



Good Practices in Nonviolent, Unarmed, Civilian to Civilian Protection

Summary of the Documentation of the Workshop in
Manila, 7-9 December, 2017

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Abstract

This paper summarizes the important discussions, issues and findings of the Workshop with the title “Good Practices in Nonviolent, Unarmed, Civilian to Civilian Protection” that Nonviolent Peaceforce organized in Manila, 7-9 December, 2017.

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The full documentation is available online under: www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org

Nonviolent Peaceforce

Summary of the Documentation of Workshop on Good Practices in Nonviolent, Unarmed, Civilian to Civilian Protection; 7-9 December, 2017 in Manila

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Good Practices in Unarmed Civilian Protection

Forced displacement has reached a record high with more people than any time since WW II, forced to flee from their homes in order to avoid harm and to save their own lives. The UN High Commission on Refugees reported that by mid-2016, one in 113 people in the world were displaced and in need of protection. The impact of this level of ongoing violence and destruction is international and multigenerational, spanning the spectrum from physical harm to economic costs that are in the trillions. The collective global community is failing to prevent violent conflict and to adequately effect protection for civilians who are impacted by it. At the highest level of decision-making, the use of military forces continues to be the privileged choice for protection, despite the increasing evidence that suggests it is of limited effect. There is an imperative to explore, strengthen and increase additional approaches for protecting civilians. The majority of protection needs are more effectively met by civilian engagement, as shown by a growing number of examples. One database identifies 41 organizations that since 1990 were or still are conducting Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) in 23 countries.¹

Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP)², sometimes also called civilian peacekeeping or protective accompaniment, is the practice of deploying specially trained unarmed civilians before, during, or after violent conflict in order to prevent or reduce violence, to provide direct physical protection to civilian populations under threat, and to strengthen or build resilient local peace infrastructures. Though the focus is on “civilians,” at least one organization active in this field of UCP, the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, also protects soldiers in situations when they are entitled to be protected as described in International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

UCP is an emerging practice, used by at least twenty nongovernmental organizations at this time. UCP has gained recognition at the United Nations as a valuable method for protecting civilians and contributing to sustainable peace. As a relatively new practice, there is an urgent need to research and document the experiences of organizations on the ground in the last decades, in order to articulate proven, effective strategies methods. These effective practices will be used to improve the work of existing groups, encourage new groups to practice UCP and inform policy for the protection of civilians, prevent violence, support local initiatives and sustain peace.

¹ See <http://selkirk.ca/mir-centre-for-peace/unarmed-civilian-peacekeeping-database>

² Unarmed civilian protection (UCP) is the practice of deploying specially trained unarmed civilians before, during, or after violent conflict in order to prevent or reduce violence, to provide direct physical protection to civilian populations under threat, and to strengthen or build resilient local peace infrastructures.

The Good Practice Process

This report documents the workshop: “Good Practices in Nonviolent, Unarmed, Civilian to Civilian Protection,” sponsored by the Australian International Development Fund Direct Aid Program, held in Manila between the 7th and 9th of December, 2017.

The workshop follows up on stage one of the good practices process, a case studies research project which concluded in 2016. It was one element in a four-stage good practices process the INGO Nonviolent Peaceforce has started in order to improve and expand UCP, and to influence policy for protecting civilians, preventing violence, supporting local initiatives and sustaining peace. The process is being carried out in four stages:

1. Conduct **case studies** in four areas of the world where UCP is being practiced: South Sudan, Colombia, the Philippines (Mindanao) and Israel/Palestine. The researchers reviewed the work of more than twenty local and international organizations, and identified and described 77 UCP good practices. Their findings were published in the book "Wielding Nonviolence in the Midst of Violence,"³ edited by Ellen Furnari, who also conducted two of the field studies herself (completed May 2016).
2. Convene five facilitated **consultation groups** on a regional basis made up of UCP practitioners, field partners, beneficiaries and academics for three-day sessions to review their work, analyze findings of stage one and validate good practices and emerging themes as well as identify dilemmas or challenges raised but not answered by the cases.
3. Assemble the first UCP Good Practices **conference** convening practitioners, field partners, beneficiaries, policy makers and academics to discuss the findings of the case studies and consultation groups, and, validate UCP good practices that can be scaled up and replicated. Participants will define ways that these findings can be used to improve the work of current UCP organizations, scale up UCP and influence public policy. The organizations currently practicing UCP have never all met. The conference will also help to establish an international UCP network.
4. **Publish, disseminate and evaluate** findings. After the good practices are identified, analyzed and validated in stages 1-3, they will be disseminated to all of the organizations currently practicing UCP for integration into training materials. Findings will also be presented to potential new practitioners, policy makers and funders including the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Department of Political Affairs, UN Friends of Protection of Civilians, regional organizations including ASEAN, the African Union and the European Union; the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and civil society networks like the West African Network for Peace Building, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, the Alliance for Peacebuilding, Frontline Defenders and War Resisters International.

³ Furnari, Ellen (2016): *Wielding Nonviolence in the Midst of Violence*, Institute for Peace Work and Nonviolent Conflict Transformation, Norderstedt: book on demand.

The Workshop

The 30 participants in the Manila workshop were practitioners from Peace Brigades International (PBI)⁴, Bantay Ceasefire (Mindanao/Philippines)⁵, Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP)⁶, ICRC, human rights activists from Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka and academics and researchers from India, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, Europe and North America.⁷ PBI earlier had projects in Indonesia (West Papua, Aceh, Flores, West Timor and Jakarta) as well as in Sri Lanka, and restarted work in Indonesia in 2014. It also has a team in Nepal. NP had a project in Sri Lanka and is currently working in Myanmar and the Philippines, as well as exploring a project in Thailand. Bantay Ceasefire is a project of several civil society organizations from Mindanao, founded to monitor the ceasefires between the Philippine army and rebel groups.

The participants of the workshop were carefully chosen for their current or previous work doing civilian to civilian protection; receiving protection from such organizations; and/or their academic research and writing on the topic. Most were interviewed before the workshop took place, to get their input on the most pressing topics to address.


The workshop was carried out through a mixture of panel presentations, in-depth group work, and plenary discussions of group findings, putting specific focus on good practices, but also on potential challenges and dilemmas of UCP work. The documentation was done on the basis of notes and tapings of the various workshops and plenary discussions. (See the agenda in the appendix.)

The workshop started with an introductory plenary which ended with participants given the task to mark on a “wheel of UCP practices” developed by Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP), which activities they were involved in and what practices they would like to learn more about. A panel discussion about principles of UCP/accompaniment – principles including points like nonviolence and impartiality followed.

The lunch break was seasoned with three presentations by scholars and activists from Thailand, India and Sri Lanka on the current political and conflict-related situation in South and Southeast Asia.

After the lunch break the participants broke into the first of five rounds of working groups. The first round (A) was about sharing personal stories of UCP related experiences.

The following rounds of working groups, over two days, addressed different topics, and were introduced with a list of questions to guide the discussion. After each round of the working groups, participants came together again to share the results. Topics of these working groups



4 <https://www.peacebrigades.org/>

5 <http://www.eprpinformation.org/files/peaceprocesses/ceasefires/What-is-Bantay-Ceasefire.pdf>

6 <https://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org>

7 See the list of participants at the end of this documentation (6.2).

were:

- Good/effective practice when starting new projects, expanding into new areas, or other beginnings
- Good/effective accompaniment/UCP practice in the current and changing South and Southeast Asian context and shrinking space
- In practice, how does accompaniment/UCP relate to stages and programming of peace making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding?
- Accompaniment/UCP strategies of deterrence and encouragement
- Early warning/early response and rumor control
- Advocacy/communication
- Ceasefire monitoring
- Capacity building
- Protective accompaniment of human rights defenders and journalists
- Staff/volunteers of local NGOs and CSOs – What is good practice in local organizations protecting other local civilians
- Managing security for staff/volunteers and those accompanied
- Sustainability and exiting
- UCP and active nonviolence outside armed conflict
- Dealing with violent extremism

The workshop ended with a final plenary where participants were asked to name good practices they had found of particular importance. Once the list was created, everybody was asked to mark those three s/he thought were the most important, and mark all those s/he may not agree with or felt warranted more discussion. A few of these were then discussed, before the close of the workshop.

The Outcomes

The participants of the workshop formulated a number of lessons and good practices which can be read in the appendix (1). As to the 77 general good practices that Ellen Furnari has extracted from the field studies in “Wielding Nonviolence,” a large part of them have been implicitly or explicitly confirmed in the workshop.

Key Themes and Good Practices

The workshop looked at various issues and themes. It sought to relate Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) to the strategies of peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peacemaking. It discussed the various challenges local and international civil society face in regard to what often has been described as “shrinking space.” And it explored the challenges that have arisen from having to deal with violent extremist groups that undermine or act outside of peace agreements.

There were many “good practices” suggested in the various groups, and described in the documentation. The following themes and issues were most important:

1. A main focus and recurrent subject of the workshop was on **relationship-building with all actors** in the conflicts, seeking the common humanity in all interlocutors. This was considered to be of the utmost importance with many experiences and examples shared.

Limitations to such relationship building were considered to be more imposed from the outside (e.g. government or donors) than being inherent in the nature of conflict parties.

2. The group considered a strict categorical distinction between the **strategies of 'encouragement' and 'deterrence'** to be faulty, because there is always an element of deterrence present even if the emphasis lies on the strategy of encouragement. A participant noted that "we cannot choose between deterrence and encouragement as one better than the other. We need to be strategic and contextual."
3. Another main theme was the **complex relationships between local and international actors**. Many observations and thoughtful evidence were collected regarding the comparison and relationship between local and international groups – access to conflict parties, deterrent power, knowledge of backgrounds and contexts, different SOPs relating to security, etc. It became clear that there are a number of local CSOs (and even individual HRDs) who accompany threatened individuals, groups or whole communities. Local CSOs monitor ceasefires, violence before and during elections, etc. The relationship between local and international NGOs (where they are present) is complex. There is a mutual accompaniment relationship – internationals accompanying locals and vice versa, often simultaneously. "Protection" does not flow only one direction – often locals with their standing in their communities are as much protection to internationals as internationals with their status as foreigners can give to locals. This happens notwithstanding the fact that many local organizations – at least in the cases discussed in Manila - are not nonpartisan in regard to the conflict issues, though they maintain their independence from the armed actors.
4. As to the framework in which UCP happens, a newer thesis put forward by some of the participants was that **UCP is useful and contributes to peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building** rather than belonging to peacekeeping.

For a few observations and lessons formulated in "Wielding Nonviolence," it turned out that more differentiation is needed:

5. The **principle of nonviolence turned out not to be as generally shared** as the researchers of "Wielding Nonviolence" had assumed. Neither the ICRC nor the local groups identified fully with the concept. However, all shared being unarmed and pursuing a non-confrontational approach in their work. But not all organizations and actors would claim that they would never condone violence.

Secondly, nonviolence seems to be a principle that translates into rather varied prescriptions for action – for the organizations in the Manila workshop mostly in terms of connecting with, talking to and working with all sides of the conflict.

Thirdly, organizations have different understandings of what nonviolence means for their own organizational structure and practices.

Fourthly, in some places the term may be connected to certain political (or religious) affiliations – the example given in the workshop was that in the Philippines nonviolence is identified with the party of the Social Democrats.

6. As to the **principle of primacy of local actors**, the concern came up repeatedly that this principle may be too general, given the plethora of local actors in any given conflict and the

need to choose the 'right' groups to work with. Additionally, it was pointed out that in some contexts internationals need to take the initiative to act to protect, in a sense becoming 'primary.'

7. As to the question of '**what violence?**' the focus of the organizations assembled in the workshop was on political violence, but there was also evidence that especially the local groups also deal with other kinds of violence, may it be feuds between clans (ridos) in Mindanao or domestic violence. It was pointed out that such other kinds of violence should not be neglected, because they are equally threatening to the individuals, and also often carry the risk of escalation into larger violence. The question was asked if encouragement strategies would work in cases of criminal gangs, or when international companies are the perpetrators. It was assumed that it probably would but there were no examples to base this on.

Key Challenges

The workshop provided an opportunity to further explore observations and lessons formulated in the aforementioned publication, "Wielding Nonviolence in the Midst of Violence." It turned out that more differentiation regarding some of the findings of that study is needed. This referred especially to the principles of nonviolence and primacy of local actors as discussed above, as well as to some of the challenges listed below.

In addition to the issue of principles, the main challenges for UCP that were discussed included:

1. **Prevention:** Much of what is done in the field happens when there is already major violence, and tactics are more often reactive than proactive.
2. **Nonpartisanship** is a general challenge for local groups, and sometimes also for international ones. The local organizations in the workshop all said that they considered themselves to be independent of the other actors in the conflict, but not nonpartisan regarding the conflict issues.
3. **Shrinking space:** There are increased risks for civil society actors in many Asian countries, for both local and international organizations.
4. Another issue discussed repeatedly was the **double-sidedness of having good relationships or a formal status with the government of the respective country** where the UCP group works. On the one hand, as the examples of NP in the Philippines and Myanmar showed, such status can help enormously in carrying out protection tasks. On the other hand, these relationships often come with restrictions, for example not working with certain groups that are identified as "terrorists", or in the case of Myanmar the need to change the approach when the government started to change its policy. A concern was also shared that being too closely identified with the government might challenge the perception of being nonpartisan.
5. A challenge remains how UCP can best work when violence against civilians is perpetrated by groups labeled as '**extremists**'. Several groups mentioned this issue, and in the end an extra group was organized to delve deeper into the topic. The participants of the workshop agreed that the principles of UCP require treating groups labeled extremists or terrorists the same way as all other armed actors, but practically the access is often limited. For example, NP's

membership in the International Monitoring Team in Mindanao stops it from engaging with Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, in spite of NP's wish to communicate with everyone. It was also pointed out that some of these groups may have less or no interest in connecting.

Strengthening UCP

One outcome of the workshop was suggestions for both subject matter focus and process suggestions to further enhance the good practices process. Participants expressed a number of ideas including:

1. Increased exchange and learning between UCP stakeholders;
2. Incorporating regional approaches in violence prevention, civilian protection strategies and response planning;
3. Sharing failures in addition to successes to improve "lessons learned" process;
4. Moving beyond project and/or program thinking with defined end dates and towards the inculcation of UCP into local, national and regional planning, similar to natural disaster planning;
5. Applying UCP in violent conflict that falls outside of that defined by international humanitarian law.

Recommendations For Future Workshops

1. Strategies to deal with extremist groups, criminal gangs and cases when international companies are the perpetrators.
2. The question of "horizontal conflicts" and of prevention.
3. How can UCP be used to prevent violent conflict?
4. Are international groups changing how they structure their work in order to avoid being pushed out of the country, and what are the implications of this? Which "red lines" should not be crossed in these new contexts?
5. Gender-related issues and the protection of LGBTQ people need to be given more attention and further explored.
6. The contradiction of UCP organizations that claim nonviolence as their principle but rely on police force, armed private security or sometimes even (legitimate) military force needs further attention.
7. Protection "from afar," without being on the ground.
8. One good practice named in "Wielding Nonviolence" was to "support nonviolent resistance movements", and it says that "some CSOs might consider their work as nonviolent resistance, but not explicitly discussed". (p 273) This may need some modification: The local CSOs present in the workshop made it clear that they are not impartial in regard to the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination, but nobody called it a nonviolent struggle. However, the rapporteur asks herself if this should be considered a good practice for UCP at all since it seems to contradict the principle of nonpartisanship. It would be good if this was explored further.

9. Another question is in regard to “provide aid” as a good practice (Wielding Nonviolence, p.275). In the workshop, it was mentioned that it was important for an international UCP organization not to be seen as delivering aid but just accompanying those who delivered it. Also the local participants did not indicate that they considered their provision of aid as part of their UCP activities.

Appendices

1. Summary of Good Practices

Countering Shrinking Space of Civil Society

Strengthening regional support, and facilitating projects and organizations learning from each other, are measures to counter shrinking space. (2.2)

People are often being labeled in public – for example as being a “Maoist” or an “extremist.” While this is difficult to counter at the national level, at local levels certain negative labels may not be that influential because people can relate to each other as neighbors, etc. Therefore approaches on a local level may work better than at national level. (3.1)

Learning from Each Other

Strengthening regional support and facilitating projects and organizations to learn from each other generally helps to build good practice. This may include mutual field visits, regional gatherings and networks of human right defenders (HRD) that may also serve to find safe places abroad if a HRD’s life and freedom are endangered. (2.2)

Moving staff from one UCP project to another is a good way of learning from each other. (2.2)

Develop regional ASEAN-wide approaches. (4.1)

Use of Principles

While it is important to have principles, they have to be evaluated and adapted. Evaluation and adaption of principles goes hand in hand with growing experience, changing circumstances and new challenges. (2.4)

Creativity is important because organizations often have to deal with the unexpected. Not everything can be planned, neither in the case of emergencies nor in entering and building new relationships. (5.1)

An evaluation and development of principles is important. (5.1)

When referring to principles, a tone of moral superiority should be avoided. (5.1)

Encouragement and Deterrence

Seeking interaction and building relationships with all actors in a conflict is a key strategy of UCP. (several groups)

If there is reporting on violations, make sure to give feedback to all sides involved in the conflict. (several groups)

The physical presence of UCP staff or volunteers may deter violence, but it works better if there has been relationship-building beforehand. (3.6)

In seeking contact and communication with all armed groups, labels (like “terrorists”) should be avoided. Such labels must not be allowed to prevent communication. (3.8)

Encouragement and deterrence are not two strategies that contradict each other, rather they are a choice guided by strategy and context. (3.1)

Even if the emphasis is on encouragement, there may still be an element of deterrence. (3.1)

At least one working group stated categorically, “We do not name and shame” (3.3) – however, this may need more exploration.

Advocacy

In communications, be it in the field or in advocacy with high-level stakeholders, it is important to find the right language. This often means using varying terminology depending on the different audiences or target groups. (2.1, 3.3)

Advocacy within a country where UCP is practiced is often better done by national/local groups than by internationals. (3.1)

It is important to identify the messenger (and the message) in terms of credibility, trust and sustainability, i.e. to distinguish between political and humanitarian messages, and if short- and long-term responses are being sought. (3.3)

The best advocacy generally (in the field and at high level) is happening when there is a human-based close network with face to face communication, rather than relying on social media or other forms of communication. (3.3)

The best voice is the voice of practitioners and beneficiaries, because their experience lends them credibility. (3.3)

Protective Accompaniment

Protective accompaniment is carried out effectively by locals as well as internationals. Both have their strengths and weaknesses. (3.6, 3.8)

Protective accompaniment requires careful all-around analysis before beginning. (3.6)

Beneficiaries of protective accompaniment usually are under threat because they are working politically – it must not be expected that they adhere to the same set of principles (impartiality for example) as the UCP organizations. However, a line is drawn where these beneficiaries are involved in violent struggle, some organizations or projects draw the line already where the groups are involved in activities considered illegal in the country they work in – for example civil disobedience. (3.1)

Uniforms, notifications of stakeholders, information on geographic locations, etc. prior to each accompaniment are important practices. However, in some cases they may pose more security risks. Therefore, for each case, new assessments must be done to see if standard procedures can be followed or if it needs to be adapted to maximize security and safety. (3.6)

Accompaniment needs strong and well-prepared teams. (3.6)

Gender balance in teams is important. (3.6)

Sometimes UCP staff or volunteers accompany aid convoys. When doing so, it may be advisable to be at the back end of a convoy so that people do not think the UCP organization is delivering aid. (3.1)

Sometimes, short-term accompaniers from outside UCP organizations have been used successfully when the organizations, for various reasons (risk), could not undertake accompaniment; however, their effectiveness has its limitations. (3.6)

Early Warning – Early Response(EWER)

EWER is a comprehensive approach that needs to be tailored to the specific situation. (3.2)

EWER should be built around the primacy of local actors, meaning the empowerment of communities. (3.2)

Local knowledge is important: Local people know early warning signs; UCP can help to build a plan. (3.2)

EWER needs to focus on all levels and many forms of violence, not only political violence, since they all have a potential to escalate. (3.2)

EWER is easier when certain overall mechanisms are in place, for example official ceasefire monitoring is happening. For the participation of the state in the protection of civilians, it is sometimes ideal to have the state involved, but it is important not to wait for state involvement. (3.2)

EWER could be used to respond not only to the armed conflict but also for other personal conflicts such as the crime of passion. (3.2)

EWER needs clear protocols for verification and communication, esp. in the context of the use of social media (rumors, propaganda). Social media often are used as a propaganda tool by conflicting parties. (3.2)

EWER in a community is also a form of capacity-building. (3.2)

Preparedness for potential conflict should be built the same way as early warning for natural disaster (3.2)

Protection should be built into disaster response, as civilians are often vulnerable to violence after natural disasters. (3.2)

Ceasefire monitoring

Ceasefire monitoring can be done effectively by local actors but international presence is often an important added value. (3.4)

To be effective in ceasefire monitoring, it is important to achieve acceptance, be seen as nonpartisan, and to establish good working relationship with all sides. (3.4)

In ceasefire monitoring, systematic tracking of violations and compliance, following up with all incidents that are reported, are essential. (3.4)

Communications with groups that are not part of a ceasefire process must be maintained even if they are not included in the agreements. (3.4)

Capacity Building

For capacity building (or: “enhancing”) to be effective it must be a continuous effort, starting from the beginning of a project. (3.5)

Capacity building is based on the needs of the local community. The recipients decide what kind of training they want, the UCP organization communicates what it can offer. (3.5)

Capacity building uses the knowledge, skills and experience (i.e. in conflict resolution) of the local community as the basis. (3.5, 4.3)

Target groups may be local communities as well as governmental structures and the military. It is important to be inclusive in offers of capacity building. (3.5)

Local and International UCP

The work of local and international organizations should be complementary. (3.8)

Where both internationals and nationals are involved, their relationship is a mutual one – protection does not flow in only one direction. (3.8)

Local organizations may describe themselves as independent but not nonpartisan. They are often part of the struggle (nonviolently) that is going on. (2.4, 3.8)

Both local and international groups have strengths and weaknesses: In some places INGOs have better access to authorities. In other situations, it is the locals who have better access, for example, are allowed into areas closed to internationals. INGOs also can lobby in their own countries and with their embassies. On the other hand, INGOs remain for relatively short periods (5-10 years is also short), and have a limited number of staff/volunteers (30 or 40 at maximum). Many people are excluded from protection in this way. Also INGOs are more dependent on funding.

Local organizations have more room to be proactive and develop long-term strategy. They are more independent and accountable to the people (not to donors or the protocols of agreements), and can be more flexible. They know the local context better. (3.8)

Starting new projects

Access to new places or regions to work in can be achieved through working with CSOs that are already working there, and, for example, offering a training or workshop to introduce UCP to local stakeholders. (4.1)

Stakeholders need to understand UCP. It is important to make realistic approaches and not to promise things that cannot be delivered as that will only disappoint people. (4.1)

It is important to talk to many people in making an initial assessment, but not lose a window of opportunity. (4.1)

It is important to define the theory of change and the goal from the beginning, and then find how to do it. (4.1)

An exit strategy should be defined at the outset of planning a new project (4.1)

It is important to invest in proactive strategies, and to find new approaches and tactics (for example including work in schools). (4.1)

Security

Local vs. international staff: both may enhance or reduce security. Local staff knows a lot about local circumstances and culture, but can be too confident. International staff on the other hand may increase security (through deterrence), but in other circumstances be more at risk and endanger a mission (danger of kidnapping, violation of cultural norms). (4.2)

Confidentiality and even-handedness (nonpartisanship) when dealing with armed groups are important for security. (4.2)

Trainings for staff regarding security management are crucial prior to deployment. (4.2)

Security SOPs must be followed, but they need to allow for flexibility to adapt to situations. (4.2)

Security planning needs to happen day-by-day but also needs long-term analysis and plans (for example for evacuation of staff). (4.2)

One key strategy is relationship building. Strong community relations are essential, as the

community can often be counted on to keep the teams safe by providing information, warnings, and connections. (4.2)

Security measures need to be embedded in and respect cultural norms. (4.2)

Communication relating to security issues is improved with the use of satellite phones. (4.2)

Have an exit plan: This may also refer to just leaving a region (evacuation) or a place where something happens (demonstration turning violent, for example). (4.2)

Calling people directly, not only texting, is important because it is more direct and personal. (4.2)

Exit

It is important to have contingency plans, clear goals (what you want to achieve so you can decide when to do it), and a transition plan - what to do and to consider when there is an exit. (4.3)

Exit plans should include risk management plans for staff and partner organizations. (4.3)

As to a needs analysis, there is a difference between perception of insecurity and actual events. UCP organizations need to have their own, independent analysis. (4.3)

Capacity building should be built in from the beginning and not just start when an exit is close. (4.3)

Principles of UCP

Nonviolence:

First, not all organizations and actors claimed that they would never condone violence. Second, nonviolence seems to be a principle that translates into various prescriptions for action – for the organizations in the Manila workshop mostly it meant commitment to dialogue, talking to and working with all sides of the conflict. Other aspects, such as nonviolence within the organization requires flat hierarchies and consensus decision-making, was not shared by all. And third, in some places the term may be connected to certain political (or religious) affiliations – the example given in the workshop was that in the Philippines nonviolence is identified with the party of the Social Democrats (and therefore not used or only with the adjective “active” – “active nonviolence”).

Primacy of local actors:

Sometimes it is difficult to define who the local actor is, in particular when national NGOs and/or local communities are in conflict with each other.

Talking to all sides and bringing people together is something which all organizations named as an important way of working – while knowing that some of them may have been the perpetrators of atrocities, accepting the basic humanity of all. A challenge is how to make the distinction between not condoning the acts, but still working with everyone.

Independence

Independence from directions of other organizations or governments is a principle that all organizations emphasized.

Nonpartisanship

Independent but not nonpartisan: This is how the local organizations that were present in the workshop described themselves. They also approach all parties on equal terms and as representatives of their organizations emphasize their independence from the parties of the conflict, but say that they cannot claim nonpartisanship in regard to the conflict issues, being part of the struggle that is going on.

Civilians being paramount

While all organizations describe that as a principle, only the ICRC also protects combatants in line with the prescriptions of International Humanitarian Law. This raises a question regarding the concept of civilians as being the only beneficiaries – don't combatants also have human rights and have a right to protection under the IHL? (2.4, 3.1)

Contributions to Strategic Theory

UCP belongs to all three: peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Moving towards peace is either a continuum or a nonlinear process, UCP is useful in all these dimensions, and contributes to sustainable peace. (2.1)

UCP is a tool that can be used in contexts other than armed political violence. (2.3)

UCP is a tool that can also be used in conflicts in the Global North (though not all methodologies of UCP work there, so adaptations of the methods are needed). (2.3)

Encouragement and deterrence are not two strategies that contradict each other, rather it is a choice guided by strategy and context. (2.3, 3.1)

Even if the emphasis is on encouragement, there still may be an element of deterrence. (3.1)

Challenges

General

Prevention of violence is a challenge for UCP in general, though specific strategies such as EWER and capacity building can be oriented toward prevention. (3.2, 3.5)

How, if at all, can UCP address new forms of shrinking space for HRDs? (2.2)

Relationship between international and local organizations

There is often competition over resources (money and staff) and decision making between local, national and international organizations. (3.7)

Nonpartisanship

A general challenge for local groups is nonpartisanship – both being nonpartisan which is often impossible, and to achieve acceptance by other actors. (3.8)

There is the need to differentiate between activism and UCP. Maintaining nonpartisanship when accompanying groups that pursue an agenda that is considered to be political, is important. (2.3)

Nonviolence

It may happen that armed accompaniment by military or police is enforced on UCP organizations. (4.2)

International Humanitarian Law

While UCP is rooted in IHL, there are tensions. How do organizations deal with the issue that accompaniers may witness atrocities and know the perpetrators? Is there a moral or legal obligation to report such crimes or serve as witness in (international or national) courts? (3.1)

Combatants or (former) combatants are entitled to protection in certain situations (e.g. when they surrendered or are unable to continue fighting because they were wounded), however, most UCP organizations avoid dealing with them. (3.1)

EWER

It is challenging to establish EWER when there are no ceasefire agreements, and massive fighting is going on. (3.2)

High-level systems of EWER often are too slow and fail when it comes to prevention. (3.2)

Safe zones

Safe zones/peace zones are ambiguous: In some cases they increase the safety and security, in others they have been found to be counterproductive. (3.2, 3.4)

If such zones are formally agreed and declared, it may also set military free to move to other places for fighting.

Security

It is a challenge to decide when to be open and when to protect information in communications (3.3)

Violent extremist groups

Membership in formal structures, donors or national laws may limit access to actors – for example to extremist groups (3.3, 3.8)

The access to such groups is often difficult or impossible – restrictions by third parties, groups' clandestine nature and the strong friend-foe-thinking of these groups that makes them often less interested in building relationships.

It is necessary to find shared concerns about civilian safety and protection with these armed groups. (3.8, 4.2)

Security for the UCP workers is a challenge – in the Philippines (and other places), there is a risk of kidnapping or violence against any outsiders and even some local people. (3.8)

Accompaniment

There is the danger that activists start to be dependent on accompaniment. Creation of dependency on accompaniment should be avoided but it is difficult to do so. (3.6)

Starting new projects

UCP organizations usually require an invitation in order to consider coming to a new country (principle of the primacy of local actors), but people also have to know about UCP in the first place to be able to invite. (4.1)

Organizations must be sensitive to the tension in the need to get advice from a variety of different groups without making initial contacts feel that you don't trust them. (4.1)

Finding quick and sufficient funds for new projects is often a challenge to international UCP organizations. (4.1)

Getting permission from all stakeholders (including government for work permits and visa) is often a difficulty. (4.1)

Challenges in advocacy

In academia, the frequent perspective or view is that when moving from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, there is no need for protection anymore. The experience represented in this workshop indicates this is definitely not true. (2.1)

2. Attendees

Name	Organization(s)	Country	Country (countries) they work/ have worked in with a UCP organization
Guiamel Alim	Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, Philippines	Philippines	Philippines
Pooja Ahluwalia	ICRC	Philippines	Philippines
Louisa Chan Boegli	NP	Switzerland	
Michael Bulett	PBI	UK	Indonesia, Nepal
Rungrawee Chalemsripinyorat	Australian National University	Thailand	Thailand
Pat Coy	PBI/Kent State University	USA	Sri Lanka
Andrew de Sousa	PBI	USA	Indonesia
Berit Bliesemann DeGuevara	Aberystwyth University	Germany	
Ronnie Delsy	NP	Indonesia	Philippines
Mel Duncan	NP	USA	
Tiffany Easthom	NP, PBI	Canada	Indonesia, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Lebanon
Ruki Fernando	Human Rights activist	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka
Marion Girard	NP	France	
Bente Hansen	PBI	Germany	Indonesia
Rexall Kalim	Bantay Ceasefire, NP	Philippines	Philippines
Avilesh Karn	PBI / Nepal Monitor	Nepal	Nepal
Elaysa Enalang Latiban	NP	Philippines	Philippines
Memem (Carmen) Lauzon-Gatmaytan	NP	Philippines	Philippines, Indonesia/E. Timor
Ramu Mannivanen	University of Madras, NP	India	
Bridgitt Sloan McMullen	NP	Canada	Philippines
Jeya Murugan	NP	Sri Lanka	Philippines
Yul Adolfo Olaya	Misyon Edukasyon Inisyatiba	Philippines	Philippines
Huibert Oldenhuis	NP, PBI	Netherlands	Myanmar, South Sudan, Indonesia
Romadon Panjor	Deep South Watch Thailand	Thailand	Thailand
Jan Passion	NP	USA	Sri Lanka

Ayu Diasti Rahmawati	Univ Gadjah Madah in Indonesia	Indonesia	
Christine Schweitzer	NP, IFGK, BSV	Germany	
Preetam Sengupta	NP	India	Philippines
Izzadeen Shahabdeen	Peace/human rights activist	Sri Lanka	
Seth Villaruel	Sulong CARHRIHL	Philippines	Philippines