

# Evaluation of the Nonviolent Peaceforce Project with the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team in Mindanao, Philippines

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## Acronyms

AFP                      Armed Forces of the Philippines

AHJAG	Ad Hoc Joint Action Group
AoR	Area of Responsibility
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
BIAF	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
CAFGU	Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit
CAB	Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
CCCH	Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities
CPC	Civilian Protection Component (of the IMT)
CP	Civilian Protection
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CVO	Civilian Volunteer Organisations
DSWD	Department for Social Welfare and Development
EU	European Union
EWER	Early Warning and Early Response
FAB	Framework Agreement for the Bangsamoro
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCRV	Grave Child Rights Violations
GPH	Government of the Philippines
HRDC	Humanitarian, Relief and Development Component (of the IMT)
ICPs	International Civilian Peacekeepers
ICPMs	International Civilian Protection Monitors
IID	Initiatives for International Dialogue
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFS	Instrument for Stability
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IMT	International Monitoring Team
IP	Indigenous Peoples
LGU	Local Government Unit
LMT	Local Monitoring Team
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINHRAC	Mindanao Human Rights Action Centre
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MoA-AD	Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
MOGOP	Moslem Organization of Government Employees and Professionals
MPC	Mindanao Peoples Caucus
NCPs	National Civilian Peacekeepers
NCPMs	National Civilian Protection Monitors
NP	Nonviolent Peaceforce
PNP	Philippines National Police
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
SOCCSKARGEN	Province of South Cotabato, Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani and General Santos City.
UCP	Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping

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## Executive Summary

*“NP has established recognition in the peace process...the communities feel more safe because internationals are present.”* (Head of MILF CCCH Secretariat).

This report presents the findings from an impact evaluation of Nonviolent Peaceforce’s (NP) work in Mindanao, Philippines. It focuses on NP’s work within the Civilian Protection Component (CPC) of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), during the period 2012-2013. The findings are based on an evaluation field mission during March-April 2014; and a desk review of project documentation, related agreements and publications.

The report looks at NP’s CPC work through several evaluation lenses:

1. Intended results and outcomes of the programme – as articulated in project proposals for the period 2012 – 2013, to Norway and the EU.
2. The Reflecting on Peace Practice Criteria of Effectiveness in Peacebuilding – as an external reference point for ‘good practice’, which was also used in an earlier evaluation of NP’s work in the Philippines carried out by swisspeace.<sup>1</sup>
3. Conflict-sensitivity – to allow for assessment of unintended impacts of the work, both positive and negative.
4. A gender lens – to assess to what extent the programme applies gender-sensitive approaches.
5. The OECD’s criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes.

The report makes separate observations on programme design, including theories of change that underlie NP’s intervention; the log frame; indicators; and attempts a categorisation of NP Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping interventions in the Mindanao context.

The main findings, laid out in detail in Section 8, are:

## **1. Relevance**

- > The ‘theories of change’ informing NP’s work as part of the CPC are relevant and broadly hold water – though other factors also affect the behaviour of armed actors, humanitarian agencies, and communities, that are more resilient to positive change.
- > NP’s intervention as part of the CPC is broadly relevant to Mindanao’s conflict context and the evolving dynamics of the peace process.
- > At the same time, the issues that will affect civilian protection, peace and security at the community level in the coming transition period and beyond, will change. NP’s work, while continuing to focus on civilian protection, needs to equally evolve.
- > NP’s approach of combining national and international staff, and high visibility of its operations (through prominently displayed logos, ID cards, NP vests and shirts worn by all staff operating in the field), is a relevant strategy in a context where outside intervention, and the presence of internationals, is seen as a positive.

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<sup>1</sup> Reimann, C. (2010) ‘Evaluation of NP’s Project in Mindanao, Philippines – Report’ (Nonviolent Peaceforce and swisspeace).

- > Connecting NP's work rooted in Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping to officially mandated civilian protection under an international monitoring mechanism has been a relevant strategy to address grassroots-level security concerns at higher levels of decision-making.
- > Donors in Manila are less clear about the concrete impacts of NP's work in Mindanao, and as a result have less appreciation of its relevance.

## **2. Effectiveness**

- > Those community representatives sampled for the evaluation have confirmed that they feel safer as a result of NP's presence, and role as part of the CPC. They understand that passing information on to NP means it can reach 'higher echelons' of decision-making, which on their own they are not able to reach.
- > Humanitarian agencies acknowledge that they receive relevant and timely information from NP regarding humanitarian needs of conflict-affected populations, especially IDP's.
- > Armed actors on both sides confirm that the presence of a third party 'watching over them', including NP, has served to temper their behaviour.
- > The third results area, 'local ownership, connections and information-sharing among key actors in the peace process strengthened and awareness of CPC activities increased', is a composite outcome that is somewhat abstract and difficult to measure in its entirety.
- > The effectiveness of NP's work relies on the active practice of its principles of non-partisanship, transparency and non-intervention. NP staff and management are well aware of this need, and are having to make often sensitive, on-the-spot decisions on matters of principle.
- > NP's effectiveness in the external delivery of its work relies on the internal effectiveness in managing the organisation, and most importantly, its people.

## **3. Impact**

- > NP's work as part of CPC has served to strengthen the IMT mechanism overall, including its information gathering capacity, its field-level visibility, and by extension, its legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. At the same time, IMT Components' and partners' capacities remain uneven.
- > The impact of NP's information flows to the IMT at the level of political decision-making is dependent on the IMT's own capacity, and willingness, to process sensitive information and pass it on to the peace panels.
- > Keeping the ceasefire in place, and maintaining '0 incidents' since early 2012, has been one important factor in keeping the political momentum going behind the peace process, and building confidence between the GPH and MILF.
- > Perhaps a more intangible and indirect, but in our view significant, impact is the innovation in international third party peace process support that the IMT-CPC represents, and to which NP has contributed.

- > While those interviewed attest to the impacts that NP's CPC work has had, NP has a modest approach to claiming impacts, and often does not clearly communicate the impacts its work has achieved.
- > If NP wants to make a broader impact on its stated aim to promote Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping as a method, in-country as well as globally, then it needs to scale up its efforts to systematise knowledge gathering, build theory, and disseminate UCP-related knowledge and advocacy products.

#### **4. Sustainability**

- > NP has focused its sustainability efforts mainly at capacitating individuals at the grassroots levels and from among local partners to carry out Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping tasks.
- > NP is appreciated as a flexible and reliable partner by its local partner organisations, one that has supported them in scaling up their work for civilian protection.
- > At the same time, local partner organisations need more systematic organisational development and fundraising support to sustain their operations in future – a type of support that is not the 'core business' of NP.
- > When it comes to the sustainability of civilian protection awareness, NP's work with the military 'arms' of the two parties means the knowledge transferred will remain institutionalised, as those trained usually move around within the institutions.
- > NP's aspiration is to make the Early Warning and Early Response aspects of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping more sustainable by ultimately linking the existing local monitoring networks to responsible governmental line agencies.

#### **Recommendations**

Detailed recommendations are presented under the following headings:

1. Develop an internal strategic plan for the upcoming transition period (until the end of 2016) that sets out likely scenarios, milestones and challenges in the process, and how NP considers responding.
2. Build on your three 'core strengths' of field-level presence; extensive multi-track networks; and UCP methodology, to deepen and widen NP work in the coming phase.
3. As new requirements emerge for the implementation of the CAB in the transition period, build on the CPC experience to consider whether and how UCP can be integrated into new, peace-process related initiatives.
4. Consider a collective, internal lesson-learning exercise among the four NGOs that together form the CPC.
5. Articulate your criteria for exit.



6. In the next phase of NP's work in Mindanao, begin to focus more attention on institutionalisation and organisational capacity development for civilian protection and EWER.
7. Draw more value from your mission preparedness training for incoming international staff (parts of) for outreach, profiling, and funding for NP.
8. Strengthen day-to-day guidance and trouble-shooting support from the main office to field site staff.
9. Standardise your use of specific approaches in UCP, such as conflict-sensitivity, or integration of a gender lens.
10. Management should insist on staff adhering to existing R&R policies as much as possible, even where staff feel they can 'stretch' themselves and cope with stress and pressure.
11. Strengthen your senior-level strategic outreach to key international and national policy stakeholders in Manila to share more information about NP's methodology, results and experiences.
12. Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping is a very specific 'niche' in international peace work, which in itself is a relatively young, and evolving, field. Start to systematise the 'NP approach' by developing a UCP 'programming framework' that sets out the why, what, and how of NP's work in this area, based on in-country experiences.
13. Consider carrying out a staff survey across the whole organisation to help identify what constitutes staff satisfaction at NP, both for international and local staff, what are obstacles, and what the organisation can do to retain senior staff to enable growth while ensuring quality in its work.

NP is currently applying lessons and approaches from Mindanao in a new programme in Myanmar on request of local NGOs and key local conflict parties. This work primarily focuses on supporting capacities for local civilian ceasefire monitoring; and providing technical knowledge in establishing ceasefire monitoring mechanisms. While the lessons and recommendations in this report are context-specific, they will hopefully also serve to inform similar work elsewhere.

*"We are more confident when internationals are present at the grassroots, that's very important for us."* (NP local partner, Datu Piang).

## 1. Introduction

On 27 March 2014, after over forty years of Moro insurgency in Mindanao, the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). The CAB identifies the main agreements on which the 'roadmap to peace' for Muslim Mindanao will be based. This is not the first, but many hope the last, of a series of agreements scattered throughout the decades of war and fragile ceasefires of the past.

At the same time, Mindanao continues to be besieged by multiple conflicts that will affect future prospects for peace: presence of other armed groups and splinter groups; disputes over natural resources such as minerals and land; and clan feuds that often erupt into long-drawn out violent confrontations (so called '*ridos*'), to name just a few. Even for peace efforts focused on one particular conflict in this context – in this case, the decades-long armed conflict between GPH and the MILF - these multiple layers and types of conflicts very much shape the operating environment for any organisation present and active in Mindanao.

One of the characteristics of the Mindanao peace process(es), seen as a key 'success ingredient' by many, are the multiple, sometimes overlapping, mechanisms and forums facilitating and accompanying the negotiations of the conflict parties. They were put in place gradually over time, many with support from third parties. These different mechanisms aim to tackle specific issues in the process, and serve to cajole and hold accountable the main negotiators throughout the talks. In this respect, Mindanao is a prime example of the kind of 'peace architecture' that is required to help manage a complex peace process.

One of the components of this 'peace architecture' is the International Monitoring Team, in place since 2004 and mandated to monitor the 'Agreement on Peace Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Tripoli Agreement of 2001).<sup>2</sup> The IMT's mandate has evolved and grown in parallel with the evolution of the peace process: in 2009, the parties agreed to adding an additional Humanitarian, Relief and Development Component (HRDC), led by the EU from 2010,<sup>3</sup> and tasked to monitor the implementation of the humanitarian, relief and development aspects, as well as the parties' observance of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights (HR) standards they had committed to.<sup>4</sup> In 2007, an additional Socio-Economic Assistance component was agreed by the parties, that was to be headed by Japan. The outbreak of war in 2008 - in the wake of the failed attempt by the parties to pass an agreement on the territories to come under the future Bangsamoro Juridical Entity – highlighted that civilians above all remained highly vulnerable to the effects of war, including large-scale loss of life and mass displacements, with nearly 700,000 people displaced during that time.<sup>5</sup> Conflict parties agreed at that time that this was one aspect the peace architecture was still ill equipped to tackle. Subsequently, the Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component (CPC) was added to the IMT's mandate in October 2009.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> GPH-MILF *Agreement on Peace Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front* (Tripoli Agreement of 2001), signed 22 June 2001; and the *Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace* of 2001, signed 7 August 2001. On the agreement to form and mandate an International Monitoring Team, see the current Terms of Reference governing the IMT, *Terms of Reference of the International Monitoring Team*, signed 10 February 2011.

<sup>3</sup> McDonald, A. and G. Munuera Viñals (2012) 'The EU and Mindanao: Innovative Avenues for Seeking Peace', EU ISS Occasional Paper No.97 (EU ISS, Paris).

<sup>4</sup> Following an evaluation of the HRDC Component, the EU decided to withdraw its support in early 2014; at the time of writing, it is not clear whether the component will continue or not.

<sup>5</sup> Figures on conflict-affected displacement in Mindanao are contested, with different sources citing different levels of displacement at varying times during the conflict. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre for the Norwegian Refugee Council gives an aggregate overview of conflict- and disaster-related displacements across the Philippines, including also figures on Mindanao at different stages of the conflict over the last 15 years. See <http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/philippines/figures-analysis>

<sup>6</sup> *Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team*, signed 27 October 2009; and *Terms of Reference of the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team*, signed 5 May 2010.

The CPC is unique in that it is led by four NGOs, three local, and one international (Nonviolent Peaceforce Philippines - NP), forming part of an otherwise military-led structure and hierarchy. Other Components of the IMT, including socio-economic assistance, and the Humanitarian, Relief and Development Component (HRDC), are similarly led by civilians – respectively, Japan, and until recently, the EU – these however being official governmental and inter-governmental organisations. NP was invited to join the CPC from the beginning of its mandate, and continues to work as part of the CPC to date.

In January 2014, NP awarded mediatEUr and IID a contract to carry out an impact evaluation of its programme in support of the CPC.<sup>7</sup> This evaluation comes after four years of NP operations under the CPC. While it focuses on the period from 2012-2013, the evaluation took cognizance of the earlier work done by the CPC as a whole, and NP in particular, to provide the wider context to the work accomplished.

The fieldwork for the evaluation coincided by chance with the signing of the CAB, of course at the forefront of everyone's minds. Many of the field sites visited were covered in green flags and banners indicating support for the Bangsamoro, and welcoming the future Bangsamoro Government. At the same time, there were reports from other parts of Mindanao of a smaller, but vocal opposition to the agreement, principally by those who felt left out of the process, and groups worried about the implications of a Bangsamoro homeland impinging on their own claims of territory and identity.

All those interviewed for this evaluation unanimously cautioned against overt optimism: the past holds sufficient lessons that when agreements are not honoured, or only partially implemented, new issues and grievances are likely to emerge in future. In the eyes of many, the multiple agreements contained in the CAB still leave many points of contention unresolved. Most respondents therefore agreed that the hard part of the work still lies ahead.

This therefore is an opportune 'milestone' moment to review third party efforts in support of the peace process, such as NP's. The aim of this evaluation is to help NP assess its lessons to date from CPC; as well as deliberate future directions.

## 2. Evaluation Approach

MediatEUr and IID proposed an evaluation approach aimed at drawing lessons from NP's work in the Philippines, with a view to informing its future practice. We sought to do this by conducting a learning-focused evaluation process; in other words, our evaluation focused on the '*how*' and '*why*' of successes and challenges, to allow for programmatic changes where necessary in response to the findings.

MediatEUr and IID put forward an evaluation team composed of an 'insider' (a Mindanao-born researcher and evaluator with many years experience assessing development, humanitarian and peacebuilding projects in the region); and an 'outsider' (a mediatEUr team member with a background in mediation and

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<sup>7</sup> The full Terms of Reference are included in Annex 1.



## 2.1. Methodology

The evaluation was carried out in several phases:

1. Desk review of internal project documentation provided by NP.
2. Discussion of evaluation approach with NP team.
3. Drafting and submission of an evaluation inception report laying out the approach, methodology and timeline for the evaluation, and question guides for different target respondent groups (see separate Annex III).
4. Planning of evaluation mission to Mindanao.
5. 2.5 weeks field mission in March-April 2014 by the evaluation team, including visits to the NP main office in Cotabato City and field sites in Maguindanao; Sarangani, North Cotabato; and Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. This included semi-structured one-to-one interviews with key informants; focus group discussions; and a small-sample rating scale survey covering the different results areas of NP's CPC work.
6. Debriefing of main evaluation findings and recommendations with the NP Country Director at the end of our visit.
7. Drafting, reviewing, and finalisation of the evaluation report.

We proposed five main points of reference to frame the types of impacts we sought to assess:

1. Intended results and outcomes of the programme – as articulated in project proposals for the period 2012 – 2013, to Norway and the EU.
2. The Reflecting on Peace Practice Criteria of Effectiveness in Peacebuilding – as an external reference point for 'good practice', which was also used in an earlier evaluation of NP's work in the Philippines carried out by swisspeace.<sup>8</sup>
3. Conflict-sensitivity – to allow for assessment of unintended impacts of the work, both positive and negative.
4. A gender lens – to assess to what extent the programme applies gender-sensitive approaches.
5. The OECD's criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes.

These are outlined in the following sub-sections.

### 2.1.1. Intended Results and Outcomes

In this section, we summarise the anticipated results and outcomes as articulated in the two project proposal documents covering the period 2012 - 2013.<sup>9</sup> Since there are numerous results and outcomes articulated, we cluster them here under several 'results headings'. A word on terminology: different donors and organisations use

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<sup>8</sup> Reimann, C. (2010) 'Evaluation of NP's Project in Mindanao, Philippines – Report' (Nonviolent Peaceforce and swisspeace).

<sup>9</sup> With one exception: in the EU proposal for this period, a fourth expected result is included, namely NP support to the Humanitarian, Relief and Development Component of the IMT. Activities under this results heading included NP administrative, human resources and operational support to HRDC (through channeling funding, supporting the recruitment of data collectors for the HRDC, operational collaboration, and capacity-building activities). In early 2014, in response to an external evaluation carried out on the HRDC, the EU withdrew its membership of the IMT as part of the HRDC. Since this aspect of NP's work during this period does form part of its work on the Civilian Protection Component of IMT, this results area was not included in the evaluation.

different terms, and this is reflected in the proposal and reporting documents of NP. For the purpose of this evaluation, we used ‘outcomes’ and ‘results’ synonymously; and understand ‘impacts’ to mean the cumulative effects of outcomes and results over time.

### 1. Safety and security of communities

- > **Intended outcome 1** (Norwegian proposal) *‘Increase in the safety and security of communities, including all non-combatants’*
- > **Expected result 1** (EU proposal) *‘Safety and security of communities, including all non-combatants, increased through maintenance of a monitoring network and community protection centres’*

### 2. Support to effective delivery of relief efforts

- > **Intended outcome 2** (Norwegian proposal) *‘To support relief efforts, especially relating to IDP needs, in communities affected by conflict in Mindanao’*
- > **Expected result 2** (EU proposal) *‘Relief efforts and return of IDPs supported and facilitated through information sharing’*

### 3. Enhancing local ownership of the peace process

- > **Intended outcome 3** (Norwegian proposal) *‘To strengthen the local ownership, connections and information-sharing among key actors in the peace process and increase awareness of CPC activities’*
- > **Expected result 3** (EU proposal) *‘Local ownership, connections and information-sharing among key actors in the peace process strengthened and awareness of CPC activities increased’*

In assessing progress on these, we also considered questions of project design – i.e. to what extent the activities proposed and carried out are conducive to achieving these outcomes and results; and what theories of change underlie them.

#### 2.1.2. RPP Effectiveness Criteria

As referenced also in the previous swisspeace evaluation, Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) proposes a set of five effectiveness criteria in peace work.<sup>10</sup> We used these as an additional ‘impact lens’ to assess to what extent NP’s work reflects what is by now an accepted reference point for effective peace work:

- > **Criterion 1:** ‘The effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances in situations where such grievances do, genuinely, drive the conflict.

Peace practice is effective if it develops or supports institutions or mechanisms to address the specific inequalities, injustices and other grievances that cause and fuel a conflict. This criterion underlines the importance of moving beyond impacts at the individual or personal (attitudinal, material or emotional) level to the socio-political level.’

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<sup>10</sup> These are cited from CDA Inc. (2009) ‘Reflecting on Peace Practice: Participant Training Manual’, (CDA Inc.)

- > **Criterion 2:** 'The effort contributes to a momentum for peace by causing participants and communities to develop their own peace initiatives in relation to critical elements of context analysis.

Such analysis, and resulting programs, should address what needs to be stopped, how to reinforce areas where people interact in positive ways....'

- > **Criterion 3:** 'The effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence.

One way of addressing and including Key People who promote and continue tensions (e.g., warlords, spoilers) is to help More People develop the ability to resist the manipulation and provocations of these negative key people.'

- > **Criterion 4:** 'The effort results in an increase in people's security and in their sense of security.

This criterion reflects positive changes both at the socio-political level (in people's public lives) and at the individual/personal level as people gain a sense of security.'

- > **Criterion 5:** 'The effort results in meaningful improvement in inter-group relations, reflected in, for example, changes in group attitudes, public opinion, social norms, or public behaviours.

This criterion reflects the importance of the relationships between conflicting groups, in terms of transforming polarized (and polarizing) attitudes, behaviours and interactions to more tolerant and cooperative ones....'

In addition, RPP finds that effective peace work has to work at two societal levels: reaching both, 'more people' (i.e. sufficiently large and relevant parts of a population to have a wider impact), and 'key people' (i.e. decision-makers with sufficient political and social influence to affect changes in policies and strategic decisions that have wider effects). Elsewhere, this is referred to as 'multi-track' approach to peace work.<sup>11</sup>

The point of referring to RPP effectiveness criteria is not to say that effective programmes must at all times address all criteria. Rather, our understanding is that the focus of any given peace programme should depend on the context analysis and resulting necessities. To be effective, a programme should however reflect these criteria to the extent that they are relevant in a given context.

### 2.1.3. Conflict-Sensitivity

Conflict-sensitivity posits that all interventions in a conflict context will have both, intended, as well as unintended, positive, as well as negative, impacts. Rather than assessing any given intervention only against the intended positive outcomes, conflict-sensitivity encourages:

1. A thorough understanding of the context: through conflict analysis, including actors, causes, and changing dynamics over time

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<sup>11</sup> See Lederach, J. (1997) *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington DC, US: United States Institute of Peace).



2. A thorough understanding of the two-way interactions between the intervention and the context
3. Taking steps to minimise potential negative impacts
4. Taking steps to maximise positive intended impacts

In referring to conflict-sensitivity, we proposed to assess the programme's conflict analysis approach, and how this feeds into design / re-design of overall strategy and activities. Since this is also essential for organisational learning, we sought to assess whether the programme takes efforts to keep track of 'unintended impacts' – both positive and negative.

#### 2.1.4. Gender Lens

We asked several gender-related questions about NP's work and impact:

1. **Approach:** How are civilian protection issues specific to women and girls taken into account in NP's work?
2. **Participation:** How is gender-balanced participation ensured?
3. **Staffing:** Gender balance in CPC, NP?
4. **Analysis:** Is a gender lens applied in NP's context analysis?
5. **Data gathering:** Is data gathered for monitoring purposes gender disaggregated?

## 2.2. Scope and Limitations

The evaluation period was limited to NP-CPC activities from 2012 – 2013. However, developments during this period need to be understood within the longer timeframes of CPC's evolution and work since its inception, as well as NP's earlier work in Mindanao that enabled it to play the role it now does as part of CPC. Our evaluation therefore takes these into account and refers to them where relevant. The Terms of Reference for the evaluation did not include an assessment of the financial aspects of the project, be that budget design, or financial management.

Similarly, the work NP carries out as part of its other programmes (such as child protection, and Early Warning and Early Response (EWER)) are key 'ingredients' of its work as part of CPC – for example, local volunteer monitors working with NP on EWER also provide information that is channelled by NP to CPC. Indeed, in the course of 2013, NP changed its programme structure from two previously 'separate' programmes – one the Civilian Protection Component programme, and the other, its Conflict Prevention Programme that included support to grassroots human rights activists, and early warning and early response – to a more fluid approach where NP staff are assigned as 'focal points', but can work across different programmatic areas interchangeably. This is similarly reflected in the evaluation.

Geographically, the evaluation team visited the NP Philippines in Cotabato City; as well as field sites and surrounding areas in:

- > Datu Piang (Maguindanao Province)
- > Pikit (North Cotabato Province)



- > General Santos (Sarangani Province)<sup>12</sup>
- > Iligan (Lanao del Norte Province) and Marawi City.<sup>13</sup>

Due to the security situation, and heightened risk of kidnapping for ransom of foreigners in these areas, the evaluation team was not able to visit NP's smaller presences in Zamboanga City, Sulu and Jolo, where one national staff member each cover primarily child protection-related issues.

Across the different field sites, the evaluation team met with a sample of respondents including:

- > Local communities
- > Local community volunteer monitors
- > Local partner organisations
- > International Monitoring Team - HQ
- > Coordinating Committees for the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) - Secretariat
- > CCCH - Provincial representatives
- > Local Monitoring Team (LMT) members
- > Provincial-level members of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG)
- > Philippines National Police (PNP)
- > Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
- > Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
- > Local Government Units (LGUs)
- > Other NGO members of the CPC
- > NP staff and management

In addition, phone interviews were carried out with donor representatives, former NP Philippines team members, and a former IMT member. In total, the team met with and interviewed more than 65 respondents, both in one-to-one interviews, as well as focus group discussions. Time constraints meant we did not meet all of the target groups listed above at each field site; but sampled respondents from different groups across different field sites. Because of the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, announced on fairly short notice for the 28<sup>th</sup> March 2014, several key respondents were not present during the evaluation team's visit, since they attended the signing ceremony in Manila.

Our research faced a final limitation in the annual rotation of the entire International Monitoring Team HQ staff, Head and Deputy Heads of Mission, as well as IMT team sites in different provinces. IMT representatives interviewed had taken up their positions fairly recently, and therefore had less exposure to NP's work than the previous IMT team.<sup>14</sup>

## 2.3. Outline

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<sup>12</sup> This field site was recently 'joined up' with the Datu Piang field site as a 'satellite' site, both now covering the 'Southern Mindanao' area. International staff rotate among the two. This 'merger' was carried out because of overlaps in the Area of Operation (AoR); and also to rationalize in response to project funding cuts.

<sup>13</sup> NP no longer has a separate field site in Marawi City, mainly due to difficulties in obtaining insurance for international staff, as the risk of kidnapping is deemed too high in the city by insurers. The Iligan field team covers Marawi City however, and one team member is based in Marawi City.

<sup>14</sup> With the exception of the Malaysia IMT CPC Coordinator, who has been in post for several years and knows the CPC, and NP's work as part of it, well.

The next section introduces NP's mandate and approach, and NP's entry into the Philippines. Section 4 gives an overview of the evolving conflict context over the last two years; in particular, the wider ceasefire monitoring architecture that the International Monitoring Team, and the Civilian Protection Component in particular, form part of.

Section 5 then looks at how the project is designed. In particular, it presents what theories of change underlie the CPC programme's approach; what types of interventions the programme includes and prioritises; and observations from conflict sensitivity and gender perspectives on the programme design.

Main stakeholders' perceptions of NP's CPC work are then presented in Section 6. Section 7 considers to what extent NP's work in Mindanao can serve as the basis of UCP work elsewhere, and what are context factors that have enabled it in this particular setting. Section 8 summarises main findings under the five evaluation criteria put forward by the OECD for peacebuilding work in situations of conflict and fragility:

1. **Relevance:** how far the intervention is based on a solid assessment of the context, and existing peacebuilding needs
2. **Effectiveness:** to what extent it achieved its stated objectives
3. **Impact:** the wider effects produced by an intervention
4. **Sustainability:** whether and how the positive benefits of an intervention are likely to continue beyond the end of a programme.

Section 9 puts forward our recommendations emanating from the evaluation findings.

### 3. NP Mandate and Approach

NP's global mission is to 'promote, develop and implement Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping as a tool for reducing violence and protecting civilians in situations of violent conflict.' NP describes Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping as 'a generic term that gives recognition to a wide range of activities by unarmed civilians to reduce violence and protect civilians in situations of violent conflict;<sup>15</sup> while its understanding of the scope of 'peacekeeping' is the prevention, reduction and stopping of violence.<sup>16</sup>


Since its inception, NP has initiated several in-country programmes, including in Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Georgia, and the Philippines. New country programmes have most often 'grown out of' existing ones, in that experienced staff have been transferred from one conflict context to another to implement lessons learnt from one programme in another context. Since NP tries to do both, *promote* Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) globally, as well as *implement* it, its effectiveness relies on strongly linking several elements in its work: practice, knowledge gathering, what we have termed 'theory-building' for UCP, and its application (see Graphic 1).

#### Graphic 1: Promotion and Application of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping

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<sup>15</sup> See [www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org](http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org)

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.



### 3.1. NP in the Philippines

NP's entry into the Philippines was first facilitated by local organisations from Mindanao that had been exposed to the idea of UCP at an international conference. A first exploratory team, composed of NP international staff members that had previously worked in Sri Lanka, visited the island in 2005, and met with key civil society leaders, who at that time were already engaged in the local '*Bantay Ceasefire*' ('Ceasefire Watch') initiative for civilian monitoring of the GPH-MILF ceasefire.<sup>17</sup> Local organisations had some early successes in carrying out ceasefire monitoring missions, but had limited knowledge and capacity on methodology when it came to preventive engagement (as opposed to, post-incident verification); local Muslim and Christian monitors in addition could sometimes face challenges in operating across communities, and could face perceptions of bias.

An assessment report laid out options for NP engagement in Mindanao in early 2006, and a second field visit focused on in-depth consultations on potential field operations. NP at this time also set up an Advisory Council made up of leaders from local civil society partners, who advised to set up the NP main office in Cotabato City, and initially two field offices: Datu Piang in Maguindanao (an area central to the MILF conflict); and Jolo (an area mostly affected by the earlier MNLF insurgency). In December 2006 NP carried out the first core training for international staff, initially deploying five International Civilian Peacekeepers (ICPs).

NP in the Philippines (NP) describes the evolution of the country programme in several stages, quite 'classical' in the evolution of organisations more generally: a

<sup>17</sup> The *Bantay Ceasefire* initiative was conceptualised and initiated by a group of grassroots organisations in Mindanao in 2003. After an initial review of the ceasefire in place between the MILF and the GPH, *Bantay Ceasefire*, with the Secretariat now in the Mindanao Peoples Caucasus, continues to monitor and report ceasefire-related incidences in the communities where it operates, counting several hundred volunteer grassroots monitors as its members. See [www.mpc.org.ph](http://www.mpc.org.ph)

first phase focused on set-up, outreach and profiling of UCP to make it acceptable and find opportunities to apply it in practice. At this point, internal systems and procedures were still quite rudimentary. In a second phase, NP saw its operational 'peak' during the years 2010-2011, with solid donor funding for two main concurrent programmes (the Civilian Protection Component Programme, and the Conflict Prevention Programme), and field expansion (to North Cotabato and Lanao in 2009; and Basilan, Sulu, Zamboanga and SOCCSKARGEN in 2010). This expansion enabled NP to also consolidate its internal systems and procedures, including the hiring of dedicated financial, administrative and human resource personnel to support its operations.

The current, third phase is described by NP staff and management as a 'transition period' where the country programme has to take a step back to consider its future options – with less funding than previously, it already has had to contract its operations, and may need to contract further in future; it may seek to continue as before; or further expand its work, building on earlier achievements and moving into new areas. This evaluation therefore comes at a timely moment also from the perspective of NP's organisational 'lifecycle.'

## 4. The Context

### 4.1. The Conflict

Mindanao's conflict history has many roots, and is principally directed by several key actors. The communist-led New Peoples Army (NPA) operates in the timber, fisheries and mineral-rich north-eastern third of the island, populated primarily by settlers and Indigenous Peoples belonging to various tribes. The central Mindanao plain where agriculture is well established and the potential for petroleum exploration has been raised, is where the estimated 11,000 main force of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is based, made up primarily of Islamized *Maguindanaoans* and *Maranaos*, who share their territory with settlers and Indigenous Peoples (IP) as well. On the western Zamboanga peninsula on the island provinces of Basilan, Jolo and Tawi-Tawi are found the *Tausug*-led forces of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the precursor of the MILF before they splintered in the late 1970s due to ideological differences.

At its peak in the 1970s and 1980s, the MNLF claimed a force of 50,000 armed regulars. Over time, smaller factions have broken away, brought on by political realignments of leadership to outright establishment of terrorist groups, kidnap for ransom gangs, to the pro-independence Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) that declared itself in 2008. Both the MILF and MNLF also have overlapping territorial claims to their 'homeland' in Mindanao. Armed militias, private armies as well as criminal groups also operate within the Mindanao region, further exacerbating the flashpoints for armed conflict and displacement. Prevailing Moro and IP practices of clan wars known as '*rido*' and '*pangayaos*' have the potential to turn communities into abandoned ghost towns.

Estimates vary of the costs to government of funding the various wars and offensives launched to resolve the Moro question since the 1970s.<sup>18</sup> All agree that the war has resulted, not only in high military costs, but more importantly, large-scale human, social, and economic losses that translate into higher poverty incidences in Mindanao than anywhere else in the Philippines; lower human development indicators; and loss of economic opportunities and productivity.<sup>19</sup>

In 1996, the MNLF signed a peace agreement with the government. At the same time, the MILF chose to pursue its own path to peace, vowing to gain more political and economic concessions for the Moro people than those gained by the Misuari-led MNLF. In 1997, the MILF agreed to a cessation of hostilities as peaceful options were worked out by the administration of then President Ramos. However, an all-out war declared by his successor, President Estrada in 2000 brought negotiations to a standstill. His replacement President Macapagal-Arroyo also tried to build peace but again resorted to war in 2003, before returning to the negotiating table. A third major war in 2008 was sparked by the Supreme Court's ruling that the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MoA-AD) worked out by both parties was flawed and unconstitutional.

After this third major clash and with the election of President Aquino in 2011, both parties renewed their peace efforts, borne out by a significant reduction of ceasefire violations and conflict incidents recorded by the IMT. In 2011, only 4 official security-related violations were recorded, followed by zero security-related incidents through 2012 up to the present. This positive climate helped pave the way to the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) on October 15, 2012, and the much more detailed Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) on March 28, 2014.

While the NP-CPC programme focuses on the conflict between GPH and MILF sketched out above, it is important to bear in mind that this is only the 'tip of the conflict iceberg': many more conflict dynamics relating to social, economic and political divisions on the island – often interlinked and over-lapping – play themselves out in the same areas where NP maintains a presence and activities. While these other conflict dynamics have the potential to affect the ceasefire between the GPH and MILF, the ceasefire monitoring structures (described below) are limited to observing the latter. A thorough and nuanced understanding of different causes, actors and dynamics involved in specific conflict incidences is therefore key in navigating this complex context carefully.

## 4.2. The GPH-MILF Ceasefire Monitoring Architecture

The GPH-MILF ceasefire monitoring architecture contains several elements that grew organically over time in response to the evolving needs of the context and the

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<sup>18</sup> Some sources cite government statistical figures on war-related military spending between 1970 – 1996 of around 73 billions pesos per year; others estimate more recent military spending since the 2008 outbreak of war at 30 million pesos a day. See for example Kalinaw 'Understanding Mindanao', available at <http://www.kalinaw.com.ph/mindanao-101/> - accessed 4 May 2014; or Lingao, Ed (2012) 'Mindanao: the Hidden Costs of War', available at <http://www.opapp.gov.ph/features/mindanao-hidden-costs-war>, accessed 4 May 2014.

<sup>19</sup> See for example Schiavo-Campo S. and Judd M. (2005) 'The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines - Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend'. Social Development Papers of the World Bank, N° 24/2005 (World Bank).

peace process. They combine to make up a collection of hybrid mechanisms that interlock, if not by design, then by operational and practical necessity:

- > The **Coordinating Committees for the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH)** – the CCCH’s task is to observe the Cessation of Hostilities in place since 1997; and to conduct inquiries into breaches. The CCCH includes a Secretariat on both sides at the Cotabato City level; and seven provincial-level CCCH representations.
- > Reporting to the CCCH are **Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Posts**, physical monitoring structures that are manned by military staff from both GPH and MILF.
- > **Local Monitoring Teams (LMT)** are made up of civilians nominated by GPH and MILF in turn, as well as independent civilian community leaders, such as religious or civil society representatives. Each LMT is chaired by one chairperson jointly elected.
- > The **Ad Hoc Joint Action Group** was set up in 2002 in response to the joint challenge of criminal or so-called ‘lawless elements’ whose presence and activities in the ceasefire areas can provoke armed incidents between GPH and MILF. The AHJAG coordinate GPH and MILF action in going after such lawless elements.<sup>20</sup>
- > The **International Monitoring Team** was set up in 2004, with a Security Component led by Malaysia and including Brunei, Indonesia, earlier Libya, and Norway. Its task is to monitor any incidents of ceasefire violations, verify them and report these regularly to the CCCH as well as the peace panels. The CCCH in turn also refers perceived violations to the IMT for verification. Three additional Components were added subsequently:
  - The **Humanitarian, Relief and Development Component**, until recently led by the EU, with a mandate to monitor humanitarian aspects, including compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law.<sup>21</sup>
  - The **Socio-Economic Assistance Component** headed by Japan, and tasked to monitor the socio-economic development situation in conflict affected areas; make recommendations to the conflict parties on development needs; and make recommendations on development assistance to the programme Japan-Bangsmoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD).<sup>22</sup>
  - The **Civilian Protection Component**, led by 3 local and 1 international NGO (NP). The CPC focuses in particular on ceasefire-related incidents and their impacts on civilians’ safety and security, aiming to complement the military-focused Security Component.

According to its Terms of Reference, the Civilian Protection Component’s objectives are:<sup>23</sup>

1. “To monitor the safety and security of civilian communities in conflict-affected areas;
2. To monitor and ensure that both parties respect the sanctity of places of workshop namely mosques, churches and religious places and social institutions including schools, madaris, hospitals and all places of civilian nature;
3. To monitor the needs of the IDPs and the delivery of relief and rehabilitation support efforts in conflict-affected areas in Mindanao;

<sup>20</sup> GPH-MILF *Joint Communique on AHJAG*, signed 6 May 2002.

<sup>21</sup> See <http://imtmindanao.org/humanitarian-rehabilitation-and-development/>

<sup>22</sup> For details on J-BIRD, see <http://www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/bilateral/image/oda%202010%20update/jbird.htm>

<sup>23</sup> GPH-MILF *Terms of Reference of the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team*, signed 5 May 2010.

4. To strengthen ownership of the peace process by supporting and empowering communities to handle conflicts at grassroots levels;
5. To monitor acts of violence against civilians in conflict-affected areas; and
6. To strengthen the linkages and information sharing between the IMT and the peace panels.”

Graphic 2 presents this ceasefire monitoring architecture, including NP’s position and role within. This complex set-up is maintained at one level structurally: the different mechanisms, their mandates, Terms of Reference, and operating procedures have been more and more clearly defined over time. At the same time, smooth day-to-day functioning also relies to a great extent on personal working relationships: knowing individuals within each structure; being able to make quick and informal contact by text message or mobile calls; coordinating and deciding fast, especially at field level; and passing and cross-checking information at multiple levels simultaneously are all necessary ingredients that ‘oil’ the system.

Interviewees familiar with the set-up and working history of the IMT point out several limitations to the overall effectiveness of the monitoring mechanism. They include short-lived tenure of annually rotating military mission personnel; coordination challenges between components with differing mandates, priorities and approaches (e.g. human rights-based approaches vs. military ceasefire monitoring); differences in ‘culture’ and mutual acceptance between military and civilian components; and disparate operational capacities across the different components.


Within these existing limitations, NP-CPC works purposely at both, structural and personal levels: institutionally, it has supported the development and standardisation of the Civilian Protection Component (CPC) by supporting its Secretariat, and encouraging regular coordination between member NGOs. It has also worked on standardising CPC procedures and reporting templates, for example by developing Standard Operating Procedures and templates for daily, weekly and monthly reporting on civilian protection-related issues and incidences that are used by CPC as a whole.

At the same time, NP-CPC staff invest considerable time in building and nurturing relationships across the different mechanisms, and coordinating information sharing, activities and movements at field level carefully. This is an important aspect of the NP-CPC’s functioning, also designed into the programme (see Section 5). Relying heavily on staff’s personal rapport with partners, and ability to maintain this network of relationships, it is of course vulnerable to changes in staffing and personalities: the Security Component for example changes over entirely on an annual basis, including the Head and Deputy Head of Mission of the IMT. On NP side, high turnover of international staff requires regular building and re-building of relationships that are key to CPC’s effectiveness.





Graphic 2: The GPH-MILF Ceasefire Monitoring Architecture



## 5. NP CPC: How is the Project Designed?

### 5.1. How NP-CPC Articulates its Theories of Change

*“A theory of change is a set of beliefs about how change happens.”<sup>24</sup>*

Articulating theories of change clearly can help assess to what extent the logic of a given intervention – how it is designed, what it does, how it goes about it, and what it ultimately aims to contribute to – is sound. Importantly, a theory of change also reveals whether an organisation’s understanding of the interaction between its chosen response and the context, including the problems it seeks to address, are adequate. If the desired changes are not occurring, this approach can help assess whether there was a problem with the original theory behind the intervention; or, whether the theory was sound, but there were shortcomings in implementation.<sup>25</sup>

Based on a review of internal documents, we have sought to summarise and make explicit the key theories of change underlying NP’s work in Mindanao. While the programme does not explicitly refer to theories of change it has adopted, there are multiple excerpts in internal programme documents that point to several theories of change informing NP’s work. We have condensed these into five major theories of change, listed below. Each is illustrated with a relevant text excerpt from an internal document, either proposal, or report, to donors. We add a commentary on the types of assumptions made for each theory of change, to test validity during the field research stage:

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#### **Theory of Change 1:**

‘An international presence in conflict-affected areas will make communities *feel and be*, more safe.’

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#### **Sample project text extract:**

*‘On a regular basis the CPC field teams conduct patrols to vulnerable parts of their AoR, visiting communities and talking to civilians, local government officials, MILF, AFP and local members of the peace structures. These patrols allow the field teams to show their physical presence in conflict affected communities, which serves as a reminder to these communities that members of the international community are paying attention to developments on the ground. This increases not only the faith in the peace process, as the involvement of international actors are seen as beneficial, but also the feeling of security among community members, who perceive international presence as a deterrence against violence from the two armed actors.’ (Interim narrative report, IfS grant)*

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#### **Observations:**

This Theory of Change rests on the following assumptions that were tested during field research:

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<sup>24</sup> OECD (2010) *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility*, p.58

<sup>25</sup> So called ‘theory failures’ as opposed ‘implementation failures’. See Rogers, P. (2012) ‘Guidance Note 1: Introduction to Impact Evaluation’ (InterAction and the Rockefeller Foundation).

- 
- > Communities value an international presence, and associate it with an increase in their security
  - > A third party international presence serves to restrain outbreaks or escalations of violence among armed actors
- 

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**Theory of Change 2:**

‘Better access and flow of information among key conflict actors will reduce incidences of violence and elicit better responses to them.’

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**Sample project text extract:**

*‘Through fact-finding missions and verifications NP ensures that information regarding any violation of the GPH-MILF ceasefire agreement, IHRL or IHL is followed up closely. This is critical as reducing the level of violence against civilians is a goal in itself and it also serves to reduce the likelihood that incidents of violence escalate and lead to larger confrontations and clashes. By verifying civilian protection related incidents, NP gives the Peace Panels an opportunity to intervene before these incidents turn into a cycle of violence.’* (Final report Norway grant)

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**Observations:**

This Theory of Change rests on the following assumptions that were tested during field research:

- > Lack of ground-level information among armed actors is an important factor causing outbreaks or escalations of violence among armed actors.
  - > More information will enable earlier, and better, response at appropriate levels of decision-making.
  - > IMT is able to process, pass on, and action, received information.
- 

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**Theory of Change 3:**

‘Better information access among humanitarian agencies about humanitarian needs of conflict-affected communities will improve aid delivery, especially to IDPs.’

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**Sample project text extract:**

*‘Through these referral mechanisms NP assists agencies whose staff, most often because of security restrictions, in reaching parts of the population they otherwise might not have been able to reach, and increases their understanding of the field situation which strengthens the impact of their interventions. It also enables NP to use these agencies to channel the kind of support to civilians which it is not able to provide itself.’* (Interim narrative report IfS RRM, 2012)

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**Observations:**

This Theory of Change rests on the following assumptions that were tested during field research:

- > Humanitarian agencies have the capacity and willingness to act on the received information
-

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**Theory of Change 4:**

‘More knowledge among conflict-affected communities about the peace process will increase their ownership over it, and as a result, make the peace process more sustainable on the ground.’

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**Sample project text extract:**

*‘By ensuring that communities have access to correct information, NP contributes to a situation where they can make informed decisions regarding their safety and security. By giving communities a better basis for informed decision-making, civilian protection-related actions are more strongly anchored in local communities, making the peace process more sustainable and strengthening local ownership of their security situation. Addressing rumours in a timely manner can also be an effective way to avoid civilian displacement or escalation of violence.’* (Final report Norwegian MFA)

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**Observations:**

This Theory of Change rests on the following assumptions that were tested during field research:

- >Lack of information is a primary obstacle to communities making informed decisions about their own security
  - > There are no other significant obstacles to communities’ management of their own security
  - > Information received make communities feel more empowered in having a say in wider peace process issues that affect them.
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**Theory of Change 5:**

‘Building the capacity of communities and civil society organisations to participate in the on-going peace process, especially civilian protection aspects, will eventually enable them to ensure their own safety.’

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**Sample project text extract:**

*‘By training local partner and peace organisations and facilitating the growth of a civilian monitoring community in [Mindanao], the CPC is helping to ensure the skills and networks of local organisations in civilian protection issues are created and/or strengthened to be able to localise responsibility within the communities, ensuring their own safety. This will ensure that the core functions of the CPC would still be fulfilled should it cease to exist either because of political reasons or because the security situations does not make it necessary any longer.’* (Proposal Narrative EU IfS, 2012)

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**Observations:**

This Theory of Change rests on the following assumptions that were tested during field research:

- > Trainees actually use their acquired skills subsequently
-

- 
- > Individuals and groups trained coalesce into community-level networks for civilian protection
  - > Local organisations have the capacity and willingness to take on civilian protection issues themselves
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## 5.2. The NP-CPC Intervention Logic: Objectives, Anticipated Results and Activities


As is often the case with NGO projects receiving funding from multiple donors, NP-CPC objectives and activities are formulated somewhat differently, targeting different donor requirements, across different project documents. However they are similar and consistent enough in presenting a clear intervention 'logic.' For the sake of clarity, we here present the intervention logic as presented in the main log frame to the project, submitted as part of the EU IfS project application in 2012.<sup>26</sup>

The NP-CPC project design is directly derived from the CPC Terms of Reference, reflecting all objectives listed in the ToR (see Section 4.3. above). NP staff interviewed for this evaluation have a clear understanding of this intervention logic, and the focus and scope of their role as part of CPC – most frequently summarised as 'monitor, verify, report.' At the same time, they appreciate that the lines between the different programmatic areas are often blurred, and this has in fact led to more of a joint-up approach since 2013 that seeks to promote more joint work across the CPC, EWER, and child protection work.

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<sup>26</sup> The original EU Proposal also includes a fourth results area to support the capacity-development of the Humanitarian, Relief and Development Component of IMT, led until recently by the EU. Here, NP mainly played an administrative role in channeling funds for staff hiring for the HRDC component. The implementation of the HRDC faced its own challenges, separately evaluated by the EU, which led the EU to take the decision to withdraw from HRDC in early 2014. Since NP's role here was limited largely to an administrative function, we have excluded it from this content-focused evaluation of NP's own role as part of the IMT CPC.

Graphic 3: NP CPC Intervention Logic



### 5.3. Observations on Programme Design

The design of NP-CPC has evolved from, and relies to a significant extent on NP's existing engagement on, early warning and early response via its Conflict Prevention Programme (later renamed as the EWER programme). While the CPC mandate is clearly delimited and restricted to 'monitoring, verifying, reporting', NP is able to take further actions where necessary in a given conflict situation, through its wider programmatic engagement. This is an effective strategy that ensures communities feel that engaging with NP and other CPC partners does not just involve extracting information from them; but also can trigger immediate responses to security concerns they raise: as an example, one anecdote the evaluation team was told several times during our stay in Mindanao by one community was an incident of AFP shelling close to the community's location. This raised concerns among community members, who passed the information on to NP-CPC. According to the respondents, shortly afterwards, the shelling stopped.


While the evaluators did not triangulate this particular incident, NP-CPC did on this, and other, occasions, contact armed actors directly to inform them of civilian concerns. Their maintenance of open and constructive channels to both sides means that GPH and MILF forces take NP information seriously, and are willing to take action on the basis of information received. In the eyes of communities, this makes NP an important 'channel' or 'bridge' to armed actors that they themselves are not easily able to reach, or communicate with.

The original programme design also morphed during the implementation period (as is to be expected in an evolving peace process context), making some activities more, some less, relevant over time. For example, the original of setting up 'Protection Sites' in response to acute civilian protection needs (such as regular and large-scale displacement as during the outbreak of war in 2008), became less relevant as fewer, and less intense, outbreaks of violence occurred in most AoR in the period 2012 – 2013. As a result, only one protection site was set up in Lanao del Norte, supported also by the LGU, and used by local volunteer monitors primarily as a meeting space. Lanao site was selected to pilot the concept of protection site due to its relative stability at the time, while in other areas, especially in Maguindanao, security issues made this type of intervention more difficult at the time.

Support to women peace advocates was provided through support to its local partner Philippine Muslim Women's Council (PMWC), based in Marawi City, which set up an all-female team of local monitors for the area. This effort could not be sustained however as PMWC faced funding challenges.


The NP overall approach to design, including of CPC, but also other programme components, can be plotted along two spectrums, presented below: the first presents categories of methods NP employs – at times separately, at times sequentially, at other times in parallel. The second graphic depicts the timing focus of NP's intervention: short, medium, to longer-term. These are an attempt at systematisation. They can help NP assess where its current emphases lie, where it may want to evolve, and where it may need to place more focus in future:

Graphic 4: Spectrum of NP Methods for Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping





Graphic 5: Security timeframes of NP's work at the community level



Several points can be highlighted from these two diagrammes presenting NP's work:

- > NP's work, especially that of CPC, emphasises and prioritises monitoring, verification and reporting – in adherence with CPC's core mandate. At the time of writing, the IMT, including the CPC, were awaiting an official renewal of their monitoring mandate from the two conflict parties in the wake of the signing of the CAB. While it is unclear what the need for monitoring, verification and reporting will be over the next two years of transition, patterns of conflict incidences are likely to change and evolve; and there may be fewer incidences falling under the narrow CPC reporting remit (while others, such as land-related disputes or '*ridos*', may rise or remain equal). This means NP will likely need to shift its focus and resource allocations from its current heavy emphasis on monitoring, verification and reporting under the CPC mandate.
- > Other areas, including those permissible in the CPC mandate, such as referrals and proactive presence, are comparatively less frequently employed. This has also changed over time: for example there has been less large-scale community displacement during the evaluation period compared to the period following the break-down of talks in 2008. As a result, NP is perhaps less frequently called on now than previously to provide proactive presence, or accompany civilians in conflict-affected areas (and this differs from field site to field site).
- > In comparison, NP is scaling up to provide more systematic support to dispute settlement interventions in cases of conflicts at the community level – while this falls outside the CPC mandate, it builds on the credibility and reach NP has built in the last two years thanks to CPC and other programmes.
- > When it comes to timeframes, across programmes, including CPC, NP's focus has been placed on contributing to the immediate safety and security of communities; and tackling security challenges in the medium term, such as the

spread of rumours; or movements and return of IDP communities. NP is aware of the need to institutionalise EWER structures and support longer-term peace and stability. However given resource limitations and day-to-day priorities, as well as realities of the context (including limited absorption capacity of government institutions and local partners), so far this longer-term peace and security perspective features comparatively less in NP's work.

- > In moving forward and designing new programme phases, giving more prominence to this longer-term perspective will add depth and sustainability to NP's work, as well as opening up new programming and fundraising opportunities (such as, for example, capacity-building support to a future Bangsamoro police force for effective community patrolling, reporting and incidence management).

### 5.3.1. Observations on Programme Indicators

The CPC programme log frame includes multiple indicators listed by expected result areas – for example:

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**Expected result area 1:**

*Safety and security of communities, including all non-combatants increased through maintenance of a monitoring network and community protection centres.*

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**Indicators included in the programme log frame:**

- Number of monitors and advocates trained and deployed in the field;
- Number of daily patrols and monitoring mission taken in communities by CPC personnel
- Number of flash, daily and monthly reports verified and submitted to ceasefire bodies
- Number of reported actions taken as follow-ups to submitted CPC reports
- CPC community offices/protection sites are established and functioning
- Number of visits made to the community offices/protection sites
- Number of rumours and cases of disinformation reported to NP teams, followed up, addressed and documented
- Number of non-combatants accompanied
- Number of Quick Response Teams established and functioning
- Number of referrals made to relevant agencies.

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The indicators included are *output* indicators, that is to say, indicators of NP activities working towards the expected results. In this regard, NP systematically collects and monitors the numbers and types of activities carried out by different field sites, included in daily, weekly and monthly reports, aggregates them, and includes them also in donor reporting.

What these types of indicators are not able to show is whether these activities cumulatively have the intended result – i.e. they fall short as *impact* indicators. While its internal and donor reports detail activities delivered in a detailed manner (such as, numbers of monitoring patrols; numbers of community orientations or trainings delivered; numbers of IDP assessments carried out and so on), evidence of how its presence and interventions contribute to an improvement in the situation is less well captured on a regular basis. Monitoring and aggregating information around specific impact indicators would allow NP to systematically track short-term effects, and longer-term impacts, of its own interventions in the context. Given that there is broad

agreement, among stakeholders and NP staff alike, that its work on civilian protection has important impacts, capturing short- and longer-term effects is important both, from a programme management point of view; and in terms of ‘marketing’ why, how, and under what conditions UCP works, and the difference it can make.

One first encouraging effort in this regard was the impact survey carried out in 2011 among communities where NP operates in Mindanao. It systematically tested respondents’ perceptions about a number of safety and security-related impact indicators formulated by NP together with an external research team. The findings concluded that this type of quantitative impact assessment is feasible and yields useful results; and that NP’s presence had indeed impacted positively on how safe and secure communities felt.<sup>27</sup>

The shortcoming of these types of large-n quantitative surveys is that they provide snapshots of one particular moment in time; and they do not elicit information on the conditions that facilitated a particular impact. Ideally therefore they would be combined with other, qualitative methods. They are also resource-heavy, and cannot be done too frequently without generating ‘surveying fatigue’ among respondents.

Nevertheless NP could build on this pilot attempt, learning from the impact indicators formulated for community security, by (a) refining them further; (b) developing similar impact indicators for other results areas; and (c) exploring how monitoring impact indicators could be integrated into its routine reporting procedures without adding too much extra burden on partners and staff.

### 5.3.2. Observations on RPP Effectiveness Criteria

NP’s approach of connecting local-level volunteer monitoring networks with the officially mandated ceasefire monitoring structures that communicate directly with the political-level conflict parties is an effective example of multi-track work that links ‘more people’ with ‘key people.’ Community members and local partners consulted for this evaluation frequently referred to NP as a ‘bridge’ or a ‘channel’ via which they felt able to reach armed actors and decision-makers. On the other hand, representatives from both AFP and MILF, as well as aid agencies, referred to NP as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the international community when it comes to understanding local-level civilian protection issues.

With regards to the RPP Effectiveness Criteria, NP’s work has most direct relevance for criterion 4, namely work that seeks to achieve ‘an increase in people’s security and in their sense of security’; as well as criterion 3, describing efforts that try to prompt ‘people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence.’

NP has worked towards both through its own direct interventions; and in supporting and accompanying local partners to carry out EWER and UCP work themselves, through different capacity-building measures. These have focused primarily at orientations and trainings for communities, volunteer monitors and local partner organisations’ staff; as well as armed actors on both sides regarding their roles and duties under IHL and HR. More detailed perceptions and findings on NP’s contributions to these RPP effectiveness criteria are included in Sections 6 and 8 below.


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<sup>27</sup> Beckmann, K. and Solberg, K. (2013, unpublished) *Measuring the Impact of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping: A Pilot Study*.

From a sustainability perspective, NP is well aware that these efforts need to be increasingly institutionalised to have a lasting impact also beyond a future NP departure from Mindanao. Graphic 4 depicts three different levels of capacity-building needed for long-term sustainability. It lists activities where NP currently focuses most of its attention (at Levels 1 and 2, and to a lesser extent, at Level 3). Level 3 lists also additional activities where it may need to focus more attention in future if it wants to systematically support the integration of civilian protection and UCP in official institutions of the future Bangsamoro.

To date, when it comes to Level 3, NP has faced the typical ‘chicken and egg’ challenges of capacity-building for local institutions and partners: scaling up and institutionalising local efforts requires a minimum of will and capacity to begin with, and a conducive enough policy and incentives environment especially in official institutions. This has been lacking in some of the local institutions NP tries to reach out to and include in its activities (for example, Local Government Unit representatives).

Graphic 6: Levels of Capacity-building for Civilian Protection and UCP



### 5.3.3. Observations on Conflict-Sensitivity

Conflict-sensitivity rests on the assumption that every intervention in a conflict context will have multiple impacts: intended and unintended; as well as positive and negative. It posits that these must be analysed and tracked proactively, based on a thorough conflict analysis; and a subsequent assessment of the two-way interactions between this conflict context (actors, causes, and dynamics) with various dimensions of the intervention. One element of this is risk mitigation – i.e. minimisation of risks related to operating in a conflict context to an organisation’s presence, its staff, activities, working methods and principles. The other element is a purposeful assessment of the ways in which an intervention may inadvertently be fuelling conflict – by exacerbating divisions in a society; undermining peaceful and productive relations and systems; and so on – with a view to minimising this potential.

## Conflict Analysis

NP carries out regular conflict analysis in the different field sites where it has a presence, and utilises a number of tools for this purpose. They include:

- > Conflict profiles, including conflict histories in particular provinces
- > Conflict mappings
- > Actor analysis
- > Capturing of conflict causes and triggers
- > Identification of 'hot spots' and 'potential hot spots'
- > Categorisation of specific conflict incidents by type (e.g. confrontations between main armed actors; ridos; land disputes; and so on)
- > Conflict impacts, such as population displacements

These are captured in a variety of conflict-analysis related documents, shared at field level, and transferred to the main office in Cotabato City. Internally, it is evident that conflict analysis is by now a well-entrenched and regular practice for NP.<sup>28</sup> The field-level presence of NP means that it has an in-depth understanding of multiple and overlapping conflict dynamics, down to individual persons involved in specific incidents. NP staff throughout have a nuanced and detailed assessment of the conflicts they deal with in their respective areas of operation.

While this internal *analytical* capacity is evident, reports transmitted to the CPC / IMT focus mainly on *factual* accounts of conflict incidents. That is to say, they present mainly information and data on *what* happened, and *results* (in terms of numbers of IDPs and so on); rather than *why* incidents occurred – i.e. CPC reports evidence less analytical content than NP would have the capacity to supply. This may be due to CPC's restricted mandate, and efforts to maintain impartiality and avoid bias in the information transmitted. This focus on the 'what' over the 'why' can however limit the peace panels' ability to discuss and reach decisions on the basis of the information provided through the CPC.

What we also observe is that NP has not adopted a consistent methodology for conflict analysis purposes (such as, one set of tools that all field sites use consistently and at agreed intervals). This would further strengthen NP's use of conflict analysis, and enable it to link the valuable analysis carried out by field staff to its organisation-wide strategic planning, prioritisation, and decision-making for interventions. Indeed, staff interviewed commented that the use of conflict analysis was uneven; and it was sometimes unclear what exact purposes conflict analysis documents serve internally. If well defined and agreed programme-wide, a more systematic approach to conflict analysis can help NP define the boundaries of its engagement in specific conflicts; appropriate types of interventions; and also help track trends over time in order to identify future opportunities for programme expansion, where appropriate. Training in conflict analysis that is appropriate to NP's needs would also be a valuable capacity-building exercise, especially for national staff.

## Risk Management

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<sup>28</sup> Whereas the 2010 evaluation observed an unclear and uneven use of conflict analysis at the time.

NP is thorough about its risk management, especially when it comes to staff safety. Assumptions and risks are articulated clearly in project documents, principally at two levels:

1. **Risks to NP's operations and staff posed by increases in violence in its operating environment:** NP's primary mitigation strategy against these operational risks is a detailed security policy and plans in place; security trainings for staff and point persons at each field sites; and, acceptance and trust from communities and all relevant parties in the operating environment.
2. **Risks to NP's presence and work in the Philippines posed by unfavourable changes in the policy environment or the peace process:** This could for example include changes in the government's attitudes towards NGO participation in the peace process and presence in conflict-affected communities; a break down in talks; restrictions to NGO work permits; etc. NP seeks to address these risks via its close working relationships with local civil society organisations with the capacity and mandate to advocate at the political and policy levels.

## Do No Harm

The third aspect of conflict-sensitivity, a two-way risk assessment that includes also the potential negative impacts of NP's presence and intervention, is more diffuse and less evident as a systematic approach: on the one hand, interviews show that NP staff are deeply culturally and contextually knowledgeable and sensitive. According to communities, conflict parties and other third parties, NP coordinates activities, movements and plans carefully and regularly. Staff and management are also aware and mindful of the potential negative impacts that international NGO presence can entail: for example, distorting local partner capacities through insensitive funding relations for example; or becoming involved in an ill-informed manner in conflicts that are settled through traditional dispute settlement systems. NP seeks to protect local volunteer monitors and community members by maintaining confidentiality in the information they pass on to others for follow-up, be that to the IMT, GPH or MILF.

NP's staff handbook indeed makes mention of 'do no harm' as a key ethics principle of how NP staff should approach their work at an individual level. This includes refraining from distorting local markets; avoidance of 'implicit ethical messages' that imply an acceptance of violence; and adjustment of any action that may have negative impacts on the communities where NP works, or on the conflict dynamics (Section 2.3.2.).

However, the programme design, and other project documents such as field-level conflict analyses reviewed, do not systematically articulate this 'do no harm' approach, assessing the potential risks or harm that NP's own presence, activities or approach may pose to communities, partners or other stakeholders.<sup>29</sup> If in place, this could help inform project planning, implementation, or adaptation in response to analysis.

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<sup>29</sup> Project documents, such as narrative reports, evidence some limited thinking along these lines. For example, mention is made in one project interim narrative report that 'an issue in which NP's limited mandate can create confusion or concern is when the NP-CPC teams engage in activities with or for IDPs. The field teams conduct IDP needs assessments, but NP does not provide any relief aid to those displaced. Rather, the assessments are shared with NP's Conflict Prevention Program (CPP), and from there forwarded to, for example, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFO and UNHCR to elicit their follow up. This most often relates to expressed needs for food or shelter.' This type of assessment is not included in conflict analysis documents reviewed.



#### 5.3.4. Observations through a Gender Lens

NP-CPC integrates a gender lens in its work to varying extent:

- > In terms of **policy commitment**, the NP staff handbook refers to gender as ‘an important issue in conflict transformation and human rights protection.’ This includes balanced hiring, and inclusion of gender in different aspects of its work. There is to our knowledge no separate gender policy.
- > In terms of **hiring practice**, NP seeks to ensure gender balance on its team, and across different field teams. Given the small size of its field teams, this balance is easily upset with the departure or change over of staff (for example, at the time of the evaluation, one field site was male-only, while in another, there were more female staff members present.) NP does however strive to maintain it on an on-going basis.
- > In terms of **information collection**, data on conflict incidences and impacts on civilians is gender disaggregated; and templates for reporting provide for this.
- > In terms of **assessment of humanitarian needs**, NP-CPC includes gender-specific assessment questions in its reports, for example on gendered relief needs of IDPs, such as hygiene.
- > In terms of **women’s participation in its activities**, such as community orientations or trainings, NP-CPC seeks to ensure balanced numbers between women, men, and young people, and encourages local partners to do the same. Staff acknowledge however struggling with the *qualitative* participation of women in public forums, especially in communities where traditionally, women are less likely to be given the floor if men are also present. This is a common challenge for NGOs, and NP could benefit from a more deliberate design of its approach and activities that reflects good practice in this regard.
- > NP has also had some experience in **targeting women and women-specific gender issues in conflict through dedicated activities and stand-alone projects**, for example supporting one partner in setting up an all-women monitoring team in Marawi; and a short-term project on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) for communities. These attempts were not sustained for different reasons, partly due to partner capacities to maintain activities; and partly because a short-term stand-alone project did not provide enough resources and focused attention to sustain NP engagement on women’s issues.
- > There is less evidence of a **balanced gender approach across its work**, considering more in-depth issues of violence and conflict affecting, and perpetrated by, both women and men, from analysis through to design and implementation. Again, NP is not alone in encountering questions of how to meaningfully integrate a gender lens in its work. A strong start would be an integration of a gender perspective in its conflict analysis; and an assessment of what ‘gender’ means for NP’s work and how best to address it more broadly in UCP. Without drawing on additional resources, an internal ‘gender audit’ of NP’s work could provide valuable insights and guide NP staff in integrating a gender lens in on-going activities without requiring additional resources. Gender training for its staff, and integrating gender into its initial induction trainings for all staff, would be another important step.

## 6. How Major Stakeholders View NP's Work

Various stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation expressed their appreciation of NP's work in a variety of ways. These are summarised in the following points:

- > NP is seen to be able to influence the actions of GPH and MILF armed actors, including the capability to cause armed actions to cease and desist through direct access. This is recounted in community narratives of firefights and incursions that are soon quelled after information is forwarded by community monitors to their NP counterparts. Accounts cite mere minutes as the time elapsed between the reporting of the incident solely to NP, and the pull-out of armed actors or the cessation of armed action in a locality.
- > NP provides 'professional' processes to data-collection, monitoring and validation, ensuring the veracity and reliability of reports forwarded. The perception that NP collects and processes information more completely and thoroughly was often repeated at various levels and has earned NP the trust and confidence of the recipients as to the reliability of such information.
- > The presence of NP internationals is seen as providing an unbiased, non-partisan assessment of the situation that nationals cannot provide on their own. The involvement of internationals is seen as ensuring against bias or favour for the interests of either party involved in a reported conflict. The internationals help temper any local preconceptions towards nationals who may be either settlers or Muslims.
- > NP is known to maintain a reliable and supportive on-site presence for as long and as much as security conditions and protocols allow. NP has manifested a penchant for staying put during times of crisis, or being the first responders to reported incidents of conflict. This active accompaniment has earned NP the trust and confidence of the communities and its partners.
- > NP works through and respects existing channels, observes protocols and emphasizes work coordination among the involved stakeholders. NP is seen as cognisant and respectful of various agreements and arrangements operating in the localities and between partners. It is acknowledged to be conscious of observing proper protocol, channels and procedures when working with other groups and agencies.
- > NP is well-resourced to provide immediate action and/or support when and where needed. NP is seen to have the resource capacity to initiate action or provide start-up support either singly or in partnership with other groups and organizations.
- > NP has built trust with communities, other stakeholders and agencies with its track record, performance and capacity to deliver. As a result, especially communities and partners turn to NP for a variety of reasons, also going beyond CPC-related issues.
- > NP's presence, particularly of internationals, is seen by partners and community members as:



- A sign of the seriousness of the situation, thus attracting the attention of a wider audience, and even the international community.
- Adding a heightened sense of safety for the communities, as armed actors are less likely to violate the peace in the presence of foreigners.
- A sign of honour and even prestige to the community, particularly for those that have never had international visitors previously.
- A sign of human concern for the situation at hand, expressing a common bond when it comes to conflict and IDPs.

## 7. The CPC in Mindanao: a Model for Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring Elsewhere?

Nonviolent Peaceforce applies tools and approaches of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) in different parts of the world, and continues to adapt them flexibly to new contexts.<sup>30</sup> Its working assumption is that UCP methods, if informed by a thorough analysis of each context, are relevant in a range of conflict-affected situations.

In this vein, NP's work in Mindanao in fact grew out of lessons from earlier work in Sri Lanka; and the Terms of Reference for this evaluation included questions regarding 'transferability' of new lessons gathered in Mindanao to other places. NP's CPC work in Mindanao is of course not a stand-alone model that can be replicated regardless of context. Its workings and achievements are determined by a number of variables specific to the time and place of intervention. These may not necessarily hold in other places. Other conflict contexts in turn may provide different factors that enable UCP work in novel ways, and provide further grounds for innovation and learning.

NP's work in Mindanao, including its entry, and participation in the CPC, was enabled by a number of factors:

- > **International presence and involvement in the peace process is broadly accepted and welcomed, both at political and community levels.** There is a clear added value that conflict parties and stakeholders perceive in an international presence and involvement in 'their' conflicts. At the level of the conflict parties, it has served to strengthen the missing mutual trust. At the level of communities, local grassroots organisations have felt 'empowered' by the international presence on their side to reach out to actors that they would otherwise not have had access to; and take actions that they previously lacked the capacity to take. This broad acceptance and appreciation of third party involvement is a sine-qua-non for the type of work NP has been able to do.
- > **With exceptions, there has been sufficient political will among the main conflict parties to find a settlement to the armed conflict, especially since the break-down of talks in 2008.** This type of good faith and ownership by the conflict parties over the process has to be in place for third parties to be able to play the kind of role NP has in terms of civilian protection.

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<sup>30</sup> Several resources are included in the bibliography that present approaches and lessons from Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping as employed by NP.

- > **The role of civil society organisations in the peace process has gained acceptance over time in the Philippines, and been embraced by the conflict parties.** This factor has also provided a fertile ground for the kind of work that NP is doing. NGOs do of course work in other contexts where they are not welcomed with open arms by conflict parties, to the contrary. The focus and scope of their work, as well as their ability to link up with official tracks, are inevitably limited in such situations. Where the space for peace work is more restricted, NP would have difficulty for example to provide proactive presence; and work on the 'high visibility' basis that has been an important 'success ingredient' to its work in Mindanao.
- > **There has been a progressive 'maturation' among the armed forces of both sides about International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, and their rights and duties under them.** Conflict parties on the ground have also become increasingly sensitive to the impacts of their actions on the wider political context of the peace process. Increasing exposure to international standards of armed combat as regards ceasefire behaviour, and protection of civilians, mean that both sides have been more receptive to outside monitoring of their actions. In addition, the AFP doctrine of the 'primacy of the peace process' has been urging restraint in armed combat and respect for the ceasefire in place. These factors have meant that armed forces on both sides in the areas where NP operates have a basic, sufficient receptivity and understanding of its mandate and 'raison d'être' to let it operate, and monitor their behaviour.
- > **By the time NP was invited to join the IMT-CPC, it had already been operating in Mindanao for at least 3 years, building up networks of grassroots human rights and early warning monitors, supporting local partner organisations' work in this area, and gaining acceptance as a result.** It had built the organisational relationships, presence, and a track-record that made it relevant and acceptable to the conflict parties as an international NGO participant in the official ceasefire monitoring structure.
- > **There was a budding indigenous movement for civilian ceasefire monitoring already in place that NP could link up to and support:** without the existence of Bantay Ceasefire, and local organisations and activists supporting it, NP would not have had the local 'counterparts' that allowed it to build wide and systematic networks across its areas of operation. It meant that it could gain entrance and acceptance at the community level with and through its local partner organisations that had already identified and started to address the need for civilian protection and the kind of work NP does.

These are all important context factors that have enabled NP's UCP work in Mindanao. Other contexts come with their own set of factors that UCP needs to be adapted to: for example, acceptance of international third party involvement may need to be nurtured first of all; official ceasefire monitoring structures may not yet be in place, requiring more informal support to local actors; or indeed local capacities for UCP may need to be built from scratch in the absence of pre-existing civil society involvement.

## 8. Main Findings

We have here structured our main findings under the main OECD criteria for evaluating peacebuilding work:<sup>31</sup>

1. Relevance: namely, to what extent the intervention is based on a solid assessment of the context, and peacebuilding needs
2. Effectiveness: to what extent it achieved its stated objectives
3. Impact: the wider effects produced by an intervention
4. Sustainability: to what extent the positive benefits of an intervention will continue beyond the end of a programme.

## 8.1. Relevance

- > **The ‘theories of change’ informing NP’s work as part of the CPC are relevant and broadly hold water – though other factors also affect the behaviour of armed actors, humanitarian agencies, and communities, that are more resilient to positive change.** Clearly, a single theory of change, no matter how carefully crafted, cannot capture all factors that enable or hinder a positive change in conflict behaviour and conflict responses. For example, while it may be true that access to better information about ground-level civilian protection issues enables conflict parties to minimise incidences of ‘accidental’ exposure of civilians to violence (for example, evacuating occupied civilian structures, or changing troop movements), there are also instances where violence is used deliberately against civilians and civilian targets. Communities’ abilities to take action to address their own security needs may indeed be enhanced, but not all factors affecting their safety lie within their sphere of influence (as evidenced by the outbreak of violence in Zamboanga City in 2013). In practice, NP’s staff is very aware about the conditions that support or in turn limit the effectiveness of their work. By clearly articulating its theories of change, NP can make more explicit the assumptions and conditions that need to be in place for it to be able to effect those changes.
- > **NP’s intervention as part of the CPC is broadly relevant to Mindanao’s conflict context and the evolving dynamics of the peace process:** the decades long conflict between the GPH and Moro insurgency groups has caused large-scale civilian suffering, including deaths, waves of displacement, and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law relating to the status and protection of civilians during war. The earlier phases of the ceasefire, and the ‘first generation’ of international monitoring, were not set up to address these civilian protection issues systematically. As the conflict dynamics ebb and flow, even with ‘0 incidents of violations’ reported since January 2012, civilian protection needs remain real and urgent: civilians are still caught in the midst of conflict dynamics. Given this on-going necessity, and the express request from the conflict parties for third party monitoring of the ceasefire, NP’s efforts to systematise and scale up civilian protection-related monitoring, verification, and reporting has been timely and pertinent.
- > **NP’s approach of combining national and international staff, and high visibility of its operations (through prominently displayed logos, ID cards, NP vests and shirts worn by all staff operating in the field), is a relevant strategy in a context where outside intervention, and the presence of internationals, is seen as a positive.** Numerous respondents have commented on what they perceive to be a Filipino ‘cultural’ trait, or perhaps a colonial

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<sup>31</sup> See OECD (2010) *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility* (Paris, France: OECD).

heritage, of trusting and 'looking up' more to foreigners than other Filipinos. Where Filipinos may be accused of biases, outsiders are seen more as falling outside these internal divisions. Communities and other respondents have commented positively on the fact that international NP staff hail from often far-flung places, including Africa, Central and South Asia, Europe and Latin America. It gives them a sense that 'the world is watching.'

- > **Connecting NP's work rooted in Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping to officially mandated civilian protection under an international monitoring mechanism has been a relevant strategy to address grassroots-level security concerns at higher levels of decision-making.** It has also focused its work narrowly to monitoring and reporting, while Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping as a methodology goes beyond that. On the one hand, being part of an official third party monitoring mechanism has given NP's presence and work further leverage, and direct reporting lines to the political level peace process via the IMT Head of Mission. At the same time, especially NP staff respondents felt that it limited NP's room for manoeuvre somewhat, since the CPC mandate is limited to 'monitoring, verifying, and reporting' – while NP's UCP work goes beyond this to proactive engagement in the contexts where it operates. Similarly, CPC's mandate is limited to disputes and conflicts of direct relevance to the GPH-MILF ceasefire in place; while communities are affected by multiple layers and types of conflicts also involving other types of armed actors present in the same environment. While there are obvious overlaps, NP has had to navigate carefully its engagement as part of CPC for example with splinter groups of the MILF, or indeed the MNLF – arguably limiting its capacity to operate.
  
- > **At the same time, the issues that will affect civilian protection, and peace and security at the community level, in the coming transition period, and beyond, will change.** NP's work, while continuing to focus on civilian protection, needs to evolve and adapt to this changing context. It needs to take into account other types of conflicts falling outside the narrow IMT-CPC mandate that affect the lives and safety of the communities it is seeking to serve. This includes land conflicts, ridos, and the presence and actions of other armed groups, to name just a few. To remain relevant, NP needs to assess whether and how to apply its 'core skills' to new and different conflicts.
  
- > **Donors in Manila are less clear about the concrete impacts of NP's work in Mindanao, and as a result have less appreciation of its relevance.** A discrepancy is evident between the appreciation of NP's work among partners and communities in Mindanao, compared to those more active at the policy level in Manila. Feedback from respondents at Manila level, including donors, suggests that they are less well informed about what NP does and how it does it, and as a result have open questions about its relevance and impact. Donors in particular would appreciate more strategic engagement in policy discussions in Manila, in particular when it comes to ground-level context analysis that they themselves lack.

## 8.2. Effectiveness

- > **Those community representatives sampled for the evaluation have confirmed that they feel safer as a result of NP's presence, and its CPC role. They understand that passing information on to NP means it can reach 'higher echelons' of decision-making, which on their own they are not able**

**to reach.** Local volunteer monitors interviewed feel safe to pass information to NP, since their reporting ensures confidentiality. They see NP as a 'buffer' that keeps them one step removed from having to make complaints or raising sensitive issues themselves, where this is too risky. It also helps them verify and address conflict- and security-related rumours that otherwise spread quickly and frequently lead to conflict outbreaks or escalation. Community members and local partners have also shared that they have felt empowered by NP accompaniment, for example to reach out to local government officials or other international organisations to advocate for services.

- > **Humanitarian agencies acknowledge that they receive relevant and timely information from NP regarding humanitarian needs of conflict-affected populations, especially IDP's.** At the same time, humanitarian needs assessed are not always met by the relevant governmental line agencies or international organisations, leaving IDPs and communities with heightened expectations and frustration. While NP's work contributes to relief agencies' ability to target aid at identified needs, it cannot guarantee the effectiveness of the aid delivered, or indeed that any aid will be delivered at all.
- > **Armed actors on both sides confirm that the presence of a third party 'watching over them', including NP, has served to temper their behaviour.** According to respondents, more, better and faster sharing of information, often instigated by NP through CPC, has helped address and de-escalate potentially critical situations early on. While this is certainly the cumulative effect of several factors - policy changes over time and political will on both sides; increasing awareness and acceptance among both conflict parties of international standards of human rights and humanitarian law; and several actors' efforts within the wider ceasefire monitoring architecture, including both conflict parties, and the IMT Security Component - NP has made a significant contribution to this. Coordination and cooperative behaviour around ceasefire monitoring by the two sides have also had an important learning effect, helping to increase confidence and trust among them over time.
- > **The third results area, 'local ownership, connections and information-sharing among key actors in the peace process strengthened and awareness of CPC activities increased', is a composite outcome that is somewhat abstract and difficult to measure in its entirety.** We therefore focused our inquiry in this regard on local communities, and their perceptions and understanding of the CPC and its work. Community members interviewed generally had a clear understanding of the CPC's role and its mandate (including its limitation to 'monitoring, verifying, and reporting'), and felt they knew whom to contact for what purpose. Most had received orientations on the CPC. To avoid partisanship, NP is at the same time careful not to cross the line into carrying out orientations of a more political nature about ongoing peace process dynamics, the status of talks, the contents of specific agreements, and so on.

Yet there is significant demand for this type of information among communities that do not have easy access to other information channels. In these cases, NP has sought to refer requesting communities to other agencies and organisations better placed and mandated to carry out this type of peace process advocacy work. Whether information sharing and resulting awareness are true signs of 'ownership' over the process by local communities depends on one's definition of 'ownership'. What is certainly the case is that there have been cumulatively more efforts to keep communities better informed on the progress on the peace talks



than was the case in the run up to the 2008 MOA-AD, where lack of consultation ultimately contributed to its failure.

- > **The effectiveness of NP's work relies on the active practice of its principles of non-partisanship, transparency and non-intervention. NP staff and management are well aware of this need, and are having to make often sensitive, on-the-spot decisions on matters of principle.** Our research evidenced that NP's main stakeholders are very sensitive to issues of transparency and non-partisanship, and appreciate the need for NP to act in an even-handed manner. Armed actors on both sides stressed they feel that NP monitors and reports on both sides in a balanced way. Still, in day-to-day work, staff can be confronted with sensitive and real-time trade-offs between principles, for example transparency and confidentiality, that can affect how its work and its impartiality are perceived. More internal support to staff on what are 'red lines', and which issues to pass higher up the decision making chain, could help teams navigate often delicate and complex decisions.
- > **NP's effectiveness in the external delivery of its work relies on the internal effectiveness in managing the organisation, and most importantly, its people.** The organisation has advanced efforts at streamlining its internal set up and procedures. New international arrivals receive systematic inductions, a handbook is in place to guide staff conduct, there is a system in place to review staff performance and satisfaction. However hiring, nurturing and retaining high quality staff needs to become more of a priority for NP, and part of its 'genetic make-up'. High turnover, especially of international staff, suggests that this needs strengthening.

### 8.3. Impact

- > **NP's work as part of CPC has served to strengthen the IMT mechanism overall, including its information gathering capacity, its field-level visibility, and by extension, its legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. At the same time, IMT component's and partner capacities remain uneven.** NP has invested over the past two years, in the coordination among Components, as well as CPC partners (through regular meetings, and joint activities wherever possible). It has also supported the standardisation of working and reporting procedures of the CPC, for example guidelines and templates used for CPC.

At the same time, NP 'pulling a lot of weight' in the IMT-CPC, has perhaps indirectly affected the standing and reach of some of the other local partners: their capacities being less to begin with, they have not been able to catch up with NP's levels of involvement, comparative logistical capacity, proactive engagement, and what many have commented on as 'professional' approach to civilian protection. So, while NP has made efforts to capacitate the other CPC partners, its hands-on work shows up their relative weaknesses to other stakeholders, leaving them comparatively 'behind' NP. This is a 'dilemma' between, on the one hand, striving to work to protect civilians, and making the CPC effective, through NP's own direct engagement; and on the other hand, building capacity of indigenous groups to do this work themselves. It is a balance that will remain delicate, and should change more towards supporting the latter over time.

- > **The impact of NP's information flows to the IMT at the level of political decision-making is dependent on the IMT's own capacity, and willingness, to process sensitive information and pass it on to the peace panels.** These

are seen as limited by outside observers. Whether, and to what extent, information from NP's own monitoring work is adequately aggregated and passed on to the peace panels lies in the hands of the CPC Secretariat, and ultimately, the IMT Head of Mission. While NP maintains strong and collegial relationships with both, political considerations may interfere and limit the effective circulation, especially of sensitive information. These political dynamics lie outside of NP's direct sphere of influence. Impacting on them requires outside advocacy pressure, e.g. regarding how the IMT deals with HR and IHL issues vis-à-vis the peace panels. The NGOs forming part of the mechanism may not be well placed to play this role, because of their own need to maintain access and safeguard their monitoring function. This is a systemic challenge in the IMT set-up that needs to be addressed in the project's assumptions and risks.

- > **Keeping the ceasefire in place, and maintaining '0 incidents' since early 2012, has been one important factor in keeping the political momentum going behind the peace process, and building confidence between the GPH and MILF.** NP's work has been one piece of the puzzle that has contributed to this collective success. Across all levels of peacemaking and peacebuilding, it is difficult, and indeed misleading, to try to isolate one particular actor's intervention as the decisive factor causing peace. This is especially true for the highest level of peace negotiations, affected and influenced by so many actors and dynamics. Yet, it is also possible to identify the whole tapestry of contributions that brought a peace process to the point of reaching an agreement. This was evidenced by President Aquino's speech at the signing ceremony of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which included a long list of acknowledgements of the multitudes of actors working at different levels for years that led to the signing of the CAB – among them also the members of the CPC. While this is not an indicator of impact per se, it is an indication of how key conflict parties perceive the CPC's, and NP's, relevance and contribution.
- > **Perhaps a more intangible and indirect, but in our view significant, impact is the innovation in international third party peace process support that the IMT-CPC represents, and to which NP has contributed.** It is innovative in its set-up and functioning, being hybrid in multiple respects: <sup>32</sup> civil-military; governmental-non-governmental; local-international. Like the International Contact Group on Mindanao,<sup>33</sup> this mechanism is a novel and creative example of peace process support that can serve to inform similar efforts elsewhere, including what has worked, and what has not.
- > **While those interviewed attest to the impacts that NP's CPC work has had, NP has a modest approach to claiming impacts, and often does not clearly communicate the impacts its work has achieved.** NP can improve its internal system to track and monitor, not just activities and outputs, but various types of impacts from its work. While NP's CPC programme log frame contains a set of indicators, it is not clear how these are being used for this purpose. Tracking impacts more systematically requires an overall systematisation of the UCP approach, how it works, what it can achieve, and what global and context-specific indicators are.
- > **If NP wants to make a broader impact on its stated aim to promote Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping as a method, in-country as well as globally, then it**

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<sup>32</sup> We are grateful to Kristian Herbolzheimer from CR for this observation.

<sup>33</sup> For details see for example <http://www.c-r.org/featured-work/international-contact-group-mindanao>

**needs to scale up its efforts to systematise knowledge gathering, build theory, and disseminate UCP-related knowledge and advocacy products:** globally, NP's presentation of the theoretical and knowledge underpinnings of UCP are fairly weak, limited to a few articles on its website, and annual reports. If it does indeed want to make a more tangible impact on the global uptake of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping, then it needs scale up its efforts, including a systematic policy advocacy strategy, more systematic case study research, writing, dissemination, and promotion of the approach via different media.

#### 8.4. Sustainability

- > **NP has focused its sustainability efforts mainly at capacitating individuals at the grassroots levels and from among local partners to carry out Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping tasks.** Together with local partners, it maintains networks of monitors that continue to function on a voluntary basis, with the volunteers engaging because they perceive the benefits for their communities. The ratio of individuals trained versus volunteers continuing as part of EWER networks is around one continuing out of every three trained. This can be regarded as a sustainable level given local monitors are not remunerated.
- > **NP is appreciated as a flexible and reliable partner by its local partner organisations, one that has supported them in scaling up their work for civilian protection.** Several local partners have commented positively on NP's partnering style, its staff's reliability and courtesy, and availability for help as and when needed. Through NP's 'referral' approach – i.e. connecting local partners to other organisations, as well as governmental line agencies – some partners have also built new partnerships with other international organisations, such as UN agencies; or been able to access new sources of funding (such as EU funding in the case of MOGOP for example). This diversification and expansion of local partners' networks can serve to build the stability, and sustainability, of local organisations in a context where they otherwise struggle to survive beyond a few years.
- > **At the same time, local partner organisations need more systematic organisational development and fundraising support to sustain their operations in future – a type of support that is not the 'core business' of NP.** Several partners have commented that they would appreciate more formalised relationships with NP (for example, through agreed Memorandums of Understanding), stronger fundraising support, or indeed a funding relationship with NP. While this does not lie within NP's remit, NP could use its effective 'referral' approach to connect local partners with international funding and capacity-building opportunities, such as funding organisations focusing on local organisations; or volunteer organisations that support organisational development, for example Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO).
- > **When it comes to the sustainability of civilian protection awareness, NP's work with the military 'arms' of the two parties means the knowledge transferred will remain institutionalised, as those trained usually move around within the institutions.** Issues of human rights, humanitarian law and civilian protection have become more entrenched on the agendas of the two conflict parties during the course of the peace process. This has been the cumulative effect of outside advocacy by non-governmental organisations; third party monitoring; and capacity-building on compliance with international standards. NP's work as part of CPC has made a clear contribution to this



collective effort, with several respondents from AFP and MILF commenting on awareness-raising and training from NP as beneficial to troops, and having affected the behaviour of armed actors in the field.

- > **NP's aspiration is to make the Early Warning and Early Response aspects of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping more sustainable by ultimately linking the existing local monitoring networks to responsible governmental line agencies.** NP has taken steps towards this, for example seeking to involve increasingly the ARMM Regional Human Rights Commission and LGUs in its orientation programmes whenever possible. However low institutional capacity in these agencies to begin with has meant that these efforts to date have had limited effect. Really 'handing over' local monitoring and response structures to line agencies may take several years still, as the new Bangsamoro entity will have to first of all create and build its own new institutions before they can absorb these tasks. NP can in the interim continue to advocate for inclusion of UCP, and civilian protection issues in particular.

## 9. Recommendations

Some of the recommendations emerging from our evaluation are focused directly at NP's work in Mindanao; while others are broader and apply to NP globally. We are listing these here separately:

### 9.1. Specific to NP in Mindanao

1. **Develop an internal strategic plan for the upcoming transition period (until the end of 2016) that sets out likely scenarios, milestones and challenges in the process, and how NP considers responding.** This can help guide NP in deciding which newly emerging needs in the Mindanao peace process it will consider supporting, and which lie outside its core mandate of promoting and implementing UCP. It can also help the organisation fundraise in the short-term as new funding streams are likely to come online to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro.
2. **Build on your three 'core strengths' of field-level presence; extensive multi-track networks; and UCP methodology, to deepen and widen NP work in the coming transition period.** There is a real risk that NP becomes a 'victim of its own success' and gets pulled into new areas of work that do not speak to its core strengths and mandate, simply because it has presence, and is accepted and requested by local actors to do so. We recommend convening NP managers to develop a set of criteria and targets for developing new areas of work that speak to its core strengths.
3. **As new requirements emerge for the implementation of the CAB in the transition period, build on the CPC experience to consider whether and how UCP can be integrated into new, peace-process related initiatives:** this includes the decommissioning of MILF combatants; the training of a future Bangsamoro police force; the elections scheduled for 2016; and the work of the Third Party Monitoring Team, tasked with monitoring the implementation of the CAB. This is not to say that NP should venture into all these areas of work; but that it should assess their potential as 'vehicles' for Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping methods.

4. **Consider a collective, internal lesson-learning exercise among the four NGOs that together form the CPC:** coordination and operational relationships between the four organisations have not always been smooth sailing, despite NP and others' efforts. This has been for a number of reasons coming together: donor requirements, financial management problems in some of the partner organisations, and personality issues. The fact that two of the CPC organisations are currently financially and capacity-wise in a more difficult place than they were when they first joined CPC raises a collective responsibility to look at what enables, and what disables, NGO institutional capacities in the Philippines for civilian protection. This is part of NP's core mandate. If carefully facilitated, a joint lesson learning process can encourage joint reflection; mend and strengthen relationships; and also lead to the formulation of collective advocacy messages to donors for more sensitive funding relations that support and protect capacities built.
5. **Articulate your criteria for exit.** While there is broad agreement among those interviewed in Mindanao that NP's work there should continue, at least until the signing of the exit agreement by the GPH and MILF, the criteria and conditions for NP's exit remain vague: local partner opinions vary from 'until communities feel safe' to 'until we have a true culture of peace in Mindanao.' Exit should be linked clearly to three main factors: continuing need; existing capacity; and likelihood that existing initiatives nurtured by NP will endure. Exit can happen in stages, as need decreases and capacities hopefully become more institutionalised: NP could for example consider, beyond the 2016 'milestone', to reduce its field presence if no longer necessary, and maintain a core staff with expertise in UCP and organisational development and capacity-building support to partners.
6. **In the next phase of NP's work in Mindanao, begin to focus more attention on institutionalisation and organisational capacity development for civilian protection and EWER.** For the moment, an important added value of NP for Mindanaoan stakeholders is its active field-level presence, from international and national staff. While this likely will continue at least until the elections in 2016, part of NP's longer-term exist strategy has to be that it shifts focus from operational UCP 'delivery' to gradually handing over its field presence to the relevant partners and institutions. This will be slow, and sensitive. It will also require a shift in NP's working methods from UCP operations to organisational capacity-building; policy advice; coaching; and better resourced accompaniment of local organisations and institutions. This should be reflected in its upcoming project proposals; and also the profiles of staff and managers it should seek to recruit in the near future.
7. **Draw more value from your mission preparedness training for incoming international staff for outreach, profiling, and funding for NP:** currently, up to ten-day trainings including introduction to UCP and NP approach, simulation, field exposure, and simulations and exercises, are run by NP and NP trainers often for small batches of incoming international staff. The programme could draw more benefits from these detailed and well developed trainings by opening (at least parts) of them up to international community participants against a set training fee. There is a market for staff of international organisations, including embassies, based in Davao and Manila, that support the peace process in different ways, often by channelling funding, but who lack the field-level exposure to peace and conflict dynamics that NP has. This is an opportunity for NP to

profile its work; expand and maintain its networks; and develop a new source of funding that can bring a small, core funding stream into the organisation.

8. **Strengthen day-to-day guidance and trouble-shooting support from the main office to field site staff.** Field site staff are extremely competent and committed; they also appreciate that they work as part of a 'bigger whole' and want to ensure consistency in their plans and day-to-day work with a country-wide strategy. They are sometimes confronted with delicate decisions about NP principles and strategy that may require more senior-level back-up. In the upcoming team retreat, discuss with field site managers what types of guidance and trouble-shooting support from main office would best serve their needs, taking into account limited human resources in main office of course. Without limiting field sites' room for manoeuvre, discuss also what types of decision-making may require clearing or running past main office (for example of sharing of sensitive information, or meetings held with individual stakeholders).
9. **Standardise your use of specific approaches in UCP, such as conflict-sensitivity, or integration of a gender lens.** Based on NP's already existing experiences and analytical tools, come up with a more standardised approach to conflict analysis, and gender-sensitivity, that can guide NP's work across the whole programme, and eventually, globally.
10. **Management should insist on staff adhering to existing R&R policies as much as possible, even where staff feel they can 'stretch' themselves and cope with stress and pressure.** While the evaluation team did not come across any cases, it is clear that the commitment and work environment of the NP team means overstressing in an often pressured environment is likely. Burn out is slow and cumulative, and is usually spotted too late. It is not just a matter of due diligence towards individual staff, but also important for overall team performance and morale, that management keeps a careful eye on this. This includes management itself 'modelling good behaviour' – ie taking R&R required, keeping to fairly humane working hours and so on.
11. **Strengthen your senior-level strategic outreach to key international and national policy stakeholders in Manila to share more information about NP's methodology, results and experiences.** This includes the diplomatic community, relevant line ministries at the Manila level, international NGOs active in peace process support, and relevant international organisations present. NP does of course share information, for example through reporting to donors, or participating in relevant coordination meetings in Manila. It could however further enhance its profile, and as a result stakeholder buy-in, through more regular sharing of information and experiences at senior levels, for example through diplomatic briefings. This would further demonstrate to the donor and policy community the added value of maintaining close links with, and funding, an international NGO that has such strong community-level presence in Mindanao.

## 9.2. Organisation-wide

12. **Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping is a very specific 'niche' in international peace work, which in itself is a relatively young and evolving field. Start to systematise the 'NP approach' by developing a UCP 'programming framework' that sets out the why, what, and how of NP's work in this area,**

**based on in-country experiences.**<sup>34</sup> This will help guide new programme design; and monitoring and improvements in existing programmes. It can help introduce UCP to new staff and teams. It can also help the organisation with approaching evaluations and impact tracking more systematically, for example by developing a set of 'standardised' impact indicators that can be adapted to different contexts. Prospective donors will be able to better assess the merits of UCP, and understand what it is they are supporting financially, and why.

13. Experienced, capable and loyal staff are the cornerstone of NP's operations, in the Philippines and elsewhere. The organisation relies on staff from one programme 'fertilising' new country programmes, and moving through the ranks quickly to take on demanding organisational and managerial responsibilities in challenging circumstances. Staff satisfaction and retention is therefore key to NP's performance and success. NP in the Philippines has experienced high staff turnover, partly due to shortcomings in hiring, and partly due to new staff's ability to work in difficult circumstances. High-quality staff are often attracted by higher salaries and career prospects elsewhere. If NP wants to scale up its work and benefit from the considerable investments it makes in identifying and hiring new staff, it needs to hire in a more targeted way, and support existing staff in a way that increases job satisfaction. **Consider carrying out a staff survey across the whole organisation to help identify what constitutes staff satisfaction at NP, both for international and local staff, what are obstacles, and what the organisation can do to retain senior staff to enable growth while ensuring quality in its work.**

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<sup>34</sup> By way of example, see International Alert's Programming Framework that presents how the organisation understands peacebuilding, and how it seeks to work on it. This has been an important 'sales pitch' document also in its dealings with prospective donors. See International Alert (2010) *International Alert Programming Framework: Design, Monitoring and Evaluation*. (London, UK: International Alert).

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## About the evaluation team

### Canan Gündüz, mediatEUr

Canan Gündüz joined the mediatEUr team in 2011. She is a board member and partner since 2012, and acted as CEO in 2013-2014. Canan is a qualified mediator, and brings a background of institutional advisory work to private and public sector clients on policies and operations in conflict-affected countries; as well as peacebuilding work in South- and South-East Asia.

Canan has worked on research, knowledge management and lesson-learning from peacebuilding interventions for a decade, including publications based on qualitative case study research, and design and analysis of quantitative research. Examples include an evaluation of International Alert's 3-year business-led peacebuilding project in Sri Lanka, evaluated in 2009/10; and research and publication of post-conflict recovery and reintegration efforts in Nepal in 2010. In 2011/2012, Canan helped to launch and pilot mediatEUr's series "Debriefing EU Mediators", including design of methodology; debriefings, and writing and publication of three debriefing reports. Most recently, Canan led on the collaboration with the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) to produce two case study reports on its work in South Sudan and Burundi; and a lessons-learnt report on NIMD's work in post-conflict contexts.

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### Raul Torralba, IID

Raul has worked for more than 20 years in Mindanao on development projects and programming, both in the not-for profit and private sectors. For a decade, he has worked on designing, implementing and managing monitoring and evaluation projects, including for Cordaid and Christian Aid.

Recent relevant assignments that Raul has carried out include, among others, acting as external evaluator for Interface Development Initiatives (IDIS) Strategic Plan Implementation (2011); external evaluator for PARTS-Inc. (NC-IUCN) project on Capability Building towards Ecological Conservation and Preservation of Murcielagos Bay Ecosystem. (2010); Team Leader for the AADC-commissioned Mindanao Poverty Study (2010); and external evaluator of the Satellite Development Approach (Sarangani Province) concept of the Peace and Equity Foundation, Inc. (2009).



Raul joined IID in 2012, initially to lead a research project commissioned by the EU on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Status in Conflict-Affected Areas in Muslim Mindanao. His day-to-day work includes regular field research across Mindanao; and design and implementation of both quantitative and qualitative research. Raul now leads IID's knowledge management programme, where he is responsible for the planning, generation and dissemination of IID's education, and learning among its local and international channels and networks.

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## Annex I – Evaluation Schedule

Timeline	Activities
<b>March 3-14, 2014</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; ToR review and planning meetings, skype calls with NP</li> <li>&gt; Desk-based review of NP project documents</li> <li>&gt; Drafting of inception report and evaluation methodology</li> </ul>
<b>March 17 – 21, 2014</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Travel to Davao, mediatEUr and IID field visit planning</li> <li>&gt; Davao meeting evaluation team and NP Country Director for finalisation of schedule and logistics</li> <li>&gt; Receipt of feedback from NP on draft evaluation methodology, submission of final inception report and evaluation methodology</li> </ul>
<b>March 24-25, 2014</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Stakeholder interviews and FGDs in Cotabato City, with IMT, CCH, NP staff, and local partners</li> </ul>
<b>March 26-27, 2014</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Field visit NP Field Site Datu Piang, Maguindanao</li> <li>&gt; Participant observation during relief distribution monitoring activity</li> <li>&gt; Interviews, FGDs with local partner organisations, NP field site staff</li> </ul>
<b>March 28-29, 2014</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Field visit NP Field Site Pikit, North Cotabato</li> <li>&gt; Interviews, FGDs with local partner organisations, NP field site staff, peace structures, community representatives, AFP, PNP, MILF</li> </ul>
<b>March 30 – 31, 2014</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Field visit NP satellite office General Santos</li> <li>&gt; Interviews, FGDs with local partner organisations, NP field site staff, peace structures, community</li> </ul>
<b>April 1, 2014</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Travel to Field Site Iligan, Lanao del Norte</li> </ul>
<b>April 2-3, 2014</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Field visit NP Field Site Iligan, Lanao del Norte</li> <li>&gt; Interviews, FGDs with local partner organisations, NP field site staff, peace structures, community</li> </ul>
<b>April 4, 2014</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Debriefing meeting with NP Country Director and CPC Manager in Cotabato City</li> <li>&gt; Return of evaluation team to Davao</li> </ul>

## Separate Annex II – Terms of Reference

## Separate Annex III – Evaluation Inception Report