Al-Ayadiyah Pact of Honor: A Study

Nonviolent Peaceforce

Exploring the Disavowal, Return, and Protection Mechanisms with Communities of al-Ayadiyah
Acknowledgements

This impact measurement report is a summary of Nonviolent Peaceforce’s work, lessons learned, and observations on the local peace process in al-Ayadiyah and Telafar from Fall 2018 to Spring 2020.

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The study was designed and implemented and the report was written by Henriette Johansen in collaboration with Paul Miranda as Nonviolent Peaceforce staff.

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Executive Summary

- IDP returns in Iraq increased significantly following the cessation of military operations against ISIS in 2017, but by September 2018 they started to slow again. Throughout 2019 only 431,130 returnees were recorded, a significantly smaller number than the year before; however, the rate of return was not equal between governorates. Ninewa governorate continues to see the lowest rate of return. As of December 2019, only 68% of its population has returned.

- IDP returns to Telafar district began in August 2017 after the district’s liberation from ISIS. As of February 2020, the total number of returns to the district is 344,880 individuals. Most Shia residents have returned whereas Sunni communities have seen more barriers to return due to a number of complex factors. Al-Ayadiyah families who wish to return and consider themselves ‘clean’ of ISIS affiliation have incentives to stay inside the camps, including education, healthcare and livelihood opportunities, and yet more barriers to return including the lack of livelihood opportunities and shelter in al-Ayadiyah.

- The establishment of a Pact of Honor is perceived by al-Ayadiyah IDPs and returnees as a symbol for hope and encouragement to return. Apart from its symbolic power, the Pact—or ‘peace agreement’—is implemented in a volatile context and met by a varied and complex caseload of IDPs which calls for the development of more protection-oriented implementation mechanisms.

- 18 months into its establishment, IDPs have become more familiar with the terms and conditions of the Pact and the procedures dictating their potential return through NP awareness raising activities. However, distrust is widespread within the IDP and returned communities regarding the ability of implementing actors to guarantee the fulfilment of each article—particularly regarding protection against false accusations and acts of revenge. Furthermore, ambiguity in the language of the articles and the roles and responsibilities of the Pact’s implementers create confusion among communities. Lastly, the language leaves gaps for abdication and nepotism and subsequent increased community distrust.

- As the disavowal process inherently generates evidence or confirmation of a relative’s ISIS affiliation (real, suspected, or assumed affiliation), the stakes are high and incentives low for IDPs to disavow and return to al-Ayadiyah. Obtaining return approval in exchange for providing information to intelligence actors is perceived as an opportunistic return condition. As such, the implementation of the Pact would benefit from a protection-oriented review. In light of the primacy and considerable power the Pact gives tribal actors through their tacit knowledge of al-Ayadiyah, an evaluation of the degree to which the Pact effectively reorients the community of al-Ayadiyah towards the Rule of Law and contributes to retribalization or neo-tribalization is called for.

- 37% of survey participants responded that they cannot access security duty bearers, 99.9% of whom were women. Respondents explained that traditions and culture within the al-Ayadiyah community prevent women from accessing security actors. As such, female respondents were more likely than men to report any rights violations to unofficial protection networks (friends, family, neighbors, NGOs and elders, mukhtars, or religious leaders), which leaves women in a situation of power imbalance with unofficial protection actors accountable to no one. Thus, should an incident involve men within her family or clan, there is little evidence to suggest that she can report an incident without significant risk. Male respondents largely report incidents to the Tribal Hashed or local police forces.

- 39% of respondents do not believe that security actors will or can treat their information with confidentiality. However, 60% of respondents across genders would still report incidents to the local police forces and 33% would report to the Tribal Hashed, in combination with reporting to unofficial structures. Respondents reported a high (74%) conviction in security actors’ ability to ensure security, and view security actors’ role as primarily safeguarding the community against an out-group. The protection of the individual is traditionally secured through informal kinship alliances.
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Abbreviations

AoO Areas of Origin
CP Checkpoint
DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix
FGD Focus Group Discussion
FHH Female Headed Household/s
GBV Gender-Based Violence
GoI Government of Iraq
HCT Humanitarian Country Team
HLP Housing, Land and Property
ID Identification Document
IED Improvised Explosive Devices
INAP Iraqi National Action Plan
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM International Organization for Migration
IRC International Rescue Committee
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISF Iraqi Security Forces
KII Key Informant Interview
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government
KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq
LGN Local Government of Ninewa
LHSF Local, Hybrid and Sub-state Force
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NP Nonviolent Peaceforce
NPC National Protection Cluster
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PMF Popular Mobilization Forces
PMU Popular Mobilization Units
SEA Sexual Exploitation and Assault
UN United Nations
UN OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WPS Women, Peace and Security
Introduction

The return of IDPs and reconciliation are omnipresent themes throughout humanitarian programming, especially due to the ongoing consolidations and closures of displacement camps in Northern Iraq. The objective of IDPs to return safely to their area of origin to peaceful coexistence, see several categories of barriers. Nonviolent Peaceforce works with people during displacement, return and reintegration in areas where peace is being brokered and developed, including the sub-district of al-Ayadiyah.

This report seeks to convey the lived experience of al-Ayadiyah residents as they navigate displacement, return, reconciliation and security processes. It studies the integration of NP’s interventions and highlights the systems of power they engage and navigate within, in order to contribute a nuanced understanding of the its impact in the sub-district. The report is divided into four chapters, discussing displacement and return dynamics of IDPs from al-Ayadiyah (Chapter 1); the implementation of the Pact of Honor (Chapter 2); the access to security (Chapter 3); and finally, program reflections and recommendations (Chapter 4).

The return of IDPs to al-Ayadiyah is pivotal to regenerating towns and villages that de-populated during the atrocities that befell the sub-district, during the ISIS insurgency. The barriers to IDP return are explored in relation to the traumas and legacies of war and displacement of the community in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 explores the engagement of communities and authorities with the Pact of Honor. It seeks to highlight the ways in which the Pact has the potential to encourage return and reconciliation, but equally ways in which it can re-circulate systems of exclusion notwithstanding its intention. Despite the right to equal protection under Iraqi law, Chapter 3 unpacks the access of IDPs and returnees to security duty bearers; the confidence and expectations of reporting systems, as well as the experiences of navigating these. The Chapter 4 sets out the key learnings of NP’s programs in al-Ayadiyah and provides an overview of key challenges and recommendations relevant to the sector.

In this report, gender is not sidelined to one designated section or represented as a post-displacement challenge, but a factor which – if under-dealt with - inhibit the success and legitimacy of NP’s interventions, of peace and of reconciliation. In this way, gender is weaved into all chapters, as all spaces (public and private) of the al-Ayadiyah society are gendered and therefore experienced and governed accordingly.
Research Methods & Limitations

This report is the result of discussions and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data and primary and secondary data collections conducted between February and April 2020. NP was supported by local informants to understand al-Ayadiyah citizens’ experiences of return, reconciliation and security, deep societal structures, and knowledge that is understood or implied by al-Ayadiyah citizens without necessarily being spoken. In order to do this, the research required qualitative exploration as well as triangulation and data validation between local members of al-Ayadiyah’s return and displaced populations.

The secondary data consisted of a meta-analysis of NP activity reports from 8 months of NP’s engagement in al-Ayadiyah and a desk review of relevant literature. Primary research consisted of 16 Key Informant Interviews (KII) which were conducted across various stakeholder groups, including security actors, Tribal Council members, community leaders, local authorities, IDPs and returnees, as well as Nonviolent Peaceforce National Protection Officers and International Protection Officers. For quantitative data, we conducted a survey with Kobo Toolbox of 257 al-Ayadiyah IDPs and returnees in al-Ayadiyah town and Qayyarah IDP camps Jada’ah 4 and 5. The quantitative data was cleaned and collated with the assistance of REACH Iraq. NP also engaged in participatory observation during program implementation activities, including the preparation and execution of a women’s Community Security Forum. All the participants of this study gave informed verbal consent in Arabic or English of their anonymous participation. Furthermore, they were given the opportunity to decline any questions they did not wish to answer and end the interview at any point during data collection engagement.

While the research utilized mixed-methods and triangulation to ensure validity, we experienced limitations that are worth mentioning. The timeframe for the entire project was short, which limited the ability of the team to do a thorough desk review of research on Iraq, particularly academic research. The secondary resources rely heavily on reports and studies from other INGOs. Furthermore, it is impossible to know how representative the sampled population is of al-Ayadiyah town or the displaced population. The sample included a compared number of respondents between the camps and al-Ayadiyah town. However, there are no reliable population statistics or censuses from al-Ayadiyah sub-district that we were able to base our sample size on and due to access-restrictions we only collected data from the town of al-Ayadiyah and not the surrounding villages. Furthermore, we were unable to collect information on tribe or clan or religious sect and did not include education levels or other key information on the segment of society that individuals belong to, in the survey. The data collection was obtained by NP staff which both enabled access to KII from a wide variety of stakeholders, but equally had limitations, e.g. due to our awareness activity with the Pact of Honour, people may have been less ostensible in their criticism towards it. Despite these limitations, we believe the report provides an accurate snapshot of the al-Ayadiyah community sense-making, at the time of the report’s publication.
"How can we live with someone who killed our family? Others say, it is better to include them."
1.1 - Context, demographics, and recent history: Al-Ayadiyah and Telafar

Al-Ayadiyah is one of the four sub-districts of Telafar district, which is located in the northwestern part of Ninewa governorate. Mosul district borders Telafar district from south-east, Sinjar district from the south-west, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) from the north-east. Telafar district is horizontally cut by Highway 47, which connects Mosul to Sinjar and proceeds towards Syria. Telafar and Ninewa governorate as a whole are ethnically diverse, particularly in comparison to the rest of Iraq, with Sunni and Shia Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidis, Shabaks, and Christians all inhabiting various parts of the governorate. Prior to the IS invasion, Telafar district consisted mainly of Sunni and Shia Turkmen and a minority of Sunni and Shia Arabs and Kurds. The district has long been a strategic location with its close vicinity to the porous border regions with Turkey to the north and Syria to the west. Telafar has historically suffered from politically rooted ethnic driven power dynamics that date to colonial rule and exemplify the style of rule and control of the Saddam Hussein regime when Sunni Turkmen were privileged and dominated the district over their Shia counterparts. These factors played a crucial role in turning Telafar into one of the most disputed and fought over areas of the country between the US-led occupation of Iraq in 2003 and ISIS’ seizure of the district in 2014. Following the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, power dynamics shifted drastically in Telafar. The Shia population took control over the majority of government positions in the district, resulting in the alienation of the majority of the Turkmen Sunni population and other minority groups such as Kurds and Arabs who suffered a double religious and ethnic discrimination. As early as 2004, Sunni insurgent groups seized control of Telafar City. While it was officially retaken shortly afterwards, the district continued to suffer from sectarian violence. For example, between 2005 and 2006, there were reports of harassment, torture, extra-judicial killings, and sectarian motivated destruction against the Sunni Turkmen population’s property. The marginalization and exclusion of the Sunni population, the continued sectarian violence, and government reprisals against the Sunni population (for example, some residents note that Shia police and troops rocketed Sunni neighborhoods at various times) had an important role in the popular support that al-Qaeda and ISIS enjoyed among parts of the Sunni population.

In summer 2014, ISIS seized control of Telafar district along with substantial parts of Ninewa governorate during their major offensive into Iraq. With its location near Highway 47 that connects Mosul to Raqqaa in Syria, Telafar became key strategic territory for ISIS and facilitated access and evacuation between the two strongholds. During ISIS’s control of Telafar district and Al-Ayadiyah sub-district, multiple atrocities were committed. For example, ISIS reportedly kidnapped over 400 women from Telafar. While the sexual violence Yazidi women faced from ISIS in Sinjar has been thoroughly documented, much less attention has been paid to conflict-related sexual violence Shia Turkmen women faced in Telafar. Additionally, in February 2020, a mass grave was uncovered in Telafar thought to contain nearly 1,000 bodies killed by ISIS from mid-2014 to late 2017.

The atrocities and everyday violence communities faced in Telafar raise a number of important considerations for returns and protection of displaced people. First, for communities of all types, Telafar and Al-Ayadiyah are spaces filled with memories of violence: everywhere and everything could be associated with violence, suffering, trauma and displacement. For example, in Telafar, there was an 18-story building that ISIS used to throw people off for punishment or street lamps where naked corpses hung upside-down for days after they had been raped. But it is also crucial to consider that many places associated with violence predate ISIS. Telafar suffered from strict and imposed social control shortly after the American occupation began. Checkpoints, access permits, and waist-height concrete barriers separated the city’s Sunni and Shia communities, transformed the old market from a place
of day-to-day social cohesion to one of anxiety and exclusion, and helped to sow fractious ethnic division. Furthermore, according to research from IOM, many in Telafar feel that the 2003 conflict and civil war were not recognized appropriately. As the study’s author concludes, even “if things are rebuilt, the more ordinary spaces filled with extraordinary memories of violence will provide the friction for smoldering tensions if unaddressed ... [A] technocratic approach to peacebuilding underestimates [the effects] that a community’s trans-generational memories of violence can have on sustainable and authentic peace.”

On 27 August 2017, the Iraqi coalition retook control of Telafar City, which resulted in ISIS fighters and their families taking refuge in al-Ayadiyah where they engaged in a fierce battle with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, also referred to as the Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF, or al-Hashed). The battle caused extensive damage to the town and its infrastructure which is still visible nearly three years later. At present, Turkmen occupy almost all of the local government and security positions and as a result, many Arabs and Kurds residing in the villages feel disenfranchised, marginalized, and excluded from most government processes and benefits. In addition, while in Telafar center security actors and most local authorities are Shia, the local authorities and security actors in the Ayadiyah sub-district are Sunni. The sub-district faces social cohesion tensions between al-Ayadiyah town and the surrounding villages; especially as most of the villages are not Turkmen villages, except for some Shia Turkmen villages. In addition, the al-Ayadiyah sub-district is heavily influenced by tribal dynamics. There are both inter and intra-tribal dynamics, many of which give rise to several social cohesion concerns. Additionally, a tribe may be comprised of several religious denominations. The tribes in al-Ayadiyah are as follows:

- Al Qassab: most of the population from al-Ayadiyah town comes from the Qassab tribe, whose largest clans include Dholfiqar, Suleiman, Jari and Al Yashili. The tribe is comprised of both Sunni and Shia, although all those living in al-Ayadiyah town are Sunni Turkmen
- Jarjary: Kurdish
- Juhaish: Sunni Arab
- Hammat: Sunni Turkmen
- Louaizi: Sunni Arab
- Saada: Shia Turkmen

1.1.1 Waves of displacement and return

Displacement in Telafar occurred in multiple stages. An initial large-scale displacement occurred when ISIS established control in Nineawa. Upon ISIS’s arrival in Telafar in 2014, 80,000-100,000 individuals, nearly all the Shia Turkmen in Telafar fled to Sinjar and Rabia before proceeding to Syria and Shia areas within Iraq. Another large-scale displacement began with the offensive to retake Mosul. From April to August 2016, nearly 30,000 residents fled from Telafar district. By the time ISF launched operations to liberate Telafar in August 2017, approximately 73,000 people, primarily Sunni Turkmen who remained in the district during the ISIS occupation, had fled to Mosul and Duhok and their surrounding IDP camps and Turkey. Despite cessation of hostilities against ISIS and some return movements, individuals continued to be displaced, in some cases for a second time. The National Protection Cluster announced that 145 female headed households (FHH) (619 individuals) arrived in the East Mosul camps between July and December 2019, 78% of whom are FHH. In 2019, overall, 16,000 households ended up in secondary displacement across Iraq.

IDP returns across Nineawa and Iraq and Telafar and al-Ayadiyah more specifically have ebbed and flowed since military operations against ISIS ceased in December 2017. In late December 2017, Iraq as a whole recorded more returnees (3.2 million individuals) than people displaced (2.6 million) for the first time since the displacement crisis began in 2013. By September 2018, however, the overall rate of return in Iraq slowed considerably and showed signs of leveling out despite reaching a total number of 4 million returnees. Throughout 2019, 431,130 returnees were recorded, a significantly smaller number than the 944,948 returns recorded in 2018. Moreover, the 2019 returns were not evenly distributed between governorates with Nineawa witnessing the lowest rates of

(page 16)

Al-Ayadiyah town, February 2020,
NP Field Team
Displacement and return. For example, as of December 2019, 91% of all IDPs from Anbar have returned, whereas only 68% of Ninewa’s population has returned.

IDP returns to Telafar district began in August 2017, shortly after the district’s liberation from ISIS. As of February 2020, the total number of returns to Telafar district is 344,880 individuals, according to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Dashboard.10 In Telafar district and al-Ayadiyah, most Shia residents have returned, whereas Sunni communities have seen more barriers to return due to a number of factors.

1.1.2 Barriers to return

With 331,170 IDPs still in Ninewa, return and the barriers to return remain a key concern for humanitarian organizations in Iraq. However, it is crucial to recognize that barriers to return are complex, multifaceted, and deeply embedded in communities as well as systems of humanitarian assistance. IDPs experience different categories of needs, including basic needs and protection. Meanwhile, such categories are considered and met according to different ethnic and religious groups across Ninewa. Displacement also poses invisible and unarticulated—taken-for-granted—barriers for women and FHH who often are not considered safe during return movements. In addition, displacement is a transformative experience and nonlinear process for the individuals and communities who experience it, which will affect their ability and willingness to return. Displacement and return are then further conditioned by gender, ethnic, religious, economic, social, and geographical factors (and countless others). Existing evidence points to a number of barriers preventing the return of IDPs to Telafar and al-Ayadiyah. However, these factors are not mutually exclusive and NP’s research points to additional barriers not present here. IDPs are likely to experience a complex interaction of many, if not all of them to different degrees:

- Absence of trust in central, regional, and local political institutions and security forces to safeguard citizens and their rights
- Lack of housing, land, and property documentation
- Lack of reconstruction activities
- Lack of livelihood opportunities for youth and adults, men and women
- Limited education services
- Restrictions of movement for women, due to intimidation, assault, harassment, child caring responsibilities and social norms
- New opportunities and aspirations since displacement and an unwillingness to return to old oppressive power structures for women
- Discrimination and harassment of FHH and families with perceived affiliation to ISIS, resulting in further stigma.
- An inability to obtain security clearance for families with perceived ISIS affiliation, upon which ID documentation is conditioned, which in turn inhibits return movements across checkpoints as well as access to statutory services (health, education, compensation to return)
- Tensions between Shia Hashed al-Shaabi forces and Sunni Turkmen and Arab communities leading to blocked returns and discriminatory processes for obtaining permissions and security clearances11

For some, return can seem like an insurmountable challenge or completely out of the realm of possibility. For FHH in the camps, normal daily activities, such as going to the bathroom (especially at night) requires careful thought and internal risk calculation due to the high levels of GBV in camps. If normal, daily activities are so challenging, it is reasonable to assume that the return procedure, a much more complicated and risky process (real or perceived risk as discussed in sections below) could be seen as an insurmountable task. If one cannot feel safe to go to the bathroom, how could one ever feel safe or confident enough to obtain security clearance for return, pass through numerous checkpoints manned by different security actors, and find ways to support oneself in their area of origin where they may face restrictions on their daily movement or revenge attacks?

Prospects and options for return are important to be considered and analyzed, it should also not assume that individuals necessarily want to return. Conflict and displacement are transformative experiences for people: gender roles, livelihood systems, and demographics and household composition change drastically. Displaced people are often exposed to new areas and ways of living as many displace from rural areas into urban centers. Access to healthcare and education often changes, sometimes for the better. For example, 93% of our respondents in al-Ayadiyah who were previously displaced experienced better services in the camps or in their place of displacement than they do currently in al-Ayadiyah. As such, we should consider whether the remaining IDPs even have a desire to return given that the services they’re receiving in the camps could be better than what is available elsewhere. The lack of a desire to return would not be a situation unique to Iraq or globally. There is already evidence to suggest that in some areas of Iraq, IDPs have little to no interest to return to their areas of origin.

1.1.3 Recent actions impacting protection of returnees

Various measures taken in the past year have affected the protection of IDPs and returnees. For example, OCHA noted that violations of the civilian and humanitarian character of camps was an issue in 2019 and may continue in 2020.12 Additionally, some camps and informal settlements were closed or consolidated in Ninewa, Salah al-Din, al-Anbar, Kirkuk, and Diyala governorates, which has the potential to lead to premature returns. If IDPs are unable to return successfully, they could to end up in secondary displacement, an issue that affected nearly 16,000 households in 2019.13

1.2 - Systems for IDP return in al-Ayadiyah

The government’s decision to complete the closures of all IDP camps by 2020 has pushed camp residents to return to their areas of origin (AoO) or engage in secondary displacement. The camp closure order has raised expectations that remaining IDPs from al-Ayadiyah will engage with return processes. Iraq-based14 IDPs from al-Ayadiyah are residing in Kirkuk in Yahyawa camp (419 families including 7 FHH) and Jeddah camps (15-20 families, including 5-7 FHH). Some of the remaining IDPs have livelihood and housing as main barriers to return, but many have complex cases of ISIS affiliation in addition to these. Moreover, IDPs from al-Ayadiyah are residing in camps that are due to consolidate and close within the year.

According to NP’s survey, 97% of returnee respondents in al-Ayadiyah confirmed that the Pact of Honor (further explored in Chapter 2) had an encouraging effect on IDP return. In fact, 81% arrived in al-Ayadiyah, following its establishment on August 9th, 2018. A much smaller component (13%) reported having returned to al-Ayadiyah since September 2019.
Based on the movement severity scale, developed for the Iraq National Protection Cluster endorsed by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), participants of NP’s survey in al-Ayadiyah indicated a combination of the so-called ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ return movements. 88% of returnees reported feeling safe during the transit and upon return (voluntary). 94% received adequate information about service provision in their AoO prior to relocation (voluntary). But nearly all (93%) reported not receiving adequate services in their AoO.

In order to initiate the return process, IDPs need to obtain a movement request form from a stationary shop and register their personal and household information to request their return. The recent returnees of al-Ayadiyah noted that the request is filed through local mukhtars, clansmen, or tribal leaders to be processed. There are two forms: form ‘A’ for families who perceive themselves as ‘clean,’ and form ‘B’ for families who have perceived ISIS affiliation. Some of the IDPs with ISIS affiliations refrain from disavowing their relatives and don’t fill out “Form B” because this could lead to the imprisonment or execution of their accused relatives. However, IDPs have been encouraged to fill out “Form B” despite their concerns. For example, the form was distributed in the Yahyawa camp.

Return requests are then sent through relevant community leaders or camp managers to the Tribal Council to assess the level of ‘suspicion’ of ISIS affiliation of the potential returnee family. Following this, Tribal Hashed and the local police force of al-Ayadiyah complete their respective security clearance procedures before sending the request form to the intelligence service in Telafar, who request an inspection from ISF group 15, brigade 92 of Telafar. Finally, the request is sent from the national security to the town council and the Mayor in order to obtain his signature. The copy is then sent to the IDPs to facilitate their return movement through the relevant checkpoints. The ostensibly longwinded process involves a myriad of actors recently morphed into a one-step process in which the Tribal Council processes the request between relevant offices. With this, the authorities can now process up to 15 return requests per day.

Simultaneously, however, more steps have been introduced to minimize risk of false ISIS allegations. For example, the Qala’a checkpoint takes four names (rather than three) in case the names are similar to an affiliated person. This allegedly minimizes the risk of similarity with names of ISIS members listed in the National Security database. The fourth name, i.e. the name of the father’s grandfather, can be found on the father’s ID and individuals tend to have a copy of the father’s ID with them. In case of further doubts, the mother’s name (written in the ID)

This chart depicts the numbers of survey respondents in al-Ayadiyah (here named, Telafar) and in displacement (here named, Qayyarah) possessing all the 4 IDs (نعم yes or no)
Out of the IDP respondents holding all four IDs, 30% needed to have them renewed. One third of IDP survey respondents reported that their family was missing one or more IDs. 40% of the missing IDs reported were Civil Status IDs (فوية الأحوال المدنية). National IDs were 31% of missing documents (بطاقة تأسيسية عمانية). ID cards 15%, and birth certificates 11% within the family. According to our informants, displaced children constitute the majority of those requiring an ID, with 37% of girls and 28% of boys requiring IDs compared to 21% of men and 15% of women.19

Obtaining an ID is a convoluted process and requires a security clearance from multiple security duty bearers. If the clearance is not obtained, an IDP will not have their ID renewed, nor be granted permission to return without disavowal of the suspected ISIS affiliation. If the person wants to obtain any official documents (even death or marriage certificates), the person must present a letter of safety clearance from national security in al-Ayadiyah. The inability to obtain or renew ID documentation could be seen by authorities as indicative of that person’s affiliation due to what could be perceived as their evasion of mandatory security clearance, preceding its issuance.

"[There is] fear of being arrested when going to complete the return procedures, most of those families are affiliated and don’t have documentation or have old civil documentation (...) It’s the security concerns that prevent us from returning to our homes of origin. Even if we completed the return procedures, a lot of people who were affected by ISIS will accuse us falsely in order to prevent us from returning to al-Ayadiyah, and may arrest [us]" (community leader KII, 2020).

Suspected and community assumptions over IDP affiliation with ISIS can override successful disavowal or even access to the process of disavowal if the IDPs safety upon returning cannot be guaranteed. “Some of the families householders went there to complete the procedures and faced a lot of problems and returned back to the camp to avoid being arrested” (community leader KII, 2020). IDPs fear ‘secret informers’ - people who have the power to inform or generate false allegations of affiliation. “False accusations happen often. If a person doesn’t like another, they can call a security actor and say that they are affiliated. This is also used to pressure people for money and other ways” (subject matter expert, 2020). However, the Pact of Honor has tried to prevent this phenomenon from recurring (further explored in Chapter 2).

1.3 Navigating return processes

Components of al-Ayadiyah’s returnees expressed strong feelings of belonging to the sub-district despite the significant challenge of rebuilding its towns and villages, as well as their lives within it. Informants explained that some of the families returned to spend their money in al-Ayadiyah to help re-start the economy and regenerate the sub-district. Furthermore, community cohesion is reported as a main factor in determining return movements. The return of community leaders or a group of families returning can determine and inform the wider discourse on return for the clan.

"The information spread in the camp; it was like a message to return. The tribal leaders came to the camp to tell people to return. When [Mullah] returned, his clan followed" (Ayadiyah citizen and subject matter expert, 2020).

Camp-based IDPs from al-Ayadiyah are largely based in Kirkuk’s Yahyawa camp and Mosul’s Jedalah camps. They have had some community leaders, mukhtars and local authorities visit to encourage their return. However, many IDPs remain insecure about the return process and the quality of life they would enjoy upon return. Some IDPs and returnees remain skeptical as one or more of those actors advocating for return remain displaced themselves. At times they are confronted with this during their campaigns for return. In turn, local authorities complain that their efforts are thwarted by women who have returned and warn IDPs in the camps about distressing return conditions. Moreover, some families are comfortable inside the camps because they have more opportunities for work and education and health services. Merely initiating the return process to al-Ayadiyah can pose high risks on the IDP as it requires leaving the camp (e.g. in the case of ISIS disavowal). Informants account of increasingly restricted re-entering policies for the camps and irregularly distributed ration stamps as creating a logistical barrier to the process. Central concerns for IDPs who see themselves as unassociated with ISIS include livelihood and shelter. Subject matter experts recount that very few families have the capital to rehabilitate themselves in al-Ayadiyah, especially with the state of destruction of houses and the lack of livelihood opportunities for both women and men. Our survey showed the government as the largest employer of returnees (18%) which could indicate that those able to return either rely on government employment or another informal money stream, e.g. starter capital through their kinship network.

"My hope is to find work so I can have a salary and pay for rent. We are in high debt, but I want to open a shop. Many families have the same problem. My husband is very sick and my children need surgery on their eyes, I cannot afford this. When we returned, there was no roof on our building and we have to live at another man’s house. He said, we can stay one year, but what am I supposed to do after that – there is no roof on my house!” (female returnee KII, 2020)

Return prospects are conditioned on various pull and push effects, including camp closure developments, livelihood opportunities, service provision comparability to those existing in al-Ayadiyah, shelter, and security concerns. Some al-Ayadiyah residents reported that return flows reflect examination seasons. The IDP return was better in 2019, initially explained by education provision and school examinations, but this year the return expectation remains low. “We still see no changes. The IDPs who could, have returned” (subject matter expert, 2020).

Recent returnees found the process of returning smooth and expressed gratitude for the Pact of Honor, which some KIs perceived as having facilitated a return procedure with a guaranteed protection against ISIS resurgence. Some returnees who were victimized by ISIS fear that reconciliation is premature; "How can we live with someone who killed our family? Others say, it is better to include them” (IDP subject matter expert, 2020). However, the recently returned KIs focused on the struggles of community stigma faced by FHH who had already overcome significant challenges prior, during and following the disavowal process.
1.3.1 Female headed households

“The people inside the camp talk about the FHH as witches, ISIS women or call them ‘whores.’ NGOs also use this shaming in indirect ways” (subject matter expert, 2020).

Displacement heightens the challenges for women and girls to fulfill their traditional roles of upholding family responsibilities to nurture life and protect ‘the family honor.’ Meanwhile, they also face higher insecurities during displacement than men. In times of displacement, women have been reported to face severe and restricting levels of intimidation, exploitation and violence. IDPs who remain camp-based throughout the camp consolidations and closures are FHH who are more challenged in their ability to return.

“No one care about women, especially ISIS widows” (community leader KII, 2020).

The conditions of IDP camps expose women to Gender Based Violence, including Sexual Exploitation and Assault (SEA), harassment, emotional abuse, ‘survival sex’ and child marriage. Some of the reported violations amount to ‘dual purpose’ crime in which the offender will use SEA both to satisfy a personal objective, as well as an act of collective punishment - by way of legitimization - against a female, with or without perceived ISIS affiliation.

Other forms of collective punishment include denial or SEA conditioned access to aid, services and livelihood opportunities, and is reportedly perpetrated by multiple actors as well as residents within Ninewa's IDP camps. In turn, reporting and accountability is absent as women fear confirming or creating suspicion around affiliation. This is in addition to other barriers to report, including that reporting actors are - or become - perpetrators upon obtaining reports and traditional norms amounting to victim-shaming or disbelief. Such acts subsequently create an extraordinary layer of perpetrator impunity. According to a recent report, all 169 informants - including men and boys - stated that FHH are being exposed to many types of harassment and exploitation either by male camp or by humanitarian workers and security officials within the camp. Moreover, in 2019 the number of women centers halved due to lack of funding.

“All the people in the families in J6 are ISIS – this is what they will say. ISIS families are in sector O. Even some organizations say this because some NGO workers have suffered from ISIS, they therefore do not hesitate to name them” (subject matter expert KII, 2020).

FHH with perceived affiliation are generally excluded and isolated from the rest of the community and are seen as residing in one section of the camp which is sometimes referred to as the specific ‘ISIS section,’ including by NGOs operating there. Openings in the fences combined with the lack of security around those areas enable perpetrators of GBV from within and outside the camps (host communities) to enter. “They [IDP FHH] put a fence around their tent, using another [tent] to create a barrier for protection. Their stuff was stolen in the [relocation] process and they said that they are targeted because they are women” (subject matter expert, 2020). In response to this, FHH isolate themselves or try to prove their innocence to gain acceptance by the community. One widow, towards this aim, started cleaning around the tents, setting up distribution mechanisms for her neighbors, which made them accept her, and reportedly advocate for her to become their Mukhtar.

“Gender specific barriers to return work in extension to those experienced in displacement. Additionally, the return process can be hard to navigate for FHH due to the traditional exclusion of women from public life. This division - contested by both women and men - hardens the barrier for FHH to access return processes. Accessing authorities, for example, require a male representative to advocate for her return request (further explored in Chapter 2 and 3)."
1.3.2 Costs of Return and Returns Incentive programs

“If they closed the camps without finding fundamental solutions to facilitate the return of the IDPs, it will be a real disaster. Most of the families do not have houses, they were destroyed during war. They need compensation, services, and work opportunities. The most important thing is solutions for the security problems that we are facing and preventing us returning before closing the camp” (community leader KII, 2020).

The local authorities as well as community leader KIIs caution over the forced camp closure and consolidations across Ninewa before safe and voluntary return mechanisms have been secured. In addition, they believe that appropriate alternatives for people unable to return must be found. Ideas about establishing another transition camp or facilitating integration into Mosul are being discussed. One of the concerning closures is that of Yahyawa camp, in which 419 families (~2,514 individuals, 67% children) from al-Ayadiyah reside. The local authorities do not believe they have the capacity to receive such numbers of returnees in al-Ayadiyah. Discussions are ongoing with the Nineawa authorities to further coordination in response to forced camp consolidations and closures.

The return is a costly process that families struggle to cover, following 6 years of displacement, without any guarantees for employment or shelter upon return. For families without ISIS affiliation who lacked immediate shelter, camps were established in al-Ayadiyah town from which returnees could work on rehabilitating themselves. Returnees will thus not necessarily resettle into their former home. In fact, 9% of al-Ayadiyah based survey respondents considered themselves as ‘out of camp’ IDPs.

The Government of Iraq has established compensation schemes under 6 sub-categories for property damages: Housing; Shops; Companies; Farmland; Vehicles; and Furniture. The Central Compensation Committee is estimated to take 6-12 months to process a request. Meanwhile, compensation claims in 2019 were up by 4,000 from the previous year, predicted to increase in tandem with camp closures. A recent study found that nearly 4,000 families had applied for compensation of whom only 1% of claims were accepted and no one receive their compensation. The new amendments of the law on compensation (Law 20 of 2009) have been made and HLP committee and partners are currently producing guidelines to the new compensation scheme and the procedures for filing the claims with compensation committees for each governorate.

CHAPTER 1 SUMMARY POINTS

- Barriers to return are complex, multifaceted, and conditioned by gender, ethnic, religious, economic, social, and geographical factors (and countless others) with different groups experiencing different categories of needs. While evidence points to a number of barriers preventing the return of IDPs to Telafar and al-Ayadiyah, displacement is also a transformative experience and we should not assume that individuals necessarily want to return.

- The majority (97%) of returnee respondents reported that the Pact of Honor had an encouraging effect on return. But, the returned population in al-Ayadiyah were a mix of “voluntary” and “forced” returnees according to the Protection Cluster’s Return Severity Scale with 93% reporting that they were not receiving adequate services in their AoO compared to what they received in the camp.

- The long-winded returns process has morphed into a one-step process where the Tribal Council processes requests and coordinates with the myriad of actors involved. However, lack of civil documents prohibits return and twice as many IDPs as returnees in NP’s survey were missing one of the four civil ID documents. A third of IDP respondents reported that a member of their family was missing one ID or more. Suspect and assumptions about IDP ISIS affiliation can override successful disavowal or prevent access to disavowal in the first place.

- Many IDPs remain skeptical and insecure regarding the return process and quality life they would enjoy upon arrival. Others are comfortable inside the camps as they experience better services inside the camp than they would in their AoO. Furthermore, initiating the return process to al-Ayadiyah can pose a number of risks and has considerable “costs” for IDPs that they must weigh against the incentives to return. But recent returnees expressed gratitude for the Pact of Honor and perceived it as helping to facilitate returns.

- Women and FHH, in particular, face considerable and gender-specific challenges to return, in addition to high levels of gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and assault within displacement settings. Furthermore, reporting and accountability is almost entirely absent.
“I believe if we can tell people in the camps about this story, they will return.”
2.1 The establishment of the Pact of Honor

The al-Ayadiyah Pact of Honor was brokered in 2018 for the purpose of reaching a common ground on principles and mechanisms desired by community leaders, local authorities and security duty bearers to secure peaceful coexistence in al-Ayadiyah (appendix II). In addition, the agreement was meant to facilitate the return of IDPs to the town and surrounding villages within the sub-district.

“The peace agreement is the first initiative for peace in the region because the conditions of life for al-Ayadiyah and Telafar were different because there are Turkman, Arab villages and Kurdish villages” (local authorities KII, 2020).32

On August 9th 2018, representatives of the then-called Committee for Coexistence and Social Peace, the Ninewa Governorate and Telafar District government signed the agreement with the local and central government in al-Ayadiyah. In addition, the agreement was signed by more than 90 tribal and community leaders from al-Ayadiyah with the hope that their respective constituents would follow the mechanisms stated.

In principle, the agreement was meant to:

1. Commit tribal authorities to the state and rule of law, disavowing violence to seek justice;
2. Commit tribal authorities to cooperate with security agencies in the pursuit of ISIS members and suspects;
3. Commit tribal authorities to move beyond parochial identities by giving priority to national identity; and
4. Allow for the facilitation of return processes for internally displaced persons (IDPs) to the town, which number around 40,000 persons inside Ayadiyah Center and its surrounding villages.33

2.2 Articles of the Pact

One of the central commitments of the ‘Pact of Honour’ is unification against a common enemy (ISIS) with outlined mechanisms to cultivate coexistence foreseeing conflict drivers from post-war legacies (false allegations, revenge crime and discrimination). The implementing partners’ roles and responsibilities are not clear which leaves room for interpretation and abdication and in turn, there is no drive to cultivate mutual accountability vis-a-vis Pact breaches. In this way, monitoring of breaches would be clear and free of negotiation if roles and responsibilities were made clear, which arguably could have taken place prior to the implementation of the Pact. Several articles seem hard to monitor and to hold implementing actors accountable to, particularly on the rectification of breaches. Return threats directed at prospective returnees, or revenge crime upon IDP return following disavowal can be invisible to implementing actors.

The implementation of the Pact should reflect its true intention and extent to which it has integrity to this goal. In order to centre the agreement around Rule of Law (e.g. article 2), mediation and assessment of return applicants’ suspected affiliation is not primarily inter-clan in nature, but place the individual vis-a-vis law enforcement, directly. However, the security actors and judicial systems can take information, according to article 6, from clan leaders on ISIS affiliated families, however, this should not translate to the Tribal Council having ‘first selection’ authority over return applicants, prior to that of security actors. The issue of basing the authorisation on suspicion to determine whether an individual or family belongs to an out-group render the Rule of Law foundation of the Pact difficult to achieve without bias from clan leaders, who, after all, are also a part of this community.

The articles of the Pact reflect a lack of inclusion of the concerns of the wider community, including women and youth, and an overemphasis on the role of Tribal leaders to speak on their behalf and represent their concerns. The diversity of thought is central in a pact that has such a significant effect on people of al-Ayadiyah and their respective barriers to return and protection and peace priorities. The lack of inclusion can simplify a complex, volatile situation and leave vulnerable families at increased risk. Signatories are almost exclusively men, eliminating the consent of half the adult return population. Furthermore, article 11 suggests the implementation and observation (monitoring) of the agreement is expected by ‘sons’ (in the English translation), despite comments made by authorities that women are central to encourage IDP return, due to their cross-displacement communication and organisation, and that 80% of NP’s female survey participants saw themselves as implementing the peace agreement through awareness raising, community engagement and monitoring breaches. Inclusion and feeling of representation are central to cultivating trust between authorities and communities, which has endured strain and, in some instances, eroded over the course of displacement. Women and youth should not be considered secondary to this social contract. In fact, their concerns need to be included and addressed in the Pact.

Caution should be raised over articles that can generate a new crucible of fear and conflict proliferation between families of IS victims and former affiliation. As the monitoring of revenge acts and false accusation remain challenging, collective punishment executed according to security reporting and clan ‘suspicion’ can - with existing conflict dynamics within and between families - drive new conflicts. For example, if an influential individual chooses to use his or her leverage to falsely accuse a person – for individual, unrelated, gain or revenge - and the breach goes unreported (due to the power of the reporter), this could drive new conflicts. This is furthered by the swaying implementation of the article 8, which conditions the return of families of first-degree ISIS affiliation on disavowal, whereas first-degree affiliated families in fact are blocked from returning, and 2nd degree affiliated families now are requested to disavow. The reason for this breach (of article 8) is reportedly due to a Baghdad order and community leaders or security actors’ discouragement of first degree affiliated IDPs, ‘for their own good’, as they cannot ensure their security against revenge acts upon return. The pact should include security and protection concerns of FHH or other vulnerable families who need to or cannot disavow. However, if security cannot already guarantee safety against acts of revenge for families or individuals with particular vulnerabilities, it is unlikely that the sole inclusion of language in the pact will make a tangible difference. Inclusion of the language should be followed by continued engagement with security actors and other local stakeholders to determine

“Even if ISIS is excluded it doesn’t mean peace” (subject matter expert, 2020).
ways in which safety could be strengthened, which are also elements that should be part of the pact.

IDPs have persisting requests for clarification on the articles of the Pact, particularly regarding what affiliation means (which is not clear in the pact itself) and the processes for disavowal in cases where families do not wish to build evidence against a relative, or for a false accusation. There is a fear that the widespread stigmatization of assumed ISIS affiliation inside the IDP camps will continue and legitimize discrimination through its codification in the Pact, following families even after disavowal.

The articles hinge coexistence and reconciliation on unity in fear of a common enemy. In ‘tribal’ terms, honour and restoring social order is central and achieved through ‘purifying’ return populations, i.e. by only allowing ‘clean’ families to return, eliminating extreme Takfiri ideology and ‘its perpetrators’ (article 6, 10). For a ‘peace agreement’, it speaks much about shaming and exclusion (e.g. article 9) and not much about the peace processes or sustenance. It can be seen as extension of the culture and system of exclusion already rife in the statutory civil documentation processes, as it conditions return both upon security clearance by clan leaders and then, security actors. It leaves IDPs in the dark about what affiliation really mean, the path for IDPs unable to disavow and what concrete guarantees against breaches the implementing actors can secure. The Pact could be extended to deal with access to statutory service provision to the most vulnerable families e.g. education for children of non-returnees.

The importance of including such families has been mentioned by several KIIs with a view to build resilience and work against discrimination that push people ‘off the grid’.

2.3 The role of the Tribal Council

The Tribal Council was established in September 2019 as a key body in the implementation of the Pact of Honor. The initial membership contained representation of all clans within al-Ayadiyah’s only tribe, the Al-Qassab tribe, namely the Mohajer, Dholfiqar, Zammo, Kheddo, Alko, Ali Yashil, Saad, Hajaji, Jeri and Jumaa tribes. Four members have dropped out due to ‘overcrowding,’ lack of popular trust in the council’s ability to effect positive development, ‘or for a false accusation. There is a fear that the widespread stigmatization of assumed ISIS affiliation inside the IDP camps will continue and legitimize discrimination through its codification in the Pact, following families even after disavowal.

The Tribal Council holds significant power and influence over IDP return vis-à-vis the Pact. Security actors depend on the decisions of the Council to give approvals to return and any family that did not get the approval from the Council cannot return to al-Ayadiyah.14 The decision as to whether someone can return is essentially based on the Tribal Council’s suspicion of that individual’s affiliation. “The only condition for return for all classes of society is the returning person must be clear and not have any security suspicions” (Tribal Council KIII, 2020). The Council’s implementing powers include specifying appropriate return conditions, according to its members’ tacit knowledge about the level of ISIS affiliation of any prospective returnee. According to members of the Tribal Council, its establishment - subsequent to the Pact - gave more power to the clans than they had before. “Of course, the existence of the agreement gave a kind of strength to the clans, as they have something formal [the Pact] to rely on in dealing with the situations or problems they face in society” (Tribal Council KIII, 2020). Some subject matter KIIIs however, questioned the legitimacy of the clans’ kinship-based community representation as incompatible to their Pact-enshrined entitlements. Reports have been detected of the Council effectively deleting 7 or more names from security actors’ database of ISIS affiliates, and instances of families with 1st degree affiliation returning successfully without disavowal raises questions about what statutory actors the Council is accountable to.

“The [Tribal Council members] try to be everything but they don’t have the power. They start investigating cases – but that’s not their job! That’s the job of the police. All they can do is advise that people follow the rule of the law” (subject matter expert KII, 2020).

According to the Council, community leaders and families are aware of the clans and families associated with ISIS, who will be ‘cleared’ and thus safe to return, or for whom safety cannot be secured even following a disavowal process. Returned community members have to trust the Council in their evaluation and their intentions for peaceful coexistence through the implementation of the Pact. Meanwhile, IDP communities express concerns regarding the ability of the implementing actors to guarantee successful implementation of all the articles of the Pact. The Council members state the limit to their powers: “we can calm the situation at clan or tribe level when crimes happen, but cannot intervene by taking legal decisions because that power belongs to the government and the security actors” (Tribal Council KIII, 2020).

The Council recognizes that the fulfilment of the pact is a process and announce that they are currently upholding the Pact at its simplest capabilities, in coordination with the local government and the security actors in al-Ayadiyah. The Council reported a lack of financial support and efforts to create action plans which could enhance the implementation. Furthermore, it reported that clearer roles and responsibilities need to be developed between implementation actors, but that the ‘greater part’ should lie with the security actors.

2.4 Community reception of the Pact

Prior to the signature of the agreement, al-Ayadiyah communities (displaced as well as returned), had not been consulted in a systematic way. According to Key Informants and Nonviolent Peaceforce al-Ayadiyah
baseline survey, the communities were not made aware of the ongoing process of brokering the Pact, despite it having a serious impact on their ability to return and rehabilitate. Signatories were not obligated to spread awareness about the pact, nor did they ensure inclusive systematic consultation with the displaced communities they sought to represent. However, for some community constituents, community consultation was not anticipated because such a process and tribal leadership decision-making more generally encompasses self-referential decision making.

“The majority of women see this as something that they need not be a part of. When we ask about FHH [including widows with ISIS affiliation], then women have an opinion about it. Then they want to have a voice” (subject matter expert KII, February 2020).

The establishment of a Pact of Honor is perceived by al-Ayadiyah citizens as a symbol for hope and encouraged return for 97% of survey respondents. Disregarding the details of the articles and principles with which return was conditioned, its symbolic value – as well as naming it a ‘peace agreement’ – reportedly generated sentiments of pride amongst al-Ayadiyah communities particularly as it eclipsed that of Telafar district and generated heightened humanitarian attention to a relatively small community. It was perceived as a stepping stone towards peace and normalization for IDPs, as well an acknowledgement of the tragedies that befell them. “It was a message of hope” (subject matter expert KII, 2020). Some returnees believed the Pact secures the rights and entitlements of returnees. For others, it was a signal of the authorities’ ability to guarantee safe return for IDPs through clan, authority, and security actor collaboration and mediation. KIIs reported a cultural significance to the Pact, as ‘something to show’ that represents the extensive collaboration across working actors in the sub-district, and a testament to their shared commitment to IDP return and reconciliation.

The announcement of the Pact was widely transmitted through TV and radio, as well as through ongoing awareness sessions by NP in al-Ayadiyah and its displaced communities.

“When the community saw the authorities of al-Ayadiyah appeared in TV – both the Iraqi and Turkman TV – reading the agreement, it meant a lot. People heard it but maybe didn’t understand what it really meant” (subject matter expert KII, 2020).

67% of survey respondents received awareness on the Pact, 44% engage with its implementation through awareness raising amongst relatives and friends, and 10% through reporting instances of breach. However, 19% of IDP respondents had not heard about it35 and only 37% of IDP respondents reported knowing details of what the Pact means.

Segments of al-Ayadiyah view the Pact with some apprehension. Firstly, components of al-Ayadiyah’s IDPs are stigmatized and discriminated against due to ISIS affiliation – real, suspected, or assumed. Indeed, some receive threats from their families or community leaders to discourage their return. Others are worried about being blocked during the costly return journey due to perceptions of volatile conditions on the road or security actor behavior at checkpoints. Secondly, families who believe they can disavow and return ‘cleanly’ through the mechanisms for breaches of the agreement upon return. To expand NP’s shuttle diplomacy efforts to overcome such issues, a delegation of al-Ayadiyah authorities and tribal leaders is due to visit relevant camps.36

KIIs also spoke of families refusing to return, unordered to reconcile with affiliated families. Displaced and returned KIIs alike discussed, unprompted, the potential radicalization of families with affiliation due to their social exclusion and systematic marginalization. In this sense, the Pact builds on the Iraqi system of exclusion, in which the issuance of ID documentation is conditioned on security clearance, to include the ability to return, to its extension. This positions people with perceived or real ISIS affiliation at the margins of society, unable to access services, protection, statutory identity acknowledgement and prohibits their movement.

Some subject matter experts and community leader KIIs perceived of the pact as an empty promise that fails to establish real accountability mechanisms to counter false allegations or revenge attacks. In this way, promising safe return for families with assumed affiliation can lead to high security risks vis-à-vis potential revenge crimes, towards which people need guaranteed protection and justice. Furthermore, some IDPs believe that the signatories were forced to approve the Pact but that some clan leaders desire revenge over peace and with their Tribal Council membership, have positioned themselves to have extraordinary powers to approve or reject return movements.

“This agreement is useful if implemented and being respected in its terms. But we didn’t see its results until now and we can’t return depending on it” (displaced community leader KII, 2020).

On the other hand, some families with ISIS affiliation disavowed, successfully returned, and are living and working in al-Ayadiyah. “I believe if we can tell people in the camps about this story, they will return” (Telafar citizen and subject matter expert KII, 2020). The perceptions of IDPs are central to understanding underlying dissent or unwillingness to return, but so is awareness raising and cross-displacement engagement37 to counter rumors fueling such sentiments.

2.5 Engaging with the Pact

One of the key issues for the Pact is the lack of consultation of IDPs across social groups and of relevant protection agencies, itself a partial result of the severed relationships between displaced communities and their leaders due to war and displacement. In some cases, trust needs to be built, which makes inclusive representation ever more crucial to a Pact of this nature. Prior to its establishment, no structured community awareness sessions or initiatives to ensure inclusivity were agreed upon among the signatories. Initially, KIIs reported that al-Ayadiyah communities did not feel they had or should have ownership or consultation in this tribal agreement and reportedly, some people did not feel the need to have consultative powers in these matters.

“The only condition for return for all classes of society is the returning person must be clear and don’t have any security suspicions” (Tribal Council KII, 2020).
However, having recently engaged more with its principles and realized its direct effects on their lives, IDP and return communities alike have raised more questions, particularly over the implementation of articles 2 and 9 on false allegations, and on revenge crimes. The agreement leaves room for interpretation by leaving out the details of what exactly constitutes ISIS affiliation. It is also unclear how the Tribal Council will determine what evidence 'counts' within their suspicions over the prospective returnees' affiliation. Lastly, the rights and entitlements of potential returnees accused of ISIS affiliation are not stated. This gap heightens the risks of opportunism, nepotism, and discrimination against returnees and raises IDP fears of facing institutionalized collective punishment.

2.5.1 False accusations & acts of revenge

For families who have returned, the Pact gives them a sense of security against false accusations and revenge acts. However, when asking signatories about breaches of the relevant articles (2 and 9), no concrete mechanisms to investigate the validity of accusations were mentioned and the Tribal Council operates on the basis of tacit knowledge to assess levels of IS affiliation. With no clear procedures for assessing breaches of the articles and the informal nature of the evidence used, there is considerable room for opportunist actors, nepotism, and abdication over collective community accusation. Although there is an alleged near-complete elimination of false accusations (95%, according to Tribal Council KII) since its launch in 2018, concrete methods to detect and follow up on such allegations were not reported. IDPs and returnees are raising questions over this and wish guarantees about the efficacy of accountability to the Pact existed. Furthermore, questions are raised over the lack of power of the members of the Tribal Council to reveal false accusations with their limited powers.

The false accusations and fear thereof have rendered some families unwilling to embark on the disavowal processes. Despite awareness about the Pact framed to facilitate the return of people, including those with affiliation, people are hesitant to trust its ability to provide unconditional (i.e. irrespective of gender, age, family, clan, tribe) protection against false accusations and revenge crimes prior to or despite disavowal. Some subject matter experts recount that the Pact gives room for false allegations as it fails to put rights and entitlements at the forefront - in line with the rule of law - and rather emphasize vilification of affiliates without specifying what that constitutes.40

Some families have been told not to return even from their own family members. Some community leaders may assess that the safety of members of their congregation cannot be secured upon return, and therefore advise them to stay in displacement. With such examples, rumors can easily spread within displaced settings and give people the impression that returned families are not 'ready' for reconciliation and may act in revenge despite the establishment of the Pact.

Communities in displacement fear that collective punishment of alleged ISIS affiliated families will recreate cycles of violence and instability. For example, ISIS affiliation and inability or failure to disavow would block an individual's return. They would fail the security clearance needed to obtain and renew civil documentation and as such, they would be blocked from accessing education, health, and other statutory services. Such exclusion and marginalization, based in real or false allegations, can regenerate extremism in a system that disenfranchises individuals from their rights.

2.5.2 Disavowal processes

“Everyone knows one another and whether they have disavowed affiliation or not. In addition, false accusations happen often. If a person doesn’t like another, they can call a security actor [and say] that they are affiliated. This is also used to pressure people for money and other ways” (subject matter expert KII, 2020).41

“Some IDPs who have security concerns, some of whom are afraid of false accusation, but we, as the Council and tribal leaders, always assure them that there are no such cases in al-Ayadiyah” (Tribal Council KII, 2020).

Qasabat al Rai, November 2019, NP Field Team
The disavowal process is essential for families with ISIS affiliation. Since the inception of the Pact, there has been considerable inquiry into the disavowal process from IDPs. Some KIIs expressed their concern over persisting issues regarding community acceptance and reconciliation, following the return of disavowed families. As mentioned above, some families who intended to, or had completed the disavowal process, before receiving messages from their families or community leaders that their return is unwanted or unsafe for them. “In the end of the day, the disavowal is only a piece of paper!” (subject matter expert KII, 2020). IDPs are intimidated by the stories about traumatizing disavowal and return processes of other returnees and fear potential repercussions over disavowal for their relatives. Conversely, security actors report of families directly affiliated to ISIS with no intention to disavow, which can put al-Ayadiyah at risk of ISIS resurgence. “We have a follow-up to the peace agreement, but legally we cannot force anyone to do the disavowal” (security actor KII, 2020).

Conversely, implementing stakeholders confirmed the return of over 20 families with previous direct affiliation who are now working in the sub-district. This message they believe will encourage people to embark on disavowal and return processes. But equally, they acknowledge IDPs’ distrust in this new mechanism and the community acceptance they will face upon return.

IDPs with assumed or real ISIS affiliation fear disavowal as the process validates and build evidence in the case against the allegedly directly affiliated relative. In this way, disavowal can work to generate ‘evidence’, a false accusation, about relatives. IDPs must weigh the consequences for providing such – potentially lethal – ‘evidence’ through disavowal, against the authorization it provides to be able to return to a place they are likely to face vast livelihood and reconstruction needs. As such, disavowal can come across as a trap, an opportune condition for security actors to gather valuable intel to prosecute people accused of ISIS affiliation. If the individual is acquitted of such relative, this could lead to the execution of this - potentially falsely accused - relative. In this calculation, return conditions need to improve to incentivize IDP return, disregarding security guarantees (in particular articles 2 and 9) as set out in the Pact. Some KIIs argue that the Ayadiyah families who wanted to return and were confident in their security clearance have already returned.

The barriers to disavow include informal layers and complex social pressures. Relatives could work against the return of a family member or individual who could spoil their ‘clean’ reputation if they returned. Another barrier is the lack of tribal or Mukhtar representation or access to such community leaders to advocate on the behalf of a family, e.g. following the death of the connecting male relative. “It is not fair for women who are seen as affiliated to ISIS to suffer – same for the children, they are the innocent caught in the middle,” several recent returnees KIIs contended. KIIs unanimously spoke of the gender specific barriers to disavowal due to ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’. The domain of such processes is considered accessible for males. However recently a FHH disavowed and returned reportedly with increased support from security actors due to her single status. Though this was only due to the fact that she had no male relative or tribal leader available to support her process (subject matter expert KII, 2020). Other barriers include harassment targeted at women at any step of the process, women’s inability to access authorities without male accompaniment, or legitimate fear thereof, “Some women are way too afraid to leave the camp in general and have not left the camps for years” (subject matter expert KII, 2020).

Confusion persists over what affiliation constitutes, as well as what degree should be disavowed. The Pact stipulates that 1st degree should be disavowed to facilitate return, whereas implementing actors request 2nd degree of affiliation disavowed and reportedly largely prevent the return of families with 1st degree affiliation. This negotiation of return conditions is depending on both the proximity to the affiliated person (degree) but also on the rank of the directly affiliated, within ISIS, PMF and local authorities have reportedly been preventing return of first-degree affiliated families, and local authorities have received orders from Baghdad to not allow their return, even if they disavow. An official letter from the Governor of Ninewa has been circulated to all districts and sub-districts saying that families with 1st relatives affiliated with ISIS are not allowed to return to their areas even if they disavowed their affiliated relatives. A Mukhtar reported that community leaders are not satisfied with this procedure because it doesn’t provide alternatives for these families. Some mukhtars are ready to support alternative options to integrate into new areas by providing families with official letter of recognition.

Logistical barriers to disavowal reportedly include the blockage of certain families who want to access disavowal in al-Ayadiyah at the Telafr distict’s checkpoints as the processes necessitate accessing to the Telafr courts as well. Another such obstacle includes the fear of missing the distribution stamp in the camp during the family’s absence for disavowal in Telafr. The stamp registration inside the displacement camps occurs at random which combined with the recent restriction on families from re-entering the camps, have rendered many unwilling to take the risk. IDPs find the process insecure and expensive and have requested the opening of al-Ayadiyah’s own court or alternatively establishing a collective disavowal transportation for affiliated families. However, this would naturally pose significant protection concerns.

2.5.3 Breaches to the Pact

“Since the beginning of the work of the Tribal Council until now, we have not noticed any breach of the peace agreement, but if this happens in the future, we will take several measures” (Tribal council KII, 2020).

Breaches are considered hard to monitor by informants, but the existence of their occurrence are highly disputed. According to a Tribal Council KII, breaches have not been noticed by the council, as the quote indicates. “The families threatened FHH from al-Ayadiyah that they will commit revenge acts. Then they cannot move anywhere. This could be the case in any village” (subject matter expert KII, 2020). Returnees and IDP KIIs talk of cases in which prospective returnees or IDPs intending disavow had not been protected, allowed, or community leaders that their return is unwanted or unsafe.

“Many families are being falsely accused of IS affiliation - I’ve heard of over 100! Without any reason some of them were rejected at the checkpoint or did not make the journey because they were scared of being rejected” (recent returnee KII, 2020). This could indicate a lack of trust in the Pact, the failure to enforce consequences for breaching it, or a lack of consistent commitment to the Pact’s articles among security actors in Telafr and al-Ayadiyah. According to al-Ayadiyah’s local security actors, breaches will be followed-up: according to the terms of the agreement breaches are not always reported and hard to detect. For example, intimidating phone calls and messages could discourage victims both from returning as well as reporting this as a breach to the Pact.
“There are many breaches and no implementation, so no one who follows up!” (subject matter expert KII, 2020).

The lack of clarity over what constitutes affiliation and periodic disagreements over procedures for 2nd or 3rd degree affiliated families increases the risk of IDPs breaching the agreement even unintentionally. The Tribal Council, for example, noted the existence of families who want to return to al-Ayadiyah but failed to disavow ‘under the pretext’ that they were innocent; a violation of one of the provisions of the agreement.

Breaches are at times seen as a sensitive topic due to the pride associated with the Pact of Honor. The mere seeding of the idea that some constituents failed to comply with the orders of their clan leader could be seen as a lack of trust or disrespect their honor. Some community members raise concerns over the emphasis the Pact puts on the informal powers of tribal leaders and allows to engage in the prosecution of people. According to local security actors, tribal leaders are the first responders to breaches and will initiate legal measures in coordination with the actors that support the Pact such as the local government.

“What will justice look like? The tribal leaders do not have the power to implement this (…) they coordinate with security actors through a monthly meeting. If there is a breach no one does anything” (subject matter expert and al-Ayadiyah citizen KII, 2020).

Some informants disclosed that breaches would be better dealt with if an action plan was generated prior to the implementation of the Pact and the instigation of return movements – particularly as the Pact deals with the return of one of the most vulnerable groups of IDPs including FHH, many whom have already faced discrimination and ostracization in displacement due to their perceived ISIS affiliation. In order to encourage return on the basis of the Pact calls for a well-consulted mechanism that considers protection through a rights-based lens, acknowledging the realities of al-Ayadiyah’s complex IDP cases.
CHAPTER 2 SUMMARY POINTS

- The establishment of a Pact of Honor is perceived by al-Ayadiyah IDPs and returnees as a symbol for hope and encouraging IDP return (97%) despite some criticisms regarding the details of its articles.

- While the Pact—or peace agreement—has symbolic power, it is meant to assist a vulnerable sub-set of IDPs with varied and complex cases and specific individual situations, which seriously necessitates the development of more protection-oriented implementation mechanisms.

- 18 months from its establishment, IDPs become more familiar with the terms and conditions of the Pact and the procedures dictating their potential return through NP awareness raising activities. But as qualitative research show, inconsistencies and distrust are widespread in the ability of implementing stakeholders to guarantee the fulfilment of each article—particularly when bringing Pact breaches (e.g. false accusations, acts of revenge) to accountability. However, some families who do wish to return and consider themselves ‘clean’—or ‘cleared’ through disavowal still see other incentives to stay in the camps—education, healthcare and livelihood opportunities—and yet more barriers to return—lack of livelihood opportunities and shelter.

- The articles provide the principles for a system that effectively allows for families to disavow ISIS affiliated relatives and return safely. However, as disavowal automatically generates fatal evidence against an affiliated relative or confirms a false allegation, the stakes are high for IDPs to obtain an approval to return.

- Some IDPs are unable to disavow, are falsely accused, or have successfully disavowed but are warned about their out-group status by community members or relatives, discouraging their return. As one informant claimed: "the disavowal is just a piece of paper." In this sense, the Pact has effectively codified social exclusion, marginalization, stigma and inability to return for some suspected ISIS affiliated families. In addition, obtaining return approval in exchange for providing information to intelligence actors has come across as an opportunistic return condition through which security actors can acquisitively confirm their suspicions.

- This mechanism for return gives people a second chance through disavowal, but is also an extension of a system that approaches war crime and prosecution of ISIS affiliates with exclusion over prosecution. For example, the conditioning of civil documentation issuance on security clearance can position some families (including FHH with alleged affiliation) outside the statutory system and services instead of providing them with ID documentation, holding them accountable to any crimes they may have committed or providing them with a system for reintegration into society. The long-term effects of such a ‘system of exclusion’ can cultivate sentiments of dissent amongst these subsequently disenfranchised communities; a concern which is reportedly widely discussed amongst IDPs and returnees alike.

- Some IDPs fear that disavowal will validate and build evidence in support of a false or real accusation, which makes them reluctant to go through this process. The effectiveness of the disavowal cannot guarantee social inclusion and prevent revenge completely. The exchange of providing intel to security actors and the local court through disavowal for the facilitation of a possible return to al-Ayadiyah can come across as an opportunistic return condition. When no other incentive is provided and return conditions remain poor, the remaining al-Ayadiyah families (who are not confident in their safety upon security clearance) are unlikely to return. Those who were confident have largely already returned.
"People are afraid of the mountains"
The return of al-Ayadiyah IDPs is not necessarily an indicator of success and some of the mechanisms in place to promote it pose major protection gaps. IDP return movements are considered a major security and protection task for relevant duty bearers in area of displacement and al-Ayadiyah. The main objectives of al-Ayadiyah’s security actors are to ensure stability and control for the local community and to safeguard them against insurgency. Recent ISIS activity has resulted in specific and consecutive attacks against the Tribal Hashed headquarters in al-Shuhada’ neighborhood, al-Ayadiyah. ISIS elements are known to be present in the mountains surrounding al-Ayadiyah town.

“We are always ready to face any attack by ISIS, although we know that their capabilities are very weak. And we will have raids and searches in the coming days [16th April 2020 onwards] in the mountains surrounding al-Ayadiyah to fully secure them” (security actor KII, 2020).

“[Attacks] give a bad signal to IDPs and returnees and they get scared. This week has seen three attacks alone! The tribal and security actors say that ‘everything is under control’ but we know it’s not under control; it’s absolutely not. People are afraid of the mountains” (subject matter expert, 2020).

To ensure stability, the local police, Hashed, Iraqi Security Forces, and their respective intelligence bodies work in close collaboration. Part and parcel of their mission is to ensure returnees have successfully obtained security clearances and approval for their return requests which requires high levels of coordination and a streamlined procedure between the various actors.42

3.1 Collective and individual security and protection concerns

Security and access to protection have various meanings to different components of society and multiple categories and prioritizations according to an individual’s context and their social status within their community collective. When analyzed through the lens of an individual’s community collective (clan, tribal, AoO, gender, family or other identity markers), protection concerns differ from those of an individual. IDPs often rely on informal actors (including community leaders) to report personal protection concerns, and their reports are addressed through community mediation and vigilante accountability mechanisms at tribal or clan levels. In this way, individual concerns are cast as the responsibility of the head of the community collective.

“Some problems related to security are solved by families. Some problems need a family leader to resolve it or otherwise you go to the Mukhtar and then he will lead the way” (female returnee KII, 2020).

Following decades of invasions, war, and mass displacement, state security duty bearers have become increasingly focused on the community collective’s military protection than with their role to enforce Iraqi law for the individual citizen. This dovetails with the survey’s findings. 70% of respondents perceived their security situation as ‘safe’ and 27% as ‘midway’ in the current post-war context, but only 61% (nearly all male) consider themselves able to access formal security duty bearers individually. By looking at security from the perspective of the community collective, it becomes clear that the differentiation and the proliferation of security actors could lower perceptions of security, stability, and control. However, by steering society towards Rule of Law, a push has been made—including through the Pact—to focus on guaranteeing the individual vis-a-vis law enforcement.

“There have been no incidents. I cannot go to the police on my own, if I saw one” (female returne KII, 2020).

In our study, accessing security also refers to the ability of citizens to exercise their rights and claim their entitlements as set out in the Iraqi Constitution, which is principally safeguarded by security duty bearers. In order to access these actors, citizens perceive of invisible and informal barriers related to their gender or assumed ISIS affiliation. The study contends with that of other organizations that barriers exist for obtaining information about reporting incidents to security duty bearers as it remains a sensitive issue in a volatile context.45

3.2 Barriers to security and protection

In order to understand the barriers of citizens to access security duty bearers, it is important to unpack the holistic experience of IDPs and returnees. It is central to consider whether actors and reporting processes are perceived as trusted, logistically safe, viable, and communally accepted. In addition, it is central to understand whether community members see the prospect of a fair and confidential treatment of their information by the security actor, which eliminates the risk of exposure to any additional harm from reporting and activates accountability mechanisms. By considering these terms for accessing security and protection, barriers that may not be readily articulated as such become visible. Furthermore, some barriers are fluid and indicate possible space for change or negotiation, particularly culturally or traditionally-defined barriers to security, an example of which can be seen in the account below.

“I saw one woman from al-Ayadiyah who disavowed. The police station facilitated the process more than if she was a man! This woman did not have relatives. They respected her more than the men as she has no relatives in al-Ayadiyah or Telafar. Culturally, it is not allowed for a woman to go by herself to a security actor or any director. ‘Her men’ from her family, religion or tribe should accompany her. But officially, anyone can go to a security actor, there is nothing official to prevent them from going. It is the first time I heard about such a case” (subject matter expert, 2020).

In our study, 14% of female and only 2% of male respondents reported not trusting security duty bearers to ensure appropriate follow up. 39% of respondents do not believe that security actors will or can treat their information with confidentiality. Nearly all respondents said they would report incidents to the local police forces and/or Tribal Hashed (almost all of whom were returnees), but both groups do so via or in combination with reporting to unofficial structures, accessing security duty bearers, indirectly. A major
limitation to primary security-actor related research is the fact that many returned families in al-Ayadiyah have relatives employed by the Tribal Hashed; another, is the sensitivity of this line of questioning. Considering the power of security actors and the reported rights violations committed by them, particularly in camp settings, respondents may not have felt confident to respond. Lastly, respondents’ access to various security actors depends on their personal exposure to that actor in their particular settings.

According to NP’s survey, 36.6% of respondents feel they cannot access security authorities, nearly all of whom (99.9 %) were women. The majority of whom were based in al-Ayadiyah. When asked why, respondents explained that traditions within the al-Ayadiyah community completely prevent women from accessing security actors alone. Women depend on their husbands, fathers or community leaders (e.g. the mukhtar) to report the incident to security duty bearers and follow up. Thus, female respondents are more likely than men to report rights violations to unofficial protection networks made up of friends, family, neighbors, NGOs and elders, mukhtars, or religious leaders.

Male respondents largely report incidents to the Tribal Hashed or the local police forces. Women’s safety is therefore largely contingent on male advocacy efforts for any incident she wants to report. This subsequently puts women in a position of extreme vulnerability from relatives or, even worse, informal leaders who effectively become power brokers for her but are accountable to no one. If the concern involves men within her family or clan, there is little evidence to suggest that women can freely report their concerns without any risk. Moreover, research suggests that perpetrators of gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) often to formal security duty bearers, as well as NGO workers and security actors in camps. However, respondents reported a high (74%) conviction in security actors’ ability to ensure security, which showcases their view of security actors’ role as safeguarding the safety of the community against an attack by an out-group as opposed to the safety of the individual.

3.2.1 Female barriers to security and protection

Women and girls experience more layers of barriers in addition to those of their male counterparts in their engagement with return processes, the Pact of Honor, and to access security in and outside of camp settings. Such barriers become evident in the structural prevalence of GBV and its severe under-reporting or legitimization by "traditional values," rendering this violence relentlessly invisible and under-dealt with by security actors, local authorities, and INGOs alike. The lack of reporting of GBV is not only due to the fact that the perpetrator is most commonly the husband or another male family member, but also the shame and victim-blaming associated with reporting this type of violence. For FHH, reporting could confirm or create rumors of ISIS affiliation as GBV is often justified as a ‘legitimate’ form of community vigilantism against women affiliated to ISIS. Women IDPs and returnees, who represent over half the beneficiaries of NP’s work, are usually the primary caretakers of children and are most commonly the heads of single-parent households within a displaced population. As such, their barriers to security and protection are central and beg for targeted address in all NP and humanitarian programming writ-large.

For women in al-Ayadiyah, accessing security is limited. Female IDPs and returnees alike report being ignored, being distrusted, shamed, or even blamed or harassed if they report a crime. Female informants explained how their security concerns or the incidents they wish to report traditionally go through multiple layers of men as it rises from family, to clan, to community leadership. It only ever arrives to statutory security authorities if it cannot be resolved at one of the lower levels. In this system, men are needed for women to access security and protection. However, a few women noted that they heard of one or two women who managed to access security and tribal leaders and report their incident directly, but this was a testament to their resilience, desperation, and lack of other options.

“I am comfortable, but I cannot go alone. There are big challenges to approaching the authorities. If I saw something [rights violation, crime] I could never go alone. I would first go to my husband and his family would go to the Mukhtar who would advise on what to do. Very few women can go alone” (returned female KII, 2020).

The economic constraints and lack of livelihood opportunities for women in displacement and upon return can lead FHH to engage in negative coping mechanisms to obtain protection and meet other basic needs. These strategies include ‘survival sex’, child labor, and child marriage. Consequently, FHH are likely to remain displaced in camp settings where
A chart depicts a snapshot of an optional text box explaining why the respondent (all female) felt unable to access security duty bearers, all of whom were obtained from Qayyarah - IDP - respondents. However, similar comments were omitted in qualitative data collection of female returnees.

Information protection structures can be built with other tents/households and aid and services can be accessed without cost. The informal settlement setting typically puts FHH at further risk due to the lack of consistent aid and security mechanisms. However, instances of GBV are often reported in camp settings, and are committed by other IDPs, host communities, and security duty bearers.

Some women suspected of ISIS affiliation disavow but are still stigmatized without evidence about their direct affiliation. As such, according to some female informants, widows should not return as they would risk their safety in al-Ayadiyah. Even if they disavowed, disavowal ‘is only a piece of paper’ and the community may falsely accuse her of remaining affiliated. False accusations are common and can be conjured up due to internal disputes among or between families or to settle personal vendettas that may predate ISIS in displacement or in al-Ayadiyah.

“Some women, are still scared, if she returns maybe she will be shamed or put into prison, which is a very shameful thing for women here. Her tribal leader may tell her not to go back if he cannot guarantee her safety against such community dissent” (subject matter expert, 2020).

Solidarity is high among some female IDPs and returnees with and without assumed ISIS affiliation of any degree. For example, accusations about ISIS affiliations of women and children are perceived by some female informants as ‘unfair’ for a number of reasons. They perceive such FHH as innocent and as victims who were ‘caught in the middle’, while also carrying the burden of navigating displacement and return singlehandedly without male protection. Or, as one informant noted, “some women lost their children in the war and are alone as a result [of ISIS] but still do not want collective punishment for the women and children with ISIS affiliation” (subject matter expert, 2020). Female informants explained that affiliated children and women need new and better influences rather than social exclusion and marginalization.

Widows with ISIS affiliation struggle to obtain disavowal. Access to disavowal is conditioned on possession of full civil documentation which requires security clearances (discussed in Chapter 1.2.1). For some women, they may be requested to disavow their own children to obtain approval for their return request, in turn generating evidence for prosecution of their children. Given this difficult position, many women are likely to abstain from both the security clearance and disavowal processes. Women reported, through the survey, that ‘many women inside the camps’ are changing their children’s IDs so they are unaffiliated.

“There was a woman with missing documentation for her youngest son. She had to disavow her oldest son who was seen to be affiliated with ISIS to ensure the documentation for the youngest son” (subject matter expert, 2020).

As this section demonstrates, FHH face high risks within and outside the camp, during their return, and after their arrival in their AoO. However, patriarchal structures are being challenged in al-Ayadiyah. For example, women have gained prominence and a larger public role by keeping schools open on a voluntary basis and women participation in community and youth fora and community police initiatives has led to more opportunities for them. Moreover, women reported that there has been considerable progress compared to the period before ISIS. “Now, girls can go to school and attend university and report – if they have male accompaniment” (female returnee KII, 2020). Some women reported that they are convinced that Telafar and al-Ayadiyah want to be free from the traditions and customs that block their participation...
and hold them back from reaching their full potential.

3.2.2. Case study: Women’s Community Security Forum

Community Security Fora are established to raise the voices of community members, including men, women and youth. The fora have been ostensibly appreciative of these initiatives by NP which have created a healthy foundation for more participatory processes, in relation to security and other social matters in al-Ayadiyah.

Female participants found the CSFs an exciting new place to be heard and advocate for themselves. They saw the value in having international presence and thought it would increase accountability vis-a-vis the promises of the authorities, resulting in greater trust. They expressed that they have been trying to get heard by authorities but largely been ignored by them and did take the opportunity to reiterate their cases in front of some of them at the meeting. This shows how women are wanting to break with traditions that oppress them and compromises their access to advocate for themselves, access security and justice.

“It is great to see authorities deal with our problems; otherwise you don't find them anywhere in al-Ayadiyah! NP has a great role in emphasizing our voices to the authorities. We do something even men don't get to!” (CSF participant KII, 2020).

“The foreign presence, I'm thinking will lead authorities to higher levels of accountability when they see that foreigners are coming all the way from another country to help them” (CSF participant KII, 2020).

“‘I like this but I want to see results with the CSF. Today there were no solutions, only problems. The women do not have the power to overcome their challenges, but step by step maybe it will change. The doors to the (authorities’) doors are not open to us women’” (CSF participant KII, 2020).

“The [local authority official] is from my clan and I have never even met him before NP! Now, I get to explain my problems directly to him” (CSF participant KII, 2020). Following this brave and self-advocacy effort, he replied that she needed to have a man take this issue forward. Some women were shy or raised protection issues community-wide or centered around their children and others brought about women’s protection issues. One lady even wanted to set up a foundation for them, at her first meeting. “This [CSF] makes us talk; some are shy but with time, they explain their issues eventually” (CSF participant KII, 2020).

One subject matter expert explained how women need time to take space to think about their own concerns and formulate it so that male authorities understand barriers to accessing security and justice, despite being equal for the law. The change is gradual, requiring long-term engagement and persistent inclusion of various components of al-Ayadiyah (e.g. including villages and not only al-Ayadiyah town).

Female participants were heard. Some of the women wanted to mobilize politically and others needed more time to get to know what the CSF could do for them. The hope is that, through long-term engagement in an open space, more women will want their voices and concerns to be heard. Hopefully, through long-term engagement with an organization that values their opinions and concerns, as well one which helps to facilitate their suggested solutions, women in al-Ayadiyah will be able to open the doors to authorities themselves.

Some informants recommended dedicated teams to focus on women as well as more time for women to gather outside of their homes. NP predicts that protection issues arise once trust has been built amongst the women in the group and encounter them during their outreach engagement during patrols in residential areas. Previous community engagements reported that a number of women would be ready to help NP increase female participation in public affairs. A community police force is already established and includes 10 women and 20 youth, but would benefit from more support, re-generation, a participant reported.

3.3 Protecting IDP Return and the Pact of Honor

According to the security informants, the Pact plays a central role in security due to increased cross-actor collaboration. Furthermore, they believe it has a stabilizing effect on the situation and allows them to clarify security concerns with the help of Tribal Council. However, the existence of the peace agreement does not affect the strength of the security actors. However, they see that tribal leaders have been given more power in the matter of IDP return.

According to them, IDP return is conditioned on their status as ‘clean,’ ‘cleared’ from ISIS affiliation—
3.4 Reconciliation and security

The Tribal Hashed is primarily recruited locally in Telafar or al-Ayadiyah itself, whereas ISF and police forces often come from other areas of Iraq. Tribal Hashed is close to the tribal authorities in al-Ayadiyah and thus have a particular awareness of the community’s tacit knowledge of people with ISIS affiliation. In addition, the local authorities and the Tribal Council have come to play a key role in facilitating collaboration between the various security actors who all empower NP to be active in supporting the implementation of its programs in al-Ayadiyah (particularly, around the implementation of the Pact with activities including the Community Security Forum).

It has been reported to NP that given the time that has passed since al-Ayadiyah’s liberation, it would be expected that the area would have witnessed more progress; for example, clearing rubble, restoring pavement, and removing mines and remnants of war to make al-Ayadiyah safer. The lack of progress is rumored to be due to the fact that heads of governmental departments and security actors in Telafar are largely Shia and al-Ayadiyah is mainly Sunni. However, according to another subject matter expert, the divisions between Sunni and Shia have decreased in al-Ayadiyah since displacement when AoO became primary identity marker, superseded that of religious sect, through engagement and forgiveness efforts and know all their movements” (security actor KII, 2020).

One of the problems faced by security actors is the spread of rumors among IDPs. “If a person doesn’t like another, they can call a security actor and say that they are affiliated. This is also used to pressure people for money and other ways” (subject matter expert, 2020). These accusations affect people who had the intention to pursue the disavowal process. “Such families face a lot of problems and then return back to the camp to avoid being arrested” (IDP community leader KII, 2020).

CHAPTER 3 SUMMARY POINTS

- 60% of respondents across genders report incidents to the local police forces and 33% would report to the Tribal Hashed, in combination with reporting to unofficial structures. Respondents reported a high (74%) conviction in security actors’ ability to ensure security, and view security actors’ role as primarily safeguarding the community against an out-group. The protection of the individual is traditionally secured through informal kinship alliances.

- 37% of survey participants responded that they cannot access security duty bearers, 99.9% of whom were women. Respondents explained that traditions and culture within the al-Ayadiyah community prevent women from accessing security actors.

- Traditionally, women report any rights violations to unofficial protection networks (friends, family, neighbors, NGOs and elders, mukhtars, or religious leaders), which conditions women’s access to security and protection on the ability of her male relative to advocate for her case. Thus, should an incident involve men within her family or clan, there is little evidence to suggest that she can report an incident without significant risk. In addition, perpetrators of GBV include all actors within the camp setting, and most often her closest relatives. Moreover, 39% of respondents do not believe that security actors will treat their information with confidentiality.

(page 54)
Qasabat al Ra’i,
November 2019,
NP Field Team
"If we are together, no one can break us"
Interventions promoting IDP return and reconciliation in al-Ayadiyah navigate existing relationships and social dynamics that result from decades of war, genocide and displacement. According to the Iraqi constitution, the state of Iraq is a democratic republic where the rule of law is upheld by law enforcing powers, including security actors. However, due to the tragedies that befell Iraq, the social contract between the Iraqi citizens and the government was challenged and, in some cases, eroded. The aspiration to enjoy representative governance became superseded by community and INGO patronage, who were able to deliver on the otherwise statutory, basic services, in times of crisis. Allegiance and social contracts thus remain strong to these actors, as to the para-military patron for collective security patrons is the Hashed al-Shaabi. In this way, engaging multiple actors, including tribal and religious actors are not to be neither under- nor over-estimated, contemplating the national move towards democratic governmentality, where Rule of Law can start replacing instances of vigilantism and kinship based judicial customs.

Throughout history, tribal structures that predate the state of Iraq with many hundred years, have been codified and utilized in foreign interventions - including through colonial projects - in opportune governmental vacuums, as instances of social contract erosion, war and displacement, disputed territories. According to feminist scholars, the kinship-based client-patron governmentality has re-circulated ancient notions of honor and shame, which often victimizes women to systemic oppression and assault that go against principles of human rights and the Iraqi Constitution. In this way, it is important to consider short- and long-term effect of engaging tribal and clan leaders in the appropriate way (as the Pact of Honor rightly prescribes) to avoid ‘re- or neo-tribalization.’

According to informants, NP’s presence has increased the power of clan leaders in al-Ayadiyah. “The best evidence for this is the tribal leaders in the Tribal Council, where they have power to accept or reject any family that wants to return to Ayadiyah and the idea of forming this council emerged from the peace agreement in cooperation with your organization (NP)” (security actor KII, 2020). It is central therefore to understand the impact of engaging and thus empowering tribal structures as well as the unwarranted and opportune relief it gives the government from meeting its obligation to its citizens.

4.1 Encouraging inclusion and equality

Despite the issue of gender discrimination and GBV affecting multiple aspects of half the beneficiaries of the programs, the structural silencing of women is re-circulated in interventions by engaging patriarchal actors and goes against the values and intentions of the programs and that of the Pact. Often, international actors shy away from engaging with what constitutes ‘tradition’ or ‘culture’, in an effort to come across as less invasive and give a more neutral or apolitical veneer. It is important to realize that every intervention engages and fortifies social norms through the actors they choose to engage. They, in turn get to determine what traditions and cultures should take precedent. Stakeholder engagements are often primarily male and tokenistic in its inclusion of women. Youth and women have historically been struggling to get empowered to shape what culture or traditions they would like to embody as a community. By ontological design, notions of culture and tradition can be represented as static and emotionally embellished in identity history or politics (including at tribe or clan levels), and become a frame through which current – at times, senseless phenomena like war and displacement - come to make sense. The central learning about oppression-based value systems is that it can re-circulate violence both between men and women as well as within and between components of society. Neither tradition nor culture are ‘set in stone’ (static) but rather, they work naturally through the dynamics of human engagement in which humanitarian interventions partake, and thus empower or accent actors who go on to define these.

As a response to this power or disempowerment to determine these notions that affect successful implementation, NP works in other country contexts for the legitimization of women’s spaces rather than only inviting their tokenistic presence in spaces traditionally occupied by males. Negotiating inclusivity requires capacity building in marginalized or ‘outed’ voices in society. These voices can be identified and heard in private or new public settings (e.g. NP meeting room in al-Ayadiyah). Consider male informants recounting of the centrality of women to en- or discourage IDP return and the implementation of the Pact, as women spread news in the region through phone calls and meetings between relatives in private settings. Conversations also take place during NGO visits in private settings where female IDPs get a chance to explain service gaps and barriers to return that organizations need to work to overcome. Furthermore, al-Ayadiyah local authorities expressed - in a ‘tongue in cheek’ comment - that women are the central problem for IDP return, because women will be ‘honest’ and warn IDPs about the current conditions in the sub-district - discouraging them from returning. Components of the return community raised the fact that members of local authority remain in displacement. Empowerment can occur in pockets such as the CSFs or local pre-established networks of opportunity that NP should take advantage of to benefit the wider community.

4.2 Women, widows and female headed households

Key informants from different stakeholder groups, both male and female, contended that more efforts need to be made in order to meet the needs of women, especially widows, by providing them with material, moral support and decent livelihood opportunities. Some households in displacement face significant levels of debt, depend of female breadwinners, and are forced to engage in negative coping mechanisms to make rent and it is therefore to be expected that this can continue following return, in the absence of livelihood opportunities in al-Ayadiyah. The compensation schemes could enable some independence (e.g. rebuilding of previous housing could eliminate exploitation by potentially abusive landlords). A subject matter expert emphasized that FHH may thrive more in a new context rather than by returning to al-Ayadiyah, requiring interventions and resources channeled to integration interventions around South Mosul and Kirkuk.

As has been discussed throughout this report, the experience of being displaced, engaging in return mechanisms and ability to obtain protection are gendered and have gender discriminatory access conditions. In this way, interventions must have this in mind, if they seek to be successful and avoid re-circulating violence and discrimination currently rife for women in this context. In addition, special structures need to be in place to facilitate safe, voluntary and dignified resettlement of widows and FHH.
4.3 Government & local authorities

Informants recommended that central and governorate level authorities should tackle false accusations with a proper mechanism. Moreover, they urged that the governorate of Ninewa should be in touch with district level authorities to facilitate return and proper processes for IDPs and not blame them for wanting to stay in camps, if their AoO have nothing to offer to cover their most basic needs. Incentives and guarantees must be made to secure a dignified and informed return movements as well as integration measures for families unable to return. Furthermore, inclusivity needs to be considered in statutory return and reconciliation measures vis-a-vis the stigmatization and discrimination in displacement and the long-term effects of their exclusion from vital statutory support and services, and recognition/ID documentation. Informants also reported a need for more efforts from the central government to provide permanent jobs for youth. Several returnees emphasized the need for youth activities and livelihood opportunities. There is al-Ayadiyah youth forum, but it reportedly ‘needs a lot of support’.

4.4 IDPs, returnees and the Pact

There is a need to reflect on the selection of actors engaged with for peace processes and other related intervention as it will de facto empower and raise their profile in the community. In the context of al-Ayadiyah, it can be beneficial to consult IDP and returned populations whether implementing actors represent them or whether there are other community leaders, youth or women from within camp or return settings relevant to engage.

Informants raised the need to risk-assess its implementation vis-a-vis principles of protection and Do No Harm. The rhetoric used within the Pact shows an approach to peace and reconciliation through, on the one hand, orientation towards the rule of law and coexistence but, on the other, through unification, ‘elimination’ and collective punishment against an ‘other,’ which calls for a reflection on what a peace agreement is by definition. The Pact is often promoted as a peace agreement, but if may be worth exploring a set definition to be discussed during the agreement brokerage phase (i.e. before it is signed off).

The IDPs’ fear over returning (e.g. to poor living conditions, insecurity of crossing check points, obtaining disavowal or ID documentation) indicate a need to increase communication of guarantees and services available for IDPs upon return by authorities claiming to uphold them. As mentioned in Chapter 1, livelihood, shelter and protection remain top priorities for IDPs. There is furthermore a need to overcome insecurities during the return process so that families can process these mechanisms from the camp settings. In addition, in order to facilitate women to navigate these mechanisms, particular attention must be given to widows or FHH to address their concerns over return as well as current protection concerns within camp settings.

“We hope that we will obtain financial support from peace-supporting organizations to conduct ongoing forums or consultative meetings and bring different groups of society together” (tribal leader KII, 2020).

Tribal KIs suggest that organizations working in the peace field (NP, in particular) set up a conference that can bring together “all components of society” including tribal leaders, clerics, youth, women, in addition to the local government, security actors, and the Wisemen Committee in order “to bring the points of view together and allow everyone to talk face to face with those who want to fill any gaps.”

Other KIs suggested the establishment of a return campaign with a delegation of authorities (security, tribal, clan and local) who can go to the Qayyarah and Yahiya camps. In this way, leaders would hear IDP concerns, and questions and to provide guidance and guarantees for IDPs, to counter rumors or discouraging perceptions about return processes. The campaign would constitute field visits and media transmission. A field visit from al-Ayadiyah delegation has been created to Yahiya camp, but is not implemented due to access restrictions in Q4 2019.

Qasabat al Ra‘i,
November 2019,
NP Field Team
4.5 NP Central Issues and Recommendations

4.5.1 Displacement and Return

Central Issues

- Some families wish to return and consider themselves ‘clean’ (or, ‘cleared’ through disavowal), but have other incentives to stay inside the camps, including education, healthcare and livelihood opportunities and yet more barriers to return including the lack of livelihood opportunities and shelter in al-Ayadiyah (and, for some families, security clearance).
- The capacity to receive all displaced families is not in place according to authorities. The swift closure of camps will pose concerns for the return mechanism and push people into further displacement, where they may face further gaps in services and protection.
- For some components of IDPs, the return mechanism can pose large protection risks (leaving camp, blocking of return). Women don’t even want to risk it, and feel unsafe even moving inside the camps.
- Women experience more (invisible) challenges at every step of displacement return and re-integration processes. Furthermore, FHH experience GBV and fear SEA during return processes or detention. Widows are afraid of the whole process, and intimidated by dealing with any authority on their own.
- Some families wish to return and are threatened from returning over the phone. ‘The disavowal is only a piece of paper’. Fear over ISIS resurrection vs. retaliation against disavowed ISIS affiliated families.
- Are clan leaders powerful enough to call out breaches if under pressure from security or other more powerful actors (i.e. Tribal Council are not exclusive from society and power of rumours)? Security actors receive phone calls from citizens calling suspicion on another family.
- Displacement challenged community cohesion (people are spread across Qayyarah and Kirkuk camps), detached from developments in sub-district by authorities in al-Ayadiyah. This challenges the trust in authorities to deliver on the return mechanisms (incl. the Pact). Guaranteed are needed.
- Children outgrow education access inside camps (e.g. as a result of missing ID documentation), nothing is done from the state’s side.

Central Recommendations

- A delegation of authorities (security, tribal, clan and local) are requested to go to the Mosul camps. They are requested to listen to IDP concerns and to provide guidance and guarantees for IDPs, to counter rumors or discouraging perceptions about return processes.
- A return campaign and conference: conference that brings together all classes of society, including tribal leaders, clerics, youth and women, in addition to the local government, security actors, and the Wisemen Committee in order to bring the points of view together and allow everyone to talk face to face with those who want to fill the gaps.
- Special mapping and assistance and advocacy to be provided for widows and FHH.
- Crack down on vigilantism, GBV and SEA and other attacks on women inside displacement camp under ISIS affiliation pretext is urgent.
- There is a need for support in accessing compensation-, return-, security clearance-, ID documentation- and disavowal processes e.g. through accompaniment (IDPs were told an NGO is working with al-Ayadiyah citizens in Kirkuk camps).
- Need for guarantee of being able to cross through checkpoints.
- Need alternative route to disavow 1st degree, if the security actors do not allow people of first degree to disavow in Telafar.
- Shuttle diplomacy of NP could expose some of the threats and blocks against certain families from coming back (Pact breaches).
- Capacity building to AoO reception with local and Governorate level authorities around the return severity scale, vis-a-vis enforced camp closures. Discussions around Yahyawa and Qayyarah camp closure are particularly relevant for IDPs from al-Ayadiyah.
- Livelihood and shelter advocacy for AoO.

4.5.2 The Al-Ayadiyah Pact of Honor

Central Issues

- The establishment of a Pact of Honor is perceived by al-Ayadiyah IDP’s and returnees as a symbol for hope and encouraging IDP return (97%). Majority of people don’t understand the details of it. Apart from its symbolic power, the Pact—or ‘peace agreement’ is received by an - at times - vulnerable sub-set of IDPs with varied and complex cases.
- Inability to guarantee that breaches of the Pact be monitored effectively. Unclear involvement of the GoI in monitoring implementation.
- Distrust is widespread within the IDP and returned communities regarding the ability of implementing stakeholders to guarantee the fulfilment of each article—particularly protection against false accusations and acts of revenge.
- As the disavowal process inherently generates evidence or confirmation of a relative’s ISIS affiliation (real, suspected, or assumed affiliation), the stakes are high and incentives low for IDPs to disavow and return to al-Ayadiyah. Obtaining return approval in exchange for providing information to intelligence actors is perceived as an opportunistic return condition.
- People are now required to disavow 2nd/3rd degree ISIS affiliation – a Pact breach, reportedly ordered by Baghdad.
- Gender perspective in Pact is completely absent. Women feel they are ignored and were not consulted before the pact and now face consequences, particularly FHH.
- Re-tribalization: are we giving clan leaders appropriate powers (enough to complete implementation of each article, exact role/ responsibility for actors and counter/mutual accountability amongst implementing actors. In addition, the Pact would benefit from a protection-oriented review particularly vis-a-vis the articles related to the disavowal process.
- Secondly establish meetings with the implementing actors, wider community representation and youth to coordinate wide implementation efforts. The more people are aware of the exact meaning, the more they will be able to share the right info through official sources. INGO actors need to know

Does the Pact really encourage coexistence and re-direct people towards Rule of Law and away from vigilantism? In light of the primacy and considerable power the Pact gives tribal actors through their tacit knowledge of al-Ayadiyah, an evaluation of the degree to which the Pact effectively re-orientates the community of al-Ayadiyah towards the Rule of Law and contributes to re-tribalization or neo-tribalization is called for.

Central Recommendations

- The Pact needs the development of more protection-oriented implementation mechanisms (and consider Do No Harm principle, issues the articles pose e.g. with collective punishment, e.g. false accusation render v. dangerous).
- The Pact works for some families but simultaneously widens protection gaps for households with complex levels of ISIS affiliation. It is advisable to search for alternative durable solutions for families unable to disavow and/or return, e.g. host community integration or shelter projects, in particular for FHH.
- Build on female solidarity found amongst some women in al-Ayadiyah with widows and FHH who wish to return.
- People feel part of implementation process via awareness spreading, maybe something which can be a way to collaborate.
- It’sly Establish precise meaning of the articles (what constitutes affiliation, what degree is disavowed etc.); then an action plan for implementation of each article, exact role/responsibility for actors and counter/mutual accountability amongst implementing actors. In addition, the Pact would benefit from a protection-oriented review particularly vis-a-vis the articles related to the disavowal process.
- Secondly establish meetings with the implementing actors, wider community representation and youth to coordinate wide implementation efforts. The more people are aware of the exact meaning, the more they will be able to share the right info through official sources. INGO actors need to know...
what authorities can really guarantee before campaigning for return and spreading awareness about the processes. With this, more trust is generated in the authorities to guarantee IDPs of equal and fair return processing.

- Streamline 2nd/3rd vs. 1st degree affiliation/position of affiliated within ISIS, then give information to IDPs that people with affiliation live and work peacefully in al-Ayadiyah, maybe this will encourage return.
- Need alternative route to disavow 1st degree, if the security actors do not allow people of first degree to disavow in Telafar.
- To be vigilant of re-tribalization, it would be worth assessing short- and long-term risks of this new power dynamic (with community members) and this potential re-/neo-tribalization. For example, understanding the effect of:
  ▶ delegating the responsibility to the Tribal Council to conduct primary assessment of return requests’ level of ISIS affiliation, ostensibly based on their ‘suspicion’ (which currently goes prior to the assessment of security actors);
  ▶ the potential effects it could have on the reorientation towards the Rule of Law over tribal governmentality - a central objective of the Pact;
  ▶ potential resurgence of conservative tribal notions of shame and honor (informal tribal justice mechanisms);
  ▶ and finally, evaluating the effect it will have on the public participation of youth and women.

### 4.5.3 Access to Security and Protection

**Central issues**

- Respondents reported a high (74%) conviction in security actors’ ability to ensure security. Security actors are seen to protect community against an attack by an out-group as opposed to the safety of the individual within the community.
- Access to security for the female half of the population denied/conditioned on male patronage. 37% of survey participants responded that they cannot access security duty bearers, 99.9% of whom were women. Female respondents were more likely than men to report any rights violations to unofficial protection networks, depending on male relatives.
- Security clearance versus exclusion? ID documentation - what do people do who have ‘security problems’?
- Disavowal process considered opportune for security intelligence to gather evidence for prosecution; unfeasible for some affiliated families.
- Accountability and trust in authorities’ ability to take concerns seriously - CSFs seem to help.
- Rumours hinder security actors’ work, making breaches hard to identify.
- Nearly 40% didn’t believe that their report would be treated with confidentiality, which is needed and can prevent reporting.

**Central Recommendations**

- Security clearance needs to be more accessible
  ▶ Need some guarantee of safely crossing through checkpoints; to secure access to security clearance procedures and ID documentation.
- Women’s group/foundation to break barrier to women’s access to security and protection. CSF must be regular event to foster cohesion and mutual support and empowerment vis-a-vis authorities who currently ‘close the door’ to women. Trust can be built to lay the ground for women’s group/foundation to break barrier to women’s access to security and protection.
- Women’s protection teams are being established in order to create a safe passage for GBV reporting and other women-specific protection concerns they are unable to report under current gender discriminatory reporting lines.
- NP presence to secure access to security duty bearers for people unable to obtain this security. Following applications to return as well as efforts to report examples of GBV etc.
- Monitor rumors and breach processes as none of the informants seem to have a comprehensive way of investigating its occurrence (phone, gossip etc.)
- Confidentiality needs to be guaranteed and trust needs to be built between the citizens and security actors, provide internal security over just against insurgency - its military role.

### 4.5.4 Overall recommendations for programming

**Central issues**

- Return is not necessary an indicator for success in al-Ayadiyah, if shelter and livelihood needs continue to be unmet - it is worth reflecting on what is a durable solution for the remaining IDPs as even local authorities is not encouraging return of all families due to these gaps.
- The Pact is not a peace agreement. If it is, the implementing partners need to show a degree of dedication to follow the 1st degree affiliation disavowal to encourage coexistence.
- 50% of survey respondents reported NP had helped them overcome challenges to security and services access, the rest the interventions did not help them overcome access to services or security.
- Yahyawa perceived as more supported than Qayyarah camps as the latter is seen as hosting ISIS affiliated families, by IDPs themselves.
- Longer engagement needed to have impact on reconciliation/social cohesion and access to authority and security.
- NP National Staff needs to be consulted on a regular level to inform programming on new dynamics on the ground to make sure we can speak back, in an organized way, to the donors.

**Central Recommendations**

- Authorities need to prioritize Qayyarah-based IDPs.
- Development in al-Ayadiyah especially for shelter and livelihood, otherwise the return solutions are not durable.
- It is worth working with the advocacy working group on alternative durable solutions for affiliated families.
- It is worth working with the advocacy working group on alternative durable solutions for women (widowed, FHH) for whom returning is not considered safe.
- Advocacy needs to be made at Governorate and central government level to stop the system of exclusion for the thousands of families who cannot successfully undergo the security clearance to obtain ID documentation; the inability to enjoy statutory services will exclude families - particularly children and youth - from services vital to community cohesion (health and education) and will have severe and extreme repercussions when disenfranchised groups will go off the grid to communities who will accept and provide for them (and even, work against the system that excluded them in the first place). To avoid this dissent, inclusion must be practiced in security.
Conclusion and Central Recommendations

IDP Return is not necessarily an indicator for success and the report calls for more protection oriented, community centred objectives. The determination of displacement dynamics are conditioned on pushes and pulls. The main pulls to remain in displacement for families unaffiliated with ISIS include livelihood opportunities and education provisions in displacement, in addition to having their basic needs met by aid providers. The main concerns for returns are security and protection, lack of housing and livelihood opportunities. Rumours over ISIS affiliation and the discrimination and exclusion experienced in displacement by many households from al-Ayadiyah see some return conditions as laminating that discrimination. Women in displacement require special support to navigate return processes as they face multiple invisible barriers to return, in addition to their male counterparts. Survivors of GBV need support to navigate these processes safely as perpetrators of this violence occur from within families and camp actors, through whom these processes are traditionally facilitated. IDPs who are unable to disavow ISIS affiliation or obtain ID, due to the inability or fear of the process of completing a security clearance, are left in a limbo that excludes them from statutory services and freedom to move across checkpoints.

Al-Ayadiyah families wanting to disavow ISIS affiliation engage in a process that automatically generates evidence or confirmation of a relative's ISIS affiliation (real or rumoured). In this way, the stakes are often high and incentives low for some IDPs to disavow and return. Obtaining return approval in exchange for providing information to intelligence actors is sometimes perceived as an opportunistic return condition by IDPs that places them and their relatives in vulnerable positions and can in its logical extension also be a driver of conflict within kinship networks. Alternatives must be established for families unable to return or disavow ISIS affiliation, potentially centred around integration efforts into the host community.

There is a need for internal clarification amongst implementing partners in consolidation with security of Telafar on the meaning of the Pact and all its articles, their implementation and statutory monitoring system. The roles and responsibilities must be cleared to avoid abdication and nepotism, and ensure implementation in line with its ambition to reconcile and orient the sub-district to Rule of Law. Furthermore, in light of the primacy and considerable power prescribed the Tribal Council, through clan leaders' tacit knowledge of al-Ayadiyah, an evaluation of the degree to which the Pact effectively re-orientates the community towards the Rule of Law or contributes to neo-tribalization is needed. In addition, to determine the legitimacy and true representation of the implementing actors, wider community consultation is required.

Al-Ayadiyah authorities need to foster and build trust with the wider community - displaced and returned, including the youth and women - to exhibit mutual accountability, transparency and cultivate trust. Once everything is clear amongst actors, a return campaign can be promoted inside Jeddah and Yahyawa camps as appropriate. In order to gain trust of IDPs to engage with the Pact, they must be supported to action every step of the return mechanism on equal footing and women need more support for this to be facilitated.

Access to security duty bearers is starkly gendered. People view security actor presence as a sign of protection against an out-group over the law enforcement and personal protection. The latter is seen as a collective, kindship-based effort, which puts women at risk as GBV most often is perpetrated by those upon whom reporting relies. Furthermore, women are hindered to report such incidents by community shame, generating suspicion of ISIS affiliation, risk of retaliation and absence of perpetrator accountability (lack of incentive). There is an urgent need to have alternative ways to report incidents and cultivate self-advocacy capacity through new structures (e.g. CSFs) in order for women to protect their rights and entitlements with trusted allies. GBV and SEA must be met with collective sector-wide crackdown through campaigning and improved implementation of streamlined reporting and accountability mechanisms to deter the systematic perpetration of violence.
1. “Do no harm” is to avoid exposing people to additional risks through an intervention.


4. As noted above, the security actors in Telafar require adherence to the judicial authority and the tribal laws adopted by the tribes in the area in accordance to the rule of law. Article 9: To address the malicious and false allegations or those who use the security institutions to practice revenge against innocent people by accusing them of ISIS affiliation without the provision of evidence. They shall be held accountable by the security and tribal rule, and their names shall be published publicly.


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Rudaw. 19.02.20 Sinkhole containing 1,000 ISIS victims uncovered in Iraq’s Telafar https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/190220201


"If we are together, no one can break us."
الوائح الداعمة 

للجان السلام المحلية 

تنتظم جمعية الدعم التالية وثقت أساسية لتشكيل لجان سلام محلية عفوية، وتجلى شراكة المشروع الذين

يتولون دعماً وتعويضاً للجان:

- اللجنة العليا للتعاون والسلام المجتمعي
- لجنة مشورة وتنشيط المساحة الوطنية
- برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإقليمي
- برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإقليمي

تتضمن جمعية الدعم:

1. الأسباب الموجبة: الرحلة التي تشكل لجان سلام محلية في العراق
2. مشاريع المباني
3. المبادرات التآتي
4. الشروط المعرفة للجان السلام المحلية
5. إجراءات التشغيل المدرسي
6. الخطوات المزودة لتشكيل لجان سلام المحلية عند الطلبة.
7. متزود من المعلومات، يرجى الإستعمال:

- د. عفاعة: لجنة مشورة وتنشيط المساحة الوطنية / اللجنة العليا
- د. قايم دو: برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإقليمي
- د. رواك بوبوك: برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإقليمي

وسابسب هذه التحديات وتكالب مقدمة: فقد استمر معظم المحال المثالية السابقة المصاحبة لمدة القوة بين الأساليب ذاتية، استمر على مدار الفترات الماضية عقلية لغة أنجح هذه العملية إلى وضع نظام سليم.

بانياً، الأسباب يعبث على المشاريع الترعية، وذلك لأن النتائج إلى أن تنمية الرغبة في العراق تيجي فرضة لا تلبس لها أو تقترب نحو تحقيق مسار مستدام، وتتفق نقياً للمزون الذي يُقرر في ساق العراق كفرصة تعزيز السلام المستدام، وتشمل التفاوض، يُشكل بعض الاستجابة والمصالحة الفعالة، وتبين كيفية المشارك في التعاون، أو الأشكال من معاهدة إتفاقية لتشكيل لجان سلام المحلية.

وسابسب هذه العملية، تعتذر الإتفاقية المتسالمة عن إدارة حملة العراق المتميزة لمحاربة الفساد، وتسأل على تلك الأسباب، ونجي بطرق إتفاقية تشير إلى إتفاقية، وتبين عقلياً قانونية، وبروفاينت الداخل والخارج، وبروفاينت الإتفاقية الأخرى في الأسئلة المختلفة التي تلتقي الحاجة للتأويلطيية والعملية الخاصة، والعملية في المجال الرئيسي المتعلق بالسياسات والممارسات.

ووسابسب هذه العملية، لم يتمكن من إدارة حملة العراق المتميزة لمحاربة الفساد، وتسأل على تلك الأسباب، ونجي بطرق إتفاقية تشير إلى إتفاقية، وتبين عقلياً قانونية، وبروفاينت الداخل والخارج، وبروفاينت الإتفاقية الأخرى في الأسئلة المختلفة التي تلتقي الحاجة للتأويلطيية والعملية الخاصة، والعملية في المجال الرئيسي المتعلق بالسياسات والممارسات.

ونقل هذه الوضعية إلى وضع نظام سليم.
السلام للعمران، ودائمًا التأكد من صحة المطالبة، سواء إلى جانبي أو إلى نور الدار، ودائمًا الطموح والتفاؤل في كل شيء.

(التوصية الأساسية)

1) الحقوق والحريات

- حقوق الإنسان والمرتكز على المجتمع الدولي
- التأكد من شمل جميع الأفراد في الهوية والثقافة واللغة والدين.
- تدعي الحكومة إلى تقديم المساعدة لأي شخص يحتاج إلى مساعدة في الوصول إلى حقوقه.
- التأكد من أن جميع الأفراد يتمتعون بالحق في التعليم والصحة والعمل والسكن.

2) التعاون国际合作

- التعاون国际合作 يتأسس على الاحترام المتبادل وال쳤الح، وظيفة العام والخاص.
- التعاون国际合作 يدعم الشعوب في مواجهة التحديات المشتركة، وتضمن الوصول إلى حقوق الإنسان.
- التعاون国际合作 يعتمد على التفاوض والأشادة، وتوسيع هذه الجهود نحو جميع الأطراف.

3) النهوض بالجهود

- التعاون国际合作 يعتمد على العمل المشترك في جميع المجالات.
- النهوض بالجهود يعتمد على التعاون国际合作، وتشجيع جميع الأطراف على المشاركة.
- النهوض بالجهود يعتمد على الرؤية الماوية، وتشجيع جميع الأطراف على العمل المشترك.

(التشريع الرئيسي)

1) الحقوق والحريات

- حقوق الإنسان ودائمًا التأكد من صحة المطالبة، سواء إلى جانبي أو إلى نور الدار.
- تدعي الحكومة إلى تقديم المساعدة لأي شخص يحتاج إلى مساعدة في الوصول إلى حقوقه.
- التأكد من أن جميع الأفراد يتمتعون بالحق في التعليم والصحة والعمل والسكن.

2) التعاون国际合作

- التعاون国际合作 يتأسس على الاحترام المتبادل والتشتاق، وظيفة العام والخاص.
- التعاون国际合作 يدعم الشعوب في مواجهة التحديات المشتركة، وتضمن الوصول إلى حقوق الإنسان.
- التعاون国际合作 يعتمد على التفاوض والأشادة، وتوسيع هذه الجهود نحو جميع الأطراف.

3) النهوض بالجهود

- التعاون国际合作 يعتمد على العمل المشترك في جميع المجالات.
- النهوض بالجهود يعتمد على التعاون国际合作، وتشجيع جميع الأطراف على المشاركة.
- النهوض بالجهود يعتمد على الرؤية الماوية، وتشجيع جميع الأطراف على العمل المشترك.
 أمر لجان السلام المحلية يأتي من مختلف مستويات مؤسسات الحكم، فإن سلطة هؤلاء تهدف إلى تكريس القيادة المحلية، وقيل/ة أو أخر من المسائل المالية. بما أن هذه اللجان هي مثابرة وغير واضحة، فإنها لا تتمتع بسلطة إدارية أو ألمانية أو شرعية.

تسعى الحكومات الإقليمية والمالية ونيابة أجل توحيد عمل لجان السلام الأخرى، معهد أو أخر من المسائل المالية، بما أن هذه اللجان هي مثابرة وغير واضحة، فإنها لا تتمتع بسلطة إدارية أو ألمانية أو شرعية.

1 - إخلاء المسؤولية

- إذا كانت محاكمات السلام المحلية والوطنية والمناطقية في بعض الأحيان يتمتعون بإصدار قانون أو قانون آخر من المسائل المالية، فإن هذا النوع من القيادات يمكن أن يكون ذا أهمية.

- تعني السلطات المحلية وضع نظام طبي إلى أساليب أو منظمات كنائس نفاذة، وتمحور إلى المسائل المالية، فإن هذا النوع من القيادات يمكن أن يكون ذا أهمية.

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قترح برامج الأمير المحمد بن نايف بن عبد العزيز آل سعود للأمن الإجتماعي، وتضمن تطوير الوكالات الأمنية وتشجيع التعاون بين الأطراف المحلية، والدولية في تحقيق الا نجاز المطلوب. يتناول هذا الأمر ابتكار القضاة والمحامين، واتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية اللازمة لضمان الحفاظ على الأمن وحماية الحقوق. وتشجيع التنسيق بين الأطراف المختلفة والتعاون بينها لضمان الامن الإجتماعي.

التحديات والحلول

أ) اختلاف النظم الفرعية والأطراف المحلية: تُوضح الحاجة إلى رفع مستوى التنسيق بين الأطراف المختلفة وتعزيز التعاون بينهم لضمان الإشراف على الوضع الأمني.

ب) ارتفاع التوترات بين الأفارقة: يتعين اتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة لتعزيز التفاهم بين الأذى الأفارقة لضمان ازدهار المجتمع.

ج) التحديات المؤسسية: يجب وضع خطة شاملة لتعزيز التعاون بين الأطراف المختلفة والجهات الأمنية لضمان الحفاظ على الأمن.

د) القضايا المتف解析: يتعين تطوير إجراءات لضمان القضايا المتف解析، وتعزيز التعاون بين الأطراف المختلفة لضمان الحفاظ على الأمن.

الناتج النهائي

توصي الأطراف المحلية احترام حقوق الإنسان والهوية، وتشجيع التعاون بين الأطراف المختلفة لضمان الحفاظ على الأمن. كما يتعين اتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة لضمان الحفاظ على الأمن، وتعزيز التعاون بين الأطراف المختلفة لضمان الحفاظ على الأمن.
- تطبيق تقارير ربع سنوية تم توصيات للحكومة بشأن إجراءات بناء اللقية والدعم الفعال للعمليات
- المصالح في المجتمع المحلي.

4- رفع الوعي ومشاركة الناس
- تقوم لجان السلام المحلية بتوحيد السكان بأهليتهم المصالحة والعملية الإقليمية في المجتمع من خلال:
  - إيراد المبادرات العامة للمصالحة التي تتضمن بأهليتهم رؤية مناسبة.
  - تنفيذ حملات إعلام وتشاور.
  - تنفيذ حملات توعية ومشاركة ودعمها.

5- الإدارة الداخلية
- تعتبر لجان السلام المحلية هيئة تطوعية وطنية لجعلها معلمة رسمية من الحكومة عبر:
  - طرق تطوعية جزء من جزء مرتين في الشهر من اجتماعات الاستثنائية
  - إعداد خطة موطنية لتأهيل الشبكات الإدارية والإعداد للمشاركين في تدريبات المشروبات الحسن الحالة.
  - تدريب والتنغيم الدوري للتنسيق.
  - تقديم تقارير ربع سنوية حتى تحلل النزاعات، وتطوير الشبكات، والتوصيات، والتنشيط الداعم.
  - أن تصل إلى (ируем من النقاط)، انظر نموذج إعداد التقارير في خمره للدعم.

أثر النتائج

تشارك لجان السلام المحلية المزدوجة من النواحي المدنية بشكل مباشر في خطط المصالحة المجتمعية، والعمليات التي تحقق هذه الثوابات في مجالات عالم الشروط:
- تعزيز الثقافة المجتمعية والتسكين الاجتماعي.
- تعزيز القدرات المحلية في تفوق النزاعات المحلية وتشكيلها، وإن، امتيازًا له،
- تعزيز النزاعات المحلية في حق المشارك في الاستثنائية، واتباع التغيير في الفكر المحلي، ومحاربة الجريمة المدنية، وهو ما يدل على وجود مشاريع في المنازعات في المجتمع.
- تعزيز الوعي العام بالمصالحة، وعند اعتراض في الأفكار الدينية، وقلم النقاش السياسي التي توزع الناس.
- معا،
- مdra،
- مسؤولية عالمية للتفاعل المؤثر الطوعي في المصالحة الوطنية.
- تعزيز مشاركة أثر من الثقافة والتعبير الاجتماعي على المستوى المحلي، وبين المجتمعات المحلية

- المسألة الذاتية.

10- رفع الوعي العام بالمصالحة

5 إجراءات العمل الوحدة
- تدور على ذلك لجان السلام المحلية المزدوجة لإجراءات العمل الوحدة التي تنشر كيفية تطبيق مبادئ التشغيل،
- والتعزيز والمتابعة اللازمة لذلك.

- التدريب للعمل

يتمزج ببرنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي ولجنة متخصصة وتنويه المصالحة الوطنية الموسيقية باستخدام تدريب لجان السلام المحلية وتعزيز، وتأسس شبكة وطنية لدعمها في العراق. ولن هذه الهدف:
- يقوم ببرامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي مع الشركاء المشاركين في تنظيم إحياء الأعياد، و.
تزويد كل لجنة سلامة محلية أعضاء بمواد قواعد سلوك تضمن على سبيل المثال لا الحصر:
- لا تقبل عضوية أصحاب السوابق السابقين من اراركوا جراح عفن.
- لا تقبل عضوية أصحاب السوابق السابقين من اراركوا جراح عفن.
- يجب الاستماع لكل الآراء ووجهات النظر، طالما أن قيادة الأعضاء، بدورها، مستعدون للاستماع إلى جميع الأعضاء الآخرين.
- تجمع جميع الإسهامات الموضوعية والتقنية والتحليلية لكل عضو مصيب، وفقاً لرئيس اللجنة.
- يتعزج الاستماع والأفعال والحرص على فيه الأعضاء كيفة أساسية.
- يعبر السعي بفعالية لإيجاد حلول موقف من الجمعية قيادة أساسية أيضاً.
- يمكن الوصول إلى توقف حتى في немجم النظام.
- يحظر تطور الخلاف إلى توازن مستمر ووصول إلى طرق مصدرين، يجب الاستعانة بالسفرة من لجنة.
- تابعة تنفيذ الأساليب المتعلقة بال념الات الإدارية والجمعية أو برنامج الأمم المتحدة.
- من حيث النداء، تتخطى القواعد عبر حوار مسير وحاقتنا لل образом، عادة، تجاوز عبادة القواعد بعد جولات حوار مستقلة، يمكن بريد القواعد.
- الأكفاء بأداء ثم ترتيب تقييم الألقابية يوضع أسباب عدم مواقف.
- تعتبر قواعد اللجنة قانونية في حال حصر تلتي تؤثيرها جلسات交替 القرار.
- خطة العمل

تضمن كل لجنة خطة عمل بالمساعدة من برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإسكاني والشركاء المعنيين. يجب أن تضمن الخطة أهدافاً تلتقي استنادت إلى معايير مستددة من المشاركين العامة، وأن حضور الأعضاء المحتمل.
- تجنب في المواقف المحيطة بالنشر، ورد في الجمعية، وتمت توزيع الفضاء الم стиль للمجال، وشكل وظيفة وتواصله المصلحة الوطنية.
- الهدف الممثل في المجال، والجامعة المالية، ومجالها المطلوب للعمل، حتى يتطلب).

التحليل والمشاركة المجتمعية

ويعتبر التحليل الواسع لترجمات والتحديد الفعلي أمراً رأسياً للاستعراض بعض ديمانيات السلطة المحلية، وعموم الفئة تقريب، يمكن من خلال ذلك أمراً، أيضاً، قد يستجيبون لديهم العمل بالعمل.
- بقية التعليم، يطلب التحليل لترجمات وتعدد الفاعليات التشريعي مع الأطراف المعنية في الأمم المتحدة والحكومة العامة لم تذكر الجبهة، وتعتبر أيضًا "لا ضر ولا ضرار".

إعداد التقارير

- تجمع لجنة سلام محلية مريتين في شهر على الاقل.
- مدونة قواعد السلوك

11

AL-AYADIYAH PACT OF HONOR: A STUDY

ANNEX

12
اقرأ المقالة باللغة العربية.
7) نموذج إعداد التقرير

تقرير الإنجاز ربع السنوي
لجنة السلام المحلية في .........................
الفترة الممولة في هذا التقرير: ................... إلى .............. 2018
المستلم: .................................................................
التاريخ: .................................................................

المحتويات

1- التطور الحاصل في التنفيذ
2- تحليل محددة لنزاعات المجتمعية
3- تقرير تركيبي لتنفيذ

4- توصيات مباشرة للحكومة المحلية وحكومة المحافظة
5- توصيات مباشرة للحكومة الوطنية
6- توصيات مباشرة للأطراف غير الحكومية
7- توصيات طويلة الأمد للمستقبل
8- المخاطر والتحديات المحددة للربع القادم
9- الملفات (الصور، الاتفاقيات المجتمعية، محاضر الاجتماعات، المشاورات)
Press Release

Announcement of Peaceful Coexistence Pact of Honor for the Tribes in Al-Ayadiyah Sub-District

Al-Ayadiyah, Iraq, August 10, 2018 – On August 9, tribal and community leaders, representatives of the Permanent Higher Committee for Coexistence and Social Peace at the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, and the local government in Nineveh Governorate and in Tal Afar District signed an agreement covering peaceful coexistence among Ayadiyah citizens, between surrounding communities, and with the local and central government in Al-Ayadiyah. The agreement allows for the facilitation of return processes for internally displaced persons (IDPs) to the town, which number around 40,000 persons inside Ayadiyah Center and its surrounding villages.

The agreement, signed by more than 90 tribal and community leaders from Ayadiyah, is the result of an initiative led and implemented by Sanad for Peacebuilding (Sanad), a non-governmental, non-profit organization promoting peace and non-violence, and Iraq’s National Reconciliation Committee, acting under the Permanent Higher Committee of Peaceful Co-Existence and Social Peace. The initiative, supported by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), involved facilitated dialogues and consultations with tribal leaders and local government officials from Ayadiyah to have a better understanding of the main challenges and opportunities to achieving peaceful coexistence, support for the rule of law, and stability after liberating the region from the Islamic State.

“This agreement is a very important development to the area as it is enforcing the mutual trust between the population of Ayadiyah who are still displaced in KRI, Mosel and Turkey. This agreement is a message to all of Ayadiyah’s population that there is still hope in the return to their town,” said Nasha’at Sadiq Mohammed, Chair of Ayadiyah Local Council.

Among other things, the agreement commits tribes to the state’s justice and security process instead of tribal justice, which has at times triggered vengeful acts. The main points of the agreement include:

- Commits tribal authorities to the state and rule of law, disavowing violence to seek justice;
- Commits tribal authorities to cooperate with security agencies in the pursuit of ISIS members and suspects;
- Commits tribal authorities to move beyond parochial identities by giving priority to national identity.

The agreement also aims to allay sectarian and extremist narratives and mandates a tribal and local peace committee to follow-up on the implementation of the above points.

Al-Ayadiyah has suffered under the Islamic State since mid-2014 and previously struggled with terrorism and divide-and-rule tactics by Al Qaeda and other actors since 2005. The principles, mechanisms, and recommendations announced today, have brought together the differing tribes, with full support of the government, in order to establish peace and implement fair and comprehensive justice in the region. Please see the annex for the signed agreement that includes the principles, mechanisms, and the recommendations.

“We believe that the dialogue sessions we had under Sanad’s program encourages the social acceptance and restoration of social ties. In my opinion, these dialogue sessions are the right tool to bring such
results and I would recommend including more community leaders to further strengthen the community agreements.” Ahmed Mahmoud Al Thahir, Mayor of Ayadiyah sub-district.

As a reflection of inclusivity and unanimity, the conference was attended by:

- Dr. Fa’al Al Maliki, representing the Higher Committee of Peaceful Coexistence and Social Peace;
- Ahmed Ja’afar, The Mayor of Ayadiyah;
- Nasla’at Sadiq Mohammed, the Chair of Ayadiyah sub-district council;
- Sheikh Khalil Aliyawi, representing Grand Ayatullah Al Sistani Office at Al Husseini Atabah;
- The Police Commander of Tal Afar;
- The head of National Security Advisory in Ayadiyah;
- Mohammed Jawad Abdulkadir, the supervisor of 14 PMF factions in western-Nineveh and a representative of Ayatullah Al Hakim;
- More than 150 tribal and community leaders and youth.

Background:

Ayadiyah, located 11 km north of Tal Afar, has a population of 16,000 with the majority from a Sunni Turkmen background and a minority from a Shia Turkmen background. Surrounding Ayadiyah, 53 villages with a total population of 55,000 consist of Arab, Turkmen, and Kurdish components which represent Nineveh’s diverse religious composition of Shiites, Sunnis, Christians and Yazidis.

After Mosul was recaptured, Iraqi forces began operations to liberate Ayadiyah from the Islamic State in August 2017. Iraqi forces faced an unexpectedly tough battle which lasted for 10 days and led to considerable destruction of the area's infrastructure. During the Iraqi Parliament's 13th session, held in March 2018, Ayadiyah was declared a disaster area due to large scale damage of homes and infrastructure. The liberation of the area, however, has increased stability and led to an acceleration of returns by Internally Displaced Persons.

About Sanad for Peacebuilding:

Sanad for Peacebuilding is a non-government organization, established in 2013 with support from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Sanad works to build and strengthen peace, democracy and human rights in Iraq by providing support and technical expertise to civil society networks. Sanad is particularly supporting the Network of Iraqi Facilitators (NIF), and the Alliance of Iraqi Minorities (AIM).

These networks were developed by USIP and have primarily transitioned to be supported by Sanad. Sanad is governed by an independent board of directors, comprised of eight members with professional backgrounds in peacebuilding, civil society, rule of law, human rights, media, academia, and government. They also reflect the diversity of the Iraqi communities. For further information on Sanad please visit www.sanad-iq.org

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A Pact of Honor for the Tribes in Al-Ayadiyah Sub-District

We, the undersigned elders, tribal and community leaders of Al-Ayadiyah, the representatives of Higher Committee for Coexistence and Social Peace at the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, the local government in Nineveh Governorate and in Tal Afar District, have found ways to consolidate stability and social peace in Al-Ayadiyah. A series of dialogues and meetings involving a wide range of tribal leaders, elders, government representatives and security officials were held in order to reach a common ground and to identify agreement on principles and mechanisms that will help promote confidence and stability in the region.

We herein announce the agreed principles, mechanisms and recommendations that guarantee the desired stability in Al-Ayadiyah, which has suffered from the criminal activities carried out by ISIS on large parts of our province in the middle of 2014 and previously by Al Qaeda and its agents since 2005. Our region witnessed the most heinous crimes against unarmed civilians, organized by the terrorist groups, who stood against their thoughts and behaviors, trying to sabotage the relations and bonds between Al-Ayadiyah people and those around them who have lived in peace and security for decades.

With the defeat of this criminal organization by the Iraqi army, the federal police, the Peshmerga, Hashid and volunteers from the tribes who were determined to get rid of the effects of that dark period and restore life to Al-Ayadiyah again, we as the elders, tribal and community leaders agree on the following articles to be the general and comprehensive framework of peaceful coexistence in Al-Ayadiyah sub-district. With the endless support of Higher Committee for Coexistence and Social Peace/General Secretariat of the Council
of Ministers, and with the support of Sanad for Peacebuilding organization and its supporting international organization, which are highly appreciated, we sign our commitment to the following:

**First:** To disavow ISIS and all criminal terrorist organizations and their members and affiliates who committed murder, displacement, kidnapping, incitement and threats and the looting of money from citizens and all crimes against the law.

**Second:** To keep the state’s laws as priority and recognize that the laws of the state are above the tribal laws and to reject any individual or collective action to take revenge without reference to the judicial authority and the tribal laws adopted by the tribes in the area in accordance to the rule of law.

**Third:** Solidarity with families of victims of terrorism and those affected by the crimes of terrorist organizations and to call for their rights and to reveal the fate of prisoners and abductees.

**Fourth:** To support and strengthen the rule of law and enable the judicial authorities to achieve justice and practice punishment on criminals belonging to terrorist organizations. To reveal criminals, and should any unrevealing occur, to ensure that they shall shoulder the legal consequences and tribal norms followed in those areas in accordance with the rule of law.

**Fifth:** The Local Peace Committee in Tal Afar and the local community activist committees to adopt a solution to the problems behind wisdom and dialogue between individuals and groups for the post-ISIS era.

**Sixth:** The head of each tribe and sub-tribe shall provide information about ISIS affiliates, all those who cooperate with them and suspicious persons to the security authorities. Agreed regulations shall be considered on eliminating extreme Takfiri ideology and punishing the perpetrators.

**Seventh:** Priority shall be given to national identity over other identities, emphasize coexistence and social peace, renounce all forms of violence and extremism, support and strengthen state institutions, commitment to moderate discourse and acceptance of the other.

**Eighth:** To prevent the return of any person who has been implicated in terrorist acts and his family members of the first degree, unless declaring their innocence before the courts provided that they are not supporters of terrorist organizations.

**Ninth:** To address the malicious and false allegations or those who use the security institutions to practice revenge against innocent people by accusing them of ISIS affiliation without the provision of evidence. They shall be held accountable by the security and tribal rule, and their names shall be published publicly.

**Tenth:** To renounce the extremist religious, political and media discourse that engenders violence; counter seditious media, rumors and subversive propaganda; monitor the performance of mosque preachers and Imams; emphasize moderate discourse; establish a committee of moderate and well-known clerics, local administrations and tribal sheikhs to select mosque preachers and abandon extremists in coordination with the security institutions - with the need to rehabilitate those who stood against extremism and provide them with educational and guidance courses to counter the response to suspicions and extremist thought.

**Eleventh:** Work shall be done between the sons of Al-Ayadiyah and the sons of their surrounding tribes under the articles of this document taking into consideration their observations for their development.

May Allah help us to serve our beloved country and our regions and pray to Allah to bless the souls of our martyrs, and the shame and humiliation to all those who supported terrorism and extremism in Iraq and the entire world.

**Therefore, we as sheikhs and elders of the region agree to sign below:**