive Director, Nonviolent Peaceforce.

What are the challenges for protective presence?

Challenges in providing protective presence include the following:

- Effectiveness is based on the acceptance of UCP personnel by conflict actors—relationships and lines of communication need to be established with conflict actors before the presence can be used to provide protection;
- Being present and being visible is the foundation of this technique, but does not provide protection in and of itself unless it is used strategically. If acceptance of UCP presence fails, protection strategies need to be backed up by credible pressures from other international actors and institutions;
- There must be real (soft) power and influence behind the pressure for it to be credible: i.e. political, economic, legal, religious, cultural or social pressure such as disruption to tourism, indictment by a court or tribunal, imposition of economic sanctions, or cancellation of contracts, investments, or aid packages;
- Protection strategies must be based on careful research. It is important to identify which actors are causing the threat and what kinds of pressure they may be susceptible to, who will be supportive, what influence they have, and to what extent will they use their influence to support the protection of civilians. Research must also clarify the likelihood that intervention will not increase risks to individuals and communities;
- It is usually helpful to have direct lines of open communication to the perpetrators somewhere along their chain of command in order for influence to be effectively applied; moreover, not all abuser groups have clear chains of command; and there are groups which it is hardly possible to influence;
- Even if UCP presence is accepted by the major parties involved in the conflict, armed splinter groups or criminal groups can target UCP personnel and take actions against UCP teams working against their interest.

² Some argue that UCP practitioners should strive for a minimum amount of visibility necessary to get the job done. Over-exposure may provide the opportunity for a political attack or a slide into dependency. Under-exposure nullifies the benefits of UCP presence to a conflict and may decrease its credibility (Schirch, 2006, p. 93)



Box 1 - Case study: Protective presence at a hospital amidst tribal violence in Jonglei

On 4 January 2012, the Government of South Sudan declared the state of Jonglei a disaster zone as a result of massive tribal clashes that occurred in late December 2011. While there is a long history of violent and brutal conflict between the Lou Nuer and Murle tribes, the situation escalated dramatically when an estimated 5000 Lou Nuer and Dinka combatants marched on town for an apparent retaliation attack. The combatants burned down entire villages en route to Pibor and wounded, killed, and abducted numerous Murle women and children.

Victims of the violence with life-threatening injuries from all three tribes were evacuated to the Juba Teaching Hospital (in the capital city). Patients in the hospital included two infants who had been found lying beside their dead mothers with their skulls cut open, and a four-year old girl found with her abdomen slit open and her intestines exposed.

Members from Nonviolent Peaceforce went to the hospital to assess the situation after members of the three tribes started visiting the hospital and threatening each other. When injured Lou Nuer combatants at the hospital claimed they would 'finish the job' and kill the Murle patients, Murle patients began locking themselves inside their ward with a chain and padlock and were not letting anyone in. As a bystander said: "It was awful. It smelled like rotting flesh. They were all on top of each other because it was too small but they were too scared to come out or to let anyone in."

Nonviolent Peaceforce engaged with patients and hospital staff, as well as with representatives from the different tribes. NP provided a protective presence in different wards of the hospital. They also convinced the hospital staff to request police presence to guard the injured Lou Nuer combatants, and they worked together with the police to maintain a safe space inside the hospital. Members of Nonviolent Peaceforce stayed at the hospital twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week for a period of three months. No violent incidents happened during those three months.

SOURCE: Nonviolent Peaceforce South Sudan



Assignment

View:

- Mahony, L. (2006.) *Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping: Part 1*. Geneva: Switzerland: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. http://www.fieldviewsolutions.org/fv-publications/Proactive_Presence.pdf



Recommended reading

- Geleta, A. (2013). *Unaccompanied Minors in Yida*. www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org. Brussels, Belgium: Nonviolent Peaceforce.

3.1.2 Protective accompaniment

What is protective accompaniment?

Protective accompaniment is protective presence in motion. It is the best-known application of UCP methods. Protective accompaniment is practiced by almost all UCP agencies in nearly all types of contexts. UCP practitioners have been described as ‘unarmed bodyguards’ because they are frequently walking at the side of threatened human rights defenders in areas of violent conflict. Protective accompaniment is provided to civilians because they perceive a threat either during their journey from one place to another, or upon arrival at their destination.

It was thanks to these foreign nationals, so concerned for our situation, who worked with dedication and deep respect. I was fully aware that without their presence the threats might turn from words into actions. They stayed with us one night in November when we had to move urgently because a man telephoned to inform me that my daughter would be raped, mutilated and tortured using unimaginable means because I had got involved with the wrong person. [Forced into our second exile] PBI accompanied us in the sad walk towards Immigration and went with us as far as the door of the plane. One of its members had to literally push me onto the plane whilst I cried uncontrollably.

Claudia Julieta Duque, Columbian journalist for Radio Nizkor. Peace Brigades International (2009).

Next to protective accompaniment UCP practitioners also provide strategic accompaniment.

This refers to the accompaniment of civilians for the sake of human security. Whereas protective accompaniment is used for the purpose of providing protection, strategic accompaniment is used as a way to build confidence and connect vulnerable civilians to designated service providers. It includes, for example, accompanying farmers to the local government offices, after the tsunami, to be a supportive presence. As land records had been washed away, people needed to re-establish land ownership, but were afraid to approach the appropriate officials. Practitioners may refer to both applications as 'accompaniment'. In this section accompaniment is understood as protective accompaniment.

How does protective accompaniment work?

Protective accompaniment works in a way similar to protective presence. However, accompaniment often means travelling through, or to, an area of violent conflict. This means that extra precautionary measures have to be taken. There may be roadblocks or mines on the way, or the road may pass through territory controlled by paramilitaries. Just as UCP practitioners build relationships vertically (up and down the chain of command) to provide protective presence, relationships also need to be built horizontally when they travel through different areas. In different areas there may also be different chains of command.

Protective accompaniment is a preventive, not a defensive strategy. UCP personnel use their physical presence, visibility, and relationships to prevent threats from being realized. In case threats are realized and the accompanied individual or group is attacked during the accompaniment, UCP personnel will not use their presence to engage in physical struggle. However, they will try to stay with the individual or group as long as possible, even if they are taken away or arrested. UCP practitioners in such situations can spend days on end going to police stations, jails, or government offices, trying to obtain information about the whereabouts and wellbeing of their local partners. They may also use their local, national, and/or international response network to advocate for the release or return of the arrested or abducted individuals.

Local actors that request protective accompaniment sometimes misperceive this as nothing more than an extra safety net. When threatened, these actors often keep a low profile and continue their activities underground. They sometimes believe that they can continue to keep a low profile, while adding international accompaniment as a precautionary measure. Protective accompaniment, however, like any other UCP method, generally cannot be carried out secretly. In fact, abandoning transparency and visibility opens the door to suspicion, mistrust and the perception of partisanship. It undermines the entire system of proactive engagement. Accepting accompaniment means raising visibility. It means that local actors step out of the shadows, showing that with the international community on their side, there are going to be serious consequences for the perpetrators if threats are realized. Therefore, in accepting accompaniment, local actors accept that potential perpetrators will be informed about their whereabouts, at least during the time of accompaniment.

In cases where threatened civilians do not wish to raise their profile, but still wish to benefit from the presence of UCP personnel, patrolling is sometimes applied instead of accompaniment. UCP teams may move around in a specific area where threatened civilians are travelling, without the responsibility of providing direct physical protection to these civilians. If accompaniment is a close perimeter presence, patrolling is a wide perimeter presence. Patrolling is also used by

UCP practitioners as an alternative to accompaniment in situations where threatened groups are very large or specific agreements about conduct and values are difficult. Large groups of IDPs may, for example, travel through hostile areas and some of them may insist on carrying weapons. Direct accompaniment of the entire group may compromise UCP's principles of nonpartisanship and nonviolence or may result in unwanted consequences. Therefore, UCP teams may decide to accompany the IDP leaders and through them provide protection to the large group, or choose to patrol the area instead.

Protective accompaniment in action?

Protective accompaniment is provided to both individuals and groups. Individuals in most cases are human rights defenders, journalists, and leaders from targeted minority groups as well as their relatives. Groups may include IDPs, youth at risk of abduction, or humanitarians delivering aid.

High-risk missions always include international UCP personnel; they may even consist exclusively of internationals. Gender, nationality, race, and ethnicity, as well as personal skills, play a role in identifying the most effective accompaniment team for a specific mission (perception is key). Low-risk missions usually include national or local UCP personnel. They may even consist exclusively of national and/or local staff (a national actor from another part of the country may be perceived very differently from a local actor from the affected community). UCP organizations have also encouraged local actors to provide accompaniment to each other. Nonviolent Peaceforce in South Sudan, for example, encouraged women threatened by sexual violence to accompany each other or move in groups when fetching water or cutting grass. This proved effective.

Before any accompaniment mission, UCP teams will assess the threat: where does the threat come from, why does the threat exist, and is there an identifiable pattern? UCP personnel also assess the risks that the threat poses to the targeted individual or group. Some threats are very serious, but because the individual or group is capable of dealing with them, the risk they run may not be high. Conversely, a threat may appear to be rather insignificant, but the targeted individual or group is extremely vulnerable and has no capacity whatsoever to deal with the threat. UCP practitioners will also assess if accompaniment is the appropriate methodology and agree with local actors on the form and intensity of the accompaniment. Furthermore, they will inform the appropriate authorities and other actors about the accompaniment. Ultimately, the decision-making on all these matters lies with those who request the accompaniment. They may decide that keeping a low profile will be more effective or safer in a particular situation. Dealing with these dilemmas requires sensitivity and creativity.

During an accompaniment mission UCP team members usually use a strict check-in call system to keep their home base updated about their progress and safety. They may also bring a list of telephone numbers and official support letters from high-ranking government officials or military commanders who are supportive of the accompaniment. These actors can be contacted in case there are complications. Though protective accompaniment involves close physical presence and visibility, UCP practitioners make sure that they are not perceived as involved in the activities of those whom they accompany. Especially in sensitive cases like the accompaniment of lawyers who are investigating human rights violations, UCP personnel make sure to maintain a safe distance for the duration of the investigation. By doing this they

send a clear message of nonpartisanship; they are present to protect the lawyer, but they are not involved in the actual investigation.

In Catatumbo, we did a visit accompanied by Peace Brigades International. We were stopped at a paramilitary roadblock. PBI made phone calls and the paramilitaries made phone calls and they let us through. The paramilitaries respect international presence ... they are trying to institutionalise themselves legally. The collaboration with the state is very clear... The paramilitaries are steadily occupying government positions, and this makes the situation more delicate for them.

Colombian human-rights lawyer quoted by Mahony, 2006



Assignment

View:

- The work of Peace Brigades International: <http://www.peacebrigades.org/publications/dvds-and-videos/?L=0> (choose one of the six available videos)
- Mahony L. *Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping Part 2: Accompanying the return of child soldiers*, 00-1:51 <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/unarmed-civilian-peacekeeping-pt-2>
- Ridd, Karen *Keynote Speech at PED Day* at Dawson College 2012 <https://vimeo.com/106968249>

3.1.3 Interpositioning

Across Africa, there are stories of unarmed women interpositioning themselves as peacekeepers between warring tribes. In many traditional African communities, it was prohibited to kill women. Only other warriors were allowed as targets. In some societies women would walk between armed groups to prevent them from fighting each other.

Schirch, L. (2006), p.17

What is interpositioning?

In 1931 Gandhi spoke of the possibility of overcoming violent conflicts with 'a living wall of men and women', who would interpose themselves between conflicting parties, without any weapons but only their bodies (Weber, 1988). Interpositioning is the act of physically placing oneself between conflicting parties in order to prevent them from using violence against one another.

How does interpositioning work?

Interpositioning works in a similar way to protective presence and accompaniment, although it often requires mobilizing a larger number of UCP team members for just one activity. It also requires a more prominent involvement and greater risk-taking by UCP practitioners than other UCP methods. Many UCP agencies refrain from using this method or make limited use of it, because they consider the security risks to be too high. Interpositioning is sometimes misperceived as a spontaneous action of jumping in between already fighting parties. However, carrying out interpositioning in such a way could result in significant security risks not only to UCP team members, but to the conflict parties themselves if strategy and risk mitigation measures are not carefully calculated beforehand. In order to use interpositioning it is vital to have particularly well-established strong, sustained and tested relationships with the conflict parties involved. Moreover, it is important to gain recognition by key stakeholders and to have in-depth knowledge of the context and conflict.

Commonly, it is assumed that interpositioning owes its effectiveness to the conflicting parties' unwillingness to harm an innocent bystander. However, there is also a more subtle and compelling effect of interpositioning: violence against another human being depends on the ability of the perpetrator to dehumanize the intended recipient of the violent act. This means that the perpetrator has to numb him or herself to the targeted person's humanity. When UCP practitioners interposition themselves, they are, in effect, saying: 'I am willing to sacrifice myself to protect this human being's life.' It has the effect of awakening the potential perpetrator to the humanity of the intended target, and, momentarily, to their own humanity. This makes proceeding with violence much more difficult (Metta Center for Nonviolence, 2013).

Analysis of different cases of nonviolent interpositioning shows that the presence of international, but also at times, national staff, trained in nonviolence and willing to risk their lives, can be of great help in scaling down a conflict. It can also increase the visibility of local

nonviolent groups of activists who strive for justice and human rights.³ However, it seems to be most effective when people related to the fighting groups (wives, parents, children) carry out interpositioning. When such people put themselves between two fighting groups, the latter tend to interrupt the violence, fearing that they may accidentally kill their own relatives (L'Abate, 1997).

³ Environmental groups are increasingly using interpositioning to protect the environment, putting themselves between whales and hunters or between trees and loggers (Schirch, 2006, p.37)

3.2

MONITORING

The decision to go to Bougainville unarmed caused some angst in the Australian Defence Force at the time, but it was the right one. At least two occasions I encountered may have gone differently if we had been armed. Perhaps more fundamentally, the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) experience reaffirmed for me that the role of peacekeepers is to not only stand between the warring sides to prevent more suffering but also to encourage the coming together of divided people.

Rice, A. Australian Department of Defence (in Schweitzer, 2010, p.7)

Monitoring is essentially the practice of observing compliance to a standard. The purpose of monitoring is to help all those involved to make appropriate and timely judgments and decisions that will improve the quality of the work, ensure accountability, and encourage implementation according to plan. Within the context of UCP there are three main applications of monitoring: ceasefire monitoring, rumour control, and Early Warning/ Early Response (EWER). This section describes these three different applications.

UCP teams also monitor many other events and proceedings, such as disarmament processes, political events (e.g., demonstrations, elections), legal proceedings (e.g., trials, tribunals) and social events (e.g., holidays, celebrations, parades). An example of such monitoring is the work of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal. At key moments of public unrest between 2005 and the April 2008 elections the OHCHR-Nepal office mobilized all its resources to have a prominent preventive presence at demonstrations. OHCHR officers would have advance discussions and trainings with the police about the use of force and would be visibly present at the demonstrations with jackets, radios, and maps, ready to feed information down the chain of command. Their monitoring presence is widely credited with reducing the risk of massive violence (Mahony et al., 2012, p.30).

As mentioned in Module 1, the monitoring of events and proceedings such as demonstrations and tribunals is often a mixture between monitoring and proactive engagement.

3.2.1 Ceasefire monitoring

NP's work as part of CPC [civilian protection component] has served to strengthen the IMT [International Monitoring Team in Mindanao] mechanism overall, including its information gathering capacity, its field-level visibility, and by extension, its legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders.

Gunduz, C. and Torralba, R. (2014) p.47

What is ceasefire monitoring?

A ceasefire is understood as a period of truce between two or more parties, especially one that is temporary and is often a preliminary step to the establishment of a more permanent peace on agreed terms. Ceasefire monitoring is used to observe compliance with the terms of implementation of the ceasefire agreements by the ceasefire parties, verify alleged ceasefire violations, and raise awareness among communities (and sometimes the parties to the ceasefire).⁴ Ceasefire monitoring is perhaps the most complex application of monitoring.

How does ceasefire monitoring work?

Once a ceasefire is declared, the parties to the ceasefire usually agree to establish a ceasefire monitoring mechanism to observe their mutual compliance to the ceasefire agreement. This mechanism may consist of representatives of the ceasefire parties and/or third party monitors, who may be local actors or foreign nationals, civilian or military. The parties to the ceasefire will have to decide on the exact composition of the monitoring mechanism as well as its mandate. Through methodical observation and timely identification, verification, and reporting of violations, the monitoring mechanism plays an important role in building confidence of the parties in the peace process, so that negotiations for a comprehensive peace agreement continue. The process of ceasefire monitoring can also serve to create confidence among affected communities, because a protective presence is provided and this encourages the conflict parties to adhere to the agreements. Though monitors may play a role in facilitating dialogue between the ceasefire parties about violations and emerging disagreements, especially if those parties are part of the mechanism, ultimately it is the responsibility of the parties to address violations and resolve disputes.

While third party ceasefire monitoring may involve armed military observers, we focus here on the use of unarmed civilians in monitoring. UCP practitioners are well positioned to play an official monitoring role. They are an independent, nonpartisan third party, usually unaffiliated with any specific government, political group, or ideology. This makes it easier for all parties, including non-state armed groups, to perceive them as non-threatening and objective. The fact that UCP practitioners are unarmed is crucial to their non-threatening stature. Finally

⁴ The soldiers on the ground themselves may not be aware about the agreements or their meaning, as these may not have been formulated very clearly, or in sufficient detail.

UCP teams are a civilian force that makes great effort to build trust among communities and focuses its protection efforts on the most vulnerable civilians. This helps them to gain trust among conflicting parties as well as within the wider community.

UCP teams often train local civil society groups in ceasefire monitoring and support them in establishing civilian monitoring mechanisms, which extend the reach of the monitoring more widely, while at the same time building confidence in the ceasefire agreement at the local level. The official ceasefire monitoring mechanism may (initially) not include civilian representation and may not extend its coverage to the grassroots level, even though many ceasefire violations occur at the grassroots level and directly impact civilians. Local civilian monitors are well positioned to respond quickly to these incidents and can feed information about incidents and community concerns into the official monitoring mechanism. Civilian monitors may also play a role in raising awareness about the agreements, facilitating dialogue between communities and armed forces, and de-escalate tensions. Minor violations, committed by ill-informed foot soldiers that misinterpret unspecific agreements, can easily escalate tensions and lead to retaliation or punishment of civilians. Whether the civilian monitors act as independent monitors, are informally aligned to the official monitoring mechanism, or an integral part of that mechanism, their presence and proactive engagement can reduce violence and protect civilians. Training is described in more detail in Section 3.4.1; establishing self-sustaining local infrastructures in Section 3.4.2.

Ceasefire monitoring in action

When UCP teams assume an official role in monitoring a ceasefire, they will mainly monitor compliance and non-compliance to the security and protection aspects of the ceasefire. Before actual ceasefire monitoring work can begin, it is important to understand the key principles of ceasefire monitoring.

Ceasefire monitoring undertaken by an organization requires basic knowledge.

- **Basic provisions and scope of the ceasefire:** ceasefire monitors should be able to identify the fundamental characteristics of the ceasefire, such as the parties involved in the ceasefire, the geographical area covered by the ceasefire, and the duration of the ceasefire.
- **Specific commitments of the parties under the ceasefire agreement:** by knowing the commitments of the parties, ceasefire monitors will be able to determine if there is compliance or a possible violation of the ceasefire provisions in the event of an incident.
- **Functions and responsibilities of a ceasefire monitor:** ceasefire monitors must be provided with a clear definition of the job and tasks they are supposed to perform. Ignoring or misinterpreting responsibilities may endanger the peace process.
- **Verification methodologies:** ceasefire monitors must know when and how to verify alleged violations, and whom to involve in the verification process.
- **Reporting and coordination mechanisms:** ceasefire monitors must know whom they will report to and what coordinative arrangements govern the different players and tasks within the monitoring mechanism.

The basic functions of a UCP ceasefire monitor are as follows:

- Perform tasks as may be directed by the ceasefire monitoring mechanism;
- Conduct regular area visits to the communities and troops on both sides of the ceasefire agreement;
- Coordinate monitoring activities with all sides;
- Conduct verification of any alleged ceasefire violation and submit a report on the result of verification;
- Provide regular updates of the developments on the ground; for example, during actual incidents of armed hostilities, or the occurrence of unusual or suspicious events that may affect the ceasefire (including specific criminal or illegal activities that both sides agreed to eradicate);
- Monitor and report about the situation of affected civilians and IDPs during and after actual incidents of armed hostilities; ensure that their rights are protected and proper assistance is provided;
- Develop capacity of local civil society to monitor;
- Raise awareness about and generate support for the peace process among affected communities.

Detailed verification of violent incidents is of great importance because a violation of the ceasefire agreement may have enormous consequences. It can trigger retaliation and counter-retaliation. This may derail the entire peace process and result in large-scale displacement, killings, and destruction of property. A complicating feature in many situations is the existence of ordinary criminal and of armed groups deliberately undermining a peace process. Their actions may create the false impression that the parties to the ceasefire have breached their agreements, which, in turn, can lead to panic and displacement. A further complicating feature is that these criminals and armed groups outside the peace process may be affiliated to one of the parties to the ceasefire through complex networks of family, political and criminal alliances. In verifying an incident of violence it is, therefore, imperative for a monitoring team to determine the affiliations and alliances of the perpetrators.

Next to the verification of incidents, confidence building also plays an important role in the monitoring process. Most communities in conflict and post-conflict areas hold deep feelings of mistrust and suspicion. A simple rumour of resumed fighting can spark panic and displacement. The (protective) presence and visibility of a UCP monitoring team in areas where incidents have taken place can help to restore confidence in the functioning of the peace process.

The practice of ceasefire monitoring by UCP teams has recently gained momentum by the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia. This unarmed civilian monitoring mission was deployed in 2008 to monitor compliance by all sides with the EU brokered Six-Point Agreement of 12 August 2008, signed by both Georgia and Russia, and the Agreement on Implementing Measures of 8 September 2008. Though faced with accusations of partiality by the authorities in Abkhazia, the EU monitors have contributed to improving the security situation through visible presence and daily patrolling in high-risk areas, reporting of incidents, and confidence building. The mission also facilitates a 'hotline', which has helped to negotiate the release of detainees and to defuse tensions when clashes have occurred. (EUMM, n.d.).



Box 2 - Case study: Monitoring ceasefire agreements and cultivating confidence in western Mindanao

In the Philippines, Nonviolent Peaceforce was part of the International Monitoring Team that monitors peace processes and ceasefire agreements between the national government and the Moro-Islamic Liberation Front.

On 7 April 2011, a sudden firefight erupted in one of the most isolated and disputed locations of western Mindanao. Some 400 armed men from law enforcement agencies surrounded an island with land troops and military boats in an operation aimed at securing the arrest of a criminal group. A firefight lasting four-and-a-half hours ensued, in which several loud explosions were heard, displacing about 4000 civilians (the entire population of the island). Thirteen houses were burned and nine suspected criminals were killed.

On the request of local stakeholders, Nonviolent Peaceforce's Quick Response Team, comprised of both international and national protection monitors, embarked upon a three-day verification mission. The prompt intervention of NP helped to ensure the immediate and safe return of the 4000 frightened civilians to their homes. Before NP's presence, they were reluctant to do so for fear of further attacks. NP's presence also helped to ensure the incident was dealt with immediately and was afforded proper attention by higher authorities, one result of which was compensation to the families whose houses had been burned.

As per the Civilian Protection Component's mandate, the resulting detailed report was sent to the International Monitoring Team who, in turn, shared the report with the both the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Peace Panels. The key parties to the peace process, on the basis of NP's verification, conducted an investigation of the incident. Further, the report was discussed at length during a subsequent round of exploratory talks on the peace process.

Local residents of the secluded island requested that NP establish an office there to help ensure their safety and security.

The two-year ceasefire has led to a peace framework agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

SOURCE: Nonviolent Peaceforce

3.2.2 Rumour control

One of the ingredients of civil disorders always ... is that misinformation is going around. There's a lot of fear; there's a lot of people picking up bits and pieces of information and spreading it. Rumors come out, and most of the time they're very destructive.

Martin Walsh, Civil Rights Mediation Oral History Project (Conflict Management Initiatives, 2001)

What is rumour control?

Rumour control refers to the verification of rumours that could potentially contribute to an increase in violence, conflict and/or insecurity. It includes: a) monitoring and identifying rumours; b) verifying rumours when possible; c) facilitating the dissemination of factual information with various parties, when feasible and appropriate, in order to prevent violence, escalation of conflict and/or premature displacement.

How does rumour control work?

Rumours can cost lives in violent situations. For example, a rumour of an imminent attack on a community has the potential to create panic among civilians. This panic may lead to mass evacuation or to a counterattack even before the rumoured attack has happened. Alternatively, a rumour that an attack has occurred can lead to revenge attacks. Verifying information and, when appropriate, sharing factual information with conflicting parties or wider communities about threats and violent incidents in the area can help to ease tensions, de-escalate the conflict, and prevent unnecessary (and usually very costly) displacement. Once people flee it is difficult for them to return. According to Jan Egeland, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council, the average amount of time for people worldwide living in displacement is 17 years (UNHCR, 2014).

Rumour control is a method that is useful in situations where levels of mistrust have skyrocketed and previous channels of communication between groups have disintegrated or disappeared. For example, in various areas in Sub-Saharan Africa communities are locked into longstanding conflicts between tribes and clans. Cattle raiding, abduction of children, and community attacks are common. Clashes often come in waves, depending on the season. Modes of communication and infrastructure are limited. Suspicions and mistrust towards other tribes are fuelled by rounds of failed peace conferences and collapsed disarmament processes. In this type of environment, 'rumour control' can be an effective method to prevent or reduce violence and protect civilians.

UCP practitioners are well positioned to identify rumours and provide rumour control. They live together with vulnerable communities for long periods of time, have a deep understanding of the local context, and enjoy the trust of the people they work with. Third-party monitors or peacekeepers who suddenly arrive in threatened areas and engage with a number of high

level actors for a limited amount of time may not get the same information as those who live within communities and (in some cases) speak the local language. Local authorities and army commanders in some places are reluctant to reveal detailed information about violent incidents in the area. They fear outside interference, decreased business activity, or damage to their reputation for not being able to manage the conflict. Even if they are willing to share information, they may only have one version of the story. In a climate of suspicion, prejudice, mistrust, and fear, most rumours will have at least three or four different versions.

Another advantage of UCP practitioners in identifying rumours and providing rumour control is that they may be able to have access to areas where other actors cannot go. Their extensive networks of relations allow them, in some places, to move through areas controlled by paramilitaries. Furthermore, their relatively low security threshold simplifies the logistics of transportation, allowing them, for example, to walk in terrain where motorized transport is not possible or is temporarily suspended (e.g., during the rainy season).

Rumour control in action

Rumour control starts with extensive context and conflict analysis. A lack of understanding of context and conflict may lead to misinterpretation of developments and incidents. Very important rumours may not be identified if monitors find themselves in the wrong place or at the wrong time (in rural areas, patterns of violence often change with the seasons). Alternatively, UCP personnel may find themselves in the right place at the right time, but fail to understand the urgency of the threat that lies behind the rumours. Efforts to de-escalate tensions in this situation may create a false sense of security among community members and increase security risks if they are not accompanied by Early Warning/Early Response efforts (see Section 3.2.3).

UCP practitioners engaged in rumour control often identify local observers in designated areas who regularly inform them about recent developments and incidents. Incoming rumours will be documented and verified with other observers in the area. UCP teams will also try to visit the place of a rumoured incident to get first-hand information. They will collect as many details as possible about the numbers, age, gender, and dress code (uniforms) of people involved in reported incidents, its exact time and place, the response of civilians and local authorities, etc. They will then analyse the rumours, discern patterns, assess the ratio of rumours to actual incidents, and share information with relevant actors. In some cases, UCP teams will use the information to engage in shuttle diplomacy and clarify perceptions and intentions of conflicting parties about (and to) each other in order to de-escalate tensions and avoid violent confrontation (see also Section 3.3.2 on multi-track dialogue).

However, in conflict situations, a great deal of misinformation and propaganda often circulate, making full verification of a rumour difficult or impossible in many situations. If UCP teams disseminate information that turns out to be false, they could not only put more people in more danger, they could lose credibility as well as the trust of local stakeholders. It is therefore essential to **independently** verify as much information as possible. If it is not possible to carry out first-hand verification, UCP teams at least need to not only crosscheck the information from multiple people/actors, but also identify each person/actor's source(s) of information: if all the actors they speak with received the information from the same source, the information has actually not been cross-checked at all.

It is particularly important that UCP practitioners do not tell a community that they are safe, or more generally what events will unfold. It is important to remember that no one can predict the future, and if they tell civilians that they are safe when an attack is still possible, they run the risk of endangering the very people they are seeking to protect. For example, if UCP team members tell a community that they will not be attacked- even if they have secured the commitment of the potential aggressor to not engage in violence- and they are subsequently attacked, the UCP team has actually contributed to their insecurity. As a corollary, it is essentially to never assume a group will refrain from engaging in violence even if they guarantee they will not do so. Sometimes leaders do not have control of potential spoilers and, more generally, dynamics shift quickly in conflict situations.

If and **only if** UCP practitioners can independently verify that the rumour is false, and the truth will not escalate tensions, they may disseminate the correct information. For example, if UCP team members have seen and talked to the person who was rumoured to have been killed, and s/he is not at risk of dying imminently, and the real information will de-escalate tensions, they can take steps to independently correct and disseminate information. In these cases, they need to consider:

- Who should they prioritize disseminating the correct information to? Should they prioritize disseminating the information to the people who will be most likely to react to the rumour first? Are there any respected individuals (religious leaders, community leaders, etc.) who have the credibility and reach to help disseminate the information? To authorities, who may be able to prevent negative consequences?
- What methods of communication should be used to make sure that the information reaches the correct people? Examples of potential strategies include:
 - Word of mouth/phone calls
 - Social media
 - Utilizing connections with local authorities to disseminate the message
 - Using local radio stations or television stations to broadcast the message
 - Community meetings.
- How should the message be framed so that it is credible and will effectively mitigate tensions?
- Are you able to disseminate the information fast enough to prevent a negative reaction?

In cases when it is not possible to verify and disseminate the information because either a) disseminating the correct information would actually increase the likelihood of violence b) it is not possible to sufficiently verify the rumour and/or c) it is not possible to effectively disseminate the correct information, it will likely be necessary to employ different tools to mitigate the conflict. In particular, shuttle negotiations, mediation, facilitating dialogue, or engaging authorities to provide protection may be appropriate strategies. If conflict mitigation is not feasible or unsuccessful, and the rumour presents a risk of a large-scale threat, it may be necessary to consider activating an Early Warning/Early Response system, assuming it is exists.



Recommended reading

- ICRC. (2012). *Enhancing protection for civilians in armed conflict and other situations of violence*. <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0956.pdf>

3.2.3 Early Warning / Early Response

What is early warning/early response?

Early Warning/Early Response (EWER) is a systematic application of monitoring for the sake of preventing violence, reducing the impact of violence, and increasing the safety and security of civilians in tense situations of violent conflict. It is based on the awareness that conflicts generally progress through well-recognized stages. By monitoring the progression of a conflict, it may be possible to predict the development of a crisis. Timely awareness of an imminent crisis may help civilians to prepare themselves to face the crisis or to evacuate the area. A timely response may prevent the crisis from developing or at least reduce its impact.

EWER can be defined as the collection and communication of information about a crisis, the analysis of that information, and the initial consideration of potential response options to the crisis. Conflict Early Warning requires (near real-time) assessment of events that, in a high-risk environment, are likely to trigger the rapid escalation of violence.

Early Response (Action) is often used in conjunction with Early Warning. It refers to the actions that are taken to prevent violence or the escalation of violence and to resolve violent conflict. In addition to direct UCP intervention, these actions can be diplomatic, military, humanitarian, and/or economic. Response options need to reflect a combination of ground realities, response capacities, and scenarios. Ground realities describe a particular situation, marked by a specific emergency context. Response capacities refer to the (in)ability of certain actors to deliver a timely, inclusive and targeted intervention. Scenarios refer to the potential outcomes of the respective interventions.

UCP personnel may only be involved in Early Warning and leave Early Response to other actors, or vice versa. In most cases they will be involved in both Early Warning and Early Response. When it comes to Early Response following a crisis situation, UCP agencies may team up with other humanitarian agencies and focus specifically on the physical security concerns and protection issues of civilians in the crisis area. Other agencies typically provide, for example, food and medical aid.

Early Response actions are selected from UCP methods described separately in this module, according to what best suits the situation. This Section will mainly focus on Early Warning and the process that leads from Early Warning to Early Response.

How does early warning/early response work?

EWER involves more than the activity of UCP teams monitoring the progression of a conflict and responding to a crisis situation. EWER involves the establishment or strengthening of community-based mechanisms of analysis, communication and response. These mechanisms need to ensure that information about incidents and developments in the area is correctly identified and shared in a timely way with relevant actors, especially those in a position to respond to an approaching crisis. In addition to information sharing, EWER mechanisms also address the issue of coordination, preparation, and division of responsibilities. Preparation may include entire communities. Children need to know what to do or where to go in an emergency situation. They may be at school, on the road, or alone at home. Disabled or otherwise mentally or physically challenged persons may need the support of others in the case of a sudden evacuation. Specific Early Warning alarm systems may be developed, but unless the entire community understands how to respond, they will not be effective.

EWER mechanisms are multi-layered, horizontally as well as vertically. They may connect actors at the grassroots level with actors at the middle range and top levels. They may also connect actors at the grassroots level on different sides of the conflict with each other. Women from one community may, for example, inform women from another community that tensions in their community are increasing.

Effective EWER requires input from a wide range of perspectives, including the perspectives of marginalized groups, women, and the elderly, who are often excluded from official peace processes. Mechanisms need to include actors who are able to recognize and categorize early indicators or signs of imminent violence. Mechanisms also need to include actors who are able to respond to these indicators to prevent the violence from occurring or prevent its escalation. Those who live in communities affected by violence are usually in the best position to recognize such indicators. These could be typical community members, members of grassroots organizations, or community leaders. Those able to facilitate a positive response to prevent violence are not necessarily top-level leaders, but they should have the necessary influence to stop violence or de-escalate tensions. They could be religious leaders, local politicians, representatives from the business sector, local military or police, as well as regional government officials or the leadership of armed groups.

It is imperative that UCP teams do not establish new EWER mechanisms without assessing the existence and functioning of existing mechanisms. In some areas existing mechanisms are geared to natural disasters. UCP practitioners can play a role in refining these mechanisms to include a conflict component. Another concern is making sure that the EWER mechanisms stay purely nonpolitical; otherwise this could create security risks for those involved.

Early warning/early response in action

The establishment of EWER mechanisms starts with the identification of crisis areas. UCP teams will focus their assessment on areas with regular clashes, bases for hard-line politicians, mixed communities as well as areas rich in natural resources, close to forward defence lines, and base camps of armed forces. After identification of a particular crisis area, UCP personnel and community actors collect baseline information and identify indicators of potential conflict:

Conflict indicators may be:

- Political (e.g., legislation favouring one group over another or hate speech);
- Economic (e.g., disruption of food distribution or uneven economic development along group lines);
- Environmental (e.g., extended droughts or bad harvests);
- Socio-cultural (e.g., destruction or desecration of religious sites);
- Technological (provocations and hate speech on radio or in the social media);
- Migrations (e.g., people leaving certain areas or cattle arriving);
- Security-related (e.g., incidents of kidnapping or appearance of new armed groups, bombings and attacks).

Following the collection of baseline information and conflict indicators, UCP personnel and local actors jointly analyse data, put it into context and attach meaning to it. They will also formulate plausible scenarios and create action plans for each scenario. The entire process of information gathering and analysis may be undertaken within the framework of a community meeting or a workshop. This allows for capacity development about protection strategies and contingency plans.

In a context where communities suffer from aerial bombings, UCP teams may, for example, conduct a workshop with community leaders on EWER. The participants can describe and analyse what happened the last time the community was hit by aerial bombing; e.g., children lost their lives because they ran away in panic, instead of seeking cover in foxholes (holes in the ground used as shelter against enemy fire); physically challenged people had no foxholes as they did not have the strength to dig them. The community leaders may acknowledge that they cannot prevent aerial bombardments from happening, but that they can reduce their impact in a number of ways. Women and teachers could be tasked to instruct children on what to do next time there is a bombing. Youth could be tasked to dig foxholes for physically challenged people. The community leaders could identify specific warning signs to ensure rapid response. They could even establish a phone tree communication system that includes UCP personnel and other actors to ensure timely response from service providers following a bombing.



Recommended reading

- *The Small Girl and the Big Men.* (Duncan n.d.). <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/what-we-do/stories-from-the-field/29-south-sudan-news/387-the-small-girl-and-the-big-men>

3.3

RELATIONSHIP BUILDING

You need fluid channels of communication with your state counterparts. You have to know who to talk to. Maybe you can't resolve everything, but you should at least go to the right place, know who will pay attention and who is going to waste your time ... With a good relationship, you can call directly—"What's up with this case?" Without a relationship, you can't.

Head of sub-office, OHCHR, Colombia (Mahony, 2006, p.52)

Relationships are an important aspect of all UCP methods. Having credible relationships with key actors and other stakeholders helps to open up channels of communication between conflict parties. It also helps to address rumours and support interventions to prevent an escalating violent situation. Finally, it enhances safety and security of UCP personnel deployed in violent conflict areas. One significant factor in the effectiveness of UCP comes from establishing and improving relationships with government representatives, armed actors (state and non-state), local religious and community leaders, and others who may have the power to influence potential perpetrators of violence or parties in conflict. While establishing relationships inherently provides some protection, if and when threats do occur, these influential persons can be called upon to reduce the risk of violence. Knowing when to emphasize positive engagement and when to use pressure in these relationships is complex and depends on careful analysis.

Though relationship building is an important component of all UCP methods, confidence building and multi-track dialogue are used as two specific applications of relationship building. Both applications will be described in this section.

3.3.1 Confidence building

Some 'consumers' of civilian accompaniment have noted that in hindsight they do not think the ... accompaniment and presence saved their lives, because they realized later that they were not in as much danger as they had originally believed. However, they did note that the solidarity they felt allowed them to continue their work, regardless of whether or not they were truly at risk.

What is confidence building?

Confidence building is a matter of supporting inner strength rather than changing external conditions or increasing skills. It also relates to people testing and when appropriate gaining confidence in state structures that are supposed to provide protection. Protracted conflicts are usually marked by cycles of violence, killings, abuse, discrimination, and a lack of or unequal access to justice, education, and basic resources. Displaced people are often automatically suspected of being politically responsible for their misfortune, while human rights defenders are routinely labelled 'guerrillas' or 'terrorists'. While there are almost always some civilians still active, working for change, many other civilians will have become fearful, mistrustful, silenced, and disempowered. Some have lost hope in a better future, others have run out of ideas about how to change their situation, or lost the will and the courage to try. In such a climate UCP practitioners can try to build or renew the confidence of civilians in themselves and in others, including state actors.

Confidence is an application of relationship building because increased confidence tends to take people out of their isolation. It leads to more engagement, initiatives, creativity, and confrontation. That confrontation may also lead to conflict and even violence is a dilemma that will be explored in 5. This section focuses on the role of confidence in preventing or reducing violence, increasing safety and security, and strengthening local peace infrastructures.

How does confidence building work?

Confidence building can contribute to UCP key objectives in different ways. With increased confidence, civilians are more likely to resist abuse or speak out against abuse. In isolated areas vulnerable populations may not be aware of their rights. They are also not connected to support networks nor have they access to support services. They may fear to approach community leaders, police officers, or international service providers. As a result they may continue to suffer from ongoing violence. Once they are aware of their rights, feel connected, and know how to access support services, they may feel sufficiently confident to interrupt the pattern of violence or ask assistance from others to do so. The same logic applies for human rights defenders or state duty bearers who feel compelled to address abuse on behalf of survivors. Although they do not suffer directly from the abuse themselves, they may lack the confidence to confront perpetrators. Once they feel protected and supported, they may find the confidence to address the issue.

Just as increased confidence can prevent violence or reduce violence, it can also increase the safety and security of civilians and strengthen local peace infrastructures. Increased confidence may, for example, encourage civilians to initiate their own activities for peace or protect vulnerable groups in their community. Lack of education or the use of top-down education systems often leads civilians to believe that they do not have enough qualifications or skills to contribute to peace and security. UCP practitioners can play a role in convincing them otherwise. The case study in Module 1 (Box 1, Section 1.1.2) showed that UCP team members encouraged women in providing protective presence and accompaniment to each other in order to protect themselves from sexual violence at water access points. These women

realized there were actions that they themselves could undertake to make a difference, and in turn they encouraged other women.

Finally, increased confidence can increase the relationships between civilians and state actors or decision makers. In many situations of violent conflict, civilians are reluctant or fearful to approach state actors for a variety of reasons. Increased confidence can help to bridge the divide and support civilians in approaching state actors to report abuses and request for additional protection measures. UCP practitioners can lead by example, as they visibly engage with security forces, police officers, and government officials and build relations with supportive individuals. At the same time, they can support the functioning of state institutions that provide protection services to civilians, such as local human rights commissions. This can help to increase the confidence of civilians in the protection capacity of the state.

Confidence building in action

Confidence can be built in many different ways. UCP practitioners may:

- Accompany survivors of violence to state duty bearers to report abuse or violations;
- Encourage local ownership of shared activities and increase participation (confidence may be prioritized over efficiency);
- Promote horizontal learning by creating dialogue among local actors—local actors may perceive UCP personnel as experts and disregard the wisdom of ‘uneducated’ local actors;
- Encourage discussions where local people recognize their own expertise;
- Explore and appreciate local mechanisms or tools before introducing external mechanisms and tools;
- Seek consultation and dialogue with a wide range of local actors, including vulnerable groups, and publicly show appreciation for the knowledge and perspective they provide;
- Use active listening skills and affirmation to show that the input of local actors is valuable;
- ‘Speak’ the local language—use examples and symbols that reflect and relate to the local context;
- Share case studies that show how people just like them have played important roles in protection;
- Offer skills-building support on security and protection, international law, or monitoring.

3.3.2 Multi-track dialogue

NP is seen to be able to influence the actions of the GPH (government of the Philippines) and the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) armed actors, including the capability to cause armed actions to cease and desist through direct access...Accounts cite mere minutes as the time elapsed between the reporting of the incident to NP, and the pull-

out of armed actors or the cessation of armed action in a locality.

C. Gunduz and R. Torralba (Gunduz et.al., 2014)

What is multi-track dialogue?⁵

UCP teams engage in diplomatic intervention in daily situations and constantly interact with key actors at the grassroots, middle-range, and top levels of society. Each contact encourages a change in behaviour. The more long-term and constant the presence, and the more relationships that have been constructed with these actors, the more this is possible. The opportunities to influence key actors are everywhere, every day. When UCP personnel are out in public, travelling to remote rural areas, talking to the local mayor or priest or commander, everyone is paying attention and calculating the consequences. And that changes the situation (Mahony, 2006, p.49). When representatives of civil society, especially women, are involved in dialogue, the results recognize a broader range of needs and are more sustainable than when only official parties and armed actors are involved.

Dialogue can be defined as deliberate, arranged conversations organized, and often facilitated by, organizations or individuals. Multi-track dialogue is a term for dialogue processes operating on several tracks simultaneously. This section explores three tracks, though they can be broken down further into nine different tracks (Diamond and McDonald, 1993):

- Track 1 usually refers to official dialogue between high-level political and military leaders, focusing on ceasefires, treaties, and post-conflict political processes;
- Track 2 refers to unofficial dialogue and problem-solving activities aimed at building relationships and encouraging new thinking that can inform the official process. It typically involves influential academic, religious, and NGO leaders and other civil society actors who can interact more freely than high-ranking officials;
- Track 3 refers to people-to-people dialogue undertaken by individuals and private groups at the grass roots to encourage interaction and understanding among hostile communities. This involves awareness-raising and confidence building within these communities (United States Institute of Peace, 2011).

⁵ This section draws on the work of Liam Mahony, 2006, *Proactive Presence: Field Strategies for Civilian Protection*.




Figure 3: Multi-Track Dialogue (adapted from Lederach, 1997, p.39)

How does multi-track dialogue work?

UCP teams operate within all three tracks and aim to promote dialogue between actors from all three tracks. For example, by connecting women peacemakers at the grassroots level (Track 3) with NGO leaders or academics at the middle-range level (Track 2), UCP practitioners not only build relationships between the actors at the two levels, but also enhance the roles of both parties. The women peacemakers may feel supported by the more influential actors at the Track 2 level and have the possibility to learn from their expertise. At the same time, the NGO leaders and academics have received first-hand information about the situation at the field level from the perspective of women. This may have given them new insights, which they can use in their dialogues with political leaders at the top level (Track 1). Furthermore, both parties have received an additional perspective on the peace process. UCP team members may also introduce the same women peacemakers directly to actors at the Track 1 level—for example, high-level UN officials—and support their continued presence at Track 1 functions.

These relationships between actors from different tracks have the potential to increase the confidence of all actors involved. They are more fully aware of what is happening and how to respond to a certain situation. Because of their involvement with all three tracks, UCP practitioners often have access to important, verified information which most of the time does not reach the higher Track 2 and 1 levels. UCP can utilize that information in a skillful way to enhance levels of connectivity between all the three tracks and consolidate grass roots to higher-level peace mechanisms. Many peace talks do not advance, because the

interactions at the Track 1 level are not connected efficiently to the Track 2 and Track 3 levels. UCP practitioners can play a role in bringing concerns up and down the chain and using their connections at higher levels to protect civilians.

As state actors and non-state armed groups usually have the biggest influence on the security situation, their involvement is key, especially when it comes to the protection of civilians. Therefore, UCP practitioners prioritize the building of relationships with these actors and try to connect them to key actors at the different track levels.

Where there is the political will within a state or armed group to listen, and workable relationships have been built, an important communication mechanism can be the use of confidential dialogue and cooperation towards reform. This can exert influence not only at higher policy-making levels but also further down the chain: at the low or middle level a commander may be afraid of being accountable to his hierarchy, and may prefer to resolve an issue quietly at his own level (Mahony, 2006, p.50). Even in situations where the state may be the chief obstacle to protection, and perhaps the primary perpetrator of abuse, UCP teams will still benefit from close local and diplomatic relationships with governmental and military decision makers at national and local levels. These relationships must be developed carefully to assure maximum access and influence, and yet not allow the host state to manipulate or curtail the organization's independence (ibid. p.52).

Communication with armed groups can be a very delicate matter in the eyes of the dominant state and its military, and security concerns must therefore be considered in such contacts. However, concern for security should not categorically rule out such communication. Security must be dealt with strategically at the operational level, considering also that lack of contact with an armed group may also pose a security risk to UCP personnel (ibid. p.53).

UCP practitioners also facilitate relationship building and dialogue between threatened civilians and international peace and security networks. They may, for example, collect and share the stories of threatened civilians to raise awareness about their conditions and protection needs. They may facilitate meetings between groups of women from isolated areas of violent conflict and representatives of the diplomatic community at the capital city, or invite human rights defenders to speak at international conferences or meetings in places like New York or Geneva. These exchanges often build the confidence of affected civilians, raise their profile, and strengthen their support networks. At the same time, it allows members of international support networks to engage directly with the affected civilians and get first-hand information, which often inspires them to intensify their advocacy and response efforts (see Figure 4).

When we asked what had contributed to women's increased willingness and ability to engage in peace activism, especially during the second war, we received several variations on the response that they had become connected to broader peace networks and sources of information.

Levine, D. (2012), speaking about women in Liberia, p.12




Figure 4: Connecting Human Rights Defenders with the International Community

The diagram shown in Figure 4 was created by Peace Brigades International. It illustrates how human rights defenders at the field level, positioned at the center of the model, are supported and protected by networks of relationships both in-country and abroad. In-country UCP personnel provide engagement with local authorities, UN agencies, and foreign diplomats to generate support for the protection of threatened defenders. Abroad, UCP networks engage with parliamentarians, civil servants, and decision makers at international human rights forums to advocate for the protection of those defenders (PBI, 2012, p.3)

Multi-track dialogue in action

Effective dialogue requires analytical, political, and diplomatic skills. Diplomacy can involve a wide variety of techniques, including direct pressure, indirect pressure ('hinting'), humour, politeness, subordination or humility, praise, stressing mutual objectives, and developing solutions together.

For effective dialogue, individual UCP practitioners must be able to:

- Engage and build trust with a wide range of actors, including abusers, survivors of violence, national and local governments, security forces, non-state armed actors, local community leaders, women, and children;
- Develop clear messages for each of these actors that relate to their situation and trigger their interest;
- Create parallel dialogue processes with vulnerable or threatened groups where appropriate. Women may not want to speak out in front of men, especially when it concerns sexual and gender based violence;
- Create a culture of respect, transparency (while protecting confidentiality), mutual consultation, and open handling of accusations— avoid making promises that cannot be kept;
- Respect existing hierarchy and traditional structures, be aware of internal divisions;
- Maintain accuracy in communicating information about incidents;
- Keep in mind the safety of conversation partners— especially when exchanging sensitive information;
- Be persistent and patient. Some actors may be ready to share information in a third or fourth meeting after their trust has been gained.



Box 3 - Case study: Conflict mitigation at Yida refugee camp

The influx of large numbers of refugees in Yida, South Sudan, led to a conflict between the host community and the refugee community. The refugee site had been growing at an exponential rate, placing both the camp and the host community at high risk of conflict and violence.

When Nonviolent Peaceforce approached the leaders of the host community to assess the situation, they complained about shortage of food and difficult access to livelihoods, as a result of the way refugees were overusing the natural resources in the area. Moreover, the host community felt marginalised by the international community as they exclusively focused their services provision towards the refugees. The lack of communication channels between representatives of refugees and host community, as well as between representatives of host community and international service providers further complicated the conflict, because underlying tensions and problems could not be addressed.

UCPs from Nonviolent Peaceforce first approached local authorities and chiefs as well as the refugee council. Then they accompanied some of these actors to the host community leaders to initiate dialogue. They also approached representatives from international donor agencies to obtain their support and involvement. Over the course of weeks the UCPs engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the various groups, facilitating dialogue and supporting the groups to establish specific, implementable agreements on how to share the resources and move their cattle during the dry season.

Though it was a challenge for international aid agencies to deviate from their official mandate to provide services for refugees only, a number of them decided in the end to extend some of their relief services and resources to the host community, which helped to further improve the relations between the parties.

SOURCE: Nonviolent Peaceforce

3.4

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

In many situations of violent conflict there is a lack of formal and informal education. If schools are functioning at all, classes are frequently interrupted and many students, as well as teachers, have been displaced, injured, or killed. Students may have been pulled out from school for safety reasons, to support their families, or to join armed forces. Survival will have become the priority for many civilians. As a result, there is often limited capacity and/or confidence among communities in areas of violent conflict to engage in peace and security efforts. The presence of UCP personnel or other actors may have increased the space for local groups to operate and grow, but the lack of opportunities and tools for shared reflection and learning may hinder that growth. Capacity development can provide local actors in situations of violent conflict with opportunities and tools for learning and increase confidence in their ability to transform conflicts.

Capacity development in the context of UCP is understood as the strengthening of knowledge, skills, and abilities for the purpose of violence prevention and civilian protection. Capacity development includes training courses or workshops on topics such as UCP and human rights. It also includes the coaching and supporting of key individuals and/or existing or newly established local protection mechanisms.

This section first describes UCP training, as this is the most widely used application of capacity development. The second part of the section describes the establishment of self-sustaining local UCP mechanisms. It is UCP provided by local actors.

3.4.1 UCP training

[Local actors] are the basic source of protection, especially when all other layers of protection fail.... [T]raining [them] is thus an important investment.

Kofi Annan, Former United Nations Secretary-General (UN Security Council 2001)

What is UCP training?

Training is an organized activity for the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and competencies. Training has specific goals of improving capability, capacity, productivity, and performance. In the context of UCP, training means working together with people in a dynamic process of discovery, analysis, and skill building.

How does UCP training work?

UCP training is provided as a direct response to identified needs and interests of a target group in a particular situation of violent conflict. Leaders of a refugee community may, for example, wish to increase their capacity in child protection, as a result of the recruitment of unaccompanied refugee children by armed militias. Before training is conducted, UCP teams, together with the refugee leaders, will assess the specific protection needs of the unaccompanied children, and analyse the protection strategies that have been tried so far. The curriculum may include basic principles of child protection, as well as specific UCP protection methods and skills. These methods and skills will be practiced during the training to test their applicability. During or after the training, UCP personnel may support the participants in formulating and implementing specific protection strategies. A follow-up training may be conducted with the same group to reflect on and assess the effectiveness of the implementation process, identify challenges, and further increase the capacity of the participants to overcome these challenges.

UCP training tends to be more effective when it is tailored to the context, needs, and interests of local actors, and when it is participatory in approach. Participants may be uneducated and illiterate, but will have in-depth knowledge about the dynamics of security and violence in their community, though they may not be able to articulate and conceptualize that knowledge at first. By using participatory education techniques, an effective trainer draws out local wisdom from participants and uses this knowledge to explore with the participants the most effective protection strategies for a specific context. She may for example encourage participants to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of existing protection strategies in their own communities before introducing UCP methods. Instead of presenting UCP methods as superior, the trainer then encourages participants to explore how some UCP methods could address existing weaknesses and shows that 'ordinary' people in their own communities or elsewhere have already applied UCP methods in some name or form. The trainer works primarily as a catalyst, helping participants believe in themselves and encouraging them to take an active role in reducing violence and protecting others. Though the trainer introduces skills and methods, he or she draws out skills and experience that already exists within the local context.

UCP training also tends to be more effective when it is part of a wider UCP strategy or mixed with other UCP methods. The case study in Box 4, following, illustrates this point. Though in essence a capacity development activity, a workshop is also a safe space for local actors to meet when it is held within a wider environment of fear and intimidation. Whereas local actors discuss protection strategies inside the workshop, UCP personnel provide a protective presence to the workshop participants. Moreover, it is not just a transfer of skills from international UCP staff to local actors. Local actors design and facilitate their own sessions,

share their experiences, and learn from each other. This clearly increases their confidence, as the following example from Papua, Indonesia shows through the conclusion of the local facilitator as well as the initiatives that were introduced after the workshop.



Box 4 - Case study: Capacity development, confidence building, dialogue and protection complementing and reinforcing each other in Papua

In 2007, Peace Brigades International conducted a workshop together with a local partner in Wamena, Papua, Indonesia, to build the capacity of civil society leaders in conflict transformation. The workshop brought together a number of community leaders as well as a human rights defender, who had barely started his activities in an isolated community with high levels of violence.

During the workshop, unidentified actors showed up trying to disturb the workshop process and intimidate the participants. While some of the PBI volunteers continued with the workshop, others went quickly outside to meet the unidentified actors, engaged with them, and persuaded them to leave.

For some of the participants the workshop was the first time ever they were asked to share their views, to talk freely about conflict, and to learn about nonviolence. For the starting human rights defender it was an opportunity to connect to other local defenders and learn from their experiences—a very active local human rights defender, frequently accompanied by PBI, was invited to the workshop as a guest speaker. One of the local facilitators, who designed his own session about the use of traditional culture in conflict transformation, using PBI's participatory training models, concluded the workshop by saying that the activity had made him realize that the Papuans would not need external actors like PBI to build peace. It was something they were able to do themselves.

While the starting human rights defender established a dialogue forum in his own village soon after the workshop (inviting PBI to attend and provide a protective presence), PBI together with the local partners and workshop participants organized a public event in Wamena town to celebrate the International Day of Peace. A year later, these same actors repeated the event without active engagement of PBI. Local human rights defenders copied the model and launched their own public event to celebrate the International Day of Human Rights.

SOURCE: Peace Brigades International

Training in action

UCP training varies in form, content, and approach, depending on the context, conflict, mandate of the implementing organization, and the personal capacity of individual trainers and facilitators.

Context: Training is most relevant in areas subject to protracted conflict, especially among disempowered and vulnerable communities or emerging civil society groups. In a context of high-intensity violence, UCP teams may invite a target group to a safe location to participate in a training or workshop.

Participants: UCP training participants include, first of all, local actors who are already working for peace and security. Training is an opportunity to further develop their capacity and allow them to exchange ideas, share their expertise, evaluate their work and refine their strategies together in a safer space. Second, participants include actors who are in a position of power and influence. These actors will be in the best position to reach out to more people, and their behaviour and actions may influence the people around them. Third, participants include representatives of vulnerable groups (women, displaced people, minority groups) as well as local service providers. Providing a space for them to share their expertise with one another builds confidence and connections. Developing their capacity may have a direct impact on the vulnerable people with whom they are associated. Fourth, participants include actors who are difficult to reach. This could include representatives of conflicting parties, armed forces, or armed groups.

Content: UCP training topics include conflict analysis, protection, nonviolence, human rights, conflict resolution, sexual and gender-based violence prevention and reduction, child protection, Early Warning/Early Response, and training of trainers.

Research on peace trainings around the world shows that many participants particularly value the exposure to other participants' hands-on experiences as well as concrete examples from other places where they recognize familiar dynamics. Learning what others have done in different situations and cultures helps participants develop new strategies and ideas for their own contexts (Anderson et al., 2003, p.79).

Prominent activists from several countries, when asked about the most useful contribution from the outside to their protracted conflicts, pointed to training conducted by international NGOs many years earlier. They claim these were critical in giving them new ideas, new interactive methodologies for working with people, and fresh energy to undertake efforts.

Anderson, M. et al., 2003, p.77



Recommended reading

- UNICEF. (2012). *Women Taking the Lead in South Sudan*. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/southsudan_65502.html
- Nonviolent Peaceforce. (2013). *Georgian Youth Negotiate Alternatives to Violence*. Brussels, Belgium: Nonviolent Peaceforce.

3.4.2 Local protection infrastructures

What are local protection infrastructures?

Local protection infrastructures are part of local peace infrastructures. Local peace infrastructures must be created or strengthened, making possible ongoing productive peace processes at the local level where ceasefires and peace agreements most commonly break down, leading to a resumption of hostilities and a relapse into violence. While UCP plays its part in this empowerment process, focusing on enhancing the direct physical protection of people under threat (the local protection infrastructure), these peace infrastructures are designed to fulfil the multiple purposes of making, keeping and building peace as a self-sustaining process. When people have sufficient safety, many will engage in more long-term peacebuilding activities and processes. This is in line with the new UN approach to enhancing civilian capacities in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict.

It is increasingly recognized that, though the physical presence of international staff can make a significant difference in the protection ability of UCP practitioners in certain cases, national and local UCP practitioners have successfully protected civilians in many other cases. Generally, however, the combination of international and national staff and organizations works best and produces a synergistic effect that produces an effect greater than the sum of their individual effects.

It is also recognized that communities often already have some self-protection strategies or mechanisms that existed long before UCP organizations established a presence in the area. Revitalizing or establishing local civilian peace infrastructures is the most obvious place for UCP practitioners to start, as well as to finish their work. It is perhaps the purest application of the primacy of local actors and brings together the three key objectives of UCP: it strengthens local peace infrastructures in their ability to prevent or reduce violence and increase the safety and security of civilians.

Local protection infrastructures are understood as self-sustaining mechanisms, resources,

and skills applied by unarmed local actors to prevent or reduce violence and protect civilians. These are processes quite separate from aid or other governance reform initiated by other international organizations. The words local, self-sustaining and infrastructure, are key.

- **Local:** It is carried out, implemented and maintained by local actors.
- **Self-sustaining:** It can continue independent of resources or support from external actors.
- **Infrastructure:** It is not dependent on the personal efforts of one person, but has become part of the structure of the community.

Why are local protection infrastructures important?

Self-sustaining local UCP mechanisms are important for several reasons:

- Local actors know their cultural and social context better than outsiders ever will;
- Local ownership of community development activities highlights the capabilities of local actors and further increases their capacity and confidence;
- Local ownership avoids dependence on foreign aid/assistance;
- External actors will not be present forever. In fact, their presence is dependent on uncertain factors such as funding, visas, etc., but local protection infrastructures are one concrete system they plan to leave behind.

Acknowledging the importance of self-sustaining local structures, in the 2010 Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support recognized the need for peacekeeping operations to understand the capacity of the local population to protect itself when implementing their protection mandates.

How do self-sustaining local protection infrastructures work?

Some form of local capacity or initiative by local actors is a prerequisite for the establishment of local protection infrastructures. In highly disempowered and isolated communities it can be difficult to do this. Without intensive support and coaching, premature establishment of locally driven mechanisms risks further disempowerment. Donors often push humanitarian agencies to establish such mechanisms as soon as possible, and under all circumstances. However, sometimes it is more appropriate to find alternative ways or extend preparatory efforts. UCP may, for example, provide a series of capacity development activities, followed by the inclusion of promising individuals into various UCP activities, before considering the establishment of locally driven mechanisms. In any case, the objective is to stimulate a successful, independent, local infrastructure.

Trust building, participation, empowerment, and capacity development are the main ways to strengthen or build self-sustaining local protection infrastructures.

- **Trust building:** When there is trust, people are willing to engage, share, listen, participate, and learn. Trust is built through authentic presence ('being with' instead of 'being for'), active listening, dialogue, transparency, consistency, respect,

nonpartisanship, cultural sensitivity, kindness, fairness, patience, and persistence, among others.

- **Participation:** When people are participating and their expertise is honoured, they learn by doing, feel included, and develop a sense of ownership.
- **Confidence building:** When people feel and believe in their own power to affect their circumstances, they are confident about their own capacity and capability, and are inspired to make a difference.
- **Capacity development:** When people develop capacity, they increase their knowledge and skills. It increases their ability and confidence to act independently and creatively.

Self-sustaining local protection infrastructures in action

The development of self-sustaining local protection infrastructures usually starts by analysing the ways local people protect themselves when international actors are not present (see Box 5 for a typology of self-protection strategies). These ways may not correspond with the humanitarian principles and values in which UCP is grounded. A particular community in a situation of violent conflict may consider displacement and bribery the most effective protection strategies. An outright dismissal of such strategies may contribute to insecurity in the community.



Box 5 - Overview of self-protection strategies typically used by communities

- Local defense groups and community patrols (e.g., groups of local youth who perform citizen arrests; armed or unarmed local defense groups who patrol to deter or confront perpetrators)
- Popular justice and vengeance (e.g., disorganized or ad hoc acts of violence in retaliation against specific offenders)
- Accompaniment and grouping (e.g., men accompanying their wives to the fields, people traveling together in groups)
- Community security meetings and information sharing (e.g., regular security meetings with local officials to discuss security priorities and plan protection strategies; sharing information on threats within the community; exchanging security information with other communities)
- Denunciation and testifying (e.g., ensuring that specific offenders are brought to the attention of the police; publicly accusing and shaming specific offenders; testifying against perpetrators in a criminal trial)
- Advocacy and protests (e.g., civil society organizations writing and sending reports to political authorities; refusing to open shops in protest against violence)
- Conflict resolution and reconciliation (e.g., dialogue between armed actors and civilians to reduce aggression; mediation of conflicts between civilians)

- Fleeing and resettlement (e.g., fleeing a village during an attack; resettling in another town for the long term; moving from the outskirts to the center of a town)
- Alert system (e.g., blowing whistles to warn of imminent attack)
- Avoidance and hiding (e.g., sleeping outdoors at night; avoiding areas where threats are commonly perpetrated; hiding in the bush during a raid)
- Submission and cooperation (e.g., providing an armed group with food or paying illegal “taxes” so as not to incur violence)
- Prayer and faith (e.g., praying for protection)

SOURCE: Gorur, A. (2013). *Community Self Protection Strategies: How Peacekeepers Can Help or Harm*. p.4

Another challenge in strengthening local self-protection strategies, and especially in transforming strategies into systems, lies in the multiple roles that people in situations of violent conflict may play: as victims, as perpetrators, as witnesses, as enablers, and as protectors. Systems need to be flexible enough to deal with these multiple roles. Moreover, as conflict dynamics change over time, strategies and systems intended to protect may eventually create threats. Non-state armed groups, for example, may originate as a way for community members to combat abuses, but may over time become a significant perpetrator of abuses against civilians (Gorur, 2013, p.4). Without local ownership of self-protection strategies and systems, as well as ongoing monitoring and analysis, UCP practitioners may find themselves responsible for the creation and support of abusive strategies or structures.

There are many shapes and forms of local self-protection efforts including community-based Early Warning systems, protection desks, security manuals, peace villages, and weapon-free zones. The outlook and application of these infrastructures is different from place to place. What works well in one context may not be useful or appropriate in another. Two examples are presented in this section: community security meetings and protection teams.

Community security meetings

In isolated areas of armed conflict, communities often lack information about security issues. Armed clashes in the area or rumours of an imminent attack on the community easily cause panic and displacement. At the same time the protection needs of civilians are many. However, official and informal contact between civilians and protection actors (government, police, military, UN peacekeepers, INGO security officers) is often limited. Under these circumstances UCP teams can organize community security meetings to bring protection actors and the community together in a safe space to exchange information and address concerns. Though these meetings may be initiated by UCP personnel, ownership of the meetings is gradually moved towards local actors.

For civilians, community security meetings can be an opportunity to obtain information about the security situation from various security actors, express security concerns, and find

solutions to issues related to safety and security. For protection actors it is an opportunity to engage in rumour control, increase community awareness of specific issues, and assess the perceptions of the community about security. For UCP practitioners it is also an opportunity to strengthen the relationships between civilians and protection actors, giving civilians the confidence and knowledge necessary to approach the military, police, government officials, and UN peacekeepers when future threats arise. Conversely, such relationships also have the potential to increase duty bearers' impetus to fulfil their responsibilities. Since international UCP personnel will eventually leave, these relationships are in some ways more important than the relationships UCP practitioners have with local actors.

In certain areas UCP teams have organized separate security meetings for women only. Women are often not included when it comes to security matters. And even if they are, they often will not voice specific security concerns (or raise their voice at all). When UCP practitioners in Pibor, South Sudan, began organizing community security meetings, no women attended the first meeting. They met with women leaders from the community to inquire why they did not attend, and she told them that the women's husbands had told their wives to stay at home to watch their children during the community security meeting that was organized. The UCP team asked if they would like separate community security meetings for women. Local women leaders eagerly accepted the offer and 75% of the women from the neighbourhood began attending their own security meetings, along with all of the relevant security actors. The women told the security actors that this first time they had ever had the opportunity to engage with security actors, and they were eager to discuss the specific security concerns that they experienced, such as harassment and sexual violence when they were collecting water at the local borehole. The UN Peacekeepers, in response, began patrolling the borehole. Police encouraged women to report incidents of sexual violence, and assured them that their reports would be kept confidential. The local health provider, was invited to talk about the importance of rape survivors seeking medical treatment in a timely manner, and also provided assurances of confidentiality. Not only did this build the confidence of the women, it also helped to change the attitudes of some of the men as they witnessed that the views and concerns of women were taken seriously by security actors.

Protection teams

Protection teams often start out as a network formed by training participants, especially when this network has been implemented as a result of UCP action plans, created in or after the training. Protection teams are also established as a response to local initiatives to prevent violence. For example, a group of women may have successfully intervened in a community conflict. The success of the intervention has led them to believe there is more they can do to prevent violence and protect vulnerable groups. In another situation rural and isolated local communities' land was on a de facto border, which led to erratic arrests and the need to get family members freed from the 'other side'. In response to a needs assessment, UCP teams worked with local community leaders to develop protection teams to both try to prevent these arrests and to respond quickly and effectively when they did occur.

UCP practitioners can support such protection teams in different ways. They may provide (further) capacity development on protection issues that are of particular relevance to the protection team. They may then connect the team to multiple stakeholders and service providers as well as other protection teams in different areas. UCP practitioners may also

include the protection team in other UCP activities, support the team in its organization and management, coach them in report writing, and introduce them to funding agencies.

The functioning of local protection teams is very similar to the functioning of UCP teams. The protection teams may use the exact same strategies and methods, though most often they focus on one particular protection issue: for example, gender-based violence or child protection. Protection teams often consist of women only. In traditional societies women are often a more constant presence within communities, where men frequently travel for livelihood reasons (for example, as cattle keepers or to larger cities to find employment). Women also experience the impact of violence and insecurity in communities, including in their own homes. Sexual and gender-based violence is often not addressed appropriately by state mechanisms, especially in conflict or post-conflict areas.

The effectiveness of local protection teams is often enhanced when they consist of actors from different parts of society, especially across conflict divides. A protection team consisting of representatives from discriminated groups or conflicting parties can help the team in recognising common humanity and in building relationships across ethnic or group lines. Subsequently, these cooperative relationships can be powerful engines for community and structural change. They build confidence and show the wider community that reconciliation and collaboration are possible.



Summary of key messages

- International field presence strengthens the international response against attacks on civilians by targeting the entire chain of command, revealing responsibilities, and strengthening international commitment.
- UCP practitioners may at times use relationships with armed actors for pressure and coercion, but cooperative and collaborative relationships are more effective over the long term of an intervention. Knowing when to emphasise pressure and when to work for collaboration is complex and depends on careful analysis.
- Protective accompaniment is a preventive, not a defensive, strategy. It uses physical presence and visibility to deter violence. For local actors it means stepping out of the shadows, showing that with the international community on their side, there may be serious consequences for the aggressor if threats are realised.
- Interpositioning owes its effectiveness to the conflicting parties' unwillingness to harm an innocent bystander and to sustained communication by the UCP teams with all of the armed actors. When nonviolent interveners interposition themselves, they are, in effect, saying, 'I am willing to sacrifice myself to protect this human being's life.'
- Monitoring serves as a way to collect and report information about compliance to agreed standards by all parties involved, but it also serves as a method to create confidence, provide a protective presence, and encourage conflict parties to adhere to agreed standards (including armistice arrangements or peace deals).
- Rumour control refers to the verification of (mis-)information about imminent threats. It also includes the timely sharing of factual information with various parties within and across conflict lines in order to prevent escalation of violence and unnecessary displacement.
- Early Warning systems aim to prevent grass-root conflicts, reduce the impact of violence, and manage conflict escalation. Early response action aims to protect civilians from violence as well as to reduce the impact of violence on civilians and to empower them to proactively engage in reducing their exposure to violence.



Summary of key messages

- Effective confidence building is a matter of generating inner strength, rather than changing external conditions or increasing skills. With increased confidence, civilians are more likely to resist abuse or speak out against abuse.
- Multi-Track dialogue includes dialogue on multiple levels with a variety of actors including military commanders, leaders of non-state armed groups, government officials, diplomats, and representatives of IDP communities. Dialogue is used to build a support network, influence actors, understand protection needs, and mitigate conflicts.
- UCP training means working together with people in a dynamic process of discovery, analysis, and skill building so that they feel capable and prepared to solve their problems and increase their own security and the security of vulnerable individuals and groups.
- When UCP is conducted by local people, community members witness the efficacy of nonviolent conflict prevention strategies first-hand. As a result, their conceptualisation of security shifts from one that is necessarily coercive, to one that can be community-based and nonviolent. With this shift, they become less dependent on outsiders for their own wellbeing.



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4

MODULE 4 UNARMED CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN PRACTICE: KEY COMPETENCIES NEEDED WHEN ENTERING THE COMMUNITY

OVERVIEW AND LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Intensive preparation is required before UCP practitioners can provide protective accompaniment, monitor ceasefires, or even enter an area of conflict. Certain conflict situations may not be suitable for UCP, affected communities may not need or want any assistance from UCP agencies, and vulnerable populations may prioritize other needs over protection needs. Even if a specific situation appears to be suitable for UCP, affected communities do request assistance from UCP agencies, and vulnerable populations do prioritize protection needs, UCP agencies cannot just move into an area and start working. They need to recruit and train the right people, thoroughly analyse the conflict, and assess if UCP can effectively address the needs of vulnerable populations.

The module describes the first steps UCP agencies take in preparing to enter and when entering the community. It begins with a description of the core competencies of UCP practitioners, that guide the recruitment, training, and deployment process. It then moves into the issue of conflict analysis, which supports UCP teams in understanding conflict dynamics, and lays the foundation for strategic planning. The section on conflict analysis is followed by a description of different types and stages of conflict. This is an important part of conflict analysis because UCP practitioners tailor their strategies, methods, and applications to the types and stages of a particular conflict. The module concludes with a description of a UCP needs assessment process, the different types of vulnerable populations that UCP agencies most frequently support, and how they address their needs.

At the end of the module, reader will be able to:

- Describe the core competencies of a UCP practitioner
- Explain the required skills of UCP practitioners
- Conduct conflict analysis within the framework of UCP
- Describe how UCP is applied in different types and stages of conflict
- Describe how violent conflict impacts various vulnerable populations
- Conduct needs assessment within the framework of UCP

4.1

CORE COMPETENCIES OF UCP PRACTITIONERS

UCP [practitioners] that rise to the challenge are often those who possess both hard and soft skills, who strike a balance between healthy self-interests and a genuine commitment to serve others, and internalize the methods and principles of UCP. They proactively engage in conflicts between team members, build the confidence of new recruits, and take time to listen to the concerns of the person that cooks their food and washes their clothes. On the other hand, the first UCP [practitioners] to drop out are usually the self-centered adventure seekers as well as those who have come to sacrifice themselves to save the day.

Former staff member of several UCP organizations

It was mentioned at the beginning of Module 1 that UCP is applied by specially trained and organized civilians. Module 1 then presented a number of key skills that these civilians use to apply different methods and principles. This section takes a closer look at the key skills of UCP as well as key knowledge and key personal qualities. These three areas constitute the core competencies of UCP practitioners. They are central to the recruitment and training of UCP practitioners, as well as to the composition of UCP field teams. Individual UCP team members may not possess all of the key skills, knowledge, and personal qualities at the time of their recruitment or even after an initial mission-preparedness training. However, teams are usually composed in such ways that the weakness of one individual in a specific area is compensated by the strength of a fellow team member in that same area.¹



Figure 1: Key competencies

¹ Various UCP theorists and practitioners have also stressed the importance of diversity in age, sex, ethnicity, race, class, nationality, and religion in the composition of UCP field teams. Particular identities may or may not be suitable for a particular violent conflict (Schirch, 2006, pp.53-54).

4.1.1 Key skills

Key skills of UCP include, but are not limited to the following:

- listening
- collecting and managing information
- engaging in dialogue
- facilitating
- negotiating
- analysing conflict and context.

Some projects require specific language skills, so that UCP personnel are able to communicate directly with local actors and beneficiaries, while other projects rely on national staff members or translators.

Listening

UCP practitioners may be skilled in initiating dialogue, but in order to generate acceptance and gain the trust of all parties they must be able to listen actively. Local actors may appear hostile, articulate violent ideas, or present strategies that are at odds with international law. Fellow team members, as well as local and international partner organizations, may have different ideas on how to approach difficult actors or implement programmes. If UCP practitioners are to reduce tensions and create safer space, a more conducive context for local actors to resolve their differences, they must be able to go beyond providing the opportunity for people to say what they want. They must be able to listen to the interests, needs, and fears that lie beneath the spoken words.

Collecting and managing information

Though many UCP practitioners imagine themselves to spend most of their time providing accompaniments to threatened civilians or patrolling unsafe areas, in reality they spend as much time—sometimes more—in managing information. In order to provide effective protection to civilians in the right place, at the right time, they have to gather, process, and share a lot of information. They have to gather information about protection needs, security risks, rumours, potential spoilers, and road conditions, among many other issues. They have to decide what information is reliable and most urgent, what information should be shared, how it should be shared, and with whom it should be shared. They also have to establish or participate in information systems that can store data for necessary analysis, while at the same time maintain security.

Engaging in dialogue

Building relationships with all parties in a situation of violent conflict lies at the core of UCP theory and practice. Therefore, individual UCP practitioners need to be able to engage in

dialogue with a wide variety of actors, including men, women, children, survivors of violence, perpetrators of violence, high-level government officials, military commanders, and grassroots community leaders. They are trained to tailor their communication strategies, messages, and vocabulary to different audiences. A large part of UCP mission preparedness trainings is dedicated to honing dialogue skills, often by exposing newly recruited UCP practitioners to a series of role-plays in which they have to interact with some of the above-mentioned actors.

Facilitating

As nonpartisan third parties that give primacy to local actors, UCP personnel often take on a facilitating role. Whether they provide shuttle diplomacy, create space for local negotiations, build the capacity of local peacemakers, or build relationships among communities and protection actors, they try to make sure that peace and security processes are owned and driven by local actors, even if these actors urge UCP team members to assume a leadership role. At the same time, UCP practitioners need to make sure that the process towards peace and security moves ahead, despite the high levels of mistrust and conflict that may exist between different parties. Therefore they need to be firm and decisive in creating space for the process to unfold, without getting personally involved in the content and decision-making. This is a balancing act that requires strong facilitation skills.

Negotiating

While UCP personnel are not normally part of high-level negotiations, they often find themselves in situations that require negotiations. Civilians that they accompany may be arrested, soldiers at a checkpoint may refuse to let them pass despite official clearance, or government officials may suddenly refuse to give them permission to enter a specific conflict area. Excellent negotiation skills may well result in the release of the arrested civilians, a passage through that checkpoint, or the permission to start operations in that conflict area after all.

Analysing conflict and context

Effective information management requires analysis skills. Most conflict situations are highly complex and dynamic. Ethnicity, economy, geography, class, gender, religion, and lifestyle may all be part of a web of causes and conditions that fuel a particular conflict. Collective or individual traumas (conscious or unconscious) may further complicate the situation. Addressing one issue at the expense of another issue, or not being aware of recent changes, may cause unexpected outcomes and worsen the situation. In order to navigate through this web of conflict dynamics, ongoing and in-depth conflict and context analysis is required. More information about conflict analysis will be provided later in this module. More information on context analysis will be provided in Module 5.

4.1.2 Key knowledge

In order to start working for a UCP implementing agency in a particular context UCP practitioners need to have knowledge about:

- the objectives and key principles of the implementing agency
- UCP values, methods, and skills
- the local context (i.e. conflict, political situation, security situation, history)
- local customs, religious and cultural practices
- roles of various actors in the protection of civilians
- security protocols of the implementing agency
- conflict and context analysis theory or tools
- key sources of guidance (e.g., International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law)
- key lessons from the field.

4.1.3 Key personal qualities

UCP work has an important personal dimension. Despite intensive preparation, UCP practitioners may be confronted with difficult situations, which can be demanding in a personal way. UCP is not the sort of job that one leaves behind at the end of the day or at the weekend. UCP personnel need to be alert and prepared at all times to respond to emergency situations. Their behaviour will be closely watched by those who live and work in the local communities where they serve, and in some cases by a broader national or international community. Skills and knowledge are often rated higher than personal qualities, but within the context of UCP, it is often the personal qualities that make a practitioner most effective. Though they are more difficult to acquire than knowledge and skills, these qualities can be trained and developed.

Key personal qualities include:

- resilience
- intercultural competence
- proactive, taking initiative
- resourceful
- courage
- empathy
- creativity
- humility
- discipline
- flexibility
- maturity
- equanimity.

In this section, four personal qualities are described in more detail: resilience, intercultural competence, courage, and empathy.

Resilience²

UCP requires a lot of resilience, elasticity, and quick recovery from adversity both physical and emotional. Individual UCP practitioners often mentally prepare themselves to face violence and destruction, but in reality mundane obstacles tend to be the biggest challenge. Away from home and their usual comforts, they often live and work together with fellow UCP team members from different cultures in isolated areas, twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week. They often bring various approaches to work and understandings of gender roles. In rural areas UCP personnel may even live in tents or other minimal accommodations with little space for privacy. Curfew may apply in areas of insecurity. Visitors may appear at the most irregular times, making a range of requests that UCP teams are not able to address. Well-designed action plans may have to be abandoned as current developments abruptly change priorities. Sudden crisis situations may require UCP personnel to work day and night for days on end. The opposite situation is equally possible: an area that has been subjected to extreme violence all of a sudden remains calm and stable for a very long time. This can lead UCP practitioners to question the purpose of their on-going presence.

Though for many UCP practitioners their time in the field is the experience of a lifetime, it always takes deep resilience to face the above-mentioned circumstances and to maintain morale, equanimity, and motivation. Individual UCP practitioners have different techniques for maintaining morale and building resilience. They may:

- ensure rest and relaxation as well as regular exercise
- re-establish focus on key priorities: violence prevention and protection of threatened civilians
- remind themselves of the reasons they joined UCP
- celebrate successes, even when to others they may seem insignificant
- maintain a spiritual practice such as prayer or meditation
- obtain trauma counselling
- ask for help
- forgive oneself and others often
- build team relations and maintain communication (share concerns)
- make use of individual talents and skills within a team: synergize energies.

Intercultural competence

Intercultural competence is a set of cognitive, affective, and behavioural skills and characteristics that support effective and appropriate interactions in a variety of cultural contexts (Bennett, 2008). It enables people to perform their duties outside their own national, as well as organizational culture, no matter what their educational or ethnic background, or

² See UNITAR e-learning course *Confronting Stress and Trauma: A Resource Kit for Personnel Dealing with Violent Conflicts and Natural Disasters* (2017), <http://www.unitar.org/ptp/>.

what functional area their job description represents, or what organization they come from.

In the context of UCP, intercultural competence is important because the effectiveness of UCP depends on acceptance by local actors. UCP strategies and methods may be appropriate to the context, but if the behaviour of individual UCP practitioners is inappropriate, local actors may be reluctant to accept UCP. Recurring issues include sexual relations with local people or public displays of intimate connection between staff; wearing revealing or locally inappropriate clothes; display of luxury lifestyles; and use of gestures, gender roles, language, or actions that offend religious or cultural beliefs and practices. In some cases inappropriate behaviour of individual UCP team members is simply unprofessional or mildly offensive. It may not have any severe negative consequences. In other cases however, culturally inappropriate behaviour has the potential to endanger the individual UCP, fellow team members, or even local actors. Intercultural competence is also critical within the UCP team itself. Often UCP team members coming from a variety of cultures find themselves working closely together in unfamiliar environs, relying on second or third languages and under great stress. This can lead to misunderstanding and conflict over matters such as differing views on gender roles.

Intercultural competence is not about right and wrong behaviour. It is not just about what not to do. It is the ability to know (or be able to ask questions at appropriate times), what is considered appropriate in a specific context, and then act upon it. UCP practitioners are expected to make an effort to ensure the appropriateness of their behaviour for the sake of the civilians they are trying to protect. This could mean that they have to refrain from certain behaviour that is considered appropriate in their own culture. This does not mean giving up who they are, but rather growing or expanding their capacities. The display of cultural differences is also an opportunity for local actors to learn and to exercise tolerance, but UCP practitioners should generally respect local customs to the extent that they do not contradict the core objectives of preventing violence and increasing security (see dilemmas in Module 5 for more on this).

Intercultural competence is more than learning the do's and don'ts. It also includes less obvious differences, for example, differences in decision-making styles or communication styles. Of specific relevance to UCP situations are values such as dealing with authority:

- Acknowledging the authority of others, and recognizing that authority may come from sources that you yourself may not consider legitimate (e.g., the elders of the community, or faith healers);
- Showing submissiveness when necessary, and knowing how to reconcile yourself to that;
- Assuming an authoritative role even though your personal preferred leadership style is participatory or even that of consensus. In fact, different leadership styles must be pragmatically adopted, depending on many circumstances.

Specific intercultural skills include:

- suspending assumptions and value judgments
- enhancing perception skills
- practicing cultural humility
- increasing tolerance for ambiguity
- listening

- recognizing multiple perspectives
- developing multiple interpretations
- learning to use multiple communication styles
- meeting people where they are, rather than expecting them to meet you in your ways of doing things.

Courage

Courage is the ability and willingness to confront fear, pain, danger, uncertainty, or intimidation. It is not the absence of fear, but rather the judgment that something else is more important than fear. Physical courage is courage in the face of physical pain, hardship, or death. Moral courage, on the other hand, is the ability to act rightly in the face of popular opposition, shame, scandal, personal impulse, discouragement, or exhaustion. Moral courage expresses itself in values-driven action, moving in alignment with our highest humanitarian aspirations and our deepest sense of who we want to be. Physical courage and moral courage are both characteristics needed in UCP, though moral courage is most important.

UCP practitioners may find themselves in situations that are frightening, though not as frequently as people often imagine. Assaults, intimidation, and attacks on UCP personnel have happened, but serious incidents have been rare. UCP teams continually make risk assessments to prevent situations of sudden danger. And UCP personnel will be evacuated from the area if risks are deemed too high. Of course, unexpected things may occur and therefore UCP practitioners have to be prepared to face their fears. Though fear is not a pleasant sensation, it is a natural and essential survival response. Fear can be debilitating, but it can be managed in the same way that stress is managed. At the same time, courage can be developed with practice.

One way to develop courage is to believe that, by acting, you can have a positive impact. For many people, the most powerful courage enabler is the recognition of what is truly at stake. Another way to develop courage is to know that inaction is untenable. By believing that the alternative is unbearable, people find the courage to act in desperate conditions and against overwhelming odds. Courage is something that people need to learn before they can be courageous. At the same time, people learn to be courageous by doing courageous acts. Practice for most UCP practitioners starts with role-playing dangerous situations in pre-deployment trainings. This kind of simulation may not be an accurate representation of reality, but it is as close as it can get. Moreover, it gives people a safe space to experiment with different responses to dangerous situations.

When fear overwhelms courage, there are ways to manage fears. Here are some techniques.

- **Breathing:** focus on the breath, slowing down the breath, counting the breath.
- **Communication:** eye contact, reassuring others, humour, sharing the fact that you are scared.
- **Touch:** clapping your own or someone else's hands, holding an object.
- **Grounding:** touching the ground or earth, holding onto a tree, a leaf, something alive or natural.
- **Body:** washing your face, quick body shake, vigorous exercise, a quick run, stretching.
- **Visualization:** closing eyes and visualizing an image of a safe place.

- **Voice:** humming or singing a song softly.
- **Prayer:** connecting to a higher power.
- **Meditation:** meditation, calming and centring techniques (Pt'chang Nonviolent Community Safety Group Inc., 2005).

In a genuine relationship, there is an outward flow of open, alert attention toward the other person in which there is no wanting whatsoever. That alert attention is presence. It is the prerequisite of any authentic relationship.

Eckhart Tolle, 2005, p.84

Empathy

The core of empathy is to understand another's feelings and the source of those feelings. Empathy involves verifying that he or she has understood correctly. As the opposite of apathy or indifference, empathy emphasizes the ability to identify oneself with the suffering or the happiness of others and respond to the emotions of others, especially to alleviate their distress. Four steps can be identified in the process of expressing empathy: taking perspective, staying out of judgment, recognizing other people's emotions, and communicating our understanding of other people's emotions (Wiseman, 1996). Like courage, empathy can be developed.

Empathy is a very important characteristic of UCP. The entire UCP system is in some way built around developing positive relationships with multiple actors for multiple purposes. In dealing with survivors of violence or natural disasters there is a natural impulse to make things better, to say or do the right thing. However, rarely can a response make something better. What makes things better is a sense of connection between UCP personnel and those they work with (Brown, n.d.). This requires empathy or true presence—not merely physical presence, but presence of body, mind and spirit. Through connection, survivors of violence will feel understood and listened to, and as a result they will be more likely to share their stories.

Empathy should not be limited to victims and the oppressed. It should be used in all interactions, including or perhaps especially in the interactions with actors who are more difficult to reach. An army commander who does not seem to have a lot of empathy for UCP methods may be more open to engage if UCP practitioners make an effort to imagine themselves in his situation. They may try to let him know that they understand the concerns he may have over the safety of UCP teams in an area under his command. Sometimes a simple question about a photo of a child on a commander's desk will do more to build a working relationship than a concise list of programme outcomes will.

When UCP practitioners act in empathic ways, it can make a big difference in interactions with perpetrators of violence. To use the words of Pablo Casals: "Each person has inside a basic decency and goodness. If he listens to it and acts on it, he is giving a great deal of what it is the world needs most. It is not complicated but it takes courage. It takes courage for a person to listen to his own goodness and act on it." When UCP practitioners build relationships with perpetrators, they need to step into their shoes and listen for the pain, frustration and fear that may lie behind the apparent indifference or hatred, even if they disagree with the behaviour; then there is a real chance that violence can be prevented. Many perpetrators have been

abused, traumatized, and abandoned, and are stuck, often not seeing other options than to repeat the pattern of abuse. Empathy may not be what they expect, but it may be what they need most. It has the power to disarm an aggressor. Change may not happen immediately, and it may not happen in every instance, but when it does, there is nothing more powerful.

4.2

CONFLICT ANALYSIS

The UCP programming cycle usually begins with conflict analysis. A UCP implementing agency may have received requests or recommendations to establish a presence in a specific conflict situation, but if initial conflict analysis indicates that the application of UCP in that situation is likely to be ineffective, inappropriate, or not feasible, the requests may have to be turned down. The UCP agency may be able to support the requesting actors in different ways, without establishing a presence, or refer the request to other actors that may be in a better position to respond. In situations where UCP agencies are in a good position to respond, they must first understand the people involved in the conflict, their positions, attitudes, and behaviours, in order to formulate appropriate protection strategies.

UCP practitioners are particularly keen to understand the role of violence in any conflict. After all, their main objectives are to prevent or reduce violence and to protect civilians from violence. UCP itself is not focused on transforming conflict, but contributes to a safer environment in which local people can work to transform their contexts.

The difference between conflict and violence is important. Conflict refers to the tensions between people over specific needs or wants they try to fulfil. It is the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving their respective goals (Galtung, 2003, p.3). Conflict is a part of life and cannot be avoided. Violence on the other hand, is a particular response to conflict and can be avoided. It is the behaviour that involves the use of force intended to dominate, hurt, damage, or kill someone or something.

Violence can be physical, sexual, psychological, or emotional. These types of violence are usually called direct violence. This is violence inflicted directly on one person by another. Violence can also be indirect, such as cultural violence or structural violence. These structures harm people and prevent them from meeting their basic needs. The dehumanization of a community of people by attacking their way of life is a form of cultural violence. Structural violence refers to violence that is built into social, political, or economic structures. Unjust or violent structures are often an underlying cause for secondary violence (e.g., oppressed minority groups may resort to physical violence as a response to unequal access to economic resources). UCP practitioners mostly focus on preventing or protecting civilians from direct violence, though they may support or protect civilians that are working to address cultural or structural violence.

Violence is one particular response to conflict and it involves choice. It can be prevented,

reduced, or stopped. Conflict, on the other hand, is inevitable, and while it cannot be eliminated, it can be resolved or transformed so that it does not lead to violence. “‘Conflict prevention’, to prevent conflicts, is meaningless. But ‘violence prevention’, to prevent violence, is extremely meaningful and beneficial.” (Galtung 2004, p.3) Conflict can even be used as an opportunity for positive change. This is exactly what peacebuilders aim for. They try to find solutions to a conflict that transcend the differences between the conflicting parties and promote reconciliation. Peacekeepers and UCP practitioners, on the other hand, aim to stop violence and support stability sufficient to allow peacebuilding to occur. They help to create a platform from which peacebuilders can address the root causes of a conflict. Whereas peacebuilders aim to realize the best possible future, peacekeepers and UCP practitioners aim to prevent worst-case scenarios. It is with this objective in mind that they conduct conflict analysis.

What is conflict analysis?

Conflict analysis refers to the detailed examination of the elements, structures, and dynamics of a conflict. It facilitates understanding of a particular conflict, in order to prevent violence and protect civilians.

How does conflict analysis work?

In order to prevent violence, it is first necessary to understand who commits acts of violence and why. The same understanding is required in order to strengthen the safety and security of civilians and to strengthen local peace infrastructures. In order to achieve these objectives, UCP practitioners must know what local security mechanisms and peace infrastructures are already in place and if and why they are not working effectively. Conflict analysis is best carried out in close collaboration with local groups. The purpose of conflict analysis is not to come up with the most authoritative overall analysis, but to deepen understanding of the conflict for the sake of providing protection. Misinterpretation of the conflict may not only lead to ineffective or inappropriate programming, but also risks endangering UCP personnel and local actors. Because conflicts are not static, conflict analysis is repeated periodically to ensure that programming is in line with changing developments and dynamics.

Protracted conflicts are often complex, and the motivations of involved actors vary considerably. Some actors may have good intentions, but their presence, affiliation, or behaviour has a negative impact on the conflict dynamics. Other actors overtly support peace, but secretly work to prolong the conflict, using other parties to carry out acts of violence. Some actors benefit from the conflict and are deeply invested in its continuation. Others perceive that they can only achieve their desired outcomes through violent conflict. In order to influence the key actors up and down the chain of command, UCP practitioners must know (as best they can) the overt and hidden alliances, vulnerability points, and affiliations of different actors in the conflict. To understand the complexity and subtleties of these dynamics, conflict analysis needs to be undertaken from different perspectives.

Conflict analysis should take into consideration a number of different factors.

- **Culture:** a cultural analysis of conflict considers traditional modes of conflict resolution

and how the use of customs, language, symbols, and local beliefs influences the conflict.

- **Religion:** analysis of how the application of religious beliefs fuels the conflict and/or contributes to reconciliation and peace.
- **Social relationships:** analysis of social relationships looks at the forms and patterns of relationships. This includes the relationships between the actual conflicting parties as well as their relationships with allies, neutral parties, followers, communities, families, provocateurs, and victims.
- **History:** a historical analysis identifies how events from the past and remembrances of those events underlie a conflict situation, and reveals their contribution to the conflict situation.
- **Economics:** an economic analysis addresses the aspects of access, control, distribution, and management of economic resources that play an important role in the conflict.
- **Politics:** a political analysis is used to identify the patterns of power relationships that exist within and between the communities in conflict. It describes aspects of political life in relation to authority, decision-making processes, and the use of or role of the media.
- **Gender:** a gender analysis considers the existing hierarchical relationships and differentiated roles in a community, based on perceived sexual identity (e.g., structures of patriarchal culture, gender-based task divisions, and different points of view on and experiences of conflict between men and women) as well as the different impacts of the conflict based on these relationships and roles.
- **Geography:** a geographical analysis addresses the roles that the natural environment and its meanings and uses play in a conflict (proximity to mountains and water, desertification, seasons, natural resources, land ownership, and land status).
- **Demography:** a demographic analysis explores how size, structure, and distribution of populations are affected by or affect conflict (e.g., relative size and distribution of ethnic communities in a region, migration patterns of people as a result of displacement).

While this multidisciplinary approach provides many perspectives from which to analyse the context of a conflict, other methods achieve results through a more focused investigation. For example, one can examine the attitudes and behaviour of specific groups, or link cross-cutting issues (e.g., the interplay of economic, cultural, and political factors in the emergence of a particular rebel group). The Do No Harm method focuses on connectors (local capacities for peace) and dividers (sources of tension) and is particularly relevant for UCP (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, n.d.).³ This method begins by assessing several elements that play a role in a conflict: systems and institutions; attitudes and actions; values and interests; symbols and occasions; and the experiences of conflicting parties. It then determines for each conflict the elements that connect communities to each other as well as the elements that divide them apart. Since UCP aims to prevent violence and, at the same time, to strengthen local peace infrastructures, this type of analysis is particularly helpful because the dividers it identifies often constitute a threat to be reduced and the connectors are a means to strengthen local peace infrastructures.

³

The Do No Harm Method was developed by the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA).

Conflict analysis in action

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, conflict analysis is usually conducted at the beginning of the UCP programming cycle, before entry, to assess the appropriateness and feasibility of UCP in a specific conflict situation. However, conflict analysis is also conducted regularly after entry. UCP personnel on the ground are in direct contact with conflicting parties and will have access to additional information, which allows them to strengthen their initial pre-entry analysis. Moreover, as conflict dynamics continuously change, regular conflict analysis supports UCP practitioners in assessing whether their strategies and activities are still relevant and appropriate.

Whatever approach is used for conflict analysis, asking the right questions to the right people is key. Box 1 provides an overview of key questions that can be used for conflict analysis. These questions follow a basic linear approach to conflict analysis—while recognizing that conflicts themselves are not a linear process—that starts with the facts relating to the surface layer of events. The following step concentrates on the various actors involved in the conflict, their motivations, and their intentions. The third step takes a closer look at the aims and purposes in the conflict, and the final step explores the causes and the dynamics of conflict.

Conflict analysis is ideally undertaken through an inclusive process involving a broad array of community members (women, religious leaders, youth, etc.). This ensures that different perspectives on the conflict are taken into account, especially the perspectives of women and minority groups. Conflict analysis can be undertaken through conflict mapping exercises, interviews, storytelling, or focus group discussions. In many cases this turns out to be a win-win situation for UCP practitioners and local actors involved in the process. Whereas local actors have in-depth knowledge about the conflict, they often do not have the skills or methods to articulate or conceptualize their knowledge. Moreover, in certain conflict areas there are few spaces safe enough for local actors to come together and talk about conflict and violence. Mapping, drawing or other visual representations of the conflict analysis tend to be particularly effective.



Box 1 - Questions for conflict analysis

Facts or the surface layer of events:

- When did violence break out? Between whom? What triggered it?
- What have been the subsequent political and military events?
- How has the conflict shifted geographically?
- Are there people displaced? From what groups? Areas? How many? Where are they?
- Have there been cessations of hostilities, ceasefires or peace talks? Who participated, who was absent, who organized them?
- Are there more parties to the conflict now than in the beginning? Why? Who are they?
- Are civilians being targeted?
- Are certain groups disproportionately incurring casualties?
- What role have international actors played in the history of the conflict?
- What role, if any, does the media play in the conflict?

Actors involved in a conflict:

- What are the relationships between the different parties in the conflict?
- How do the different parties portray each other? How do they define themselves?
- What internal opposition is there to the violence? How is it working?
- What traditional methods of conflict resolution exist? How are they working?
- Which international actors are visibly or discreetly involved in the conflict?
- What is the internal structure of the respective warring parties?
- What do warring parties claim is their power base? What is their real power base?
- How are they funded?
- Are children being forced to fight?
- Where do they get their weapons?
- How do warring parties portray groups opposed to violence and international interveners?

Aims and purposes in a conflict:

- Why do the warring parties say they have to fight? What are their claims?
- Who supports the warring parties?
- What resources are fuelling the conflict?
- What are the stated claims and purposes of the civil opposition to the violence?
- What are the stated claims and purposes of the outside interveners in a conflict?
- What humanitarian pretensions do the warring parties claim?
- How credible do you and others find the stated claims and purposes?

Causes and the dynamics of conflict:

- What are the older, historical and deep structural factors that have contributed to the conflict?
- What are the major factors that contributed to historical tensions leading to violence?
- What is the current dynamic of conflict, why does the conflict appear to continue?
- Is the conflict currently in a phase where it is susceptible to influence or not?
- What may be the stabilizing points in the situation?

Challenges for conflict analysis

Though precise conflict analysis will in most cases lead to the identification of appropriate steps to undertake, there are certain challenges:

- Conflicts are dynamic processes. Analyses need to be done again and again, which takes time.
- Conflicts can be unpredictable. Effective conflict analysis may create the false impression that everything is understood, which in turn may weaken alertness.
- Pure objectivity is impossible, and personal biases may be hard to detect. Moreover, UCP practitioners do not always have equal access to all conflicting parties.
- Some cultures encourage analytical thinking more than others. Lack of analytical thinking does not mean lack of capability.
- There are always different ways to approach organizing an analysis, which can be confusing, as these may lead to different conclusion.
- Undertaking analysis without pre-determined objectives can hinder the process, as there are no clear demarcations of what constitutes success and failure.

4.3

TYPES OF CONFLICT AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR UCP

One reason for the existence of various conflict analysis approaches and models is that there are many different types of conflicts. The type of conflict has serious implications for UCP programming. In a situation where armed groups specifically target internationals, protective accompaniment is in most cases not an effective or appropriate method to increase the safety and security of civilians. In fact, public affiliation with internationals may make civilians a target in such a situation. In less extreme situations UCP methods may simply need to be modified to fit a particular conflict situation.

UCP has been conducted in situations of horizontal and vertical conflicts (see 4.3.1), inter-state and intra-state conflicts, as well as conflicts over natural resources, political power, ethnic identity, self-determination and territory. Most of the violent conflicts nowadays take place within the borders of a state (intra-state) and are fought over issues like identity, territory, power, or natural resources. At the same time, many of these intra-state conflicts are highly internationalized. The current (as of this writing) conflict in Syria is a case in point; Russia, Iran, USA, the EU, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel as well as non-state actors like Hezbollah, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), and al-Qaeda are all taking active roles.

The following sections provide some examples of different types of conflict and their relevance for UCP programming.

4.3.1 Vertical and horizontal conflict

Vertical conflict

UCP has been predominantly used in situations of vertical conflict, where UCP practitioners have protected civilians caught in conflicts between the state and non-state combatants. A prominent example is the armed conflict between the government of Guatemala and various leftist rebel groups, mainly supported by Mayan indigenous people and Ladino peasants. In this situation the UCP organizations involved were Witness for Peace, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Peace Brigades International (PBI), and the Guatemala Accompaniment

Project. In the armed conflict between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, both PBI and Nonviolent Peaceforce were involved. The latter was also engaged in the conflict between Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Building international networks, providing proactive engagement, providing protective accompaniment, Early Warning/Early Response, confidence building, and using multi-track dialogue are typical UCP strategies and methods used in situations of vertical conflict.

UCP has been more frequently undertaken in conflicts that are primarily vertical because most state actors care about their reputation. As state actors have the responsibility to protect civilians, they may be particularly responsive to concerns raised by UCP teams. Though the presence of both international and national observers limits the space of state actors to use excessive force, allowing their presence may also improve their reputation both domestically and internationally. It shows the world that they have nothing to hide.

Many non-state armed actors who are politically motivated and challenge or aim to replace their government also care about their reputation. As a Colombian human rights lawyer accompanied by PBI mentioned, “The paramilitaries respect international presence ... they are trying to institutionalise themselves legally. The collaboration with the state is very clear ... The paramilitaries are steadily occupying government positions, and this makes the situation more delicate for them” (Conflict Research Consortium, 1998b). In some situations, however, the repercussions for state or non-state actors will not affect the perception of their legitimacy, their reputation, or cause them to lose support in some important way. For these reasons and others, reputation is not always a sensitive pressure point. UCP then becomes increasingly challenging, though not impossible.

Horizontal conflict

Horizontal conflicts refer to conflicts between non-state actors. This includes tribal conflicts, conflicts between religious or ethnic groups, and conflicts between indigenous communities and multinationals. An example of UCP in a horizontal conflict is the work of NP in the midst of tribal violence in Jonglei, South Sudan (see case study in Box 1 of Module 3). Providing UCP in a situation of horizontal conflict often implies a shift of methods. Conflict mitigation, building relationships at the grassroots level, rumour control, and EWER tend to become more prominent in these situations than building international networks, conducting systemic nonviolent advocacy, and providing protective accompaniment.

Foreign observers may not easily deter religious or ethnic groups in violent conflict with each other. Moreover, these conflicts are predominantly played out at the grassroots level, and large numbers of civilians are actively and openly involved. This implies a different strategy for violence prevention. Providing shuttle diplomacy or conflict mitigation between the two communities is usually a key method for preventing violence in such conflicts. If the state is party to the conflict, however, even these methods may need to be scaled back or applied in a less prominent way, because state actors may view the participation of UCP organizations in conflict mitigation or shuttle diplomacy as interference in internal affairs.

Although, in theory, horizontal and vertical conflicts appear to be two distinct types of conflict, in reality they are not. Most vertical conflicts have horizontal components and vice versa.

Ethnic conflicts may be instigated by state actors to legitimize increased military presence in a specific area or create distractions around sensitive political decisions; mining companies locked in conflict with indigenous communities may be supported and protected by national security forces; clans fighting each other at the grassroots level may receive financial support from political elites in return for votes or land rights; conflicts between national governments and freedom fighters may create tensions between ethnic groups; and peace agreements may create conflict within armed groups and between the constituencies of different factions over political influence, development aid, and even peace support efforts. For example in Mindanao, there are 'rido', which are local conflicts between clans or groups of extended family and their allies. These rido are related to the vertical conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippines government, though on the surface they may appear simply horizontal, with only local implications. This reality underscores the importance of careful and continual conflict analysis. UCP practitioners must be flexible and adept at using all of the methods available to them as they engage with a particular conflict situation.

4.3.2 Power, identity and natural resources

Issues of power and identity are complex and the following sections are a brief mention of aspects of these concepts specifically related to UCP conflict analysis and work. Most horizontal and vertical conflicts are fuelled by the struggle for power, identity, and/or natural resources. Just as conflicts are rarely purely horizontal or purely vertical, they are rarely only about one issue. The conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government (1976 – 2005), for example, appeared to be a conflict about self-determination. However, the existence of large amounts of oil and gas, the economic and political power linked to these resources, as well as the identity of the Acehnese people played important roles in the conflict. Another example would be Autessere's (2012) work in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which describes the complex interrelationship of factors that contribute to the ongoing conflicts there. Her work contradicts the mainstream explanation that the conflicts are primarily over resources. Many similar examples could be cited, including the well-known case of the so-called blood diamonds.

For UCP practitioners to prevent violence and increase the safety and security of civilians, it is crucial that the different aspects of a conflict and their interaction are understood. Many conflicts that appear to be about ethnic or religious identity have deeper/other roots related to political power, social justice, and equal access to natural resources. In order to be most effective, UCP interventions must take into account these root causes.

Power

Most conflicts are about power in one way or another, usually about political and economic power. Power is the ability to get what you want or, as scholar Kenneth Boulding put it, "the ability to change the future" (Conflict Research Consortium, 1998b). Significant power inequities

become occasions for the abuse of power. Over time, these inequities are destructive to people and relationships.

There are different forms of power. One way to categorize these forms is as visible, hidden, and invisible power (Gaventa, 2006). **Visible power** includes formal rules, structures, authorities, institutions, and procedures of decision-making; **hidden power** relates to influential people and institutions maintaining their influence and determining the agenda; and **invisible power** involves the shaping of psychological and ideological boundaries of participation. One example of this invisible power is the profound influence that traumas (suffered by all conflict parties, including their leadership) have on a negotiator's ability to represent the best interests of their respective sides during peace negotiations. Unless they have had the opportunity for trauma therapy, their emotions may be too easily reactivated based on the years of animosities, and be limited in their mental and emotional bandwidth by anger, jealousy, fear, paranoia and sorrow—psychological states that may not serve them, or their peoples, well. Defensiveness and indoctrination may have the same negative effect. Understanding how the different forms of power are at work in conflicts creates opportunities for UCP practitioners to influence the right decision makers and strengthen the right peace infrastructures.

Identity

Identity is a prominent factor in conflicts worldwide but is often used intentionally or unintentionally to obscure other root causes. Identity issues include religion, ethnicity, gender, nationality, and culture. Conflicts over identity occur when a specific group feels that their sense of self or distinctiveness is threatened or denied legitimacy. This sense of self is fundamental to their interpretation of the world, as well as to the self-esteem of the group. A threat to the identity of the group is likely to produce a strong response. Typically, this response is both aggressive and defensive, and can escalate quickly into an intractable conflict. Identity plays a role in many religious and ethnic conflicts. It is also a key issue in many gender and family conflicts, when men and women disagree on the proper role or 'place' of the other (Conflict Research Consortium, 1998a). National identity or the lack thereof plays an important role in many of today's struggles for independence. Many of these struggles are the result of colonial boundaries that forced a national identity upon groups that didn't share a sense of self.

Identity can be divisive and a source of tension, but it can also bring people together. Ethnic identity may divide two groups and lead to conflict, but their shared religious identity or economic interests may unite them. UCP interventions can address the tensions and make use of the connecting opportunities, as they work to prevent or reduce violence.

Natural resources

Natural resources (e.g., oil, water, gas, timber, rubber, coltan, diamonds) are increasingly the subject of competition and conflict. In many places local communities have been forced to leave their ancestral lands or witness degradation of the environment due to large-scale operations by multinational corporations. These multinationals often operate with the support of the national government, as well as other governments. Sometimes security forces are used to forcibly relocate local people off their land, as well as protect employees and assets of these multinationals. Conversely, some non-state armed groups may draw financial strength

from controlling certain natural resources.

For UCP teams, the involvement of multinational corporations poses new challenges. An international mining company responsible for environmental damage and displacement of indigenous people may not be deterred by international presence at the grassroots level. However, their operations are based on the consent of the national government, and multinationals almost certainly care about their reputation among consumers in global markets. Moreover, their managers may be part of the small international community in the area. This gives UCP practitioners the necessary entry points to act. They need to be aware of the multinational corporate sector and its contributions to conflicts.

4.4

STAGES OF CONFLICT

I conclude ... that—as with many instruments that can help make the difference between war and peace—an unarmed civilian presence can sometimes be useful in different phases: in a conflict prevention mode; during the mediation of active conflict, when popular voices of moderation risk being extinguished by the forces of violence; and in the post-conflict phase, in support of the implementation of peace agreements and the consolidation of peace.

Christopher Coleman, Director of Civilian Capacities Project at the UN, (Coleman 2012, p.15)

Complex as conflicts may be, they generally pass through well-recognized stages. Recognizing these stages can help UCP practitioners at the field level to understand better the conflict dynamics and developments, and to formulate appropriate scenarios and timely responses. Stages of conflict include latent conflict, confrontation, crisis, outcome, and post crisis (simplified diagram, Figure 1, below based on: Galtung 2000, p.2). Though most conflicts go through these different stages, they often jump back and forth as unresolved issues may lead to additional confrontations and crises. Additionally, conflict may manifest differently in specific local areas, so that nearby communities appear to be in different stages at the same time. So although the figure below appears linear, conflicts are frequently circular, as root causes are often not sufficiently addressed.




Figure 1: Stages of conflict

Latent conflict

Latent conflict is the stage when there is an incompatibility of goals between two or more parties, which could lead to open conflict. The conflict is hidden from general view, although one or more of the parties are likely to be aware of the potential for confrontation. There may be tension in the relationships between the parties and/or a desire to avoid contact with each other at this stage (Fisher, 2000).

As UCP is ideally applied in a preventive capacity, the early stages of a conflict are particularly important. A wide variety of methods can be used. Latent conflict is the ideal place to establish EWER systems together with communities, and to build relationships and engage in dialogue, especially in a situation with recurring cycles of violence. It is also a good time for capacity development. Though tensions are relatively low, local actors are often aware that there is a potential for conflict and are willing to explore options for early response.

Confrontation

At the stage of confrontation, the conflict has become more open. If only one side feels there is a problem, its supporters may begin to engage in demonstrations or other confrontational behaviour. Occasional fighting or other low levels of violence may break out between sides. Each side may be gathering its resources and perhaps finding allies, in the expectation of increasing confrontation and violence. Relationships between the two sides become strained, leading to polarization between the supporters of each side (Fisher, 2000).

At this stage UCP teams may intensify their monitoring and may engage in rumour control to de-escalate tensions. Intensified efforts of UCP personnel are often a direct result of intensified efforts undertaken by local actors to protect human rights or resolve conflicts. UCP practitioners may be needed to create safer spaces for dialogue to take place and to provide protective accompaniment to local conflict negotiators and at demonstrations.

Furthermore, UCP teams may engage with government officials, security forces, and UN peacekeepers to ensure the protection of vulnerable communities in case violence occurs. Finally, they may use their relationships to negotiate and facilitate mutual commitment from aggressing parties to not attack specific places (e.g., hospitals, schools) or people (e.g., civilians, women, children, foreigners).

Crisis

The crisis is the peak of the conflict, when direct physical violence is most intense. In a large-scale conflict, this is the time when people on all sides are being killed. Normal communication between the sides has probably ceased. Public statements tend to be in the form of accusations made against the other side(s) (Fisher, 2000). There may be mini-cycles within a longer overarching cycle of conflict that leads to a return to crisis stages periodically within the larger cycle.

In crisis situations UCP practitioners may use protective presence, accompaniment, and

interpositioning to stop violence and provide protection to vulnerable groups. If they are not able to provide sufficient direct protection, they may use advocacy and multi-track dialogue to encourage other actors to stop violence or provide protection. In Mindanao, for example, UCP personnel, together with a large number of civil society organizations, on one occasion managed to negotiate a temporary ceasefire or a human corridor. Because of the close relationships built up over a long period of time, the leadership of both parties agreed to hold their fire for a short while, just long enough to evacuate a number of vulnerable civilians.

Though UCP teams may try to stay as long as possible in crisis areas to protect civilians, there are high-intensity crisis situations in which they have to evacuate from the area. When UCP practitioners are no longer able to protect themselves, they cannot protect others. UCP security protocols (see Module 5 for more) identify good relationships and mutual protection between UCP teams and local people as essential for security. This allows UCP personnel often to be the last international civilian actors to evacuate a crisis area. Moreover, they will return to the area as soon as possible. While there have been instances where UCP organizations have had to evacuate from a particular site, in most cases they have been able to return.

Outcome

One way or another, direct physical violence subsides and the crisis leads to outcomes of various sorts. One side may defeat the other(s), or perhaps call a ceasefire. One party may surrender or give in to the demands of the other party. The parties may agree to negotiations, either with or without the help of a mediator. An authority or other more powerful party may impose an end to the fighting. In any case, at this stage the levels of tension, confrontation and violence decrease somewhat with the possibility of a settlement. If there is no clear victor and neither party is destroyed, the groups may develop a 'cost-consciousness' of the losses each side is incurring. In this period groups may be more likely to welcome UCP and begin earnestly looking for a negotiated solution to the conflict and help maintaining any agreements (Schirch, 2006, p.68).

In the outcome stage, UCP practitioners may organize an emergency response assessment and accompany vulnerable people to safer places or to designated service providers. They may also provide protective presence to threatened survivors in hospitals, conflict negotiators or human rights defenders who visit crisis areas to investigate violations and abuse. UCP practitioners have played critical roles in monitoring ceasefires during this stage of the conflict. Through the verification of incidents, reporting and rumour control, they can help to stabilize the situation and create a space in which local actors can transform these ceasefires into peace agreements.

Post- crisis

Finally, at the stage of post-crisis, direct violence has significantly decreased. This also leads to a decrease in tensions and to more normal relationships between the different parties in the conflict, which allows for nonviolent political contestation. However, if the issues and problems arising from their incompatible goals are not adequately addressed, this stage could eventually lead back into another cycle of escalating conflict, leading to another crisis. In fact, many peace agreements have collapsed within five years.

At this post-crisis stage, UCP practitioners can help facilitate the transition from crisis to peacebuilding. They may be involved in evaluating the crisis with local communities. They may support communities in redesigning protection strategies and strengthening the capacity of local peace infrastructures. In light of their exit strategy, UCP teams will make an effort to further move the ownership of UCP activities to local peace committees, NGOs and CSOs, and protection teams. These protection strategies are important as they provide the space and stability in which peacebuilding activities can unfold and set the stage for reconciliation.

4.5

NEEDS ASSESSMENT

What is needs assessment?

A needs assessment is a systematic process for determining and addressing needs, or gaps between current conditions and desired conditions. In the context of UCP, a needs assessment usually determines the safety and security needs of civilians in situations of violent conflict. Needs assessments are usually carried out in conjunction with conflict analysis, before initiating operations/establishing a presence in a country or a specific area of violent conflict.⁴ Conflict analysis is a key part of a needs assessment, as it allows UCP agencies to determine if there is a role for UCP to play in a particular type and stage of conflict. Though the answer may be affirmative, it does not mean that UCP can be implemented immediately. First, UCP teams need to determine if there are vulnerable populations in that conflict and if these populations need to be protected from violence. More specifically, UCP teams aim to measure the discrepancy between current conditions and wanted conditions, and to measure their ability to appropriately address the gaps. Other needs, such as food or healthcare, may occasionally be assessed by UCP personnel in isolated areas with a lack of other service providers. These needs will then be shared with appropriate service providers in areas nearby who may be able to address them.

In case there are no vulnerable populations, or they do not want protection or support in violence prevention, there is no reason for UCP practitioners to be present. Lastly, they need to find out if affected communities will accept UCP personnel to live and work in the area. UCP practitioners need the acceptance and consent of local actors to conduct their operations effectively. Needs assessments are conducted to answer these questions.

UCP teams aim to measure the discrepancy between current conditions and wanted conditions, and to measure their ability to appropriately address the gaps. Other needs, such as food or healthcare, may occasionally be assessed by UCP personnel in isolated areas with a lack of other service providers. These needs will then be shared with appropriate service providers in areas nearby who may be able to address them.

⁴ Conflict analysis often precedes *and* follows a needs assessment. UCP teams may conduct a preliminary conflict analysis before carrying out a needs assessment at the field level. The needs assessment will provide them with more detailed information about the conflict that allows them to finalize the conflict analysis.

How does needs assessment work?

Needs assessments are conducted to answer the following basic questions:

- What are the most vulnerable areas?
- Who are the most vulnerable populations and individuals in those areas? Why?
- What are the (most urgent) protection needs of those vulnerable populations and individuals?
- Why have these needs not been addressed (yet)?
- What are the existing local structures and mechanisms that address safety and security needs?
- How can UCP teams enhance these structures and mechanisms?
- Are others trying to address these needs? Who are they? What have they achieved?
- Can UCP organizations address (some of) these needs? Do they have the capacity?
- Are UCP practitioners the right people to address these needs? Can others do it better?
- Do local actors want UCP organizations to address these needs?
- What could be the negative impacts of the presence and involvement of UCP practitioners?

It is important that UCP teams conduct their own needs assessments, rather than solely relying on the outcomes and recommendations of third parties (national and international). Conflict situations continuously change. The outcomes and recommendations of other actors may be outdated. More importantly, the needs assessments of third parties are driven by their own objectives and mandates. They will most likely exclude elements that are crucial to UCP. Furthermore, adhering to the primacy of local actors, UCP practitioners will engage directly with local communities in order to assess their acceptance of UCP. This consultation process includes the direct involvement of vulnerable populations and individuals, as well as other key stakeholders. However, it is essential that UCP practitioners do not raise expectations, and they are clear that an assessment does not automatically guarantee that a team will be established, and even if they do establish a team, there may be a delay in being able to do so, as it may require a great deal of preparation (fundraising, staff recruitment, etc) to be able to do so.

It may be important to first meet with government officials or other leaders in the area and request their permission to carry out the assessment in order to demonstrate respect and avoid offending them. If this is not done, the UCP team could potentially damage its relationship with these actors from the outset, and potentially even lose access to the area. More generally, UCP practitioners need to be sensitive to hierarchical structures and local custom. However, it is also important to ensure that the assessment is not limited to interviewing leaders: they also need to make an effort to engage directly with different sectors within the community, including those that are at the bottom of a hierarchy, as these may be the groups with the most severe protection issues and the least representation. The views of government officials or community leaders do not automatically reflect the views of the people they represent. These representatives may say that there is no need for UCP because they themselves sustain patterns of abuse, because they are out of touch with the reality of life in distant areas, or simply because they consider international presence to be a nuisance. Best practices are to speak to women separately, and not in the presence of men.

UCP practitioners conduct needs assessments in the following situations:

- Before establishing a presence in a country that is experiencing violent conflict;
- Before establishing an additional field site in a part of the country where UCP teams have infrequent or no presence;
- After a crisis situation in a particular area of violent conflict (rapid response assessment);
- Before a UCP agency expands its programming to include an additional area of work (e.g., child protection, prevention of sexual and gender-based violence).

Needs assessments may also be carried out within the context of a particular activity. A training-needs assessment, for example, assesses the needs of participants to develop their capacity on a specific issue. This type of needs assessment is not included in this section. Although each of the above-mentioned needs assessments will have different objectives, their basic outline is similar. This section focuses on the first three types of needs assessment, though it will be relevant for the fourth type as well.

Needs assessment in action

Most assessments go through three basic stages: pre-assessment, assessment, and action planning. Pre-assessments are carried out before moving to a particular target area and are guided by the overarching mission purpose or mandate. This stage is basically about data collection through online research, as well as conversations with relevant actors in the area. In capital cities there are usually multiple sources of information about the situation in the target area. These sources include NGOs, think tanks, diplomats, and displaced communities from the target area. The action planning focuses on the basic question, 'How are we going to translate what we have into what they need?' It includes the formulation of recommendations, (security) concerns, and outstanding issues, oriented toward meeting the overall mission goals.

It is important for UCP personnel to remember that an assessment may also be the beginning of building relationships with different stakeholders, and thus they need to make sure they do not do anything that could hinder the process to build relationships of trust and acceptance. It is important to plan how you explain UCP carefully to different stakeholders, as this explanation will have a big impact on how much information you are able to gather. It is usually also important to clarify in the introduction that UCP does not entail the provision of material aid. Additionally there may be a history of feeling disappointed or harmed by previous or current international interventions, and the related mistrust must be addressed.⁵ Providing concrete examples about the functioning of UCP in other communities tends to be an effective way of explaining UCP, as long as contextual differences are acknowledged. Answers to questions, such as 'What makes you feel (un)safe in this community?', may further provide UCP practitioners with context specific examples that they can use to explain UCP in a way that communities will understand (see Box 2).

⁵ Particularly people who have been asked to take part in survey or questionnaires and have never seen any value come from it.



Box 2 - Sample needs assessment questions

Civilians:

- Do you feel safe in this community or your community? If not, why?
- What makes you feel unsafe in this community?
- Do you feel more safe/unsafe during different times of the day? Why?
- Are there any locations you feel particularly safe? Unsafe?
- What could be done to make you feel more safe?
- Are your children attending school? Why or why not?
- How has the violence affected you and your family?
- Are there areas in you community where you will no longer go?
- Do you ever travel out of town? If so, where? Is there anything that makes you feel unsafe when you are traveling ?
- Do you have any interaction with the authorities? If so, how has it been?
- Are you aware of anyone trying to address the sources of insecurity? Who and how?
- Who helps you when there is violence?
- Have you seen lots of other people moving in and out of town recently? If yes, where are they coming from, where are they going to, and why are they moving like that?

Government:

- Which are the most vulnerable groups or areas in the community?
- Which are the least vulnerable groups or areas in the community?
- What threats are there from outside the community?
- What threats are there from inside the community?
- What services are available in the community for people who are victims of violence?

Police:

- Do you see much violence inside the community? What kind of violence?
- What is your response when a violent incident occurs?
- Do all groups in society report cases to you?
- Do you see a change in the number of reported incidents of violence?
- Do you see a change in the types of violent incidents you are responding to?
- What contributes to these changes?

The rapid-response needs assessment is a type of needs assessment that UCP practitioners carry out frequently. Following incidents of violence, a bombing or an attack, UCP personnel may visit the area to assess the protection needs of the affected population. They may also provide a protective presence at the place of the incident or use other UCP methods to prevent additional incidents or revenge attacks from happening. In isolated areas UCP personnel may

be the only international actors present and will play an important role in coordinating service provision with service providers in areas nearby.

UCP practitioners have to be careful, transparent, and creative in their approach to affected communities, because they may be expected to provide material aid. Moreover, community members may not ask for protection or respond positively to an offer of unarmed protection if the process and its implications have not been clearly explained. Sometimes, it is simply a matter of giving practical examples or asking the right questions ('what are you worried about?' and 'why do you worry?' instead of 'what can we do?' or 'do you want protection?').

As they begin to identify patterns of violence during assessments, UCP teams may end up interviewing survivors and/or witnesses of violence. This is a delicate matter that requires refined listening skill and empathy as described in Section 1 of this module. UCP personnel need to ensure that there is a safe space for survivors and witnesses to talk. They should never conduct an interview that will result in an increased risk to the survivor or witness or retraumatizing the survivor/witness. Prior to conducting any such interview, it is essential to obtain the informed consent of the interviewee. This entails explaining the work that the team carries out, the reason that they want to carry out the interview and the specific purpose it could serve, explaining how the information from the interview will be used (including provisions for confidentiality), and finally making it clear that it is the survivor/witness's choice as to whether to engage in the interview and that they should not feel any pressure to do so. If the survivor/witness agrees to participate in the interview, it is important to allow them to recount their story without interruption, and then ask questions when they are done speaking to clarify any points or obtain specific details. In order to identify specific patterns of violence, teams may need to ask questions about the time and specific location of the incident, clothing style, numbers, age, and behaviour of perpetrators etc. The more details are collected, the more effectively the information can be used to control rumours and mitigate conflicts. It is essential to be very careful about asking about sensitive topics. Upon a first meeting, it is usually inappropriate to ask directly if someone has experienced sexual violence. Open-ended questions such as 'did they harm you in any other way' may be used to give the interviewee an opportunity to discuss such incidents, should they choose to do so. There may be cases in which the interviewer suspects a interviewee has been sexually assaulted, even if the interviewee does not say so directly. In these cases, it is important to refrain from pressing the issue excessively. However, even without such an admission, it may be important to let the interviewee know about the importance of receiving medical attention, ideally within 72 hours, if 'anyone s/he knows experiences such an incident.'

Information can be gathered in many other ways. Sometimes the least obvious sources can provide the best information. Drivers or local caretakers at the UCP compound may have in-depth knowledge about the security situation in the area. Humanitarian aid agencies may have conducted extensive needs assessments in a particular area and be willing to share their conclusions and recommendations. In divided communities it is important to collect information from all sides of the divide. Information can be sensitive and needs to be managed confidentially. The imperative of 'do no harm' requires utter meticulousness. The safety of the people providing information has the highest priority. Leaving a notebook containing details about human rights violations behind in a public taxi may endanger the life of the human rights defender or informant whose name has been written down in that notebook. Projects must consider email security and other technology security concerns. At the same time, transparency must be maintained about the fact and purpose of information gathering. Even

a perceived lack of transparency can create suspicion among authorities or other actors that UCP personnel are spying. This can undermine the trust that has been carefully built up.



Recommended reading

- ACAPS. (2013). *Compared to what: Analytical thinking and needs assessment*. Available at <http://www.acaps.org/resources/technical-briefs>
- ICRC. (2013) *Professional Standards for Protection Work*, Chapter 6. Geneva, Switzerland: ICRC

4.6

VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND THREATENED INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

UCP practitioners conduct conflict analyses and needs assessments for the sake of preventing violence and protecting civilians. However, not all civilians threatened by violence need to be protected. Some civilians may be threatened, but feel confident in dealing with these threats on their own. They may have sufficient security measures in place or consider the threat not to be a high risk. Therefore, UCP practitioners provide protection services to civilians who request protection or to those who are highly susceptible to loss, damage, suffering and death. These civilians are referred to as 'vulnerable'. Vulnerability is a relative concept. Everyone is vulnerable in some way or another, but some more than others. The level of vulnerability depends on specific circumstances, some of which are more fixed than others. A threatened human rights defender can, for example, change his or her profession in order to reduce his or her vulnerability. A member of an oppressed ethnic minority does not have this option. However, this person may be able to leave the area or the country and by doing so, reduce his or her vulnerability. In this example, location determines the relative degree of vulnerability, despite the individual's unalterable ethnicity.

Populations that tend to be vulnerable and groups that are frequently threatened in situations of violent conflict are children; women;⁶ elderly; the disabled; and people discriminated based on sexual orientation and gender identity (Knight, 2014); the poor or isolated; displaced people; human rights defenders; and journalists. Generally speaking, UCP practitioners approach the protection of vulnerable populations from three different angles. They aim to:

- **Decrease the levels of vulnerability of threatened civilians.** For example, a lone journalist who publishes articles about human rights violations may be vulnerable to violence, but when the journalist is connected to a support network of influential people he or she becomes less vulnerable.
- **Increase the capacity of these civilians to deal with threats.** The same journalist may join a workshop on security, where he or she learns additional ways of self-protection and increases his or her confidence.
- **Remove the threat, or at least deter potential aggressors from realizing the threat.** UCP personnel may engage with government officials and police who have the capacity to influence the potential perpetrator, or they may provide protective accompaniment to the journalist to deter violence sometimes on a 24/7 basis or provide proactive presence at the media office.

⁶ Men are also subject to gender violations such as castration and rape. Conscription itself is considered by some to be a gender violation, targeting principally men.

A common thread in all three approaches is confidence building. Through decreasing levels of vulnerability, developing capacities and removing threats, UCP practitioners encourage vulnerable populations to find their own strengths and become actors in their own protection. In the following sections, four different types of vulnerable populations or frequently threatened groups will be explored in more detail: children, women, displaced people, and human rights defenders. These four groups often constitute the beneficiaries of UCP.

4.6.1 Children

Around two million children lost their lives in armed conflict during the first decade of the 21st century, and the number of children injured is more than three times higher (UNICEF, 2011). In 2013, an estimated 7 million children were refugees and between 11.2 and 13.7 million children were displaced within their own country due to conflict. More than twenty eight million children were out of primary school in conflict-affected countries in 2013 (European Commission, 2014, p.2). Children living in the midst of armed conflict face unprecedented threats. These include the six types of grave child-right violations mentioned in UN Security Council Resolution 1612: killing and maiming; attacks on schools and hospitals; recruitment of children in armed forces or groups; rape and sexual violence; abduction; and denial of humanitarian access.

The protection of children is a recurring theme in the UCP sources of key guidance, described in Module 2, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (especially art. 34-38). UCP personnel work in different ways to protect children from violence, frequently in partnership or coordination with other organizations such as UNICEF, UNHCR, Save the Children and ICRC, and through protection clusters when they exist. They:

- provide protective presence and accompaniment
- establish safer spaces for extremely vulnerable children
- monitor and report abuse and child rights violations and advocate for the protection of children
- support government officials and social workers in child protection
- provide family tracing and reunification for separated, unaccompanied and abducted children
- return abducted child soldiers
- prevent the abduction of children
- support the reintegration of ex-child soldiers
- establish or strengthen local child protection infrastructures
- develop capacity and raise awareness about child protection
- promote mainstreaming of child protection in all appropriate guidelines and plans.

Depending on their age, children can be supported to become actors in their own protection. Moreover, UCP personnel encourage the representation of youth in peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts.

Particularly vulnerable groups among children include:

- unaccompanied and separated children
- child soldiers, ex-child soldiers
- children that suffer from sexual and gender-based violence
- children with disabilities or injuries
- displaced children
- LGBT children
- children in conflict with the law
- abducted children
- HIV/AIDS orphans or victims.

The following paragraphs will provide a brief description of the protection needs of the first three groups of vulnerable children. It also describes how UCP is applied to address some of these needs.

Unaccompanied and separated children

In areas of violent conflict many children have been separated from their parents or primary care takers. Parents may have died, disappeared, become critically injured or kidnapped. Children may have been abducted or separated from their parents during their flight. They may have escaped from armed forces or brothels. Many of these children do not know where their families are or if they are still alive. They wander around alone, or in groups of other children, or they may have found an adult who is taking care of them.

Living amidst communities in areas of violent conflict, UCP personnel are in a good position to identify separated and unaccompanied children and identify their needs. They may be able to address some of these (protection) needs directly, while connecting these children with other service providers in the area. UCP teams have especially played a role in family tracing and reunification. In South Sudan for example, NP, in collaboration with local governments and other actors, such as UNICEF and Save the Children, has helped to reunite around 500 children with their families.

Child soldiers and ex-child soldiers

There are an estimated 250,000 child soldiers in at least twenty countries in the world today, mostly in Africa. It is estimated that 40% of all child soldiers are girls (War Child, 2015). They are often used as 'wives' (i.e., sex slaves) of the male combatants. Many rebel groups use child soldiers to fight the government, but some governments and paramilitaries also use child soldiers in armed conflict. Not all children take part in active combat. Some are (also) used as porters, cooks and spies. As part of their recruitment, children are sometimes forced to kill or maim a family member - thus breaking the bonds with their community and making it difficult for them to return home (War Child, 2015). According to UNICEF, more than 100,000 children have been released and reintegrated into their communities since 1998 in over 15 countries affected by armed conflict (UNICEF, 2011). Additionally, narco-traffickers and gangs forcibly recruit children to transport drugs and help control turf.

Children participate as child soldiers for a variety of reasons. They are:

- forcibly recruited;
- manipulated by adults;
- encouraged by their parents to become soldiers;
- sent by their parents as hunger and poverty may have driven parents to offer their children for service (armies may pay a fee);
- drawn to armed groups willingly, by ideals of manhood or as an opportunity to revenge the death of relatives;
- drawn to armed groups as a way of survival: they are from impoverished backgrounds or separated from their families;
- drawn to armed groups as a surrogate/substitute family.

Whether recruitment is forced or 'voluntary', it exposes children to extreme risks, such as death, physical injury, psychological damage, drug addiction, and sexual abuse. A return to civilian life often poses many challenges for both children and their communities.

UCP agencies work to prevent forced recruitment of children in vulnerable areas, such as refugee camps that border conflict zones. In Sri Lanka, Nonviolent Peaceforce accompanied mothers to military training camps where their children had been taken and frequently gained the release of the children. The organization also supported mothers when they demanded a cessation of child abductions and provided a visible protective presence at Hindu Temple festivals where children were routinely abducted. Furthermore, UCP personnel raised awareness among vulnerable communities about the recruitment of child soldiers and worked together with these communities, in close cooperation with UNICEF, Save the Children and others, to identify and implement prevention strategies. They also provided accompaniment to mothers who began reporting incidents to the human rights commission and proactive presence when mothers began demonstrating against child abductions. UCP personnel may work together with a wide range of local and international actors, including armed forces, to identify child soldiers and advocate for their release and reunification with their families.

Often local governments, in collaboration with international agencies such as UNICEF and Save the Children, are the drivers of child protection processes, especially when it comes to child soldiers. In those cases, UCP teams may play a supporting role, using their presence in isolated areas to monitor the protection needs of ex-child soldiers following their reunification. Reunification and reintegration of ex-child soldiers can pose a range of challenges that the child or the community is not able to deal with. In some cases the child may have been encouraged by their families to join armed forces and is now perceived as a burden. In other cases, the child goes voluntarily back to the same armed forces. In yet other cases, the child is not accepted by the community and is threatened or stigmatised as a 'killer' or a 'prostitute'.

Child victims of sexual and gender-based violence

In times of war and protracted violent conflict, the disintegration of families and communities leaves children vulnerable to violence. Death, critical injuries, poverty, and disruption of daily life tend to increase tensions within the family and the likelihood of domestic violence. Rape is a continual threat to children—girls and boys—as well as other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, including prostitution, sexual humiliation, early marriages, and mutilation.

Children victimized or traumatized by sexual and gender-based violence also include those who have witnessed the rape of a family member. Armed conflict entails poverty, hunger and desperation, which may force girls into prostitution. They may feel compelled to offer sex for food or shelter, for safe conduct through the conflict zone, or to obtain papers for themselves and their families. They may suffer in silence, fearing reprisal from offenders as well as stigmatization by the community.

UCP teams have worked towards prevention of sexual violence of unaccompanied children in refugee sites by providing protective presence and accompaniment. They have also raised awareness and built capacity among vulnerable communities about child rights and child protection. Timely referral of survivors of sexual violence to designated service providers, especially related to psychosocial counselling and trauma treatment, is particularly relevant.

4.6.1 Women

Among women aged between 15 and 44, worldwide, targeted acts of violence cause more death and disability than cancer, malaria, traffic accidents, and war casualties combined. Up to 70% of women experience physical or sexual violence from men in their lifetime—the majority by husbands, intimate partners or someone they know. Women and girls comprise 80% of the estimated 800,000 people trafficked annually, with the majority (79%) trafficked for sexual exploitation (UN Women n.d.). In situations of armed conflict, many women and girls are forced into sexual slavery by fighters or are raped at gunpoint. In some situations, rape is used as a weapon of war, a deliberate strategy to hurt or humiliate the opponent. In some cultures, women are exchanged as part of peace agreements. Violence against women not only devastates their own lives and that of their children, but also fractures communities and stalls development.

Sexual and gender-based violence is the most common threat to women in situations of violent conflict. It refers to violence that is directed against a person on the basis of gender or sex. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental, or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion, and other deprivations of liberty (UN General Assembly, 1993; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 1992). While men also experience sexual and gender-based violence, and the numbers are generally unknown (as it is even more hidden), the majority of victims are women and girls. In many areas of violence it is downplayed as an unfortunate, but inevitable side effect of conflict. If laws exist that protect women from sexual and gender-based violence, they are seldom implemented. Women are often unsure what their rights are and what supporting mechanisms and legal processes are available to them. Women in rural areas may be illiterate and unable to navigate the legal system on their own. Family structures in traditional cultures often encourage women to accept gender-based violence as a part of life.

Though women in situations of violent conflict are particularly susceptible to violence, they should not be considered as passive victims of violence. Violent conflict can create large numbers of female-headed households when men are detained, displaced, have disappeared, or are dead. This can heighten insecurity and danger for the women left behind,

since traditional protection and support mechanisms may no longer be operating. But women often take on leadership roles in these circumstances, whether as a matter of opportunity or of necessity. They are often at the forefront of peacebuilding and human rights defence. Women may also be forced to take over responsibilities and activities traditionally carried out by men. This often requires the development of new skills and confidence as they become involved in rebuilding the lives of their own families, as well as their communities. Moreover, women often play an important role in the prevention of and resolution of conflicts (Forced Migration Online, n.d.).

Although many male respondents prioritised women at first when describing groups that they considered 'vulnerable', through discussion they often modified their thoughts, conceding that women were often better able to cope better than men. And all Nuba men interviewed admitted without exception the crucial role of women in caring for the family as well as their wider contribution to protection...

Justin Corbett, 2011, p.21

In spite of the important roles that they play in enabling communities to survive times of crisis, women are often excluded from decision-making processes regarding peace and security. Protection and security are widely considered to be responsibilities of men. Women often have different views and priorities regarding safety and security, including the needs of children and other vulnerable groups. Moreover, they have frequently learned more than men to find sources of power other than physical strength. Therefore, if women are not included in analysis, decision-making processes, and coordination mechanisms, many of their protection needs remain unaddressed, while their insights are not shared. These are missed opportunities for the development of appropriate protection strategies.

UCP organizations have recognized the often-unaddressed protection needs of women, their lack of access to support structures and decision-making processes, and their potential for playing an important role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. Therefore women are an important target group for UCP, as recipients of protection services and as drivers of local peace infrastructures. Furthermore, the protection of women is a key tenet of the UCP sources of guidance, described in Module 2, including UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security. In order to protect and support women UCP teams:

- Develop the capacity of women's groups to undertake their own UCP activities;
- Accompany women to access services, especially survivors of sexual and gender-based violence;
- Raise awareness and develop capacity of local actors (men and women) about the rights of women, especially through the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW];
- Support and encourage state actors and other duty bearers to protect the rights of women;
- Include women in community security meetings, trainings, UCP teams and local protection teams;
- Conduct separate activities for women;
- Develop EWER systems in areas where women are particularly vulnerable to violence.
- Promote gender mainstreaming: monitor the protection needs of women, for example in refugee sites.

There is little if any recognition that men may also be victims of gender-based violence and no protections written into international standards. Men suffer from sexual assaults: castration and other genital mutilation, as well as rape in prisons and IDP camps, according to Laura Stemple (2006). Men suffer summary execution in wartime, their assailants assuming that men are enemy combatants; they suffer from the gender-based violation of conscription and abduction (Carpenter, 2009).

The existing standards suffer from the same thinking that has marginalized women: that women are peacemakers and victims, and that men are war-makers and perpetrators. While UCP practitioners and other actors in various parts of the world are working toward making men part of the solution for women's protection; little is being done to making women (and men) part of the solution for men's protection. Likewise the protection of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transgendered people is also marginalized, if not ignored.

4.6.3 Displaced people

Displaced people, including refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs), and returnees constitute a third vulnerable population. Refugees and IDPs are people who have left behind their homes and communities because they have suffered (or fear) persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion or because they flee from conflict or natural disaster. Whereas refugees are outside their country of origin or habitual residence, IDPs have not crossed an international border to find a safe haven. Returnees are people that voluntarily or involuntarily return to their country of origin after a long absence.

The number of people forcibly displaced because of conflict or persecution exceeded 50 million in 2013, the largest number since WWII according to UNHCR. During 2012, conflict and persecution forced an average of 23,000 persons per day to leave their homes and seek protection elsewhere, either within the borders of their countries or in other countries. This equates to a new refugee or internally displaced person every 4.1 seconds. Developing countries host over four-fifths (80%) of the world's refugees, compared to 70% ten years ago. In 2012, 46% of refugees were under 18 years old. That same year, an estimated 7.6 million people were newly displaced due to conflict or persecution, including 1.1 million new refugees. This is the highest number of new arrivals in one year since 1999 (UNHCR, 2011).

During their flight from areas of conflict displaced people continue to be exposed to multiple physical dangers, including sudden attacks and landmines, shortage of food and water and lack of medical care. Moreover, refugee sites are not always set up in ways that promote the protection of, and assistance to, vulnerable groups. Old power struggles among displaced groups are often reproduced and traditional systems of social protection may come under strain or break down completely. High levels of violence, substance abuse, sexual harassment and rape, forced and early marriage, and forcible recruitment also play a role. The large influxes of refugees over short periods of time often lead to tensions with and within host communities, as they put a strain on local infrastructures and lead to competition over natural resources. In a similar way, the reintegration of returnees into their former communities can increase tension and open old grievances.

UCP personnel living within or near communities of displaced people are in a good position to identify and understand the different needs of displaced people. Special attention is given to the protection needs of women, children and the elderly within displaced communities. In line with IHL and IRL, UCP organizations work in different ways and in coordination with UN and other humanitarian organizations to protect displaced people. They may:

- Provide protective presence and accompaniment for displaced people under threat;
- Facilitate access to services (protection, aid, medicine, legal services) for displaced people;
- Provide child protection within refugee sites and IDP communities;
- Mitigate conflicts between displaced and host communities and within displaced communities;
- Develop capacity and raise awareness of UCP with leaders of displaced communities about the protection needs of vulnerable groups;
- Develop and support UCP teams within the sites;
- Promote protection mainstreaming; they support government officials as duty bearers and service providers working in refugee sites to include the protection needs of vulnerable groups into humanitarian relief programming.



Box 3 - Case study - Accompaniment of returnees in Guatemala

From 1981 to 1983, indigenous Mayan campesinos fled Guatemala from the terror of the anti-insurgency policy of Rios Montt, then President of Guatemala. This led to the massacre of at least 100,000 campesinos and the destruction of numerous highland villages. Some refugees slipped back into Guatemala during the mid-to-late 1980s and early 1990s. On 8 October 1992 the Guatemalan government signed accords with the Permanent Commission (representatives of the refugees) to allow for their collective, organized return.

The refugees declared themselves Communities of Popular Resistance (CPRs) and engaged in a form of nonviolent direct action by choosing to re-enter the conflict zones as unarmed civilians. The CPRs requested a high profile protective international presence in moments of crisis. Many different UCP actors, including the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation and Witness for Peace (WFP) decided to respond to this request and accompany the refugees on their return to Guatemala. The presence of expatriates allowed the CPRs to return publicly and increased the political cost of violence against the CPRs.

The accompaniments were carried out from 1992 to 1997 and were coordinated by the National Coordinating Office on Refugees and Displaced of Guatemala (NCOORD) under the UN repatriation plan and repopulation of the conflict zones. At the 'first organized return', 100 buses, each bus including a pair of UCP accompaniers, departed from Mexico to Guatemala. As one of the UCP team members from WFP recalls, "Just on the other side of the border the roadsides were jammed with thousands of Guatemalans loudly cheering, waving the Guatemalan flag. It was such a heartfelt and warm homecoming."

When the returnees paused for the night and were assigned to military-type tents, they refused to use them, as they brought back too many memories, and demanded that they be replaced with civilian tents. Furthermore, when the Guatemalan government provided medical help, the returnees discovered that some of the doctors and nurses were military personnel and suspected them of being infiltrators. The leadership of the returnees then demanded that the military personnel leave, making it clear that they felt safer with the UCP presence and accompaniment.

SOURCE: Witness for Peace, and Lisa Schirch, 2006, p.22.

4.6.4 Human rights defenders

'Human rights defender' is a term used to describe people who, individually or with others, act to promote or protect human rights. Human rights include civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Particular issues of concern in areas of violent conflict are executions, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, discrimination, forced evictions and access to health care. Human rights defenders investigate and report on human rights violations and abuse. They also accompany survivors of human rights violations, take action to end impunity, support better governance, contribute to the implementation of human rights treaties, and provide human rights education.

Many human rights defenders work in places where carrying out human rights activities, or giving voice to survivors and witnesses of human rights violations, can put their own lives at risk. Front Line Defenders, an international foundation for the protection of human rights defenders, states that the safe space in which human rights defenders work in many countries is consistently shrinking: "Governments have shut down the local media, subjected human rights organizations to campaigns of intimidation, or tried to silence those brave enough to bring the facts to international attention" (Front Line Defenders, 2013).

Human rights defenders are, perhaps, the group most frequently accompanied by UCP actors. An important reason for this is that the work of human rights defenders often has significant impact on the lives of many others. UCP actors have accompanied human rights defenders in many different countries: for example, lawyers who advocated on behalf of

human rights workers who had disappeared in Guatemala, lawyers who filed lawsuits against army commanders and police chiefs in Colombia, and human rights activists who advocated for the protection of sexual minorities and sex workers in Indonesia. UCP personnel have sat in front of the offices of human rights defenders, courtrooms, and prisons, while human rights defenders conducted their affairs inside, sometimes for weeks on end. For many human rights defenders amidst armed conflict, the unarmed civilian presence and appearance of UCP personnel not only makes them feel safer and morally supported, but also reaffirms their belief in their own unarmed struggle for justice.

The protection of human rights defenders is a key tenet of the UCP sources of guidance, described in Module 2, including the Declaration of Human Rights Defenders (A/RES/53/144). UCP teams:

- Build the capacity of human rights defenders to strengthen their protection strategies;
- Provide protective accompaniment to human rights defenders under threat;
- Monitor compliance of protection agreements (for example the EU guidelines for human rights defenders [2004], that EU member states pledged to implement through their missions abroad);
- Provide presence and monitoring for human rights trials and tribunals;
- Connect human rights defenders with each other and to international support networks in-country and abroad (for example through speaking tours);
- Encourage and support human rights defenders in building relationships with security forces and non-state armed actors, and include these actors in the support network;
- Indicate to government officials and other duty bearers the international expectation that human rights defenders be permitted to work unimpeded.



Summary of key messages

- Key skills of UCP practitioners include listening, engaging in dialogue, analysing conflicts, managing information, facilitating, and negotiating. Key knowledge of UCP includes UCP theory, security protocols, the political situation, and local customs. Key characteristics of UCP practitioners include resilience, intercultural competence, courage, and empathy.
- Conflict analysis is a tool that helps UCP teams to understand a particular conflict, in order to design appropriate protection strategies. Misinterpretation of the conflict may not only lead to ineffective or inappropriate programming, but also risks endangering UCP personnel and local actors.
- UCP has been conducted in various types of conflict situations, including horizontal and vertical conflicts, inter-state and intra-state conflicts, and conflicts over natural resources, political power, ethnic identity and self-determination. UCP practitioners tailor their methods to the different types of conflict.
- Complex as conflicts may be, they generally pass through well-recognized stages. Recognizing these stages can help UCP teams at the field level to better understand conflict dynamics and developments, formulate appropriate scenarios, and develop timely responses.
- A needs assessment is a systematic process for determining and addressing gaps between current conditions and desired conditions. It allows UCP teams to assess if there are vulnerable populations that need to be protected from violence and if affected communities will accept UCP personnel to live and work in the area.
- Vulnerable groups include children, women, displaced people, and human rights defenders. UCP practitioners aim to decrease the vulnerability of these groups, increase their capacity to respond to and diminish threats. Most of all they encourage vulnerable populations to find their own strengths and become actors in their own protection.



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NP Photo / Peace Process and Chiefs' Meeting, South Sudan / June 2011



5

MODULE 5 UNARMED CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN PRACTICE: LIVING IN AND EXITING THE COMMUNITY

OVERVIEW AND LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Applying UCP in situations of violent conflict requires ongoing analysis of the situation as well as security management. UCP practitioners tailor their strategies and methods to continuously changing conflict dynamics, and in response to the initiatives of local partners. A rare window of opportunity for the prevention of violence may suddenly appear amidst a situation of turmoil. In order to use this window of opportunity to maximum effect, all the pieces on the chessboard need to be in place. Security measures and contingency plans must be updated and known to all UCP personnel at all times. They need to be prepared for the worst-case scenario, even if it is unlikely that this scenario will ever occur. When violence prevention is the goal, a situation where 'nothing' happens is an indicator of success.

Module 5 starts with a description of context analysis, followed by a description of security management. These are two major components of the UCP programme cycle that are carried out continually. They are initially modelled on the outcomes of conflict analysis and needs assessment. In turn context analysis informs the occasional review of conflict analysis and also leads to additional needs assessments. Furthermore, context analysis accompanies and strengthens the application of UCP methods. The last stage of the UCP programming cycle to be described involves UCP exit strategies, which guide UCP personnel in phasing out of a particular situation of violent conflict.

After describing the various last components of the UCP programming cycle, completing a process that was started in Module 4, Module 5 presents a case study from South Sudan that brings the learning from all five modules together. This case study is used to show how the different components of the UCP programming cycle described in Module 4 and 5 and the UCP methods described in Module 3, can be applied in a particular situation of violent conflict. Module 5 concludes with a number of key dilemmas that UCP practitioners may experience throughout the UCP programming cycle.

At the end of the module, readers will be able to:

- Conduct a context analysis within the framework of UCP
- Describe the basics of UCP security management
- Describe a sustainable exit strategy
- Describe key dilemmas of UCP
- Devise a comprehensive UCP implementation strategy

5.1

CONTEXT ANALYSIS

After conducting a conflict analysis, UCP organizations will have determined if there is a role for UCP to prevent violence or protect civilians in a particular situation of violent conflict. They will also have identified the need for UCP among communities affected by this conflict and received acceptance from these communities to establish a presence in the area. Finally, they will have identified vulnerable populations that most urgently require UCP services.

Based on these outcomes, UCP teams will start formulating strategies and tailoring UCP methods to address the needs of the identified beneficiaries. When enough confidence is present that UCP will be useful (based upon extensive exploration), sufficient funding is in place, and initial arrangements made, a UCP intervention will begin. While UCP personnel will have already analysed the conflict and understood its dynamics, the situation around them, including the conflict dynamics, will be continuously changing. To make sure that the strategies that have been formulated remain relevant against the backdrop of a changing situation, they need to analyse the local context. This not only serves the purpose of streamlining programming, it is also a matter of security. Understanding the context from which threats arise, and formulating informed strategies to reduce exposure to those threats, makes the difference between risk avoidance and risk management.

What is context analysis?

Context analysis or situational analysis, as used by some UCP organizations, refers to the detailed examination of the ongoing developments and dynamics of a specific situation. UCP teams conduct context analysis to identify trends of violence in order to predict and prevent crises, as well as to prepare for a timely response to a crisis situation. Context analysis is different from conflict analysis, but they are interrelated. **Conflict** analysis has a limited focus on one particular conflict and its development through time (focus on the past). **Context** analysis on the other hand has a broad focus on one particular moment in time (focus on the present). **Conflict** analysis precedes context analysis and is undertaken periodically, especially at the beginning and end of a project cycle. **Context** analysis is done continually. UCP personnel at the field level may conduct context analysis on a weekly or monthly basis.

How does context analysis work?

Though context analysis is conducted continually, it is especially important in situations where:

- UCP is starting its operations;
- There is a sense by those in the field or at headquarters that UCP methods are not adequately addressing the situation;
- Major developments have changed the conflict dynamics or the positions and power bases of conflicting parties.

There are many different ways to undertake context analysis. Most models follow these basic steps:

- Information gathering and identification of priorities of locations, methods and vulnerable populations;
- Analysis and interpretation of events and specific actions of influential actors;
- Establishment of linkages between political, economic, social, religious and security aspects;
- Revealing and understanding trends;
- Assessment of the role of UCP personnel within the context.

Unlike conflict analysis and needs assessments, which are (ideally) carried out jointly with local actors, context analysis is an internal exercise. It includes details about threats, power plays, and hidden agendas of conflicting parties, as well as the perception of local actors about UCP and its practitioners. UCP personnel will necessarily engage with local actors to gather information, but they will conduct the analysis by themselves (see box 1 for sample questions that guide UCP team members for an internal context analysis).



Box 1 - Sample questions that guide UCP teams in context analysis (addressed to UCP personnel, not directly to local actors).

In all the following questions attention should be paid to changes, trends and patterns:

Civilians:

- Who do you see in the community: women, girls, men, boys, elders, or disabled? Estimate numbers.
- How would you describe the atmosphere? (Do they seem happy? Angry? Fearful? Calm?)
- Are there areas where you do not see any civilians?
- Do you see any armed civilians? What were they armed with?
- Are civilians initiating contact with humanitarian workers? Are they willing to talk when approached?

- Are people fleeing or preparing to do so? If yes, is it a particular group?
- Do you see anyone injured? Anyone who lost a limb?

Armed actors:

- Do you see armed actors – if so, who?
- Does the community appear to accept them?
- Are their numbers increasing?
- What do the uniforms look like on the armed actors that you see? (e.g. colours, pattern, armbands, hats)
- How do they behave towards civilians?
- Are the armed actors engaging with humanitarian workers? If so, what is the engagement like?

Infrastructure and surroundings:

- Do you see a functioning market? What goods do you see in the market?
- What kinds of shelter do people have? What is the condition of civilian shelter?
- Are children going to school?
- Do you see any recent destruction? (e.g. trees damaged, bullet holes in walls)
- Are any public buildings (e.g., schools, hospitals) occupied by armed actors? If so, where and by whom?

Humanitarian experience:

- Are you able to move in the community freely? Are there areas that you cannot travel?
- Did anyone accompany you to certain locations? If so, who and where?
- Did anyone threaten you? Or were you harmed in any way?
- Did anyone question what you were doing? If so who? Why?

Specific protection indicators:

- Did you see anyone harmed during your visit? If so, who and what were the circumstances?
- Did you see any children associated with the armed groups?
- Was there any direct threat to life?
- Are the threats specific to women? Children? Elderly people?
- Is civilian movement restricted?
- What is the ratio of men to women in the community?
- What, if anything, has changed in the local, regional, national and international context that is impacting our work? Why?

An important part of context analysis focuses on the role of UCP practitioners within a particular context. It is important to know how local parties perceive them and also to assess if there is a risk of becoming too involved with non-state armed actors. UCP personnel need to understand if the government is attempting to manipulate them or use them to strengthen their

position. A corrupt government may, for example, collect large amounts of money from the UCP organization through a variety of bureaucratic measures. They may also use the presence of UCP teams to show the world that they are respecting human rights, while curtailing their movements to a bare minimum. For example, each time UCP personnel provide protection to human rights defenders who are critical of a corrupt government, the government may respond by refusing to extend their visas. Through context analysis, UCP teams analyze this type of behaviour and determine whether their current strategies are effective. They may conclude that their presence strengthens the position of the corrupt government and undermines the work of human rights defenders. In that case they will either change their strategies or leave a particular area, or the country.

5.2

SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Some aggressions are preceded by threats. Others are not. However, the behaviour of individuals planning a targeted violent aggression often shows subtle signs, since they need to gather information about the right time to aggress, plan how to get to their target, and how to escape.

Enrique Eguren and Marie Caraj, 2009, p.54

Analysis of the security situation is an important part of context analysis. UCP teams operate in dangerous and volatile environments. Therefore, the work of UCP, by definition, involves a level of risk. In order to effectively mitigate and address risk factors, UCP organizations apply a management system for staff security and safety in the field (Peace Brigades International, 2009; Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2011). The security of UCP field staff and assets is inextricably linked to its mission of improving the security and protection of civilians in situations of violent conflict. UCP personnel cannot protect others if they cannot protect themselves. Moreover, they cannot provide a more secure environment for civil society organizations if they cannot provide a more secure environment for UCP.

What is security management?

Security in the context of internal UCP security management relates to the protection from violence of UCP personnel, the image of the UCP intervention or organization, and UCP assets. The image of the UCP intervention is not merely a matter of public relations. A negative image of UCP has direct implications for its capacity to protect. Additionally, measures are taken to avoid or mitigate effects of circumstances that are not related to violence. These include 'accidents' caused by nature (e.g. avalanches, earthquakes) or other external circumstances like forest fires and road accidents. They also include illness, injury, and death resulting from medical conditions or from a lack of adherence to safety guidelines in the workplace.

How does security management work?

UCP considers staff security and safety to be an integral part of its programmatic work. The credibility of UCP as a valid approach to civilian protection would be undermined if UCP agencies were not able to provide for the safety and security of their own staff. The safety and security of staff members are therefore an integrated and essential component of analysis,

planning, implementation, and monitoring of all UCP related activities on the ground.

Staff safety and security are direct extensions of context analysis and are based on the same logic as UCP methods for civilian protection. For example, by observing troop movements, incidents of violence, and behaviour of local actors, UCP teams assess their own vulnerabilities and their capacities to reduce threats. They must also assess the strength of their networks with other actors whose visible concern helps to protect them. Just as they aim to reduce the vulnerabilities of threatened populations and increase their capacities to respond to threats, UCP practitioners also try to reduce their own vulnerabilities and increase their own capacities (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: The Security Wheel (adapted from Eguren, 2005)

“A wheel must be round to turn; in other words, all the spokes need to be of the same length. The same applies to the security wheel with its 8 spokes (components), representing the security management of an organisation...” (Eguren, 2009, p.133). By reducing vulnerabilities or strengthening capacities in weak components of the security wheel, UCP teams can strengthen their own security management and that of the organizations they support or protect.

Generally there are three types of threats UCP practitioners need to be aware of: direct threats, indirect threats, and common criminal attacks. Direct threats are directly targeted to the UCP agency or an individual UCP. They may be reduced with the support of influential actors within UCP's political support network, by improving or strengthening relationships with key actors, or by changing strategies. Indirect threats arise from the potential harm caused by violent incidents in the area or external circumstances such as natural disasters. This is about "being in the wrong place at the wrong time". Indirect threats can often be reduced through context analysis, precaution, and contingency plans. UCP personnel are especially vulnerable to the third type of threat: common criminal attacks. These attacks are more difficult to prevent, as they are in most cases not clearly politically motivated (though they may have political undertones). Increased physical security (e.g. window bars, other protective barriers, care about traveling after dusk and rarely alone) may be necessary to reduce threats. However, UCP practitioners often prefer to keep these physical protection mechanisms to a minimum and in all cases use only nonviolent options. Close relationships with neighbours and community acceptance often go a long way in providing protection and do not damage the image of UCP as a force of unarmed protection.

Security management in action

The first step in managing staff security is the transmission of a clear understanding to all staff and all stakeholders of what UCP is. The next step is to gain a deep understanding of where UCP is placed within the conflict. This step is directly related to context analysis. The third step is to build security strategies. Different organizations may use but not all of the following strategies. These strategies include:

- Building trust and acceptance among all (often qualified by legitimate or legally accessible) actors in the area to prevent harm;
- Protecting and monitoring the UCP organization's image and reputation in the communities and with all actors for being nonpartisan, independent, respecting the primacy of local actors;
- Establishing precautionary and preventive security measures (e.g. locks and fences, travelling in groups, varying routes, avoiding public displays of wealth) to prevent or reduce harm;
- Building relationships with influential stakeholders who can be called upon in situations when UCP practitioners are under threat;
- Ensuring that UCP staff – both international and national – behave appropriately by local cultural standards;
- Including the perspectives and information from local partners, staff, and community in security analysis.

In order to be responsible and effective, UCP teams constantly monitor and analyze the level of risk so as not to exceed the threshold of 'acceptable risk'. They necessarily work in places where other (humanitarian or development) INGOs, agencies, and peacekeepers might not choose to work, go where they might not go, and engage in activities that they might avoid. This does not mean UCP practitioners are reckless, careless, or cavalier about their security. On the contrary, the work that they do requires them to be at least as security conscious, if not more so, than most other INGOs and agencies working in similar environments. This imperative is reflected in their pre-deployment training and ongoing alertness.

Dealing with direct threats to UCP is particularly important. Direct threats cannot be mitigated through general security measures or context analysis in the same way that criminal attacks and indirect threats can. It relies upon having established relationships in advance with the hierarchies of the armed actors. When dealing with direct threats, UCP security strategy involves four essential steps aimed at reducing vulnerability to the perceived threat. UCP practitioners:

- Identify exactly what the threat is and where it comes from;
- Engage as directly as possible with the source of the threat to explain the nature and purpose of UCP;
- Move up the chain of command as far as necessary to remove the threat;
- Proceed only if and when the threat has been effectively removed.

There are a number of precautionary measures that can prevent direct threats. UCP practitioners:

- Maintain nonpartisanship at all times, treating all parties with respect and goodwill;
- Avoid public statements, denunciations, and any other activity that may embarrass, humiliate or demean any of the parties;
- Remain as open and transparent as possible about all UCP activities with all parties concerned;
- Support parties in understanding that it is in their own interest to prevent and avoid attacks on civilians and other gross violations of human rights and International Humanitarian Law;
- Maintain a clear and unequivocal image of UCP as an institution that seeks to work with all parties to help them prevent violence from taking place. By doing so, UCP is helping these parties to improve or, at least, not tarnish their image with external actors
- Build and maintain visible and transparent support networks.

UCP security strategies are based on the assessment of specified, rather than generalized, threats. This enables UCP personnel to work in more places and circumstances than would otherwise be possible if they used a more traditional approach to security, based on generalized threats alone. The most important thing is that UCP practitioners do not take unacceptable or unnecessary risks: rather they operate on a more analytically-refined assessment of the specific threats they face.



Recommended reading

- Eguren, E., *Protection Manual for Human Rights Defenders*, 2005, Dublin: Front Line: International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders: http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/files/en/2312_Protection%20Manual%20for%20Human%20Rights%20Defenders.pdf

5.3

EXIT STRATEGIES

Conflicts are continuously changing and so are the needs of civilians within conflicts. When vulnerable populations or threatened groups feel increasingly safe and empowered, and local peace and protection infrastructures more effectively address conflicts and prevent violence, it may be time at least for international UCP team members to leave the area or the country. The decision to leave a particular area or country is not taken suddenly. Clear strategies are formulated to guide UCP teams in making that decision and, in fact, work towards that decision. This section describes such strategies.

What is an exit strategy?

Despite the phrase 'exit strategy' becoming increasingly prevalent in peacekeeping and peacebuilding discussions, there does not appear to be a common definition for the term. The term seems to have originated in business circles, moved to the military, and has more recently been applied to humanitarian and development-related third-party interventions. Nonetheless, the phrase implies that careful thought and preparation should be given to the timing and process with which an external organization (in this case, a UCP provider) withdraws from a field of action, so as to allow local actors to sustain the work undertaken (if appropriate) and minimize organizational disruption as the process of removal is completed.

How does an exit strategy work?

The UN Security Council, in a debate on 'no exit without strategy' (November 2000) identified three circumstances that prompt a peacekeeping operation to 'exit' or significantly alter its operation: successful completion of the mandate; failure; or partial success. Members of the Security Council also noted in the debate that the ultimate purpose of a peace operation is the achievement of a sustainable and sustained peace. 'An international peace is sustainable', according to the Security Council, 'when two States have arrived at a mutually agreed settlement to their conflict, respecting each other's political independence and territorial integrity and recognising common borders, which they have demarcated or have agreed to have demarcated.' A domestic peace becomes sustainable, 'not when all conflicts are removed from society, but when the natural conflicts of society can be resolved peacefully through the exercise of State sovereignty and, generally, participatory governance' (UN Security Council 2001).

UCP operations are not mandated by the UN Security Council, but based on acceptance of local conflict parties as well as the acceptance of the national government. Therefore, the three circumstances that would prompt UCP to exit are as follows: local actors no longer need or have interest in UCP, partial success of mission, and failure of mission. Lack of funding could be added as a fourth circumstance, as this has played a role in the past in the exit of UCP actors from situations of violent conflict, and may again in the future.

Local actors no longer need or have interest in UCP: When civilians are no longer threatened, and feel confident in their ability to protect themselves and/, or are effectively protected by state structures, the need for UCP has ceased. This may seem clear, but the reality is often more complex. First, as the collaboration between UCP teams and local actors progresses, additional areas of interest and need are easily identified. There are always vulnerable people who need to be protected, especially in an area that is emerging from protracted conflict. Deciding that a particular threat to a vulnerable population is not serious enough to maintain a UCP presence is not easy.

Second, a complicating factor is the uncertainty of a peace process. Many peace processes, apparently well on the way to sustainable peace, have collapsed within a few years. Others have moved back and forth between crisis and post-crisis at a snail's pace. A period of stability without incidents of violence does not automatically indicate a ceased need for UCP. When the stage of crisis passes, there usually is a period of tension, when it is not clear if the 'calm' will be maintained. During this time UCP personnel can play a critical role, along with UN peacekeeping monitors, to strengthen the confidence in the peace process and support the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. This is a period when UCP teams might replace armed peacekeepers for a distinct period of time, until UCP organizations also phase out their presence.

Though determining the right time to exit is difficult, timely implementation of exit strategies is important. Humanitarian organizations in areas of violent conflict at times continue their operations too long. This may lead to an identity crisis within the organization as its mandate and methods no longer suit the context. Lack of morale and loss of reputation are some of the consequences. It may also lead to unnecessary dependency of local actors on protection and support of external actors. To avoid such a situation, exit strategies need to have clear objectives that are sustainable and substantive, but also attainable. The objectives need to be formulated in a way that provides clear criteria for the fulfilment of the mandate.

External indicators that can contribute to an UCP exit strategy include:

- **Decreased incidents of violence:** a systematic decrease of incidents, obtained through monitoring of trends over a significant period of time, indicates a decreasing need for violence prevention and reduction;
- **Increased safety and security of civilians:** evaluation and context analysis need to be carried out to measure the security situation and the perception of safety among civilians;
- **Increased local initiatives for peace and human rights:** an increase of local initiatives for peace and human rights often indicates that the space for local actors to address safely issues related to conflict and violence has increased;
- **Increased functioning of state structures for civilian protection:** an increase in the effective use of state mechanisms for the protection of human rights indicates a

decreasing need for UCP;

- **Changing nature of UCP methods:** a decrease in the number of activities that involves protective presence, accompaniment, and interpositioning and an increase in conflict mitigation, dialogue, and training activities indicates a decreasing need for direct protection;
- **Increased peacebuilding activity:** increased peacebuilding activity may be observed in different ways. First, responding to the needs and requests of local actors, UCP teams may increasingly include components of peacebuilding in their work. Second, professional peacebuilding agencies may increasingly start their operations alongside UCP. This indicates that the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding is well underway and that the need for direct physical protection is decreasing. Although the inclusion of methods that are often associated with peacebuilding (e.g., capacity development, providing space for dialogue) is an important added value of UCP and often reinforces protection strategies, and while distinctions between keeping and building peace may not be relevant in the field, UCP is not intended to be a peacebuilding intervention. When successful, UCP interventions support the transition to situations where peacebuilding is more needed than protection of civilians.
- **A large presence of internationals:** part of the strength of UCP lies in the presence of internationals (other than armed actors) in isolated areas of violent conflict. A large presence of internationals in conflict-affected areas is often an indicator of increased development and openness and means a loss of added value from UCP.

Exit strategies also need to address how UCP efforts will be sustained by local peace infrastructures following the exit of UCP personnel. In all likelihood, an exit strategy must include capacity development for both local government and civil society actors to support the inclusion of effective protection of civilians in local peace infrastructures. If not already accomplished, part of the exit work ensures that local efforts are connected to national and international agencies for continued funding and other support, when possible. Including national staff as peacekeepers or in comparable roles can also be regarded as part of the exit strategy.¹ Not only does it make UCP work more effectively, it is also one step towards sustainability. Local staff are likely to remain in the country after internationals have gone (Schweitzer, 2012). It is equally important to have a realistic mandate. This should inform and guide the development of concrete programmes and at the same time be flexible enough to adapt to the changing context in the country.

Partial success: Between clear-cut success and failure lies a large grey area. Complete success, if such a thing exists when there are so many different variables in play, would coincide with much decreased needs of local actors for UCP. Partial success refers to a situation in which a UCP agency withdraws an operation that is making a positive contribution in some respects, but is being blocked in others. UCP teams may be curtailed by the national government in such ways that the limited positive impacts of their efforts do not justify the continuation of the entire operation. A government may, for example, require an organization to leave the area or make it impossible to function by creating administrative hurdles, such as cancelling visas. These actions could indicate that UCP is having a positive impact and

¹ Part also involves management training so that the local organization can take over the running of an organization. Management training is often a gaping hole in most UCP organizations.

challenges the government's own lack of protection of civilians. Or it could indicate a failure of the UCP organization to build and maintain critical relationships. A good exit strategy in the context of partial success or failure will also take into account any risks to local and national staff and local partners, due to their employment in the UCP intervention, and include plans to address this.

Failure: A UCP operation can be considered a failure under the following circumstances:

- UCP personnel repeatedly endanger local actors;
- UCP personnel repeatedly endanger themselves;
- Local actors do not accept UCP;
- UCP does not achieve any of its objectives.

5.4

DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE UCP STRATEGY

Modules 2 and 3 have described UCP principles and methods, and Modules 4 and 5 have explained key components of the UCP programming cycle, from the identification of suitable personnel to the formulation of exit strategies. What makes these components ‘UCP’ is their combined application in a situation of violent conflict. In this section some of the main components of UCP are brought together and applied on a case study from South Sudan (Nonviolent Peaceforce n.d.). The first part of the section (5.4.1) provides a presentation of the case study; the second part (5.4.2) describes, step by step, how UCP can be applied in this particular situation.

5.4.1 Case study: Mvolo County and Yirol West County reconciliation process, 2011, South Sudan²

In Greater Mundri, violence occurs virtually every year during the dry season. It occurs when Dinka cattle keepers from Yirol West County in Lakes State migrate across the border to Mvolo County in Western Equatoria State (WES) to graze their cattle (see figure 2). Because there is insufficient grass and water in Yirol West to keep their cows alive during dry season (approximately December to May), Dinkas move south where there is more grass available. However, as they move south, they cross over into Mvolo County, where Jur farmers reside year-round. According to the Jur, the Dinka and their cattle trespass on their land, destroy their crops, steal their fishnets and scare away the animals they hunt. However, usually the violence is relatively contained and short-lived, as the Mvolo and Yirol West communities have a history of peaceful coexistence, including shared schooling, health care facilities, and intermarriages.

But 2011 was different. Fighting started abruptly on 9 February after a youth was killed while

² See Appendix 1 for a series of five brief case studies illustrating UCP methods and approaches to the conflict in Mindanao, Philippines.

travelling through Mvolo. Although it was never clear who committed the murder, or what the motives were, a series of retaliatory attacks immediately followed. South Sudan has been at war for most of the past fifty years and only established its independence as a separate country on 9 July 2011. Therefore, its legal structure is still evolving, and often violence remains the reflexive response to any type of conflict. Initially, the Maduynyi Cattle Camp, located in Mvolo, was attacked where the cattle camp members were Dinkas from Yirol West. The fighting at first was restricted to two villages in Mvolo, but it soon spread to affect the entire county and into Yirol West. Youth from both sides were moving along the borders and violently attacking communities from the other side. According to parties on both sides, the conflict escalated far more in 2011 than it had since 2005, when Sudan's civil war ended; the violence was more brutal, it affected a larger geographical area, and it lasted for a longer period of time.

Large-scale destruction of property and attacks on civilians ensued: between 9 February and 3 April 2011, over 6,000 homes were burned down, over 76,000 people were displaced, dozens of civilians including children were killed or injured, and hundreds of cattle and goats were raided.

Those who were interviewed by UCP team members reported that children were hiding in the bushes, dying from dehydration, meningitis, and attacks by bees. A mission team from the South Sudan Legislative Assembly found that "children, women and elderly were under trees without food, water and health services and there was a high danger of outbreak of disease such as malaria, pneumonia and diarrhea".



Figure 2: Map of South Sudan

The red circle indicates Mvolo County, Western Equatoria State (yellow area) and Yirol West County, Lakes State (orange area).

5.4.2 Development of a comprehensive strategy to provide UCP in Mvolo County and Yiro West County

In the following strategy outline, it is assumed that a UCP agency had a long-term presence in Greater Mundri at the time this series of incidents occurred. The outline is written from the perspective of UCP personnel residing in Western Equatoria State at the time of 9 February 2011 when violence started abruptly.

Conflict analysis

As UCP personnel have been present in the area of Greater Mundri for a long time, an in-depth conflict analysis may have already been done. They are familiar with the conflict between the Dinka and the Jur, as violence occurs every year during the dry season. Nevertheless, they will engage in a limited conflict analysis. As mentioned in the case study, in 2011 the situation is different from previous years. The unusual scale of the violence is a good reason for reviewing conflict analysis.

UCP team members may first of all try to gather information from as many sources as possible at their base in Western Equatoria. They may try to analyze the conflict from different angles, including national politics, social relationships, culture, religion and geography. The relationship between the Dinka and the Jur communities is a key component to be analyzed. As mentioned in the case study presentation, there is a history of peaceful co-existence. Team members may question if recent developments have caused a strain on this relationship and if there are other signs that indicate a breakdown in ties between the two communities. Other aspects of thematic analysis include the existence and functioning of conflict resolution mechanisms, as well as possible changes in the environment that may have further increased the scarcity of grazing areas. While the conflict presents itself as an inter-communal conflict, it occurred across a state border, so there could also be a political aspect to the conflict. Therefore, UCP personnel may want to assess the relationship between the different states. This information will not only support the analysis, but can be used later on, when state authorities may need to be involved in addressing the situation.

UCP team members may strengthen their thematic analysis by assessing the attitudes and behaviour of different groups. This would include, first of all, the youth, as they are prominently involved in the conflict, but it should include also other groups such as community elders and women. These groups may have different attitudes towards the conflict and could be encouraged to take a leadership role in promoting peace. An analysis of connectors and dividers may also be insightful. Shared hospitals, schools, and inter-marriages have connected the two communities in the past and could be used to reconnect them in the future. The

difference in identity between the Jur farmers and Dinka cattle keepers is clearly a divider, though the scarcity of natural resources seems to be the main cause of the conflict. However, as cattle keepers, the Dinka clearly view these natural resources differently from the Jur and this intensifies the conflict. Though the ethnic differences between the Dinka and Jur do not seem to be an issue at the moment, it could become a main driver if the conflict were to intensify or expand.

When the UCP team has collected sufficient information about the conflict, they will try to integrate the different aspects of the conflict and draw conclusions. They may create a conflict map that shows the different parties and their relationships to the targeted areas. They may also draw a time-line of events to see how the conflict has progressed since the killing of the youth on 9 February. Furthermore, they need to find out if the local government, police, or chiefs have intervened and how widely the fighting youth are supported by the rest of the communities.

UCP team members may conclude that there are a number of entry points for UCP to prevent or reduce violence and provide protection in this situation. Many civilians have been displaced and may fear additional violence. If other service providers are present at all they may also fear for their safety, especially local service providers. Local authorities and segments of the affected communities most likely do not support the violence, though it is important to determine their attitude toward it. In fact they may wish to intervene before the conflict expands in order to bring the two communities together as soon as possible. As most of them are directly or indirectly affiliated with one or another of the communities, potential peacemakers may fear being targeted if they take active roles. They may welcome the presence of a nonpartisan third party at their side.

Needs assessment

As soon as UCP personnel receive word of the first incident they will contact local partners and contacts in the area to gather information (pre-assessment). As the needs assessment coincides with a specific incident, information gathering for conflict analysis and needs assessment partly overlaps. UCP networks may already include actors from the affected areas; if not, local partners will be able to facilitate these relationships. Local contacts in affected communities may not only have more details about the situation, they will also be able to assess if it is appropriate for UCP personnel to become involved. UCP team members will approach local authorities for the same reasons. Moreover, they may ask them what local authorities in the affected areas have already done to respond to the crisis. They will also contact other service providers in the area. Since reports about casualties and displacement will have circulated quickly, other service providers may be planning a rapid response assessment and may be interested in teaming up.

Following initial information gathering and an affirmative response from local actors to their possible involvement, the UCP team may plan a rapid response needs assessment. Ideally this assessment is conducted in collaboration with other service providers. As early reports may already have indicated the need for food and other supplies, a collaborative needs assessment would identify and/or address various needs as quickly as possible. The communication network in rural areas may be limited, which could hinder the exchange of information. This makes it even more important for UCP personnel to travel in person to

the area to gather information and assess the needs from a variety of perspectives. As the incidents have taken place during the dry season, the roads will be accessible by car, though affected areas may still be hard to reach.

Team members will have to determine the location of the needs assessment prior to departure. Because the attacks started at the Maduynyi Cattle Camp and two villages in Mvolo, this would be a likely place to start. They may also try to identify the exact place where the youth was killed on 9 February and engage with the community there to find out what happened. The most urgent issue, however, is to locate the displaced people. As mentioned in the case study, 6,000 homes have been burned down, over 76,000 people have been displaced, dozens of civilians including children have been killed or injured, and hundreds of cattle and goats have been raided. Moreover, children are hiding in the bushes, dying from various diseases. Children, women, and elderly people have also been found without food, water, and health services. Once located, UCP personnel will need to engage with these people to assess their needs. Based on the reports, there seems to be a need for food, water, shelter, medical treatment, and safety. There may also be children who have lost their parents in the attacks or were separated from their families during their flight. As livestock has been raided, many people have lost their source of income.

The UCP team will not only engage with vulnerable populations, but also with local authorities, community leaders, and civil society organizations. They will need to engage with these actors to build trust, increase their understanding of the conflict, and assess the needs of these actors. These are important actors as they may be the drivers of change, as well as potential partners. Team members will explore with them how UCP may be of service to the communities in reducing violence and protecting civilians.

In conducting the needs assessment, UCP personnel have to make sure they engage with both sides of the conflict, even if most of the urgent protection needs are identified on one side. They have to demonstrate that they are nonpartisan and advocate for the safety and security of civilians rather than favouring a particular outcome to the conflict. Furthermore, they need to engage with the authorities at the county and state levels in both Lakes State and Western Equatoria State to make sure that the presence of UCP personnel is explained and supported. This would also ensure that emergency response action by various actors is coordinated and streamlined.

Context and security analysis

Context analysis in this situation will take place during the needs assessment and during any follow-up missions to the affected areas. However, an assessment of the security situation both on the roads and at the location of the needs assessment will need to be conducted prior to departure. If the conditions are not deemed sufficiently safe, the needs assessment cannot take place. In this particular fighting situation, there is no indication that external actors are targeted. The youth involved in the fighting seem to have moved to the border areas between the states to confront each other. Moreover, the displaced people will have moved to safer areas where UCP personnel can assess their needs. Accessibility of the area needs to be assessed prior to departure. The affected areas may be located in remote areas that are difficult to reach by road and perhaps impossible to reach by phone. Local authorities, police and partners will be key sources of information in regard to security and accessibility.

During their journey and on location, UCP team members will try to observe and analyze the situation. Are people armed? Who are they? What weapons are they using? What is the ratio of women to men among the displaced people? Are particular groups targeted? Are they fearful? Are they injured? Are they willing to talk to UCP personnel? Where do they come from and where do they go? Team members will try to answer these questions and ask similar questions again on their following visits. This will help them to detect trends and changes in the situation and anticipate additional crises. One of the impending crises in this situation could come in the form of food insecurity. If a settlement of the conflict is not reached by the beginning of the rainy season, the displaced people may not be able to return to their homes. This means that they cannot start cultivating their crops and will risk having no food for the rest of the year, which could increase tension and spark more conflict.

Part of the context analysis is focused on the position of UCP in the conflict. As the UCP organization has a base in Western Equatoria, but not in Lakes State, it could be perceived to be on the side of the Mvolo community. Most of the UCP activities will have been conducted among the Mvolo community and their relationships with the Mvolo community may be stronger as a result of this. The UCP team can reduce this vulnerability by building relationships with key actors on all levels in Lakes State as well as with the community in Yirol West. Other vulnerabilities of UCP personnel may be identified as well. Criminal actors may take advantage of the chaos and pose threats. These actors may not target UCP practitioners, but precautionary measures have to be taken to avoid being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Identification of populations to be served

The first population to be served will be the displaced people. They are in urgent need of help. UCP personnel may be able to support the displaced people in increasing their safety and security. They will not be able to address many of the needs of the displaced people directly as many of these needs involve material aid, but they can engage other service providers who may be able to address material needs.

Other populations to be served are the wider communities of Mvolo and Yirol West. UCP team members may support them in reducing and preventing violence, as well as increasing their safety and security. They may also strengthen local peace infrastructures in the two communities in their efforts to resolve the conflict and build peace. Though the displaced people come from these same communities, they are considered a specific target group with distinct needs.

A third population to be served consists of individuals and groups who will take a leadership role in addressing the crisis situation and/or resolving the conflict. These actors may be local peacemakers from one of the two communities, but it may also be representatives from a national mediation NGO located in the capital city. The UCP team may support these actors in addressing the situation.

Identification of local partners

UCP organizations often do not have to look for local partners. During the needs assessment they will engage with a wide range of actors about the situation and the potential role of UCP in the situation.

A partnership may fall into place during one of these encounters. The national mediation NGO, for example, is an obvious choice for a partnership. They may have been approached by local authorities or community leaders and have come down to the area to do their own assessment. There may also be local relief and development agencies in the affected area that have assumed a leadership role in the crisis and approached UCP personnel during their needs assessment. Additionally, local community leaders such as tribal elders may offer to partner once they have met and feel confidence in the potential UCP intervention.

Though teaming up with civil society organizations is usually the easiest and most frequently used form of partnerships, in this particular situation there may not be any organized civil society organizations in the area. Therefore, the establishment of ongoing working relationships with the local government, informal structures or with community leaders would be the most obvious strategy here.

UCP competencies and methods

The use of UCP methods depends very much on the expressed needs and interests of the populations served, as well as the recommendations of local partners. Asking the right questions and active listening are key skills in drawing out these needs and interests. The following text describes how UCP team members of Nonviolent Peaceforce applied a variety of skills and methods in this particular situation.

As the only civilian protection agency working in the area, Nonviolent Peaceforce became involved from the early days of this conflict. Their team members, initially four internationals and six nationals, utilized various strategies to increase the security of civilians affected by the fighting and to support the development of a sustainable peace agreement. Working together with local government authorities, they were able to locate many of the civilians who had been displaced by the fighting. UCP teams played a key role in linking humanitarian service providers with the populations in need. They alerted their partners, participated in interagency assessments of internal displacement, and advocated for humanitarian agencies to provide emergency support, while developing strategies to mitigate the violence.

Because Nonviolent Peaceforce had an office in Western Equatoria State, but not in Lakes States, they had to ensure that both sides of the conflict perceived them as a trusted and nonpartisan actor. Therefore, the team members undertook several trips to Lakes State, where they began to build relationships with communities and government officials. This laid the groundwork for later UCP interventions. By May they had established trust with community leaders, chiefs, elders, youth, police, government, and military on both sides. They also gained a comprehensive understanding of the conflict dynamics and needs of all parties involved.

Developing relationships on both sides of the conflict was crucial, but they also needed to identify key actors on all levels of the conflict. The strategic first step was spending time visiting the affected communities and local government officials, such as the district commissioners and village administrators. UCP team members worked together with partners such as the Mundri Relief and Development Association (MRDA). They coordinated and participated in the three Peace Conferences that MRDA held in April, July, and September. They also provided a constant protective presence within the affected communities. Following these initial efforts, UCP team members travelled to the state capitals of Western Equatoria and Lakes State to meet with the governors and ministers. The governors of both states were involved in the

project at the state level, but were not involved in the detailed engagements at the community level. While team members in the field engaged with the authorities at the state level, others in the capital city met with members of the national legislative assembly to gain support from high-level government officials.

As the project developed, the Nonviolent Peaceforce team also ended up working closely together with a unit of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), called the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU). The JIU, deployed to the area to bring the situation under control, had a difficult time engaging with the various parties as they were sent out to cover two states with one vehicle and no communication equipment. Nevertheless, according to the UCP team members, the JIU turned out to be a very helpful partner. "...they were one of the most genuine group of soldiers we had ever worked with and they were eager to be agents of peace..." (Easthom, n.d.).

At the beginning of May 2011, UCP personnel learned of an initiative coming from the chiefs on each side to meet. On three occasions meetings were scheduled, but all failed. On 25 May two UCP teams travelled along the borders of Mvolo and Yirol West to meet with a number of key actors. These actors included local government officials, chiefs, elders, youth, as well as the recently deployed Joint Integrated Unit forces.³ The UCP team members inquired why the scheduled meetings were cancelled. The local government and chiefs told them that the community feared to travel to each other's side of the border to meet. Two days later UCP personnel coordinated with the Joint Integrated Unit and the local government to hold the first peace talks. UCP team members accompanied chiefs and local leaders from Kokori to Mapourdit, two of the most affected areas, to meet. They provided proactive presence throughout the meeting. This was the first time since the start of the conflict in February that chiefs crossed the border from one side to the other.

The dialogue was remarkably successful. Peace and freedom of movement were officially declared between the communities of Kokori and Mapourdit. Furthermore, concrete measures were established to improve the situation for civilians affected by the conflict and to strengthen the relationships between the two communities. For example, both sides agreed that the main hospital would be reopening with immediate effect to provide medical care to the sick and injured people from Mvolo. These patients had been too afraid to travel into Mapourdit since February. Schools located in Lakes State, which had provided educations to residents from both Yirol West and Mvolo, re-opened. Chiefs encouraged their displaced communities to return home. Furthermore, a structure of accountability between the youths, chiefs, and local government was agreed upon to strengthen the peace process. Any breaches of the agreement were to be reported to the Joint Integrated Unit forces.

Despite the significant progress, more dialogue was necessary. In order to sustain and further strengthen the peace process, chiefs from other affected areas, as well as the two most respected leaders in Yirol West and Mvolo would need to participate and buy in to the peace agreements. UCP teams organized and accompanied a convoy of four vehicles to carry the chiefs, elders, and youth from Mvolo to Yirol West to the second round of peace talks on 7 June.

³ The JIU were neutral forces composed of government soldiers from outside this conflict area, who had been specifically deployed to support security within these communities.

The second round of peace talks was emotional and intense. Chiefs on both sides expressed a strong desire to restore peace. As a result of the talks, peace and freedom of movement were officially declared between all communities along the border. IDPs were encouraged to return home and begin their cultivation. The chiefs also agreed to meet again to draft guidelines on how the different communities would interact. This involved cattle-keepers obtaining and carrying letters of permission from local government officials whenever they entered other villages. Finally, on 10 June 2011 UCP team members accompanied chiefs from Yirol West into Mvolo to a special ceremony and monitored the meeting as all participating chiefs signed the peace agreement.

Evidence of the success of the ceasefire agreement was already apparent the day following the first meeting on May 27 when UCP personnel observed nurses returning to the hospital to resume their work. The ceasefire agreement also included provisions to allow IDPs to safely return home without the threat of further violence. In the days following the first peace talks, UCP personnel observed small groups of men returning to the deserted communities to begin cultivation and by the end of the second peace talks, families were observed walking home with their belongings. The chiefs from the border communities estimated that approximately half of their people returned in those days.

Following the peace agreement UCP team members worked together with the two communities to monitor its implementation. On 22 June the peace process faced its first challenge. There was news that five unidentified youth went looking for their cattle that had been stolen in the first major incident on 9 February in Mvolo area. Once the youth realized there were no cattle in the area for them to reclaim they killed five people. The investigator for the South Sudan Police Service in Greater Mundri immediately led an investigation team to collect information, informing the local community not to take the law into their own hands. UCP personnel arrived on 23 June and stayed until 25 June to meet with authorities and community leaders. There was an enormous sense of frustration and anger among community members in Mvolo. They felt the other side was not keeping their part to the peace agreement.

Although there were communication channels between the two sides, the relationship was still weak. Moreover, the chiefs did not know whom to contact to find out why they had been attacked. Because the UCP teams had built relationships with both sides, they travelled into Yirol West to meet with community leaders and authorities to gather information. From 27 to 30 June a UCP team was deployed to first meet with the Mvolo side again, before going to Yirol West. This visit was simply made to advise the community in Mvolo about the trip they were undertaking to Yirol West. It made the affected communities aware about the movements of UCP personnel in the area. In Yirol West, UCP team members quickly found out that the communities of Yirol West were appalled by the incident. The administrator of Mapourdit as well as the head chief both sent letters of condolence to the communities in Mvolo and informed them that they had nothing to do with the attack.

When the perpetrators were apprehended, UCP personnel visited them in prison. They also engaged with the leaders of the community to which the perpetrators belonged. This community feared revenge attacks and made a real effort to explain that the community did not support these criminal acts. They also wrote letters to the communities of Mvolo to express their condolences. UCP team members traveled back to Mvolo to share the information they had obtained on their trip to Yirol West. This helped to ease tensions in Mvolo and the leaders of the affected areas in Mvolo expressed their willingness to re-engage with the other side to further increase the relationship and

prevent similar incidents in the future.

In all of these efforts UCP personnel tried to identify the actors most committed to the peace process. They encouraged these actors to influence those who were losing confidence in the process in order to avoid a re-escalation of the conflict. UCP teams continued for a long time to provide follow-up support to these communities. They visited tribal chiefs to ensure that information of the ceasefire had been properly disseminated and planned a follow-up conference to ensure buy-in from all tribal chiefs. They also provided accompaniment for returning IDPs to the affected areas. Finally, UCP personnel supported the leadership from both communities to document their resolutions and to formulate mutually agreed codes of conduct. This would guide communities through difficult issues such as cattle movement and the use of land. In September 2011 the chiefs on each side signed a Memorandum of Understanding that consolidated all the agreements.

There have been no conflicts since September. Usually the conflicts are in the dry season between September and April. This has been a 100% success. I give the credit to Nonviolent Peaceforce.

Sapana Abuyi, Deputy Governor Western Equatoria State in South Sudan, 2012

Though South Sudan descended into civil war in December 2013, large-scale violence between the Jur farmers and the Dinka cattle keepers in Mvolo County and Yirol West County has not yet repeated itself. There have been a couple of minor incidents in the area, but no deaths have been reported since the September agreement. The effects of the civil war have been felt in the area and increased all sorts of tensions, but the local government has reportedly been effective in diffusing major tensions that could lead to a resurfacing of the conflict between the farmers and the cattle keepers. Nonviolent Peaceforce has continued to monitor the situation and occasionally sent a UCP team to the area to conduct community dialogues and support affected populations to explore their options. These teams observed that local communities have been proactive in solving conflicts nonviolently and appeared strongly committed to prevent new outbreaks of violence.

Exit strategy

Throughout the peace process, stakeholders repeatedly shared with UCP personnel that they felt they needed to learn how to deal with conflicts without violence. As a component of conflict prevention, Nonviolent Peaceforce therefore developed a capacity development programme for the two communities. This programme was designed to increase the skills and the confidence of community members to engage in nonviolent conflict resolution and develop unarmed community protection mechanisms. A training-of-trainers was provided as a conclusion to the capacity development programme, allowing local actors to continue to train more people. As a follow-up to the capacity development programme, UCP personnel worked together with the two communities to develop their Early Warning Early Response (EWER) capacities.

The capacity development programme and the establishment of community-based EWER systems can be seen as part of an exit strategy. The capacity development programme helped to increase the confidence and capability of local actors to take over the role of UCP teams in the process as well as to develop the capacity and confidence of others. The development of

EWER systems strengthened UCP infrastructures in the area, which communities could use to prevent and reduce violence in the following years.

The case study shows that many of the UCP methods presented in module 3 were used over the course of this particular conflict. Some of these methods could have been applied more extensively, in different ways, or at different stages of the conflict. Additional methods like interpositioning could have been applied as well. However, the choice of methods and their particular application in a particular situation depends very much on specific developments in the conflict, as well as the initiatives of local actors. The moment community leaders initiated peace talks or peace conferences, UCP team members responded to these initiatives and adapted their strategy to support them. It clearly shows that local actors are the main actors in the peace process, while UCP personnel work as catalysts, creating the space for these processes to take place, nurturing the processes and ensuring they are followed through, despite many obstacles. In doing these activities, UCP teams not only accompanied individuals but also accompanied the process.

The case study only describes a few obstacles. There were many more. Reducing violence, protecting civilians, and supporting a sustainable resolution to this conflict required NP to engage in 115 separate interventions between February and September 2011. It shows that peacekeeping requires sustained effort over a longer period of time. It also shows that a peace agreement may only be the beginning of a much longer peace process. The investment in direct attention and presence in the community yields real rewards, in the gradual restoration of safer communities.

5.5

DILEMMAS

During the implementation of UCP in situations of violent conflict, throughout the UCP programming cycle, a variety of dilemmas can arise. Difficult choices have to be made between two or more alternatives that are equally undesirable or may lead to undesirable consequences, or where there is pressure (for example from donors or governments). A lot of these dilemmas are caused by the tensions that arise between the various key principles and key sources of guidance when they are applied to a specific context, as well as the realities of conditions on the ground.

The following sections provide a number of dilemmas that UCP practitioners may face.

Promoting human rights and nonviolence versus the primacy of local actors

UCP teams may find themselves in situations where the civilians they protect or the actors they team up with engage in actions that seem to go against UCP principles. They may for example find a weapon on a human rights defender they are about to accompany, even though the organization that person represents espouses nonviolence. The principles of the primacy of local actors and nonpartisanship require UCP practitioners not to interfere in the affairs of local actors. At the same time, the principle of nonviolence tells them not to support or be associated with armed struggle. This can be a dilemma.

Though UCP practitioners refrain from imposing their views on local actors, it does not mean they have to respect violent attitudes or behaviour. In regards to the abovementioned example, they may engage the human rights defender in a dialogue about the use of weapons, the perception that carrying a weapon creates, and its impact on the work of the organization. Furthermore, they may offer the defender the possibility to proceed with the accompaniment if he or she decides to go unarmed, all the while clearly explaining that ultimately it is the choice of the defender to decide on the desired course of action.

Being responsive versus primacy of local actors

In certain isolated areas of violent conflict, UCP teams may be the only service providers present. Though the levels of violence are high and protection needs many, state structures may be limited and organized civil society nonexistent. Interest in UCP services may be apparent, though it is not articulated or formulated into official requests. This situation prompts

UCP personnel to take a more active role in the prevention of violence and the protection of civilians. If the primacy of local actors is too strictly adhered to, there is a risk of stagnation. UCP teams will be perceived as not responsive to the urgent needs and may even risk further disempowering an already disempowered community. Though traditional mechanisms can be identified (they exist in every situation) and capacity can be developed, UCP organizations will have to exercise a greater degree of leadership for a time in these contexts.

In determining the boundaries of their more active involvement, UCP personnel not only need to consider the danger of interfering in local affairs, but also in overreaching their professional capacity. The lack of basic support services and expert service providers may prompt them to be responsive and support affected communities wherever they can (“if we don’t do anything, no one else will”). This may be appropriate in some cases, but not in other cases. Providing trauma counselling to survivors of sexual violence without appropriate skills may not only be unprofessional, but it may even cause harm. Even the act of simply opening a space to talk about sexual violence, without providing any access to psychosocial and medical support services, may have a negative impact. It may encourage women to come forward and address these issues in their community, while UCP teams do not have access to the necessary support services to back them up.

Another issue related to the dilemma of being responsive, while maintaining the primacy of local actors, is immediate conflict intervention. Perceived as expert peace workers, UCP personnel are often approached by local actors independent of an EWER system to solve urgent conflicts in the community or interposition themselves in a fight. Not only is such an active role in many cases interfering with the principle of the primacy of local actors (i.e., local police, elders, or others might asked), it may also interfere with being nonpartisan. Moreover, it is often a security risk. UCP protection methods are mainly preventive and interpositioning is only undertaken after very careful preparation and risk assessment. It would be more appropriate if local actors would intervene in the conflict themselves, while UCP teams provide a protective presence. In another example, UCP organizations may be asked to provide training or other forms of capacity development, that could be provided by or at least include local actors in leadership. Community people may prefer the ‘outside experts’ and request just UCP support, but care must be taken not to undermine the position of local expertise.

Preventing violence versus promoting conflict transformation

Prevention of violence is a key objective of UCP. De-escalating tensions is one method that UCP practitioners use to prevent violence. De-escalating tensions at the stage of confrontation may prevent violence, but it may also reaffirm an unjust status quo (structural violence) and prevent the transformation of conflict. Oppressed groups may have accepted an unjust status quo for a long time, but at some point feel sufficiently confident and emboldened to confront their oppressors. Confrontation in this case is a sign that the balance of power is shifting. It may eventually lead to a more just status quo. At this stage the injustices need to be made visible in order for negotiations to take place and change to occur. Civil society advocates may push for a re-balancing of power. They may amplify the voice of the oppressed, legitimize their concerns and aspirations, and undermine the legitimacy, authority, and power of those who rule over them. The confrontation is addressed through either violent struggle or active nonviolence, or a combination of both.

UCP methods such as accompaniment, proactive presence, capacity development and confidence-building may be partly responsible for the initiatives of local actors in challenging the unjust status quo. Guided by the principles of nonviolence and of International Human Rights Law, UCP practitioners may encourage this process, as long as the confrontation is addressed through nonviolence. As nonpartisan actors, though, they must refrain from taking the side of those driving the process. This is a subtle difference that can be extremely challenging for individual UCP practitioners, who may have joined the UCP agency out of their commitment to social justice. In case of a vertical conflict, in which the government is maintaining the unjust status quo, UCP personnel are easily perceived as interfering with state sovereignty. They may be perceived as taking the side of ‘trouble makers’ and ‘actively promoting conflict’. If the confrontation becomes violent, the government may even blame UCP teams for actively promoting violence. Under these circumstances it is of the utmost importance that UCP team members maintain a strict discipline in adhering to nonpartisanship, nonviolence, and the primacy of local actors. One step out of line may give the government the justification to shut down the entire UCP operation and expel the international UCP personnel.

Using privilege versus nonviolence

Some UCP practitioners make use of the special status that a foreigner is given in many places around the world, in order to provide protection. Even many of those deemed to be ruthless killers usually abide by etiquettes of hospitality and civility. UCP personnel are often perceived as “guests”. The Swahili phrase “when the guest arrives, the host desists” succinctly states the mechanism.⁴ UCP teams “use the psychological force of the universal inclination to hospitality to prevent their ‘hosts’ from losing this esteem. Granted, this is a subtle ‘force’, but no less real. It exists only through face-to-face presence of ‘guests’, especially guests from places most distant...” (Grant, 2008).

Using the visibility and the privilege accorded to them as internationals to their advantage has been an important instrument of UCP protection strategies. It may have enabled them to pass through checkpoints, and given them access to military camps or to authorities who are reluctant to meet local actors from particular ethnic groups or classes. This, however, can be a dangerous use of privilege. It can reinforce the existing oppressive order and may contribute to preventing the population from standing up for their rights. In that way, UCP presence can contribute to a culture in which the state is not held accountable for the continuation of a discriminatory status quo. UCP organizations usually counter this by developing the capacity and confidence of oppressed minority groups and facilitating dialogue between minority groups and other groups, including state actors.

Building confidence versus protection

Building confidence usually empowers people, but if it is not handled correctly it can also disempower people. In a situation of violent conflict it can even put people at risk. If confidence building is not linked to a real improvement in security, it could encourage excessive risk-taking. Conversely, when training becomes teaching people what to do or ignores local

⁴ The aphorism refers to a husband and wife who must stop arguing because a guest has arrived.

wisdom it can reinforce dependency on external experts and decrease confidence.

The East Timor experience is an example of high-stakes encouragement. The presence of UN peacekeepers in East Timor encouraged full popular participation in the ballot that led to independence. It enabled Timorese political organizations to feel that they, in turn, could encourage popular participation. As violence and threats mounted, the UN mission promised, 'We will not leave.' But it was a promise that the UN mission could not keep; as security conditions deteriorated drastically, the mission reached a point where it felt that its protective impact was not significant enough to justify the risk to its staff. The mission first pulled out of all the provinces, and then held on in Dili until a military intervention was mandated (and until it could evacuate the national staff and IDPs hiding in its compound). In this case the policy of encouragement—firmly supported by the leadership of Timorese civil society—may have increased civilian vulnerability to subsequent massacres (Mahony, 2006, p.77).

The strategy of stopping a bullet only works once.

Tiffany Easthom, NP Executive Director

Self protection versus protecting others

Increasing the safety and security of threatened civilians is one of the highest priorities in UCP, but it is never done at the expense of the safety of UCP personnel. They are not asked to sacrifice themselves to save others. The basic rationale behind this is a pragmatic choice: UCP practitioners cannot protect if they get shot. Furthermore, the death of a peacekeeper will have a negative impact on the capacity of UCP to provide protection. Even if vulnerable civilians are under immediate threat, UCP teams may have to seek cover instead of advance and protect. As has been mentioned before, UCP is a preventive strategy, not a defensive one. It is something all UCP practitioners know, but in a situation of immediate threat, it is not always easy to apply. Moreover, it is often not easy to determine the severity of a threat.

Most UCP agencies have strict security protocols in place to prevent such occurrences. Evacuation of UCP personnel is often a decision taken by the country director and does not allow individual team members the option to stay behind and protect civilians. Even a consensus-based organization like PBI has exceptional mechanisms in place: a particular body is provided with the authority to make a unilateral decision on the evacuation of UCP personnel in emergency situations. Risk assessments and context analysis are continually carried out to evaluate the security situation. UCP teams also rely heavily on their extensive network of relationships, especially local partners, but also diplomatic and NGO communities. In a very real way, they are being protected by those they have come to protect. For instance, when a UCP team member of Nonviolent Peaceforce was kidnapped in Mindanao in 2009, local civil society groups held public demonstrations demanding his release.

Immediate needs versus sustainable capacity development and change

UCP practitioners in the field are frequently confronted with a dilemma between reacting to current needs versus developing and implementing plans towards more sustainable changes. Parents may approach UCP personnel, requesting support for the return of their children from

armed groups, IDPs may need help negotiating with other agencies and the government, a crisis flares and specific communities may need proactive presence. These activities can consume all available resources and push to the background previously planned activities such as supporting the development of a community network or establishing a local protection team. The pressures of daily work and the need to react to immediate needs is often seen as being in contradiction with the need to take time to update context analysis, make a work plan, or collect evaluation data. This can be understood as a dilemma between the primacy of local actors and their requests, versus the need to build sustainable change. Or it might be characterized as a dilemma between the immediacy of the need to uphold IHL and human rights versus the need to develop local capacities to do sustainably which would support the primacy of local actors in the long term.

One can even think of this as a dilemma regarding UCP practitioners being nonviolent toward themselves versus responding to the context at hand. Thomas Merton noted that: "There is a pervasive form of contemporary violence to which the idealist most easily succumbs: activism and overwork. The rush and pressure of modern life are a form, perhaps the most common form, of its innate violence. To allow oneself to be carried away by a multitude of conflicting concerns, to surrender to too many demands, to commit oneself to too many projects, to want to help everyone in everything, is to succumb to violence. The frenzy of our activism neutralizes our work for peace. It destroys our own inner capacity for peace. It destroys the fruitfulness of our own work, because it kills the root of inner wisdom which makes work fruitful." (Merton, 1977)

These are just several of the many dilemmas, which UCP practitioners face. There are no simple formulas to guide decision making in these cases. They present what can be termed wicked problems. UCP practitioners must rely on a strong grounding in the principles and practices of UCP, a strong team that can discuss the specifics of the situation and help each other make good decisions, and the humility to acknowledge mistakes and change course.



Summary of key messages

- Successful UCP interventions are complex requiring meticulous and often ongoing conflict and context analysis, needs assessments, security management, communication with multiple parties, external support structures, exit strategies, appropriate choices of personnel and partners and the application of appropriate methods and skills.
- Context analysis refers to the detailed examination of the ongoing developments and dynamics of a specific situation. It allows UCP practitioners to identify trends in violence in order to predict and prevent crises, as well as to prepare for a timely response to a crisis situation.
- The security of UCP field staff and assets is inextricably linked to its mission of improving the security and protection of civilians in situations of violent conflict. UCP practitioners cannot protect others if they cannot first protect themselves. The first concern of all UCP fieldwork therefore is to ensure the security of its own staff, reputation and assets.
- UCP operations are phased out when local actors no longer need or want UCP, when UCP has achieved some of its objectives but is unable to do more, or when UCP has been a failure or expelled by the government. Exit strategies need to have clear and attainable objectives and address how UCP efforts will be sustained by local infrastructures, following the exit of UCP personnel.
- During the implementation phase, UCP practitioners will face a variety of dilemmas that are caused by the tensions between the various key principles of UCP. Strict adherence to these principles alone will not solve these dilemmas. A deep understanding of these principles, as well as skill and common sense are essential.
- Effective UCP requires sustained effort, flexibility, persistence, and the strategic use of a wide variety of methods. Successful UCP means being present at the right time, the right place, and ready to apply the right methods and the right skills to support local actors in stopping violence and resolving conflicts.



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APPENDICES

1

CASE STUDIES

The following is a brief record of five events. These events illustrate the various UCP methods and approaches that were used at different times during that conflict.

April 2011

Verifying violence and cultivating confidence in western Mindanao

A sudden firefight erupted in one of the most isolated and disputed locations of western Mindanao on 7 April 2011 when some 400 armed men from law enforcement agencies surrounded an island with land troops and military boats in an operation aimed at securing the arrest of a criminal group. A 4.5 hour firefight ensued in which several loud explosions were heard displacing some 4,000 civilians, the entire population of the island, burning 13 houses and killing nine suspected criminals – burnt beyond recognition.

On the request of local stakeholders, Nonviolent Peaceforce's (NP) Quick Response Team, comprised of both International and National Protection Monitors, embarked upon a three-day verification mission. Mindanao is a large island about the size of Greece so it took the team some 10 hours and a boat-ride to reach the secluded sight in western Mindanao.

The prompt intervention of NP helped to ensure the immediate and safe return of the 4,000 frightened civilians to their homes. Before NP's presence, they were reluctant to do so for fear of further attacks.

A local representative of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) said, "The people in my municipality, and in particular the people in the village which you visited, are very happy for your eagerness to help them diffuse their fears..."

NP's presence also helped to ensure the incident was dealt with immediately and was afforded proper attention warranted by higher authorities one result of which was compensation to the families whom houses were burned.

The Vice Mayor of Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay Province, said: "Thank you Nonviolent Peaceforce for the concern for the people of my community. We will do our best to cure their trauma and will assist them the best we can".

A complicating feature to the conflict, and of relevance in this particular incident, is ordinary

but widespread banditry confuses both the origin of violent attacks, extortion and kidnapping. In this case, it was unclear whether the target of the operation was indeed an MILF member or only a criminal. If he was an MILF member, the operation would have implications far greater than just an operation against criminal elements and could indeed constitute a ceasefire violation. Such a violation could trigger retaliation and counter-retaliation, thereby derailing the entire peace process resulting in massive displacements and irreparable damage to civilians and their property. In the past, triggers not unlike this one, precipitated full-scale hostilities. It was therefore imperative for NP's team to determine the affiliations and alliances of the target of the operation. In Mindanao, these alliances and affiliations are not straight-forward and are often complicated by multiple affiliations which can include a vast network of family, political and criminal alliances.

Upon arriving at the site, one member of the verification team said: "The first thing that struck me was the imposing silence and emptiness of the area. Houses remained closed and only domestic animals were seen wandering. The scene portrayed chaos and destruction. Thirteen houses and many trees were totally burned. Impacts of bullets could be seen on walls of the remaining houses and trees." After the incident all civilians had left the island, fearing for their safety and security.

The reconstruction of the incident with the police and some witnesses shed light on the course of the incident and focused on the sequence of events and questioned the balance of force against the objective pursued. The observation also evaluated the amount of destruction and assessed the needs and possibilities for civilians affected by the incident to return safely to their location.

As per the Civilian Protection Component's mandate, the resulting detailed report was sent to the International Monitoring Team who in turn shared the report with the both the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Peace Panels. The key parties to the peace process on the basis of NPP's verification conducted an investigation of the incident. Further, the report was discussed at length during a round of exploratory talks of the peace process held in Malaysia. This speaks loads to the positive impact that NP is having on civilian protection related issues and is the first time a specific civilian protection related issue was talked about in the forum of the official exploratory peace talks.

NP's report found that no violation of the ceasefire between the government and the MILF had occurred during the encounter. Rather, it was an operation meant to reinforce the law and was ordered by the police in Zamboanga Sibugay supported by the army. However, it did suggest that future similar operations be better coordinated, especially when carried out in predominantly Muslim areas, so as to preclude panic amongst civilian populations resulting in displacement because of the impression that the army is targeting muslim populations. Joint mechanisms to combat criminality exist.

As a final testament to the positive impact of such interventions, local residents of the secluded island requested NP establish an office there to help ensure their safety and security. Incidentally, NP was officially requested by local civil society to establish a field office in the Zamboanga peninsula previously. Although the request is still under consideration, NP made a series of initial courtesy visits to local Government authorities to explore the viability of the proposal. Local response has thus far been positive.

June 2012

Cultivating a culture of peace in future leaders

Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) in the Philippines supports the peace process by assisting in the development of future Bangsamoro¹ leaders and managers who will utilize their political and socio-economic knowledge and skills to improve the situation in conflict-affected Mindanao.

Twelve future leaders, from all across conflict-affected central and western Mindanao, including the most conflict-affected island provinces of Sulu and Basilan, attended a three-day training from 28-30 May 2012 given by NP's Maguindanao field team. The training was done in support of the Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute (BLMI).

Majid Nur, a participant from Al-Barka, Basilan, where late last year a clash between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines resulted in the death of 19 soldiers said: "Thank you Nonviolent Peaceforce for delivering this training. We live in places with many challenges so it is good for us to learn more about human rights and conflict management. It will help us support our people in time of conflict."

The BLMI, a registered nongovernmental organization, is envisioned to be a center of excellence and repository of knowledge in the discipline of human resource development that produces individuals of impeccable character, equipped with exemplary leadership and managerial qualities for the transformation of the Bangsamoro people.

The establishment of the BLMI was discussed during the 10th Formal Exploratory Talks between the two parties in February 2006. It was finalized and formally agreed upon during the 14th Formal Exploratory Talks held on 14-15 November 2007, with funding commitment from the Philippine Government to jumpstart the Institute's operations.

The Government of the Philippines (GPH) panel chair Dean Marvic Leonen said: "If I have to underscore the many gains that the negotiating process between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front achieved, I would count the establishment of the Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute to be close to the top of the list."

In the wake of NP's training, the BLMI officially launched the institution on 6 June 2012 in a new building. Mohagher Iqbal, chair of the MILF Peace Panel, during the turnover ceremony, attended by NP representatives, said: "We acknowledge with utmost sincerity the big contribution extended by... Nonviolent Peaceforce through its Country Director, Brother Atif Hameed, in conducting training...needed to capacitate future Moro leaders especially from the youth sector."

The training was conducted on the request of the BLMI with an eye to forming a long-term sustainable partnership wherein NP will act to capacitate the Institute and conduct trainings related to unarmed civilian peacekeeping and human rights. The training in May first gave an overview of NP and unarmed civilian peacekeeping and then delved into various related topics

¹ Bangsamoro refers to the Moro people or nation. The word comes from the Malay word *bangsa*, meaning nation or people, and the Spanish word *moro*, from the Spanish word for Moor, the Reconquista-period term used for Muslims.

including sessions on but not limited to: conflict analysis, peaceful approaches to solving conflict, International Humanitarian Law, Grave Childs Rights Violations, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The sessions were participatory in nature and the participants were eager to share their own experiences in light of the training.

Tirso Tahir, a participant from Zamboanga City said: “It is very hard for us living in conflict-affected Mindanao to be patient. But we would like to thank NP for the opportunity to come together here. It is important that we listen to each other and the other party. This platform will help us to understand human rights violations and its remedies.”

The training not only served to educate the future leaders on their rights and obligations under international and national law, but also connected the participants with the newly appointed Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao’s Commission on Human Rights Director, Attorney Laisa Alamia.

At the turnover ceremony, the Malaysian facilitator Tengku Dato’ AB Ghafar Tengku Mohamed aptly pointed out: “Peace without education is not peace, this is a very good step towards peace and development.”

As a member of the International Monitoring Team’s (IMT) Civilian Protection Component, and due to initiatives such as partnering with the BLMI, NP acts on two fronts in support of the peace talks: it supports the ceasefire as a member of the IMT and supports initiatives such as the BLMI, a product of the peace negotiations, geared towards confidence building and institutionalising endeavours supporting the peace process.

Silvestre Afable, former government chief peace negotiator under president Gloria Arroyo at the turnover ceremony said: “Confidence-building measures lie in the meat of any peace process anywhere in the world. While we seek a political solution in the peace talks, we try to safeguard the ceasefire like precious life itself, and carve out a positive direction for fighters-on-hold—who will hopefully trade their guns for ploughshares when a final settlement is reached.”

NP in the Philippines Country Director, Atif Hameed, said: “The budding partnership with the BLMI is a poignant example of how unarmed civilian peacekeeping can support actors in a conflict while they try to negotiate a sound and lasting peace.”

November 2012

Averting violence and displacement in Mindanao

“It was not long ago that in barangay Mamaanon that the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] and the MILF [Moro Islamic Liberation Front], heavily armed and ready to fight, came as close as 50 meters to one another. If it was not for Nonviolent Peaceforce who intervened, the community would have experienced the effects of another war ... Piagapo is already affected by conflict and cannot afford anymore, so I would also take the opportunity to appeal the community to support Nonviolent Peaceforce for the wonderful work they have been doing for peace in our community.”

This was said by the former Mayor and current Chairperson of the Association of Barangay Captains of Piagapo municipality on 8 November 2012 during a programme which included the official signing of a peace covenant between local military and MILF commanders, in the presence of Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) and the community.

The Chairperson was referring to an incident wherein due to a lack of coordination and miscommunication, elements of the AFP and the MILF were set for an imminent armed clash. The roughly 800 inhabitants of the barangay were panicking and preparing to flee.

An NP-trained EWER local monitor informed NP's local partner, the Kalimudan Foundation Inc, who in turn informed NP. NP immediately contacted the MILF and government bodies responsible for coordinating troop movements so as to avoid violent clashes under the ceasefire agreement.

They also contacted the security component of the International Monitoring Team, a third-party ceasefire mechanism led by Malaysia, of which NP is a part.

Within an hour, the ceasefire mechanisms did what they were designed to do – prevent open hostilities by utilising structured lines of communication. Sometimes though these lines become plugged and that is where NP and the local Early Warning mechanisms it helps to build have a profound impact, at many levels. A clash was avoided thereby surely preventing the loss of life. Civilians did not flee and the terrible consequences of such an action like the disruption to livelihoods and education was avoided.

And at the higher level? At the time, MILF and Government representatives were meeting in Malaysia for peace talks. Had violence occurred that day, it is likely that the talks would have been cut short, and had the violence spiraled out of control, in a worst case scenario, the delicate talks could have potentially been derailed. It was not long after the incident in question that the MILF and the Government signed a Framework Agreement for peace – a monumental step in achieving a just and lasting peace.

March 2011

Building bridges across conflict

Hundreds of people participated in a “Walk for Peace” in the conflict-affected municipality of Datu Piang, Maguindanao province, an event demonstrating the strong push of civil society organizations (CSOs) for the Peace Negotiating Panels of both the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to forge a negotiated political settlement of the conflict as soon as possible. Had it not been for Nonviolent Peaceforce's (NP) assistance, the walk would most likely not have taken place.

Maguindanao province is the most conflict-affected province in Mindanao. According to the International Organization for Migration some 82,000 individuals remain displaced in the province, resulting mainly from the 2008 conflict but also stemming from years of clan feuds over political power and land, which often boil over into renewed violence. The most infamous event in recent history connected to a clan feud in the province was the “Ampatuan Massacre” in which 57 people were slaughtered. At least 34 of these were journalists making it the single

deadliest event for the press in recorded history.

The massacre illustrates the often dangerous position that civil society finds itself working in, and Nonviolent Peaceforce Philippines can play a crucial role in supporting local initiatives for peace by, for example, bridging and convening a wide array of local actors and providing neutral space for these actors to come together, without fear.

Field Coordinator of Maguindanao field site said: “The community here is extremely polarized springing from years of conflict, and although difficult, we are in a position where we can bring the communities together.”

NP’s local partners in Datu Piang, the Bangsamoro Centre for Justpeace (BCJP) and the Kaduntaya Foundation Inc. (KFI) spearheaded the “Walk for Peace” initiative. To do so, the partners had to arrange a meeting with the Mayor and involve him in the planning. The partners also wished to include religious leaders in the peace walk, with whom they had not previously engaged. Upon their request NP’s field team held a series of meetings with the Mayor and/or his representatives and religious leaders, on separate occasions.

Both the local government unit and the local religious leaders had earlier been collaborating with NP and were therefore familiar with its mandate and thus agreed to meet NP’s local partners. The religious leaders however agreed to meet only on the condition that the meeting was to be held within the NP’s compound as they felt much safer talking openly within NP’s premises. The meeting went ahead and subsequently the Mayor appealed to all citizens to join the activity.

Abdulbasit R. Benito, BCJP’s Executive Director said: “NP’s field presence has really helped us bridge divides created by conflict and even strengthen our links with local institutions, a key factor in creating a robust and resilient civil society.”

The peace walk was a success and sent a clear message of the peoples’ desire for a just and lasting peace. People from all walks of life including women, youths, civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations participated. Further, both the local imam and the local priest invited their respective communities.

Shadab Mansoori, Field Coordinator of Maguindanao said: “I think the best part of the peace walk was that the local imam and the local priest led the procession holding hands and chatting the entire time”

This was a promising step towards reconciliation because new paths of communication and dialogue were created which sent a clear and resounding message to the communities: peace is the way forward.

Benito said: “We are very grateful for the work that Nonviolent Peaceforce has been doing in our community and its sincerity of purpose is evident in that it is the only international nongovernmental organization actually living and working conflict-affected communities across Mindanao.”

NP recognizes it is just one actor in a wide array of local organizations, local community leadership, national civic movements, political parties, women’s organizations, religious

organizations and others. In a conflict situation their diverse activities are critical to any serious strategies for change and need to be supported. NP supports peace initiatives of local actors like the BCJP and the KFI and works to connect diverse actors, like the Mayor with civil society. And crucially NP bridges divides created by conflict like that between the local imam and the local priest.

October 2010

Helping unknown victim of violence

In September, while visiting a municipality Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) had not been to before, the team noticed a camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) beside the highway. As the team was new to the area, it went down to meet the IDPs living there and learn more about their situation. NP was received with intrigue and it soon became clear that these IDPs were not used to international visitors. Initially they responded politely to our questions about their wellbeing, not sure about the team's motives or relationships with other actors in the conflict. However once the NP team explained that it is a member of the International Monitoring Team and has a specific Civilian Protection mandate, the IDPs began to open up about their anxieties and experiences. They described living in fear over the past few months because lawless armed groups had been roaming the area and targeting vulnerable communities, like their own. They started to tell the NP team about recent incidents and pointed to a ramshackle shelter nearby. They said a young girl living there had been shot two weeks before when one of these lawless groups entered the camp. NP quickly made its way to the shelter to find out what had happened.

Sitting quietly in the corner was 10-year-old Liz², wearing a bright yellow plaster cast on her leg. Liz's mother described how armed men had surrounded their home and fired indiscriminately as the family hid for safety inside. When the firing stopped, the family members realised Liz had been shot, a bullet passing through a bone in her leg. They told NP that the only support they had received since the incident was a small hand out from the local mayor to cover their transport to the hospital. Liz's mother said that the cost of the medication Liz needed was draining the family's resources and they were struggling to survive. NP then explained that it would try to link the family to an organization that could assist them and immediately returned to base to set about this task.

Through the main office NP was able to contact a number of International Nongovernmental Organizations and local welfare organizations. Details of the incident quickly passed from one agency to another, all alarmed by what they heard and eager to assist. Within a few days, several organizations came to visit Liz's family: the local Department of Social Welfare, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross; all of which pledged their support for Liz's future medical treatment.

The NP team recently returned to the camp where Liz resided and visited the family. Although Liz is still wearing the cast, it is due to come off shortly and the doctor expects her to make a full recovery. Moreover there was a noticeable change in how the family spoke with NP. They were much more positive about Liz's situation and the mood of the camp in general, saying

² Victims name has been changed

that they had not been harassed in recent weeks and felt a lot safer.

IDP communities are among the most vulnerable in Maguindanao and are often located in conflict-prone areas where NP is the only international organization with a sustained presence. Not only do they have to cope with the trauma of war and displacement, but they are also an easy target for armed groups. The recent influx of international organizations at the camp clearly sent a message to the armed groups that people do care about these communities and their actions will not go unnoticed. On one level, NP's intervention was simple, and on another level it was vital. There is a real need for the work NP is doing in these communities. NP bridges the gap between abandoned civilians and the people who can help them. It's a crucial link connecting those in need of services with those who can provide them, but very often a missing one.

2

UCP IN UN DOCUMENTS

1. UN General Assembly Resolution 69/139. Follow-up to the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace

Noting the initiatives of civil society, in collaboration with Governments, to strengthen civilian capacities to enhance the physical safety of vulnerable populations under threat of violence and to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes,¹

2. High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO). With respect to protecting civilians, the Panel recommends that:

Unarmed strategies must be at the forefront of UN efforts to protect civilians.

In view of the positive contributions of unarmed civilian protection actors, missions should work more closely with local communities and national and international non-governmental organizations in building a protective environment.²

3. The Global Study on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325. The study finds:

*Unarmed civilian protection (UCP) is a methodology for the direct protection of civilians and violence reduction that has grown in practice and recognition. **In the last few years, it has especially proven its effectiveness to protect women and girls.** And recommends that the UN in collaboration with Member States, Should: Promote women's empowerment and non-violent means of protection, and taking into account the whole range of women's protection issues and the interventions to address them—including women's leadership and women's empowerment—in mission planning, implementation, and reporting, as well as in policy discussions on the protection of civilians in the context of peace operations.*

Scale up their support to unarmed civilian protection (UCP) in conflict-affected

¹ Follow-up to the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly, 15 December 2014.

² Uniting Our Strengths for Planet, Peace, Politics, Partnership and People, Report of the High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, A/70/95-S/2015/446 (2015), p.23, United Nations, New York.

*countries, including working alongside peace operations.*³

4. Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

*The Special Committee underlines the relevance of unarmed strategies to protect civilians in peacekeeping operations... In this regard, and taking into account the positive contributions of unarmed civilian protection, the Special Committee stresses that peacekeeping missions should make every effort to leverage the non-violent practices and capabilities of local communities to support the creation of a protective environment.*⁴

5. The Report of the Secretary General: Mobilizing Collective Action: the next decade of the responsibility to protect.

*Second, we must bolster our investment in the broad range of peaceful tools available to protect populations affected by atrocity crimes. ...The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people (A/70/95-S/2015/446) also highlighted unarmed civilian protection measures as a significant part of this toolkit.*⁵

6. Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

*The Mission will also explore the use of unarmed civilian protection techniques to enhance its ability to protect civilians, in particular those threatened with sexual violence.*⁶

7. UN Security Council Resolution 2327 (2016) renewing the mandate for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

Recognizing that unarmed civilian protection can often complement efforts to build a protective environment, particularly in the deterrence of sexual and gender-based violence against civilians, and encouraging UNMISS, as appropriate, and when possible, to explore how it can use civilian protection techniques to enhance its ability to protect civilians, in line with the UN Secretary-General's recommendation,

³ Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing Peace: Global Study on the Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 (2015), pp.153, 157, UN Women, New York.

⁴ Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations for the 2016, substantive session Section 247, p.55; April 2016, New York.

⁵ The Report of the Secretary-General: Mobilizing Collective Action: the next decade of the responsibility to protect, A/70/999-S/2016/620, p.13, 22 July 2016, New York.

⁶ Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan: S/2016/951, p.12, 10 November 2016, New York.



Tiffany Easthom, executive director of Nonviolent Peaceforce, speaks at UN briefing in New York on unarmed civilian protection sponsored by the missions of Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica, the Netherlands and the Philippines on Oct 19, 2016. (Photo by Doug Hostetter)

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GLOSSARY





Nonviolent Peaceforce

GLOSSARY

C

Capacity is the ability of individuals, institutions, and broader systems to perform their functions effectively, efficiently and achieve their development objectives in a sustainable way. **Capacity development** is a long process whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time.

Capacity development in the context of UCP is understood as the strengthening of knowledge, skills and abilities for the purpose of violence prevention and protection of civilians. Capacity development includes training courses or workshops on topics such as UCP and human rights. It also includes the coaching and supporting of existing or newly established local protection mechanisms.

Ceasefire monitoring is used to observe the implementation of the ceasefire (a ceasefire is understood as a period of truce, especially one that is temporary and is often a preliminary step to establishing a more permanent peace on agreed terms), verify alleged ceasefire violations and raise awareness among communities about the agreements between the two parties. Ceasefire monitoring is perhaps the most prominent and most complex application of monitoring. See also **Monitoring**.

Civilian immunity is to be understood as ‘an almost absolute principle that spells out one of the central and most stringent requirements of justice as it applies to war, and recognizes an almost absolute right of the vast majority of civilians—namely, all those who cannot be considered “currently engaged in the business of war”—not to be targets of deadly violence.’

Civil society or the **citizen’s sector** is distinct from the public sector and the business sector. It usually refers to civil society **institutions**, which include the parliament, the press, the judiciary, local councils, **PLUS** civil society **organizations**, which include (1) *mutual benefit organizations* (religious, political, community-based, employment-related and mass organizations), (2) *public benefit organizations* (NGOs implementing development projects, philanthropic organizations, and non-profit companies) and (3) *private benefit organizations* (which include spurious NGOs such as criminal organizations or donor- or business-organized ‘NGOs’ aka CRINGOs, DONGOs and BONGOs, respectively).

Civilians are those persons who are not combatants (members of military/paramilitary forces) or members of organized armed groups of a party to a conflict or those who are not part of levée en masse (mass uprising).

Conflict refers to the tensions between people over specific needs or wants they try to fulfil. It is the interaction of interdependent people who perceive

incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving their respective goals. Conflict is a part of life and cannot be avoided. See also **Horizontal** and **Vertical Conflict**.

Conflict analysis refers to the detailed examination of the elements, structures and dynamics of a conflict. Conflict analysis is a tool that helps understanding of a particular conflict, in order to prevent violence and to manage or solve the conflict in a timely manner. See also **Context Analysis**.

Context analysis or situational analysis refers to the detailed examination of the ongoing developments and dynamics of a specific situation.

Context analysis is different from conflict analysis, but they are interrelated. Conflict analysis has a limited focus on one particular conflict and its development through time (focus on the past). Context analysis on the other hand has a broad focus on one particular moment in time (focus on the present). Conflict analysis precedes context analysis and is undertaken periodically, especially at the beginning and end of a project cycle. Context analysis is done continually. UCP personnel at the field level may conduct context analysis on a weekly or monthly basis.

Courage is the ability and willingness to confront fear, pain, danger, uncertainty or intimidation. It is not the absence of fear, but rather the judgment that something else is more important than fear. Physical courage is courage in the face of physical pain, hardship, or death. Moral courage on the other hand is the ability to act rightly in the face of popular opposition, shame, scandal, discouragement or exhaustion. Moral courage expresses itself in values-driven action, moving in alignment with our highest aspirations and our deepest sense of who we want to be.

D

Deterrence means confronting aggressors with sufficient negative consequences to influence them not to commit human rights violations or abuse. See also **Encouragement**.

Deterrence means confronting aggressors with sufficient negative consequences to influence them not to commit human rights violations or abuse. See also **Encouragement**.

Duty bearer: by ratifying a UN human rights treaty or convention, the state (as principal duty bearer) automatically assumes the role of guaranteeing these rights (of the right holders), namely the obligations to respect, protect and fulfill people's rights. In other words, the state must take all necessary procedures to guarantee their citizens' rights. Non-state duty bearers (aka moral duty bearers) include parents, teachers, principals, administrators, NGOs etc.

E

Early Warning/Early Response (EWER) is a systematic application of monitoring for the sake of preventing violence, reducing the impact of violence and increasing the safety and security of civilians in tense situations of violent conflict. It is based on the recognition that conflicts generally progress through well-recognized stages. By monitoring the progression of a conflict, it may be possible to predict the development of a crisis. Timely awareness of an imminent crisis may help civilians to prepare themselves to face the crisis or evacuate the area. A timely response may prevent the crisis from manifesting itself or at least reduce its impact.

Early Warning can be defined as the communication of information of a crisis, the analysis of that information and the development of potential, timely, strategic response options to the crisis. Conflict Early Warning requires (near real-time) assessment of events that, in a high-risk environment, are likely to trigger or accelerate the rapid escalation of violence. It consists of data collection, risk analysis, and the sharing of information and recommendations with selected recipients.

Early Response (Action) is often used in conjunction with Early Warning. It refers to the actions that are taken to prevent violence or the escalation of violence and to resolve violent conflict. These actions can be diplomatic, military, humanitarian and/or economic. Response options need to reflect a combination of ground realities and response capacities and scenarios. Ground realities describe a particular situation, marked by a specific emergency context. Response capacities refer to the (in-)ability of certain actors to deliver a timely, inclusive and targeted intervention. Scenarios refer to the potential outcomes of the respective intervention. See also **Monitoring**.

Encouragement can provide moral support, boost morale as well as providing new ideas and additional protection tools. This can support local peace infrastructures in generating renewed efforts for peace and security. It can also support perpetrators of violence in identifying alternative strategies to fulfil their needs without resorting to violence. See also **Deterrence**.

Environment-building action refers to a more structural process aimed at creating and/or consolidating an environment conducive to full respect for the rights of individuals and groups. See also **Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping**.

H

Horizontal conflict refers to conflict between non-state actors. This includes tribal conflicts, conflicts between religious or ethnic groups, and conflicts between indigenous communities and multinationals. See also **Conflict** and **Vertical Conflict**.

Human rights defenders, individually or with others, act to promote or protect human rights, including civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Particular issues of concern in areas of violent conflict are executions, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, discrimination, forced evictions and access to health care. Human rights defenders investigate and report on human rights violations and abuse. They also accompany survivors of human rights violations, take action to end impunity, support better governance, contribute to the implementation of human rights treaties, and provide human rights education.

Human security goes beyond the traditional concept of national security to a new and inclusive concept that brings together the agendas of basic human rights, freedom from want and freedom from fear. It recognizes the intrinsic indivisibility of human development, rights and safety.

Intercultural competence is a set of cognitive, affective and behavioural skills and characteristics that support effective and appropriate interactions in a variety of cultural contexts.

International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is made up of an accumulated body of international instruments including treaties, declarations and standards that aim to establish the basic rights of all people.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is the law of armed conflict. It is a set of international (conventional and customary) rules specifically designed to govern the humanitarian issues stemming from armed conflict, whether international or internal.

International Refugee Law (IRL) is a set of rules that aims to protect: i) persons seeking asylum from persecution; and, ii) those recognized as refugees under relevant legal instruments.

Interpositioning is the act of physically placing oneself between conflicting parties in order to prevent them from using violence against one another. See also proactive engagement.

M

Monitoring is essentially the practice of observing compliance to a standard. The purpose of monitoring is to help all those involved to make appropriate and timely judgments and decisions that will improve the quality of the work, ensure accountability, and encourage implementation according to plan. Within the context of UCP there are three main applications of monitoring: **ceasefire monitoring**, **rumour control**, and **Early Warning/Early Response (EWER)**. (Definitions in Glossary)

Multi-Track dialogue is a term for dialogue (deliberate, arranged conversations organized, and often facilitated by, organizations or individuals.) processes operating on several tracks simultaneously.

- Track 1 usually refers to official dialogue between high-level political and military leaders, focusing on ceasefires, treaties and post-conflict political processes;
- Track 2 refers to unofficial dialogue and problem solving activities aimed at building relationships and encouraging new thinking that can inform the official process. It typically involves influential academic, religious, and NGO leaders and other civil society actors who can interact more freely than high-ranking officials;
- Track 3 refers to people-to-people dialogue undertaken by individuals and private groups to encourage interaction and understanding between hostile communities. This involves awareness-raising and confidence building within these communities.

More information: <http://glossary.usip.org/resource/tracks-diplomacy>

N

Needs assessment is a systematic process for determining and addressing needs, or 'gaps' between current conditions and desired conditions or 'wants'. 'Needs' refer to basic human needs that apply to all human beings. In the context of UCP, a needs assessment usually determines the safety and security needs of civilians in situations of violent conflict. UCP teams aim to measure the discrepancy between current conditions and wanted conditions, and to measure their ability to appropriately address the gaps.

Being nonpartisan means not choosing or taking sides in a conflict. **Nonpartisanship** does not mean indifference or passivity. Nonpartisan actors proactively engage in a conflict. They may work against injustice and the violations of human rights, or for personal dignity and individual freedom, as means for establishing an enduring peace.

P

Nonviolence is a framework that consists of a specific ethical and political philosophy, principle, and practice. In its most basic form can be defined as the use of peaceful means, not force, to bring about political or social change. As an ethical philosophy, nonviolence upholds the view that moral behaviour excludes the use of violence; as a political philosophy it maintains that violence is self-perpetuating and can never provide a means to a lasting peaceful end. As a principle, it supports the pacifist position that war and killing are never justified. As a practice, pacifists and non-pacifists have used nonviolence to achieve social change and express resistance to oppression.

Peacebuilding efforts aim to resolve violent conflict and improve political processes, social services, state functions, and economic development.

Peacekeeping Is action undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the **peacemakers**. Peacekeeping efforts deliver security and early **peacebuilding** support.

Peacemaking efforts aim to bring about a negotiated agreement between conflicting parties.

Power is the ability to get what you want. There are different forms of power: visible, hidden and invisible power. Visible power includes formal rules, structures, authorities, institutions, and procedures of decision-making; hidden power relates to influential people and institutions maintaining their influence and determining the agenda; invisible power involves the shaping of psychological and ideological boundaries of participation.

The phrase '**primacy of local actors**' refers to the principle that local actors have the right and responsibility to determine their own futures, govern their own country or community, and solve their own problems. In the context of violent conflict this means that third parties can support, protect, empower and/or collaborate with local actors, while recognizing that the local actors remain the drivers of peace processes, development and socio-political change.

Proactive engagement refers first of all to the need of being proactive for the sake of providing protection. It means being physically present, as well as being proactively engaged with all stakeholders for the purpose of providing protection. It has three different, but closely related, applications: **protective presence**, **protective accompaniment** and **interpositioning** (definitions in Glossary).

Protection can be defined as a concept that encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law.

Within the context of UCP protection is mainly understood as direct physical protection from imminent violence.

Protection of civilians in the context of UN Peace Keeping Operations is composed of three interpretations and approaches of protection, namely (1) rights based approach, (2) stabilization and peace building as durable forms of protection, and (3) physical protection from harm. This course primarily focuses on physical protection of civilians from harm.

Protective accompaniment is a strategy whereby individuals or groups/communities under threat of imminent violence are accompanied to move from one place to another. It is perhaps the best-known application of UCP methods. Protective accompaniment is practiced by almost all UCP agencies in nearly all types of contexts. Protective accompaniment is provided to civilians because they perceive a threat either during their journey from one place to another, or upon arrival at their destination. Protective accompaniment is different from strategic accompaniment. Strategic accompaniment refers to the accompaniment of civilians for the sake of human security. Whereas protective accompaniment is used for the purpose of providing protection, strategic accompaniment is used as a way to build confidence and connect vulnerable civilians to designated service providers. See also **proactive engagement**.

Protective presence is a specific method by which UCP practitioners are strategically placed in locations where civilians face imminent threats. It is the stationary version of the mobile protective accompaniment. Physical presence tends to increase the feeling of safety among civilians nearby. Protective presence is perhaps the most basic application of UCP methods. Proactive presence is usually provided for a shorter period of time, from a few hours up to a few months, and represents more accurately the concept of proactive engagement than the sometimes-used definition of protective presence as the more long-term presence of a UCP team in an area of violent conflict. See also **proactive engagement**.

R

Refugees and **IDPs** are people who have left behind their homes and communities because they have suffered (or fear) persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, and political opinion or because they flee from conflict or natural disaster. Whereas refugees are outside their country of origin or habitual residence, IDPs have not crossed an international border to find a safe haven. **Returnees** are people that voluntarily or involuntarily return to their country of origin after a long absence.

Relationship building with local and international actors at the grassroots, key parties in the conflict, middle-range and top levels of society (including

UN Special Rapporteurs) is used to prevent or reduce violence, create community acceptance, control rumours, communicate needs, dissuade potential perpetrators, connect communities with duty bearers and influence decision makers. A crucial element of relationship building is establishing and improving relationships with actors who have the power to influence potential perpetrators of violence or parties in conflict. These actors include government representatives, armed actors (state and non-state), and local religious and community leaders. While establishing such relationships inherently provides some protection, these influential persons can be called upon if and when threats do occur. They may be able use their influence to dissuade potential perpetrators from actualizing their threat.

Remedial action is aimed at supporting people in restoring their dignity and ensuring adequate living conditions subsequent to a pattern of violence. It usually involves access to rehabilitation, restitution, compensation, and repair. Remedial activities are longer-term and aim to assist people living with the effects of a particular pattern of abuse. See also **Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping**.

The **Responsibility to Protect** (R2P) doctrine introduces the concept of 'sovereignty as responsibility'. It places limits on national sovereignty in case a government cannot or will not protect its own citizens. Until recently national sovereignty was an undisputed organizing principle of the post-WWII order. There is a growing realisation that no single actor can do the work of civilian protection alone. This applies especially in cases of mass atrocities.

Responsive action is undertaken in connection with an emerging or established pattern of violation. It is aimed at preventing the recurrence of violence, putting a stop to it, and/or alleviating its immediate effects. See also **Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping**.

Rumour control refers to the verification of rumours about imminent threats. It includes the timely sharing of factual information with various parties within and across conflict lines in order to prevent escalation of conflict and premature displacement. Rumour control is always intended to de-escalate tensions. See also **Monitoring**.

S

Safety can be defined as being free from danger, risk, or injury; Safety implies an inner certainty that all is well. In a sense, safety is internal.

Security can be defined as the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger. In a sense, security is external.

Stages of conflict include: latent conflict, confrontation, crisis, outcome and

post crisis. Latent conflict is the stage when there is an incompatibility of goals between two or more parties, which could lead to open conflict. At the stage of confrontation the conflict has become more open. The crisis is the peak of the conflict, when tensions and/or violence are most intense. One way or another, the crisis will lead to an outcome. One side may defeat the other(s), or perhaps call a ceasefire. One party may surrender or give in to the demands of the other party. The parties may agree to negotiations, either with or without the help of a mediator. An authority or other more powerful party may impose an end to the fighting. In any case, at this stage the levels of tension, confrontation and violence decrease somewhat with the possibility of a settlement. In the stage of post crisis the situation is resolved in a way that leads to an ending of any violent confrontation. It also leads to a decrease in tensions and to more normal relationships between the different parties in the conflict.

U

Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) is the practice of civilians protecting civilians in situations of violent conflict. The practice is entirely nonviolent and nonpartisan. It provides protection on invitation from local actors. It supports local actors as they work to resolve the consequences of violent conflict. This practice is grounded in the global promise of civilian immunity in war and protections afforded by international conventions. UCP methods can be responsive, remedial or environment-building actions.

V

Vertical conflict refers to conflict between the state and civilians. See also **Conflict** and **Horizontal Conflict**.

Violence is a particular response to conflict. It is the behaviour that involves the use of force intended to dominate, hurt, damage or kill someone or something. Violence can be physical, sexual, psychological and emotional. These types of violence are usually called **direct violence**. This is inflicted directly from one person to another. Violence can also be **indirect**, such as cultural violence or structural violence. The dehumanization of other cultures is a form of cultural violence. Structural violence refers to violence that is built into social, political or economic structures. Unjust or violent structures are often an underlying cause for secondary violence (e.g., oppressed minority groups may resort to physical violence as a response to unequal access to economic resources).

Vulnerable populations: Civilians who request protection or who are highly susceptible to loss, damage, suffering and death. These civilians are referred to as 'vulnerable'.

I welcome the initiative of UNITAR, in collaboration with Nonviolent Peaceforce, to develop an online course called Strengthening Civilian Capacities to Protect Civilians from Violence. The course supports efforts for sustaining a global culture of peace by engaging civil society and other relevant stakeholders in bringing about peaceful settlement of violent conflicts and is designed to foster intercultural dialogue, understanding and cooperation for peace.

John W. Ashe, President of the 68th General Assembly of the United Nations, 9 September, 2014

Unarmed strategies must be at the forefront of UN efforts to protect civilians. Humanitarian organizations play essential roles in protecting civilians. Where appropriate, timely coordination between missions with humanitarian actors is indispensable in pursuing unarmed strategies as these partners often work closely with communities, especially internally displaced persons. Many non-governmental organizations, national and international, also ensure protection by their civilian presence and commitment to non-violent strategies for protection. Missions should make every effort to harness or leverage the non-violent practices and capabilities of local communities and non-governmental organizations to support the creation of a protective environment.

With respect to protecting civilians, the Panel recommends that: In view of the positive contributions of unarmed civilian protection actors, missions should work more closely with local communities and national and international nongovernmental organizations in building a protective environment.

High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 16 June 2015

[W]e heard a few messages again and again. First, the journey from war to sustainable peace is not possible in the absence of stronger civilian capacity. Without this capacity, there may be breaks in the fighting but resilient institutions will not take root and the risk of relapse into violence will remain.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Chair to the Senior Advisory Group to the UN Secretary General on Civilian Capacities in the Aftermath of Conflict, March 2011

Every time non-violence has been used correctly it has been a brilliant success – and almost every time, barely anyone notices. Until the media catch on, it's up to the public to get informed about unarmed civilian peacekeeping. For if we know of no alternative, we may continue to flounder in the old dilemma of violence or inaction.

Nagler, M N and S Francesca Po. 2010, 6 July. Kyrgyzstan: The Road Not Taken. Common Ground News Service

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